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My first question when I entered medical school as a teacher was: "What 
shall I teach?" The answer I rece1ved was not as clear as I wanted, but wrapped 
in some (to me) mystical concepts like "medical competence" and "experience", 
the first one only to be achieved by the other. 
"Experience" could only be reached by intensive practicing for several 
years (and a lot more years thereafter). "But", as I asked myself, "when 
competence and experience are so thoro~ghly linked, is it for jtmior physicians 
a logical impossibility to reach the same degree of clinical competence as the 
more experienced doctors?" 
The training in clinical competence has not essentially changed throughout 
the centuries. Formerly, the apprentice turned to a master, a well-known example 
of his profession, a so-called expert, and received his lessons by closely 
watching the skills of his teacher. Nowadays, students go to a medical school, 
which contains a crowd of experts, where they get a basis of practical and 
impractical knowledge, and are assigned to a teacher who tells them to closely 
watch his (or her) skills and attitude. The training for these skills and 
attitudes is performed on patients placed at the students' disposal by the 
teacher. 
Measurement of the clinical competence is accomplished by making a 
comparison between the knowledge, skills and attitude of the student with those 
of his teacher (or peer-group). 
There is a growing tendency to disagree with this procedure. It does not 
e.g. take into account the teacher's competence, neither as a practitioner nor 
as a professional teacher; it assumes problem solving competences invariable 
over time; and it does not explain - nor test - the mental strategies along 
which physicians will arrive at a decision. 
However, for teaching programs and procedures, we need knowledge and 
insight into the reasoning processes of experienced (and non-experienced) 
physicians. Without this insight we may, with a famous word of Mager, "very well 
end up somewhere else, and not even know it." 
The intention of this study is to investigate the methods physicians use in 
solving the patients' problems. A myth in medicine tells us that there are as 
many methods in medicine as the world counts doctors. To make up an inventory of 
all these methods is a Sisyphean labour, appalling and discouraging most 
investigators. Disagreeing with this myth I wondered why physicians all over the 
world so easily recognize each other: problems, methods, and contexts. Can it be 
that physicians have more in common than they want to acknowledge? Moreover, 
why would physicians differ in their methods of decision-making from other 
people when placed in comparable circumstances? Although often assumed 
otherwise most physicians are normal human beings. 
If a general framework for reasoning and/or decision making processes could 
be modelled, I could investigate whether the physicians' practical clinical work 
fitted into this(ese) model(s). The theoretical framework for this study has 
been derived from the two types of scientific reasoning: deductive and inductive 
inference. These two types were rephrased into the usual medical jargon in order 
to establish congruence. 
The discovery of the exclusive use of the inductive inference strategy 
yields several consequences. The main consequences descend from the typical 
characteristics of inductivism among which are: the personal character of the 
physician's medical knowledge; the personal - and, therefore, - incomparable -
conception about several common medical items like symptoms, signs, diagnoses, 
treatments, and epidemiological estimates; the irretraceability of the mental 
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processes in medical problem-solving, and the myth of enhanced expertise with' 
increasing experience. 
It also means the questioning of medicine as it stands, medicine as it 
relies on its traditional classification of diseases; as it maintains the 
suggestions of a unified conception of diagnostic entities; as it suggests a 
joint concept of particular therapies for specific diseases. 
The study also challenges the feasibility and the possibilities of 
normative medical decision making to the routine of medical work. 
But, above all, the study pictures the physician as an ordinary human 
being, as an imperfect decision maker, "satisficing" rather than "optimizing", 
who is kept within the constraints of uncertain situations, medical ethics, and 
his personal emotions. These characteristics the physician has in common with 
many decision makers like economists, politicians, managers, and everybody 
facing situations of uncertain choices. Insight·in these processes may lead to 
an understanding and improvement of the medical problem solving and decision 
making. 
If this study could in any way contribute to this aim, it might prove to be 
of value. 
Behind the scenes two people especially contributed greatly. Without my 
wife's shrewd observation of my habitual working pattern as a general 
practitioner and her astute explanations, this study may have failed from the 
beginning. In combination with her domestic and relational sacrifices during the 
eight years of this study she really showed to be an invaluable comrade at arms. 
To Hans Geilenkirchen I owe my sincere gratitude for his assistance in the 
elaboration and ultimate completion of this study. His intriguing questions and 
his inspiring thoughts were of decisive help for the accomplishment of the task. 
I wish to thank all the participating physicians for their sincere 
co-operation, and furthermore all friends and relations who provided me with 
their valuable advice. 
I am very grateful for the financial support of the "Praeventiefonds" which 
made this investigation possible. 
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CHAPTER I 
BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION 
La preface d'un livre scientifique en est une partie nec~ssairej 
elle satisfait a cette question. Quel est cet homme qui vient me 
faire des recits? (Apres Stendahl). 
Physicians solve patients' problems. It is their duty, the goal of their 
daily work, some even speak of vocation. But how the problems are solved is 
wrapped in mystery. Some peQple call it art, others consider it as a scientific 
process. But the real questiGns essentially are: 
- do patients benefit from their doctor's advice?; and 
- do physicians lmow what they are doing? 
The first question is repeatedly stated in politics and in the press. It is 
noted that in the United States there is about the highest e1~enditure per head 
of population on health care but this country ranks about 15th among the 
healthiest nations in the world. Yet, in Japan, where so much less is spent on 
health care, there are statistics showing the highest life expectancy, the 
lowest infant mortality, and fewest deaths from heart disease. It was observed 
that the Dutch health status was higher than the Belgian, although Belgium 
counts many more physicians. 
To state this question in terms of these statistics is putting facts in a 
wrong focus. Populations are no patients; physicians treat patientsp no 
communities. 
Life expectancy and mortality rates do not satisfy personal conceptions 
about health. 
The discrepancy between the personal conception and the population's 
concept of health can be illustrated from a biological point of view. From this 
standpoint civilization implicates the same disadvantages as the domestication 
of our animals. Lack of physical exercise, inappropriate nourishment, e~d a 
number of subsequent causes led to a malfunctioning of several organs of animals 
and humans. It diminishes the individual's resistance to several diseases and 
ailments. 
In 15,000 years caries developed from zero to more than 98% of the global 
population. The second factor is the introduction of the doctor. In the 
Mesolithicum when the human race generally came to choose a fixed dwelling-place 
and started agriculture, the physician entered the scene. From that moment on 
the number of diseases increased rapidly. Causes and consequences will be left 
to your imagination. 
The physician's 
advance to the age 
natural circumstances 
animals,threatening it 
defective animals. 
interference gave the diseased people the possibility to 
of procreation and pass the disease to next generations.In 
this development would be disastrous to a herd of 
with extinction by the maintenance of larger groups of 
Biologically speaking, recovery of the patient is most favourable to the 
doctor. The morbidity of diabetes mellitus, rheumatism, epilepsy and many other 
diseases increased 5, 10, 20 and more fold in a couple of centuries. However, 
what to do about it. Maybe it is human's tragedy that doom is cast over one of 
human's best qualities, his compassion to the poor and the weak. Or in the 
famous words of Nietzsche: "An deinen Tugenden wirst du zugnmde gehen" (you' 11 
go under because of your virtues). 
This illustration typifies - in an extreme way - the contrast between the 
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health status of 
and the health 
health care) . 
a population (growing worse the more health care is applied), 
care to the individual citizen (benefiting from a superfluous 
The former item typically being the concern of politicians and 
administrators, the latter one concentrating on the pains and the sorrows, the 
well-being and the illnesses of the single human being. Both pursue the same 
goal: health, but, as we have shown~ they do not :frequently happen to coincide. 
In this study we have focused on the individual: the physician solving the 
patient's problems, which in turn is his, the physician's, problem. 
Our question, therefore, is: 
"How do physicians solve problems?", with the related questions: 
- "Do they use special methods, strategies, in order to reach a solution?"; and 
- "Can these strategies be formalized?" 
The question is often raised whether medicine is an art or a science (1, 
2). Or, in our context, whether the problems are solved in an intuitive, 
personal way, or by the sheer force of logical reasoning. Must we allude to 
Kub~'s op~n~on that medicine is a craft, like calendering and metallurgy, or do 
we have to share Braithwaite's opinion that medicine is a science because of its 
"natural domain"? 
Science is a method of acquiring exact knowledge by observation, 
experiment, and measurement leading to the formulation of a hypothesis .that will 
explain the relationship between the facts observed (3).Art, in contrast with 
science» is harder to define precisely and concisely. Like science, art is based 
on experience, but the experience is subjective, incapable of precise analysis, 
irreproducible, and impossible to measure. But whereas science is completely 
impersonal, art is intensely personal. 
From the preceding lines we may think that the physician, generally, is 
more attracted to art than to science: preferring the personal touch to the 
iJmpersonal one. But such thoughts lead to confusion. If medical problem solving 
is an art, and, therefore, subjective and irreversible9 how can we possibly m1ow 
what the physician is doing? vllien the activities and actions of the physician 
cannot be logically justified, can there be any justification for this 
professional doings? 
Generally this question is answered by pointing to the - often huge -
experience of the physician. Popper presented a patient case to Adler. Although 
the case was quite unfamiliar to the great Viennese psychiatrist, he easily 
explained into details the inferiority complex of the boy. Popper asking Adler 
hmv he could be so sure, got the reply: "Because of my endless experience. n 
Although this answer is very much recognisable to many physicians, 
especially the experienced ones, it does not lead to a solution because of our 
ignorance about the real nature of experience. When the physician's knowledge is 
largely based upon experience, then we can ask, with the Scottish 
philosopher Hume (1711 1776)., "how do we know that the cases we have not 
experienced resemble the ones we have?" How could Adler know for sure that the 
presented case resembled the ones he had met in practice? How can anybody 
predict from previous cases the succeeding one? How can we conclude from a 
certain experience anything else than its similarity with some previous cases? 
Without proper knowledge of experience and its related method of analogic 
reasoning, we again face the question: "Do physicians lmotl\f what they are doing?" 
Ma~y people assert the problem-solving in medicine to be a scientific one: 
the (hypothetico-) deductive strategy (e.g. 4, 5, 6). If deductive strategy is 
regarded as a method of deducing detailed hypotheses from universal statements, 
deduced in a strict logical, reversible order, we have some doubt. Dur.ing my 
thirteen years of family practice, I have never found myself solving problems in 
a strict logical, deductive way. The more doubts I had the more curious I was to 
know and to understand how my colleagues managed to cope with that apparently 
endless stream of complaints, illnesses, and diseases. How do they solve their 
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problems? 
For obvious Feasoos I refus,ed to admit that it was I who was the exception. 
However, we have to assume some method which enables physicians to 
reconstruct their reasoning process in case of error. A method which enables 
them to judge their problem solving superior in cases of correct diagnosis. 
Denying this construction metms that nobody will be able to tell the physician 
what there is ·to learn, or even whether there is anything for him to learn. He 
may learn that what he and/or his colleagues think the correct diagnosis and 
treatment should be, but this is only learning about what an other person thinks 
that he bows, (but not about the patients) (7). 
Brehmer sees this ~roblem as the old controverse between inductive and 
deductive reasoning. · ''Inductive judgment cannot be justified in the way 
deductive judgment can be justified. The judgment may very well be truep and 
serve as a guide in action,' but it cannot be shown to be true. The fact that it 
works says little about its · truth; it · just tells us that it works, and the 
explanation why it works may be very different from what we think it is. "(7). 
When our judgments cannot be justified, how can we find out whether the 
patient benefitted from our advices and preScriptions? We can ask the· patient 
but the odds are favourable when the patient recovered from the disease, and the 
reverse is true ·in cases ' of the opposite effect. These reports are grossly 
biassed. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our skills and knowledge grow with 
experience. We tend to believe that diagnostic slrill is an innate trait of 
experienced doctors that is generalized across clinical situations. Physicians 
are expected to profit from their experience, from their successes and from 
their mistakes. However, to learn only by trial and error, from one's own 
mistakes, would be a slow and painful process and unnecessarily costly to one's 
patients (8). 
Medical education is Partly based on experience. In the vocational training 
for family physicians emphasis is predominantly placed on experience. The 
student or the junior physician is placed at'an experienced physician-teacher in 
order to learn the 'va-et-vient', the 'ins and outs' of medical practice. What 
can be expected from this teaching when the teacher, in the conception of 
Brehmer, cannot explain the processes underneath the problem-solving structure? 
Following Polanyi's Stages ·of Learning (9), only the third one can contribute 
to real learning.The three stages are: 
A: Trick learning = discovering useful means-ends relationships; 
B: Sign learning: Observing sign- event.relationships: relies primarily on 
perception; 
C: Latent learning: occurs when the process of reorganisation is achieved 
not by a particular set of contriving or observing, but by achieving a true 
understanding of the situation, which has been open to inspection almost 
entirely from the start. 
Thus tridc learning, like the performance of human skills, is more 
completely controlled by purpose than sign-learning, which like connoisseurship, 
is primarily the achievement of attention. However, the stage of latent 
learning, which is the purpose of education, oan only be achieved when the 
situation can be clearly defined. If this is not possible, we are almost unable 
to know if the process of reorganisation has taken place into the direction we 
wanted. Confronted with the family physician's vocational training I was forced 
to asked myself: "What do we teach?9' and "How do we teach?" 
Do we teach them tricks: or is our goal a real understanding of contents and 
methods of family medicine. Asking the question is answering it. The first and 
principal problem, therefore, is to establish methods or strategies as they are 
used in the general practice.: 
Preliminary to this study I proposed ari investigation about the the actual 
behaviour of family physicians confronted with a case of myocardial infarction •. 
Joint cardiologists and family physicians have agreed upon a common procedure in 
these cases. A stu~y about predicting symptoms and signs of myocardial 
infarction (10) and a device to weigh these symptoms (11) developed from this 
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study had been published, respectively distributed at that time. So, with a 
fixed treatment protocol and a ruler to ascertain the probabilities of the 
symptoms and signs at hand, it was expected that methods among family physicians 
were more or less uniform. An investigation team interrog~ted 10 family 
physicians in order to investigate the methods the participants employed when 
confronted with a case of myocardial infarction. 
The results were shocking. Although all conditions for a uniform strategy 
seemed to be fulfilled, any consistency among the methods could not be found. 
Each physician interpreted the predicting symptoms and signs and their weighings 
in a very personal way. Half the physicians followed the recommended treatment 
upon which agreement had been reached; the other half deviated from the plan. 
We asked ea~h of the 10 physicians to describe the most characteristic 
picture of myocardial infarction as they had memorized it in terms of symptoms, 
signs, tests etc. The results were a complete surprise. The description differed 
like fingerprints among a population. Each doctor has his own personal 
conception about this disease entity, and hardly a single attribute covered the 
description of this disease by an other, equally experienced, physician. 
The finding of inconsistency for diagnosis~ diagnostic methods and 
treatments made me curious about the physician's problem-solving behaviour in 
cases of other, sometimes less well-known, diseases. 
It seems the more interesting because we are still unable to unambigiously 
answer the question: "Do patients benefit from the doctor's advice?" 
To investigate the physician's problem-solving behaviour several problems 
had to be conquered, like 
a) the - theoretical - modelling of the strategies; 
b) the highlighting of the landmarks within these strategies in order to 
recognize and to observe their various behaviours; 
c) the choosing of a way of observation which enabled the testee to behave 
as naturally as possible; 
d) the elimination of mutual influencing of physician and patient by 
standardizing the 'patient'; 
e) the fact that the 'standardized 
free-questioning throughout the 'patient 
physician-participant. 
patient' 
data 
had to 
base' 
allow 
by 
for 
the 
f) that the types 
clinical disease classes; 
of patient-scenarios had to cover a large part of all 
g) that the number of participating 
conclusions. 
physicians must enable us to draw 
h) that we had to find a representative sample from the population of 
family physicians in the city of Rotterdam. 
Lasegue stated: "Doctors observe little, and they observe badly". Being a 
doctor myself, apparently little hope is left for observing the essentials and 
characteristics of the medical problem-solving process. Fortunately, several 
investigators of different disciplines, like psychologists, information 
scientists, statisticians, philosophers, and even physicians, preceded me in 
outlining the theoretical and - sometimes - practical aspects of the physician's 
decision-making methods. Statistical and Artificial Intelligence models have 
been originated and sometimes even put to practice with more or less 
success. 
However, these models represent a logical way of reasoning, which at the 
moment cannot be contradicted, but seem a bit remote from the day-to-day working 
pattern of the physician. At least, this is how I feel it. Howell complains that 
too much focus is laid upon the methods people ought to use, not how they use 
them. "We should concentrate on what people actually do and develop descriptive 
models to account for · decision processes. This, then, has been the trend of 
late: from normative to descriptive modelling." (12) 
This thought may be suggestive for the conception that models, how precious 
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they may ~ • which .da not fit the practioner' s working methods will not be 
accepted ane amalgamated in the daily reutine. If we .could be able to find a 
common · denaminato:r, er even better, a model that could actually reflect the 
problem-solving behaviour ofphysicians, we may be capable to retrace or even to 
reproduce the · methods in eases of failure or success. It may Cfi>ntribute to 
understanding and insight into that mystical occurrence called the medical 
process. It may also contribute as a 'trait d'union' between normative and 
descriptive model:;;. 
The landmarks · ml,lSt come from the elements and their nomenclature as . they 
are usually employed in the act~al medical process.Features that are alien to 
the physician and the medical process, like sometimes met in normative decision 
making models, qannot contribute to the .observation and recognition of the 
methods employed by the participating physicians. This implicates a scenery and 
a registration which enables the physician to operate in a way as natural as 
.pOssible. It 4!cludes observation and registration in his own familiar office, 
to interview the 'patient' in a verbal mode, fre~questioning in every 
direction, adequate 'patient-answering', customary time-limits, avoiding 
normative judgment. etc. Briefly, to set the participant at ease, expecting to 
proceed in his customary way. We shall have to realize that some.stress will 
remain as a normal feature of all medical problem solving. 
The doctor has to make decisions in an uncertain problem situation which 
involves two systems: his · own and that of the patient. From this the main 
problem arises, because studying the functioning of the physician means: 
observing these two systems which at the same time influence each other in a 
special implicit way. It is like focusing on a certain point on a turning wheel 
while sitting on an other wheel rotating in an opposite direction. One observes 
flashes only partly recognisable. 
In order to investigate the problem-solving process, one has to freeze one 
of the two systems. Studying the doctor automatically includes a 'tfixed" patient 
(and vice versa). A "fixedu patient is a simulated patient: a device which could 
serve as a patient (with or without the help of an intermediary.) 
For our purpose of storing a large number of data, these data must be 
highly flexible, have to cover a broad area of symptoms and signs ·and should be 
easy to produce and manage. Besides, it must fulfil the requirements of realism 
and above all it must be cost-effective. 
The various . types of . patient-scenarios should cover a large part of the 
clinical disease classes. They have to deai with a wide range of complaints, 
illnesses, physical, psychical and social dysfunctions. Especially these latter 
elements represent a large proportion of the total number of patients visiting 
the doctor. Eventually, we chose for the clinical part of medicine as the part 
being most clearly circumscribed. The ambiguity of the p~chosocial part may 
bias the investigation. This feature runs the risk of proving the inadequacy of 
its registration and its classification. "It is hardly possible to distinguish, 
at least clearly, between illness and illness behaviour, and complaints of 
psychophysical origin and complaints of social origin. The mixture of all these 
elements make us talk about psychosocial complaints and problem behaviour (of 
the patient). But it is :the problem of the ~octor not recognizing the 
appropriate parameters for each of the component symptoms and signs. "(13, 14). 
We asked and got the co-operation of 60 family physicians and 8 general 
internists. We strived foi- a stratification of the family physicians according 
to: 
- age and, sex; 
- spread over the research area; 
- patient population between 1500 and 3000; 
- medical school of study. 
Because of the total number of family physicians in the city of Rotterdam 
(approx. 200) we could not strictly adhere to this stratification, but strived 
for a sample as representative as possible. 
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Before we come to the actual description of the investigation and its 
results (chapters VI, VII, VIII)~ we shall first make a tour d'horizon of the 
domains which have contributed to the origination and framework of the study~ 
Chapter II will describe the domains of the cognitive processes involved in 
p~oblem-solving. Human problem-solving, under which guise the human thinking 
processes have been studied for over fifty years, have drawn attention 
especially by the involvement of cybernetics (Wiener, 1948), concept formation 
(Miller, 1956, Bruner, Goodnow & Austin; 1956) and computer science (Newell, 
Shaw & Simon: Logic Theory Machine, 1957), into this field of oognitive 
psychology (giving rise to Artificial Intelligence Science). 
The study was complicated by the observation of the varying kinds of human 
behaviour in the face of problem solving and decision making. Especially in the 
face of uncertainty and stress, which often accompany problematic·situations, 
humans employ strategies which detract from optimizing solutions. Overload of 
information may force people to the use of shortcuts which detract from an 
optimal solution, but enables the problem solver to 'survive'. 
We are confronted with several questions still waiting for an answer. We 
can observe the inputs and the outcomes but the thought prqcesses in between 
these items are still wrapped in mystery, apart from some tempting theories. 
Medical problem solving is mainly ~reated as a particular entity. Whether the 
medical procedure really differs from the general pattern as we may meet in 
human problem solving, remains to be seen. The claim of medical problem solving 
as a discipline comes from the special features and essentials within the 
medical world. The medical world has not only to deal with the specific 
structure of its science but also with the ethics of the profession. 
The basic issue in medicine is whether health and disease are universally 
definable conditions or relativistic phenomena, identified ~d labelled 
according to generally accepted classifications, cultural values and social 
norms. 
It appears that medical knoWledge mainly consists of the joint knowledge 
every physician in the world has in his mind. This knowledge, however,is not 
explicit and not generalisable across situations, cultures, languages and 
societies. Patient and physician appear to create a unique situation, not 
transferable to other similar situations. It implicates that the real meaning of 
a "medical problem" cannot unequivocably be ascertained. 
In chapter III we return to the question of implicit and explicit 
inference, the personal, art-like reasoning versus the scientific, or logical 
way of reasoning. The latter way is generally adapted as the main approach to 
scientific questions and studies. It is based on a sequence of logical steps 
descending from a universal statement to consequence-bearing hypotheses which 
can be verified or preferably - falsified. The process can be t~aced and 
retraced, and its outcome .can be generalized across situations. 
The former is the inductive way of reasoning. It employs a different 
strategy. Principally, it. accumulates information in order to elicit - mainly by 
intuition (induction) or by pattern-recognition (analogy) - a solution which may 
explain a certain number of elements within the acquired information. It results 
in a personal statement as the act of appraisal of the component elemen~s or 
features of the solution is a personal one. However, "this person is taking a 
risk in asserting something, at least tacitly, about something believed to be 
real outside himself. Any presumed contact with reality inevitably claims 
universality" (9). The inductive outcome is believed to be generalisable and can 
contribute to the "body of experience". The introduction of probabilistic 
concepts to the inductive way of reasoning does not essentially change the 
process or the outcome. 
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In chapter IV I shall describe l'11hat I shall conveniently call 'theJ. me:di9al · 
process'. 
The medical process can be described as the total sum of processes taking. 
place between tbe entry and the depart of the patient from the health care. 
system (or parts of it) . The features of this process are largely described in 
their customary order: data acquisition and data processing, diagnoses and their 
classification, prediction and treatment.· These elements are bound together by 
the strategies physicians apply to solve the medical problem. These str~tegiem·' 
are the focus of our study. However, they cannot be understood without the 
description of the elements to which they pertain. Although the doctor entered 
the scene of health care approximately 15.000 years ago, these elements are 
still beyond generally accepted clear-cut definitions. 
In Chapter V we shall delineate that, when the medical science itself does 
not provide its standards, medical decision making as a discipline has to sup~ly 
its own predefined nomenclature. At the same time it had to redefine and remodel 
the structure of the medical procedure in accordance to the principles of 
Decision Theory. By doing so normative medical decision making replaces a rather 
undefined medical taxonomy and structure by a system still to be proven more 
effective in ordinary daily practice. The newly developed system allot;ed for the 
application of statistical or mathematical (sometimes called actuarial) methods 
in order to process data in a probabilistic way. 
It is my impression that the means, the various and varying statistical 
methods, govern the ends, the decision making model, instead of the other way 
around. 
Thusfar the decision-making systems suffer from at least three drawbaclts: 
the systems are highly constrained to limited domains of the health care; 
the systems are largely untransferable to other clinical situations; and 
the systems are largely rejected by the physicia!llm~ 
A new development in this field, Artificial Intelligence, suffers from the 
same or similar restrictions. 
Chapter VI delineates the different models of medical reasoning. They 
reflect largely the methods of scientific reasoning as we discussed them in 
chapter III. The deductive inference :method has been adapted in minor details 
for the 'medical deductive strategy' (the term hypothetico-deductive will be 
avoided because of its tautology). 
The inductive strategy is modelled according to the thought I have 
perceived and conceived from the literature. It is mainly based on analogical 
reasoning; analogies between remarkably few data of the present patient and 
memorized patterns of similar cases. The method is based on the verification of 
whether some pattern fits the particular data pertaining to the patient. 
The end-point of the diagnostic process is constituted by two elements: the 
weight the physician places on a hypothesis of choice to be a diagnosis; and the 
minimization of his personal feelings of uncertainty i'lith regard to the solution 
of the problem. The weight, or the posterior probability, to a hypothesis can be 
viewed as a proportional value of the number of acquired symptoms relative to 
the number of symptoms within a memorized pattern. 
The physician's appreciation of the amount of stress as e"perienced within 
the problem solving process is reflected by his perseverance to search for a 
solution as well as his relief (minimization) to the uncertainty when he is 
convinced having arrived a solution. 
The landmark of the deductive reasoning is constructed from observing the 
progression down the hypotheses-levels with increasing sharpness of 
circumscription of disease entities. The recognition of the inductive reasoning 
is mainly marked by its typical process of cycling around the construction of a 
'base of hypotheses' during the course of the worl!-up. 
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Chapter VII. To identify the methods and strategies a numbe'r of conditioll$ 
had to be fulfilled, al'll we discussed already. To me, the most important 
condition was the construction of a simulation model that could fulfil most of 
my wishes: to simulate the routine work of the physician and to create an 
illusion of reality. 
A new simulation (R~model) was created on the basis of symptom 
configuration and classific:ation. The symptqm is defined as "every functionally 
objective or subjective phenomenon which can be observed direc~ly or indirectly 
and which is indicative of either an illness or condition· of the patient". This 
classification enabled me to meet the demands of'the self-imposed task for 
reality. This sphere of reality was underlined by the use of the verbal mode for 
the physician-'patient' interview. The video-taping of the scenery did not 
really disturb this sphere of reality. · 
Chapter VIII presents the results of this study. To create a review, the 
chapter is divided into 6 paragraphs, each representing one or more of the 
characteristics of the process and their interdependenci·eer. After the 
introduction paragraph 1 describes the main objective of this study, the 
deduction of the methods of problem solving employed by the participating 
physicians. These strategies are matched with the two groups of physicians, 
family physicians and general internists. They are also matched with the 
different patient cases in order to discover (or not) presumed 
problem-orientation of the problem-solving process. 
Paragraph 2 elucidates the role and the meaning of the hypothesis in the 
process. Its relation towards the levels of hypotheses-refinement, symptoms, 
diagnosis, and cycles will be elucidated. and - as far as possible - explained. 
Paragraph 3 tells the story about physicians' questions, patients' answers 
and the time-constraints within which the operations take place.Special 
attention has been paid to the interdependence of these·variables,and to the 
effectiveness of the physician' interviewing in raising relevant information. 
Paragraph 4 shows the variability of the subjective estimates.Special 
attention has been paid to the estimations of some elements as they are used in 
medical decision making strategies.The application of Dayes'Theorem in Medical 
Decision Making requires knowledge of the Prevalence (or Incidence) rates of 
diseases,and the weighted disease - symptom relationships.However, by lack of 
reliable values for these items, decision making engineers rely mainly on the 
subjective estimations of (expert) physicians. 
In this study we asked the participants to give their estimations with 
regard to these elements. In this section we shall discuss the results. 
In the same section physicians' estimates of their feelings of uncertainty 
or stress during the case work-up are presented. As we may remember, our 
hypothesis of the problem-solving end-point predicted a minimization of the 
physician's uncertainty. · 
Paragraph 5 delineates the various kinds of actions physicians take after 
establishing the diagnosis. The various variables are matched to each other and 
to several related ones. The finding of a treatment plan already being 
incorporated into the diagnostic part of the process is a striking phenomenon. 
Paragraph 6 concludes this chapter with the presentation of several 
consequences of the applied strategy(ies). The role of the personal appreciation 
of diagnoses,their interjudge (in)consistency and the effects of experience, and 
continuing education are shown in this paragraph~ Some prudent conclusions about 
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th~ effectivity of the strategies will be given. .·· · 
We shall try to present a description of methods and features of the 
processes physicians operate in trying to solve the clinical problemS of th~ir 
patients. 
This study cannot provide an ultimate and final statement about physicians' 
problem-solving behaviour, but it may give rise to criticism, argumentation.and 
discussion; it may even bring new thoughts and new inspiration to penetrate i~t~ 
that often mystical domain of science called medicine. 
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CHAPTER II 
Human thinking processes have been subject to many theories and 
philosophies, from· the earliest· daY's of mankind untii the present day, from 
Socrates till Artificial Intelligence. Still, we only have a scattered picture 
of their true nature. Although the notion that (cognitive) psychology could. 
become a scien~e of observation, and experimentation had been stated clearly and 
explicitly by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (Logic, 1843) it required 
a person who really knew how observation and experiments are made to bring it 
off. The real founder of this discipline can be considered to be Wilhelm Wundt 
(1832 1890) who opened the first laboratory of experimental psychology at the 
University of Leipzig. His successors at the University of Wurzburg applied 
"introspective" methods to higher mental processes. Members of this achool 
argued that much thinking goes on below the level of consciousness, thus giving 
rise to "imageless thoughts"·, aa the ·results of such processes emerge into 
consciousness. This theory was challenged by Wundt and others. It was argued 
that images were always present in consciousness. This eontroversy could not be 
bridged; the argument between the theories could hardly have been settled by 
experiment. After the demise of the Wurzburg school, thinking processes were 
studied in psychology under the guise of "problem-solving!" 
In this chapter we will delineate some of the ideas and conceptions about 
problem-solving, as far as they are relevant to some theories about the medical 
part of this subject. Paragraph 1 discusses the question "what is a problem?" 
The next paragraph sketches some co~cepts about human problem solving. 
To enter the world of medical problem-solving, firstly we have to make 
clear our statement about medical knowledge. Much theory concerning medical 
science seems rather implicit, or in tenns of Polanyi, is 'tacit knowledge'. 
Therefore, we cannot enter the scene of medical problem solving without a 
paragraph dedicated to medical knowledge. 
The next paragraph must, of. course, discuss the question of i'what is a 
medical problem?", followed by the discussion about medical problem solving in 
the last paragraph of this chapter .. 
Paragraph 1 
The English Platonist Weldon said that there are three kinds of elements 
that people are concerned about regarding the thinking processes of man. There 
are troubles which we do not quite know how to handle; there are puzzles whose 
conditions and unique solutions are quite clear to everybody; and there are 
problems. We invent a problem by finding an appropriate puzzle form to impose 
upon a trouble. 
Before a person . can attempt to solve a problem, he must understand or 
assimilate a description of the problem. The presentation of a trouble or a 
complaint does · not automatically imply the understanding by the problem-solver. 
There are at least two conditions to this understanding. · 
a.) ·it can be a problem only if it puzzles or worries somebody 
(assimilation) (1), and 
b.) a translation of the problem can be made in such a way that it becomes 
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a familiar type of problem to the problem-solver, for which h.e has means within 
his repertoire for. solving (acquisition) (2). The first condition refers to the 
situation that something is called a problem when it pertains to a task for 
which the respective subject does not immediately perceive a course of finding a 
solution. It means that every problem·has its individual and personal character. 
This is reflected in the definition of Thorndyke (1898): 
"A problem exists when the goal that is sought is not directly attainable 
by the performance of a simple act available in the personal repertory; the 
solution calls for either a novel action or a new integration of available 
action" (3). 
Most people prefer to avoid problems, especially the complicated ones. 
Politicians confronted with complex, multi-faceted dile~as will try to satisfy 
their constituents, rather than struggle with basic solutions to the dile11muw. 
Judges asked to settle a major legal controversy will often make their decision 
not directly resolving the substantial · issue, but evading it, to reach a 
conclusion based on matters of technical procedures. Facing a problem means 
facing the highly personal dilemma of making decisions. And people are 
constantly being reminded .of what they already know from personal experience -
that making a consequential decision is a worrisome thing, and one is liable to 
lose sleep over it. We cannot but recognize and smile about the cartoonist's 
statement in Peanuts: "No ,problem is too big or· too complicated that it cannot 
be run away from!" (cited in (4). 
It needs a translation to a familiar type of problem to lead people to the 
phase of solving it. It ~an giv.e rise to an early formulation of the problem. 
This formulation is largely based on personal and/or presumed images and prior 
expectations. Chapman and Chapman (5) demonstrated how prior expectations can 
lead to fawlty observation and inference. It has been demonstrated that although 
there were no relationships between cues and criterion statements, most 
individuals erroneously "learned" the cue-criterion iinks which 'they had 
expected to see (6). This element of foreknowledge has a number of serious 
implications. : 
it directs more 
pattE}rn-recognition 
short time before; 
when 
or less the problem-solving. Medin et al. (7) saw more 
there was an assumed resemblance to cases presented a 
- it conceals largely the details of the process; 
it inhibits an evaluation of the judgment processes by preventing a 
careful consideration of the various options; 
- it biasses our guesses. 
Most of these elements are usually complete obscure. The individual has no 
idea which factors influence the process. Sometimes even the fact that the 
process is taking place i$ unknown to the individual prior to the point that a 
solution appears in consciousness. 
The Gestaltpsychology which flourished between the world wars stressed the 
importance of structural relations in perception. It was argued that it was a 
full grasp of the structure of a problem which led to the insight yielding its 
solution (8). Although the concepts of Gestalt psychology are largely 
underscored it does not explain the problem-solver's troubles in defining his 
problem. There is a notable inclination tot<~ards familiarizing the presented 
case. It is translated and sometimes transformed to a task the problem solver 
thinks he is capable of tackling. This means e.g. that the physician translates 
the patient's problem into a task.he can understand within the context of the 
medical science and the health care. Every problem solver facing a problem 
creates his task in terms of such a task environment. 
This task environment is defined by the problem solver, in order to be able 
to attack it, in terms of.a problem space. The problem space consists mainly of 
states of knowle4ge about the problem and rules relevant to the various states: 
e.g. a mathematical problem and the relevant rules to solve it, or, a medical 
problem and the ordering of the relevant symptoms and signs to elicit the 
diagnosis. This means that the task (and its environment) mainly determines the 
characteristics of the problem solving (9). Simon & Newell (10) summarize these 
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characteristics as follows: . ·,~ 
~.) a few, and only a few, gross characteristics of the htman information 
processing system are invariant over the task and problem salver; 
2.) these characteristics are sufficient to determine that a task 
environment is repres.ented as a problem space and that problem solving tak• 
place within the problem space; 
3. ) the structur~ of the task environment determines the possible structure. 
of the problem space; 
4.) the structure of the problem space determines the possible prografJJfir 
that can be used for the problem solving. 
Eventually, this ·will lead to the formulation of a number of conditio~s for 
a problem-solving program or simulation. 
· a.) it should predict the performance of a problem-solver handling specific 
tasks; 
b.) it should explain how.human problem-solving takes place; 
c.) what processes are used; 
d.) what mechanisms perform these processes; 
e.) it should predict the incidental phenomena that accompany the 
problem-solving process. 
In the next paragraph we shall discuss some of the elements of the system 
and the program. 
Paragraph 2 
Animal studies led to the belief that problems are solved by trial and 
error. This concept led to a preference for observation instead of 
introspection. However, as Bertrand Russell (1927) remarked, animals tended to 
display the national characteristics of the experimenters: Animals studied by 
Americans rush about frantically with an incredible display of hustle and pep, 
and at last achieve the desired result by chance. Animals observed by Germans 
sit still and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner 
consciousness (cited in 8). 
But trial and error is, in fact, a rather limited procedure for solving 
problems, and perhaps therefore, performed on a large scale. 
Although most psychologists studied the problem-solving processes from the 
viewpoint of deductive inference (with an eye on logic), tensions remain between 
these conscious deductions and everyday inferences. The inferences that underly 
deductive problem-solving are often slow, voluntary, and at the forefront of 
awareness: they are explicit. 
For practical reasons like alertness, quick reactions, workload etc. this 
type of inference is scarcely used in routine problem-solving. 
In contrast, the inferences that underlie the ordinary process of 
perception and comprehension are rapid, involuntary, and outside conscious 
awareness: they are implicit (8). 
The distinction between these. two types of inferences can still be observed 
between, e.g. the formal programs in medical artificial intelligence and the 
routine problem-solving of the health care provider. 
What processes do people use to solve problems? 
Essentially two major conceptions can be traced. 
1.) Sequential: the solver always appears to search sequentially, adding 
small successive accretions to his store of information about the problem and 
its solutions (10); 
2.) Configura! (Gestaltpsychology): The mind has the tendency to organize 
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and integrate and to perceive situations, including problems, as total 
structures. The insight that leads to a solution, in the Gestalt view, stems 
from the perception of the requirements of a problem (Kohler, cited in (3). 
Productive thinking is not accidental success or the mere application of bits of 
past experience. The problem has a structure of its awn that points the way to 
its solution. 
Both theories have in common the creation of a problem space which 
encompasses the elements of the problem, its related knowledge and ru~es ~d the 
perception of a - solution. "Only if we believe that a solution exists can we 
passionately search for it and evoke ourselves heuristic steps towards its 
discovery. Therefore, as it emerges in response to our search for something .. we 
believe to be there, ( ... ) it will always come to 'US with the comrictiori Qf Hit:~ 
being true" <l). In Gestaltpsychology the perception of the solu,ti~n qf ~ 
problem is hl<e the perceiving of a hidden figure in a pu~zle picture~ T~a~ .· 
means that: 
- the perception is sudden. . 
- there is no conscious intermediate stage. 
the relationships of the elements in the final perceptions are different 
from those which preceded, i.e. changes in meaning are involved. The implication 
of this latter vi&H is decisive, because, the irreversible character of a 
discovery or solution of a problem can only be accredited as a discovery if it 
is not achieved by following the definite rules. For such a procedure would be 
reversible in the sense that it could be traced back stepwise to its beginning 
and repeated at will any number of items (1). While the sequential process can 
be made expl1cit following the steps, the configurational one is unique, 
'einmalig'. Especially this latter claim is most often mentioned by, not to say 
typically for, physicians. 
Meamvhile, this does not signify that we now really understand cognitive 
processes. The bulle of the research on problem-solving has been carried out with 
naive subjects on tasks that do not call for much specific subject-matter 
knowledge, with scarcely any resemblance to real-life processes. The results of 
many experiments have given rise to pessimistic reactions. Recently, several 
cognitive psychologists (Mandler, 1975, Miller, 1962, Neisser, 1967) have 
proposed that we may have no direct access to higher order mental processes such 
as the ones involved in evaluation, judgment, problem-solving, and the imitation 
of behaviour. 
Simon {1981) speaks of the simulation of cognition rather than the creation 
of artificial intelligence. Such simulation of cognition or creation of 
artificial intelligence contrasts with the modelling of the actual processes of 
human reasoning. A system that simulates the reasoning of an expert clinician 
needs only have similar input and output, but a system that models the reasoning 
process of an expert would also have to employ similar operations in generating 
the output from the input (11). 
Trying to model a system on human cognition we must first learn how human 
cognition works. This is usually investigated by means of using three types of 
:models: 
~l ~~Q£~~~ ~tygie~ of how human judgments are actually made; 
~l ~r§~£ri~tiY~ mQg~!~ which make use of a formal theory of how decisions 
ought to be made; 
C: ~§~~r!2!iY~ mQg~!~ which attempt to describe the context and factors 
which influence judgment. 
Our study can be classified within Category A and C. 
Problem solving enables mankind to react and respond to needs, to behave 
adequately and to survive in an environment that represents unpredictable 
threats and opportunities. Varying problems in changing environments require 
different processes to find adequate solutions. Are these qualities inherited or 
acquired? 
The excellent studies by 
phases of thinking processes 
Piaget and Inhelder (12) reveal much of the 
in children. The authors distinguish 4 stages of 
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thought a.nd reasoning: . 
1.) the sensory-~otor stage of early childhood; 
2.) the preoperatory stage.: the younger child tries to discover the world 
without being goal-directed; 
3.) the concrete operations stage: here we enter the stage of the 
schoolchild. The child is already capable of certain logical reasoning proeesses 
but only to the extent of applying particular operations to concrete objects·- or 
events in the immediate present. 
4.) the stage of formal operations. The principal novelty of this period.il!l 
the capacity to reason in terms of verbally stated hypotheses and no longer 
merely in terms of concrete objects and their manipulations. This is a decisive 
turning point,. because to reason hypothetically and to deduce the consequences 
that the hypotheses necessarily imply (independent on the intrinsic truth or 
falseness of the premises) is a normal reasoning process. Hyp<>thetical reuoi!d,ng 
implies the subordination of the real to the realm of the possible, and 
consequently the linking of all possibi~ities to one another by necessary 
implications that encompass the real, but at the same time go beyond it. The 
individual who becomes capable of hypothetical reasoning, by the very fact will 
take an interest in problems that go beyond his immediate field of experience. 
Propositional logic appears to be one of· the essential conquests of formal 
thought. This fourth period can no longer be characterized as a proper stage, 
but would already se~ to be a structural advanqement in the direction of 
specialization. This stage is reached in different areas at different ages 
according to aptitude and professional specialization. It can only develop after 
the scheme of causality has been firmly established, approximately around the 
ages of 12 to 15 years. 
The notion of order is developed prior to that of probabilism. The notions 
of chance and probability cannot develop until a person has reached the stage of 
.formal operations~ Probabilism contrasts to the schema of order, of causality. 
Not everyone enters the fourth stage. Smedslund (13) maintains that Piaget and 
Inhelder's stages of developement represent different levels of cognitive 
functioning at which adults operate. Thus, although adults are capable of using 
disconfirming information for the inferring of relationships, they fre9uently 
fail to do so and operate at a lower, more frequently used level, for ex~ple, 
concrete reasoning.At the concrete-operatory level a structure cannot be 
generalized to different heterogenous contents but remains attached to a system 
of objects or the properties of these objects. A formal structure seems, in 
contrast, generalizable as it deals with hypotheses. .It cannot be stressed that. 
disregarding of the thought levels of operation experimental studies may lead to 
largely varying results and subsequent conclusions. 
There is no algorithm for choosing which method to adopt in trying to solve 
a problem. 
Polanyi (1), quoting Poincare's "!'Intuition et la Logique en 
mathematique", recognizes four stages: 
1.) ~r~P~r~!!Q~ : acknowledge a problematic situation as a problem; 
2.) !~£gQ~!iQ~ : considering the problem by tentative discoveries; 
3.) !!!~!~~!ion practical realization of tbe principle discovered by 
the insight; 
4.) Y~rifi£~!iQ~ : manipulations to the test of practical realization. 
This is in agreement with Polya (cited in 8) who recognizes also four 
phases of work on a problem: 
a.) Understanding the problem: you have to determine the goal, the data 
that are given to you, and any general constraints or conditions. 
b.) Devising a plan: you have to find some ~thod of connecting the data to 
the goal. Here, useful heuristics may be to consider any related problems with 
which you are familiar, to try to reformulate the problem, or to try to solve 
part of the problem. Often there will be many related problems in which case it 
can help to concentrate on those with the same, or similar, unknowns. 
c.) Executing the plan: you carry out each step, checking its correctness 
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as you go. 
d.) Looking back: When you have solved the problem, you should check the 
result and reconsider your method. You may be able to discover a simpler 
procedure, or a more effective one. 
Both concepts consider the problem-solving processes as sequentj_al and 
explicit information processing. Nowadays, information processing can readily be 
done by technical equipment, the computer. Therefore, we shall have a look at 
some concepts in this field. 
Information processing methodology essentially involves the determination 
of the thought processes or symbolic manipulation necessary to the performance 
of a taslr and their precise specification as a model or computer program (14). 
Investigations are specially directed towards the process, on how 
particular human behaviour comes about, on the mech~isms that enable them. 
Simon & Newell (10) proposed a program with the following items: 
a.) Discover and perform a set of processes which results in a system 
capable of storing and manipulating patterns to perform complex nonnumerical 
tasks, like those a human performs when he is thinking: 
b.) Construct an information processing language, and a system for 
interpreting that language in terms of elementary operations; 
c.) Discover and define a program, written in the language of information 
processes, which is · capable of solving a type of problems that htimans find 
difficult; 
d.) Obtain data on hUman behaviour in solving the same program as the one 
tackled by the program; 
e.) Search for both similarities and differences between the behaviour of 
the program and the human object. 
On the basis of these recommendations a number of so-called tiExpert 
Systems" have been created. "Expert Systems" are Artificial, Intelligence 
prog~ams capturing the special knm1ledge of experts, e.g. experienced 
clinicians, in a given subject matter field and encoded or represented in a 
"knowledge base", which will be computer processable. Especially the last 
recommendation of Simon & Newell is in focus because sofar the differences 
outnumber the similarities~· Various caUses can be identified among which special 
attention can be directed towards the question as to how.much of an expert's 
performance is due to skilf and how much is propositional lmowledge. This is the 
difference between 11knowing how" (Polanyi 's Personal knowledge) and "lmowing 
that" (Popper's Objective knowledge) with the latter being the sort that is most 
readily articulated and incorporated into computer progrwns. If Polanyi is 
correct that the portion of "knowing how" cannot be translated into explicit 
rules, and if a significant part of the expert diagnostician's performances 
derives from this kind of knowing, then attempts at formally describing it would 
seem to be in for. trouble (15). 
Human information proce$sing characteristics are described as: 
1.) The system operates essentially serially, on~ process a time, not in 
parallel fashion. 
2.) The inputs and outputs of these processes are held in a small Short 
Term Memory (S.T.M.) with a capacity of only a few symbols. 
3. ) The System has access to an essentially infinite Long Term Memory 
(L.T.M.), which has a fast retrieval rate, but a slow storage (10). 
Considering the limited size of the working memory (S.T.M.) and the slow 
storage capabilities we · ml1st set out the problem in suitable symbols and 
continuously reorganize its representation with a view to eliciting some new 
suggestive aspects. 
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This means e.g. that a physician working on a patient's problem always will 
translate the presented data in to him suitable symbols like symptoms and signs, 
and rearrange them constantly in varying. clusters suggest'ing different 
disease-hypotheses. Therefore, he has to ransack his memory for any similar 
problem of which the solution is known. 
To overcome the limitations of the Short Term Memory, some tricks may be 
used. 
Faced with a decision task of challenging complexity, an individual may try 
to restucture that task into a simpler one (16). This can be accomplished in two 
ways: plunder his memory for any similar.and known cases, or to combine data in 
known categories. In the former method the total amount of alternatives is 
constrained to a limited number of ~lternatives (17) 
The latter method can be divided into three strategies: 
I.) Restructure of the problem 
II.) Limiting the information 
III.) Restructure of information transmission. This latter item will be 
discussed·in greater detail. 
I.) g~§!rY£!~~~ Qf fb~ 2~QQ!~ : dismantling the problem to its bare bone 
and limiting the number of· alternatives. The quality of a person's thinking will 
be poorest of all in multivalued decisions that require evaluating the 
consequences of alternative courses of actions in terms of a large set of 
values, not just in terms of one or two objectives (4). 
a.) Avoiding or disregarding data about possible negative (or positive) 
outcomes (18). People tend to focus on the number of true positives, they follow 
the strategy of using only confirming evidence (19). 
b.) Coupling of systems to correlations: limiting 
only certain types of correlated symptoms, symptoms 
typical or both atypical characteristics. Occurrence 
atypical symptom counts less (7). 
the search procedure to 
that either have both 
of one typical and one 
Human judgments are often based on comparisons between couples of faced 
data (20). Medin et al. (7) report that subjects (in the experiments) are. 
looking for correlation, even with less typical information. The subject's 
diagnoses were primarily determin(:ld by the correlated symptoms, although it is 
not clear whether the correlation per se was used or whether entire symptom 
patterns were matched (and thus coincidentally correlated symptoms). The Ullle of 
correlations suggests that the underlying decision process involves more than 
the weighed sum of independent attributes. This finding is strong evidence 
against independent cue models, which predict that the number of typical 
symptoms should be the principle determinant of performance. A question of 
special interest is, assuming that people learn about each attribute 
independently, how a category of correlated symptoms has come about. Presumably 
it is based on experience with copies of a category. 
This method deals with the framing of the Short Term Memory and the 
(over)load of information. The restriction of S.T.M. can be viewed as a 
safeguard to man in order to survive in a constantly fluctuating world. It is 
far better to have a little information about a lot of things than to have a lot 
of information about a small segment of the environment. In a world of expanding 
specialisms this conflict causes considerable tension in people. When the amount 
of information is increased people will begin to make more and more errors. At 
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first the tran~mitted information will increase but eventually, it will level 
o'ff at some asymptotic value~ (See e.g. 21). This latter value is called by 
~!iller (22) The Channel Capacity. This Channel Capacity can be defined as "the 
upper limit on the extent to which an observer can match his responses to the 
stimuli that are given to him". Accordi:P..g to Miller the Channel Capacity poses 
an observer the limits to distinguish between alternathres given a number of 
bits. One bit of information is the amount of information we need to make a 
decision between two equally likely alternatives: l bit distinguishes 2 
alternatives, 2 bits 4 alternatives, 3 bits 8 etc~ The ~eneral rule is simple: 
every time the number of'alternatives is increased by a factor two, one bit of 
information is added. The limitation of the S.T.M. is defined by the number of 
items, to be distinguished fron1 the amount of information. To overcome the 
limited span some important devices can be employed: 
to arrange the problem-solving task in such a way that we make a sequence 
of several judgments in a row. For instance, generating hypotheses each 
sequentially explaining a relationship between the collected data; 
to combine informational elements. The combination of bits is called a 
chunk. A chunk is defined as· "any structure · that has become familiar from· 
previous repeated exposure and hence is recognizable as a single unit."(23). 
S.T.M. restriction is directly related to a nmnber of chlJll}rs but independent of 
the number of bits per chunk~ By increasing the bits per chunlr the amount of 
messages that the operator can remember increases correspondingly (22). There 
is a great deal of evidence to sugg-est that experts in any field think in terms 
of chunks whilst the novice regards the same information in smaller units~ In 
the language of communication theory, 'this process is called recoding (see e.g. 
24). The input is given in a code that contains many chunks with few bits per 
chunlc. The problem-solver recodes the input into another code that contains 
fewer chunks with more bits: per chunk. There are many ways to do this receding, 
but probably the simplest one. is to group the input events, apply a new name to 
the group, and then remember' the new name rather than the original input events. 
Receding is an extremely. powerful weapon for increasing the amount of 
information we ~an deal with. In one form or another, we use receding constantly 
in our daily behaviour. When we want to remember we rephrase it "in our own 
words": we make a verbal description of the event and then remember our own 
verbalization (22). 
Miller estimates the S.~.M. capacity for chunks of information at 7 plus or 
minus two. Elstein (25) f()und 4 plus or minus 1 hypothesis a time, and 
Kozielecki (26) 3 - ·s hypotheses. The question is that we do'not know what the 
contents and the validity o;f a ch:unk may be, Largely, they have a very personal 
nature often based on only singular samples which may be falsified by to:morrow'.s 
happening (27). 
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People commonly view their memories as exact copies of their ori~inal 
experiences. 
During reconstruction, a variety of cognitive, social and motivational 
factors can introduce error and distortion into the output of the Memory Recall. 
If people are unaware of the reconstructive ·nature of memory and 
perception, one cannot distinguish between assertion and inferences; they will 
not critically evaluate their inferred knowledge. In general, any process that 
changes the contents of memory unbeknownst to peeple will keep· them frOm asking 
relevant validity questions and :may lead to overconfidence (28). Wason & 
Johnson-Laird (29) have shoWI) subjects having considerable confidence in their 
own erroneous reasoning. The inferences had not been arrived at as a series of 
logical steps but swiftly and almost unconsciously. 
The validity of the inferences was usually not inquired into; indeed, the 
process was usually accompanied by a feeling of certainty of being right (28). 
The strategies of the .inference processes seem to differ from subject to 
subject. The subject '·s strategy becomes a crucial intervening variable between 
the task environment in which he works and the behaviour he produces. Some 
strategies may be more effective than others, but effective strategies may be 
.difficult to discover, and it must not be assumed~ particularly in unfamiliar 
tasks, that all subjects will come equipped with the best strategies or will be 
able to find them during ·the problem-solving setting. Subjects tend to Ufile 
various kinds of heuristics to restrict their domain. The selectivity of search, 
not speed, is taken as a key organizing principle (10). There is a strong 
tendency to confirm. the hypothesis directly. The strategy of disconfirming 
alternatives is less automatic. Subjects largely behave in a deterministic way. 
When the ruies fail, they tend to assume that there is n~ rule at all.They 
use some sort of memorization strategy or they give up and gtiess (19). 
Wason and Johnson-Laird question why subjects fail to follow adequate 
logical rules. They suggest that subjects do not understand the logical relation 
of implication ("if","then") but tend to consider this relation equivalent to a 
double implication "if, and only if". Hypotheses were not properly tested 
although the optimal rule to help them was given. (29). 
It was assumed that subjects will employ deductive inferences with ari eye 
on logic; instead they use various and varying heuristic rules according to 
time, environment and personality .. The reason may be that they lack the 
necessary basic schemata to help them understand and use the information 
provided by their experiences. Subjects have the intuitive understanding that 
non-randomness is information, and information can be exploited to search a 
problem space in promising directions and to avoid the less promising. A little 
information goes a long way to keep within bounds the amount of search 
required, on average, to find the solution (10). 
When they encounter or detect order or pattern stimuli, perhaps a memorized 
correlation of a known chunk, subjects feel · at ease. It will direct their 
pathway through the problem space. This is especially interesting when 
conclusions or patterns are formulated early in the process. They can be 
misleading and may direct attention to irrelevant features of the problem, cause 
the subject to engage in a search for inconsequential cues that would otherwise 
be ignored, or lead the decision maker to refrain from useful search for cues 
that would otherwise be collected. 
"Decision-making is reducing uncertainty in a problem situation" (30) A 
-22-
harassed decisionmaker confronted with a complicated task suffers a decline in 
cognitive functioning as a result of the anxiety gener~ted by his awareness of 
the stressful situation. Considerable stress can be evoked in a decisionmaker 
merely by his trying to cope with the cognitive limits on his ability to work 
out a good solution to the problem in hand. Next to cognitive complexity, there 
are major sources of stress in iecision making, including profound threats to 
the decisionmaker's social status and to his self-este~m that intensify 
decisional conflict (4). Every problem to be solved has a more or less mental 
impact on the decisionmaker. 
Theoretical reflections on pr :>blem solving invariably st.ow us how different 
our concepts of thiruring processes are from what actually @eems to be the case 
when confronted with real trouoles. The cognitive functioning is affected by 
psychological stress. The difference between the well-irained versus the 
non-trained individual is often striking. Well-trained people are often less 
subject to intellectual deliberation. Problem-solving skijls notably diminish 
when the indtviduals are confronted with problems outside t.heir (sub)specialty 
areatS (31). 
Stress ~1d uncertainty are accompanying elements of problem-solving and, 
have been, thusfar, hardly subject to investigation. 
According to Einhorn & Hogarth (32), our culture does not encourage 
explicit representation of uncertainty; it tends to promote confusion between 
certainty and belief.However, the relation between stress anc problem-solving is 
noteworthy. It involves several features in the problem-sol~ing process as well 
as the choices and applications of various decision-making strategies. 
When there is a high level of uncertainty the amount of information search 
declines. The problem-solver spends less time in the initiaJ examination of the 
problem and enters the information processing phase much quJcker than in a less 
stressful situation. One can observe that subjective uncertainty is inversely 
related to ttme. The greater their uncertainty the less people perceive the 
studying of •.he problem as a fruitful enterprise which can lead to a solution 
(33). 
Each person (subconsciously) knows his level of uncertaJnty which marks the 
difference be·.ween intelligent decision making and panic, between looking for 
solutions and complete confusion. He tends to avoid cue~ that can stimulate 
anxiety or o:her painful feelings. It may sometimes help a person to avoid 
becoming comp 'etely demoralized. Janis & Mann (34) recCtgnize 5 patterns in 
coping with st··ess and uncertainty in emergency situations 
1. ) Y!g.!.!m!£~ the individual is capable of e:ffecti veness in an 
uncertain situation. It generallv results in thorough 1nformation, search, 
unbiassed assimilation of new information, and effective planning. 
2.) q~£Q~f.!i£!§g !~§rti~ if the oncoming disaster is of an unfamiliar 
nature, the person is likely to generate alternatives by searching his memory in 
an effort to remember similar threats encountered by himself or others in the 
past. An effective action will be taken if the memorized alternative emerges 
into consciousness. 
3.) q~£qnf.!!£!§Q £b~g~ tQ ~ ~~~ £QYr§~ Qf ~£!!Q~: the person's aroused 
emotional state leads him to a defective coping behav1our if the danger 
materializes. His search for an effective action largely depends on this 
assessment of his own internal resources. .rf he cannot find an anst\ler, the 
person will pessimistically give up searching for a better solution, despite 
being dissatisried with the options that are open. 
4.) ~~f~~§!Y~ ~YQ!g~£~ the subject will avoid cues that stimulate 
anxiety, uncertainty, stress or other painful feelings. The person becomes 
selectively inattentive to threat cues and avoids thinking about oncoming 
danger. Three forms of defensive avoidance are distinguished 
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-the evasive form : neglecting and ignoring elementary safety precautions, 
becoming fatalistically apathetic. 
-buck passing: depending upon someone else to make the decision. It may 
take the for-m of relying on outside agents of dtmious reputatio~ if they promise 
a less painful solution than the genuine expert who insists that the person 
himself must take responsibility. 
-bolstering: ignoring available information and developing rationalizations 
which argue against evidence of its potentially unsafe features. Typical 
~'amples of bolstering are to be found among certain types of cancer victims. 
Many of them ask no questions and selectively misperceive what their physicians 
are saying. They also develop rationalizations to convince themselves that their 
worries will be over after treatment 
5.) ~;'LE~!:Y.!gi!§!!£§ in its extreme form it is popularly referred to as 
'panic'. The victim surmises that time is too short to m~te a (thorough) search 
for alternatives. He is overwhelmed by his emotions, unable to look for any 
effective action. 
Apart from the first one the other coping patterns are more or less 
defective with regard to an optimal decision making strategy. As we shall 
discuss in Chapter V, decision theory is based on the concept of optimizing 
objectives. The optimizing strategy's goal is selecting the course of action 
with the highest pay-off. Such a strategy requires estimation of the 
comparative value of every viable alternative in terms of expected benefits and 
cost. But human beings rarely adopt this decision making approach. The 
determination of all the potentially favourable and unfavourable consequences of 
all the feasible courses of action would require the decision maker to process 
so much information that impossible demands would be made on his resources and 
mental capabilities. 
As a result of personal limitations, which we concisely mentioned before, 
and various external constraints, a decisionmaker who does the best he can to 
use an optimizing strategy is still prone to use such gross miscalculations that 
he ends up with an unsatisfactory suboptimizing solution, one that maximizes 
some of' the utilities he expected to gain at the expense of losing other 
utilities (4). 
The optimizing strategy can be regarded as an excellent NO~-ATIVE modelo 
i.e. a set of standards the decisionmaker should strive for. However, objection 
can be raised against the assumption that the optimizing strategy provides an 
accurate DESCRIPTIVE model of how people actually do make decisions or solve 
problems. With a view to the obvious restrictions that underly the routine 
problem solving processes, we are inclined to assume different strategies people 
use in their decision making. 
Pitz hypothesized a strategy of "best-guess" heuristic (cited in 28). 
Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz (35) focus on inductive strategies. Instead of assuming 
the problem-solver has perfect knowledge of the task environment, they assume 
that the decisionmaker's only l!nowledge is what can be induced from the 
observation of individual instances. 
In the same line, Simon (36) hypothesizes that the decisionmaker satisfices 
rather than maxl.Ill~zes. According to Simon, people simply do not have "the wits 
to maximize". The decisionmruier looks for a course of action that is 'good 
enough', that satisfies his goals and expectations. ActuallyD he does not bother 
to compare it with alternative actions. Simon .argues convincingly that the 
satisficing approach fits the limited information-processing capabilities of 
human beings. "The world is populated by creatures of "bounded or limited 
rationality"D he says, and these creatures constantly resort to simplifications 
when dealing with comple" decision problems. Man's limited ability to foresee 
future consequences and to obtain information about the variety of available 
alternatives makes him settle for a barely "acceptable" course of action. He is 
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not inclined to collect information about all the complicated factors that might 
aff.kct the outcome of his choice, to estimate probabilities~ or to livork out 
preference orderings for many different alternatives. He is content to rely on 
a "drastically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confusion that 
constitutes the real world" (36, 4). 
Janis & Mann (4) point to a number of variations in the satisficing 
strategy. In quasi-satisficing, a moral precept serves as the sole rule when 
m~ring a decision to help someone in trouble. This person promptly takes action 
without deliberating about alternatives. He does not believe his choice to be 
minimally satisfactory, instead he is convinced that his action is the best, 
that no other course would be morally justifiable. Tversl~J (37) described his 
11elimination-by-aspects" approach as a combination of simple decision rules, 
which can be applied to select rapidly from a number of salient alter~atives one 
that meets a set of minimal requirements. Lindblom's 91art of muddling 
t.brough"(38) does not specify major goals but tries to find ends that are 
appropriate to available, or nearly available means without searching for better 
alternatives. By setting its goals at a low-scale incremental improvement the 
decisionmakers will easily be satisfied expecting that each small change will 
lead to en optimum. 
According to Janis & Mann (4) at least four different variables are 
involved in the distinction between optimizing and satisficing strategies: 
1.) The number of requirements specifying the testing rule~used to 
determine a certain course of action, is small in the satisficing strategy. 
2.) The number of alternatives is small in the satisficing strategy. The 
satisficer tests each alternative that comes to his attention; if the first one 
happens to be minimally satisfactory, he terminates his search. 
3.) Ordering and retesting of alternatives. ~1hen using a satisficing 
strategy, the decisionmaker typically tests the alternatives only once and in a 
haphazard order. 
4.) Type of testing model used. ~Jhen testing to see if an alternative meets 
a given requirement, the satisficing decisionmaker typically limits his inquiry 
to seeing whether it falls above or below a minimal cut-off point. If there is 
more than one requirementp he treats each cut-off point in the same way, as 
equally important. 
Some of these variables can be observed within the context of the medical 
problem-solving process. They will be discussed in Chapter VIII presenting the 
results of the investigation. 
But before we pass to the medical side of problem-solving, we want to know 
more of what largely creates the medical problem-solver's task environment: the 
:medical knowledge. 
Paragraph 3 
Introduction. 
The first question we have to face is whether there is such an identity as 
'medical knowledge'. There is a medical knowledge as stored in books, papers, 
patient records etc. and there is the knowledge as it is applied in daily health 
care. Are they identical? If we assume the latter lmmrJledge as being the actual 
medical kn~~ledgep we run into an ambiguity. 
On the one 'hand there is the health care as a social commodity available 
through the organized channels of society (39). In this sense medicine is a 
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social institution as well as a technical activity, and is shaped by the 
economic and sociocultural context in which it is embedded (40). On the other 
baud there is the medical care for the individual; the patient with his 
disorders a~d displeasures of life. But when medicine is dependent on 
understanding causal relations which occur, both in nature ~d in ~rsons, we 
have to admit that .these relations can change with. changing sa;»cieties, the rise 
of social and economic wellfare 9 and the supply and availability of medical care 
to populations. 
ft!Jiea'ltl (41) remarks that the ordinary disorders and di~pleasures of life 
become s~~ptoms of disease, latent disea~e, disease in remission, and even the 
syndrome of 'non-disease?. 
This all leads to what Illich calls the "medicalisatiou l,i)f life" (42). The 
basic issue, therefore, is whether health and illness are universally definable 
conditions or relativistic phenomena$ identified and labelled according to 
cultural values and social norms (43). Mechanic (44) tells about a study of skin 
disorder (dyschromatic spirochetosis) in a South American tribe in which the 
disease was so prevalent "that Indians who did not have (it) were regarded as 
abnormal and were even eJccluded from marriage". In my opinion, Sadeg;h-Za.deh 
argues this item very clearly in his editorial "Towards metamedine" (45). 
"We in medicine are always arguing the question whether 
'there is' such a thing as disease and what 'the nature of 
disease' is, while we have no concept of disease which can 
form the intersubjectively controllable basis for such a 
debate; chaotic ontologies hamper rational discussion and 
argumentation because everyone has his own explicit idea of 
disease; yet we do not hesitate to classify this or that 
phenoMenon as a disease, or this or that person as diseased; 
the boundaries between medicine and other socio-cultural 
areas remain quite unclear; hence the blind respect that the 
layman has for medicine is easily abused to permit the 
uncritical extension of medical interpretations of events to 
all aspects of human life. We daily arrive at countless 
diagnoses in numerous social fields, not only in the 
hospital or in medical practice, but also at the requests of 
courts, employers, insurance companies, school authorities 
etc.; we thns affect the lives of countless people and set 
far-reaching social processes in motion, and yet we lack a 
clear concept of diagnosis; nor does there exist any 
explicitly formulated diagnostic method which can suggest to 
us how individual physicians reach their supposed diagnoses 
8!lll!d what they understand ' diagnoses' to mean. We daily 
generate countless prognoses and etiologic statements which 
underlie our therapeutic decisions, and yet we lack an 
'dlllilderstanding of 'prognosis' and 'etiology' • The same holds 
for treatment itself because no concept of efficiency for 
its evaluation is available. In short, medicine is in danger 
of becoming supervisor of society and the controller of 
human culture, although its foundations are extrenely 
defective. 
As a consequence of these unfortunate deficiencies we 
have 20-60% or more misdiagnoses (see bibliography : Wagner 
et al. (46951), which certainly lead to at least as many 
mistakes in therapy and to malpractice. The responsibility 
for these failures is usually ascribed to the practioner. He 
or she is reproached for not applying ~the latest medical 
1mowledge'9 and it is said that keeping up to the minute 
would have helped. This is an all too primitive view for at 
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least hn1o reasons. First, one cannot reasonably require that 
specialized, complex knowledge must be applied in order to 
reach a particular goal if one does not state at the same 
time exactly what the goal is and hoti\1 the method of 
application is supposed to work. Such a demand is based, 
secondly, on the misconception that clinical practice is 
nothing other than the application of medical kncwledge. 
Third, who can assure us that the 'latest medical knowledge' 
is best? For in acquiring the 'latest' knowledge central 
notions like 'disease', 'diagnosis', 'pro~osis', 
'etiology', and 'efficiency' must again be relied upon, end 
these notions, as stated above, have an obscure m.eaning01 • 
Sadegh-Zadeh expresses his utmost concern about medicine as it stands. It 
must be an alarming thought that within thousands of years medical knowledge did 
not reach generally accepted definitions about the most fundamental elements in 
medicine. At the time of Hippocrates disease was considered to be a purely 
clinical phenomenon. It was observed directly in the patient at the bedside, and 
was identified directly, according to the observed clinical evidence, with such 
names as fever, cyanosis and consumption ( 47). Causes ·for such 'diseases' 'fi'Jere 
frequently ascribed to supernatural influences. It is probably mystics that 
hampered investigation and organisation of medical knowledge in the following 
centuries. 
The persistence of medical schoolmen, who preferred theoretic disputation 
to experimentation, did have its own influence. But it had no far-reaching 
consequences. If a patient at the beginning of the thirteenth century developed 
an acute fever, the physician would prescribe some medicinal herb. This h.erb was 
said to possess great healing powers, although unproven. When also a Pater 
Noster and an Ave Maria were recited three times , the process was further 
dependent on God~ the pbysicial condition of the patient, and chance (48). 
Nothing more could be done. 
During the 17th century Thomas Sydenham founded the discipline of nosology 
by insisting that diseases were "specific". Before that time physiciams had 
regarded each sick person as having his own specific ailment. Since then the 
classification of diseases flourished. The nosologists of the 18th ~d 19th 
century selected 'diseases' in a wholly arbi tracy manner. Each nosologist 
created his own collection of 'diseases' based on his o~~ interpretations a~d 
beliefs about grouping diverse clinical manifestations together into a cl1~tered 
entity called 'disease' or, more modestly 'syndrome'; the latter being free of 
causal explanation. (See Feinstein, 47). The innumerable personal names~ 
attached to as many diseases are still a .memory of these ages. 
But already in the 19th century some philosophers gave rise to their 
concern about the uncontrolled growth of this arbitrary classification of 
diseases. In 1822 Gilbert Blane pointed at the impossibility of logical and 
successful medical reasoning. Oesterlen formulated in his bo.ok 9 Medizinische 
I.ogik' (1852) a number of recommendations such as : "to show, clearly and 
impressively, the mode in which we must proceed in our observations~ 
investigations~ and conclusions, in order that our theorem and problem may 
become more clearly intelligible, and that we may arrive at· experimental truths 
and definite laws in our department of science, as well as at scientific 
principles of practice";. and "thus, when we speak of medical logic 9 we siiiDlply 
mean the application of the science in question to our own special province. We 
only seek by its aid to explain and develop more clearly the ways and means, the 
various processes by which the natural philosopher, the physiologist, and the 
physician are accustomed to proceed in their investigation of the phenomena, 
occurence, and influences". 
Bieganski (1894) put it straightforward into a triad of rules: 
1) a rational reconstruction of the processes of clinical diagnosis and 
decision making, with a view to understanding the nature of securing the 
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validity and truth of such endeavours; 
2) a psychological account of the processes of clinic~l judgment with a 
view to understanding the nature and securing the efficiency of such judgments; 
3) an epistemologically or psychologically based re~1s~on of actual 
clinical .approaches to medical diagnosis and decision m~ring to the end of 
greater validity, truth and efficiency in clinical judgment (borrowed from 
Engelhardt et al. (49)). 
The claims and indications of Oesterlen and Bieganski ar~ still valid, and 
their fulfilment is not yet in sight. 
In the 19th century the natural sciences came into th~ scene. They have 
become the core of the medical science, and shaped the outl?ok of medicine of 
today. But the fundamentals of medicine itself did not ch~ge. It is mainly 
based on 'ideal type' patterns. 'Ideal types' which are approximated, or assumed 
to be, by the majority of disease entities, ultimately defined by their joint 
pathology and etiology. 
Initially a physician called attention to a syndrome, a cluster of signs 
and symptoms that he had observed in his practice, or learned as a prototype in 
medical school. Sometimes even a single patient might be ex~plar - including 
some account of the course and outcome, death or recove~y with or without 
sequelae, and the like. Even in a fairly advanced state of knu9ledge concerning 
them, disease entities are at the clinical (symptomes, complaints, course) level 
that complete statistical predictability from any symptom to any other Sl~tom 
or set of symptoms is beyond our grasp (41). 
Reasoning, which considers most physician-patient encounters as unique, has 
various drawbacks. The limiting case of uniqueness, e.g., would make diagnosis 
and indeed all deductive extrapolation impossible. And if :medicine is built on 
'ideal types' and 'unique cases' what about the objectivity and general 
applicability of medical knowledge? The obvious question arising at this point 
is the following: has the medical language which describes diseases and 
syndromes really a logical structure? We have some doubts about it? (50). Does 
:medical knowledge use one common language all over the world? What do we know 
about our daily judgments? Usually we take the most striking judgments, data and 
results for pure gold and. construct with these elements our daily medical 
decisions, scientific results and explanations, the reliability of which we 
hardly have any knowledge of (51). De Dombal bitterly remarks that "What doctors 
do is moving from anecdote and aphorism into operational a.nalysisu (52). But 
most doctors consider their work not as a science but as an art. They mean that 
it is a fundamentally qualitative and intuitive form of tho~1t which is 
seriously distorted and impaired by the attempt to use the precise models of the 
natural sciences. 
Most models consider it possible to describe precise quantitative 
techniques which generate differential diagnoses on the basis of specifications 
of sympt~~ and signs. The existing tensions between the two areas in the 
medical world can give rise to rather dogmatic and inflexible standpointsj 
confused thoughts, and all too firm concllisions. nMedicine, like theology, 
cennot tolerate ignora.nce. If i.t does not know the answer, it must invent it" 
(53). 
The theory of myocardial infarction e.g. states that this disease is caused 
by acquired anomalies of the coronary vessels. The moment a case of myocardial 
infarction is found without this ano~aly the theory ought to be rejected. 
Hundreds of cases of the latter type were found, but the theory still e"ists. A 
second theory was added to the first one: a hypothesis about a temporarily 
narrowing of the vessels, which is unproven (see also 54). Especially in the 
field of medical knowledge we can quote Popper when he says that 'the old 
scientific idol of episteme, of absolutely certain, demonstrable kn~1ledge -
has proven to be an idol. » 
Perhaps it can be hypothesized that medical knowledge consists of the joint 
collection of the linowledge of every physician in the world. It could explain 
why so many physicians react so furiously when medical knowledge is criticized. 
It could explain the manifold conceptions about health and.disease. 
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Since the human body (unlike social institutions) has changed relatively 
little over the millennia, the functional norms o:f somatic medicine are 
relatively conservative. But since, understandably enough~ medicine has expanded 
its purview to include mental health and mental illness~ and since medicine in 
general :must subserve; ho~vever conservative, the determinate ideolog<J and 
ulterior goals of given societies, the actual conception of diseases caJrmot but 
reflect the state of technology, the social expectation, the division of labour, 
and the environmental conditions of those populations (55). 
These general statements about the concepts of health and disease are even 
more complicated by the physician's personal concept of a patient and his 
disease. This concept is derived from an integration in his own mind of the real 
patient in front of him and an artificial one, embodied in the collection of 
medical ~ecords from various periods over the years. But this recollection in 
its turn is distorted by psychological, social and enviromnental changes in time 
and person. It is hardly possible to distinguish at least clearly, illness fro~ 
illness behaviour, complaints of a somatic or psychological origin from 
complaints of a social origin. This mixture causes us to talk about psychosocial 
or problem behaviour, but it is the doctor's problem of not recognizing the 
appropriate parameters for each of the component symptoms and signs (56). 
The physiologist Selye suggested that what turns symptoms into medical 
problems are massive failures in adaptation on the part of individuals to manage 
the stress that accompanies these symptoms. The mere presence of fixed medical 
indicators of disorder is not as clinically relevant as the overall coping 
capacity of people to deal with the situation (57). For the physician confusion 
arises between deviance and pathology, as there are also ambiguities for disease 
and health within simultaneously biological and social conditions (58). 
This makes it very hard for a physician to cope with the patient~s problem. 
Tremendous differences (see e. g. Friedson, Mechanic, Scheff) e::dst between 
medical criteria used by the examining physicians and the relativistic 
sociocultural standards employed by lay people to identify (the presence of) 
illness. Patients entering the 'sick role' (Parsons (59)) have their own 
concepts of disease. Because the 'sicli: role·' provides a person with certain 
privileges, this concept is not free from personal values. The doctor's role is 
to define illness, confer the sick status on potential patients~ establish 
priorities, and take the initiative in evaluating health status and controlling 
health problems (60). 
Redlich (61) describes bJo stages, referred as sidr role I and II. The 
patient in sick role I assumes that 
a) he is not responsible for these changes (they are not voluntary and not 
punishable); 
b) he is e11:cused from hi:? ordinary social and occupational obligations; end 
c) he is expected to strive to get well as expediently as possible. 
Ackno'!dedged as a 'patient' by the physician, he enters sick role II, in 
which it is a'Slsumed that 
1) he will drop or modify his own system of thinking; and 
2) adopt the physician's system, especially if clear professional 
information is offered to him. 
This not only puts the responsibility in the hands of the physician, but it 
may also lead clinicians to confuse symptoms with sociocultural patterns of 
behaviour associated with help-seeking.· The distinction frequently summoned 
between illness and disease is between "what the patient feels lfJhen he goes to 
the doctor and what he feells on the way home from the doctor's office~~ is often 
denied (41). The doctor is.greatly aware of the fact that when s~~toms become 
illness problems, they are like the tip of an iceberg - a botherso~e 
outcropping of a condition which much of the time lies unobtrusively below the 
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surface (43). The physician maintains all this medical kn~wledge largely in 
terms of abstractions; that is, his concept of a particular disease is really a 
generalization of his past experience with patients he has read about or saw 
himself. These generalizations are the representation of :!)!ore or less loose 
associations of similar patients about which ~ome statem~nts may be made 
regarding common mechanisms or causes of illness or regarding therapeutic 
choice, response, and prognosis (62). 
The concept of disea.c;;e, therefore, has a strict personal ~aracter composed 
of various sources. Therefore;) ph.ysicia'ls claim that every individual case is 
unique, that individual values are involved in clinical judgment and hence no 
general approach can be valid (63). But as Scriven (63) stresses this claim is 
about on a par with "every athlete is unique end hence their perforr...nances cw:mot 
be compared1•. ~~hen physicians (and society) cannot agree on ooncepts of health 
and disease, how can we know what ~'ile are doing» how can we avoid being 
criticized about the expensive health industry. 
Thus:far, medicine has determined it goals and strategies almost exclusively 
with regard to its own interest and assumed interest of the :population. But we 
are obliged to analyse medicine as-it-stands. Most of those who have attempted 
such an analysis have avoided consideration of a fundam~ntal logical problem -
·the definition of the basic concept : "A disease11 • Diees.s~,es are regarded as 
having some sort of an independent e'dstence, though the sense in· which. they can 
be said to exist is left conveniently vague by referri!,'lg to them in such 
'Wldefined terms as "events" (64), or "entities" (Baron & Fraser (65)) or by 
regarding them as attributes of the patients (Ledley & Lusted) (62). Scadding 
(66) set forth the requisite requirements for a formal definition of disease: 
l) avoiding of tautologies; 
2) definition of relevant populations; 
3) establishment of normal standards; 
4) universal acceptance of terminolog-y; 
5) confidence in establishing the presence of each disease; 
6) flexibility to allow for modifying definition by changes in diseases 
with time. 
That means a conceptual openness; the list of indicator~ is an open list, 
in that we do not rely upon only one or a few definitive indicators; that we do 
not claim that the list is complete, because we eh~ect more advanced knrn~ledge 
to be discovered in the future. 
One of the points of pursueing this kind of questions is to improve 
clinical practice, and one way in which this might be achieved is through our 
conception of disease and to learn how it effects our ways to diagnosis. 
Medical diagnosis is a difficult and complex task largely empirically 
based and poorly understood as an intellectual task. The gap between the 
information which is present for diagnosis and the information accessible from 
memory is difficult to close even for a·highly trained general practitioner with 
substantial daily e~~osure to many disorders (67). 
One way to make diagnoses more accessible to understanding and comparison 
is to dismantle them of emotional and personal values. But according to Whitbeck 
(68) this naive view of diagnosis is that it is the scientific determination of 
the nature of the disease, manifest in a given case of illness, that it is 
value-freep and that the value issues arise only when one turns to subsidiary 
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ta.sl{s of. deciding upon treatment @lld management. But this Aristotelian vii~:w 
which declares natural objects like diagnosis to be existent prior to and 
independent of human purposes, separates diagnosis from the rest of the 
decision-making a.qd makes diagnostic reasoning often le$S accurate. The present 
difficulty is that if a patient has a problem that is not in the specialty area 
of the physician, it will not be recognized, and the diagnosis may be missed 
entirely. 
Sadegh-Zadeh summarizes what the diagnosis is not: it is neither an 
attribute, ail abnormality, a dysfunction, a pathological state or a disease~ 
nor the name of these attributes, abnormalities etc.; the recognltion of the 
patient's disease, the recognition of the 'ultimate cause', or the class to 
~1hich the patient belongs. Diagnosis is a particular statement about an 
individual and relative to the patient to whom it applies. This particular 
statement is· relative to the physician, his conception of disease~ his :medical 
knowledge, and time (69). But this gives diagnosis the status of a highly 
personal op1n1on and, therefore, incomparable to similar cases, a11d not 
accessible to evaluation. 
Newell and Simon (70) viewed diagnosis as a representation of the 
problem-solving process wherein the problem~solver (in this case, a physicia~) 
is required to examine, evaluate and select information in order to reach a goal 
(a disease specification). It requires : 
l) formal lang"Uage for dealing with complex problems; 
2) a precise formulation of the theory; 
3) a direct and unequivocal test of the theory. 
As we have illustrated beforeg in most cases these requirements are not all 
there. 
Attaching a diagnostic label to a patient is equivalent to establishing a 
similarity of the presented s1.gns and SY!l'Aptoms with prototypical patterns. But 
in the practice of :medicine the patient will not have all the described symptoms 
and signs of any of the textbopk diseases, because they are largely collective 
descriptions which are personally percepted and described. 
The individual presents usually but a tattered fragment of the full-bl~~ 
composite picture of the disease as described in the textbooks. E:~q>erienced 
physicians knot..r the variability of the prese~ted symptoms and signs. There are 
very few truly pathognomonic signs either in the sense of' an inclusion test (the 
presence of a sign quasi-proves the presence of the disease) or stronger, 
two-way pathognomicity, in which the absence of the sign excludes the disease 
(41). Textbooks, therefore, generally do not concern themselves with providing 
probabilistic information (52). The S}~tom-diaodDosis relationships are usually 
described by means of labels like never, almost never, very very seldom, very 
seldom, more or less seldom, not }{Down, and similar or different fancy epitheta 
to the positive side (71). In practice the incidence o:f the variott'::! symptoms and 
diseases is un..lu!ot>m. These figures :must be estimated from data bases of past 
patient records~ doctor's memory~ and the like. Problems arise beca~we: 
1) data collection varies in time, per patient, per physicia1r1, 
2) the conjunctions of combinations of symptoms or symptom-complexes vary 
in time, with the kind of patients, per physician. Actually one can say that 
every doctor creates his own data base which enables him to behave in a 
heuristic fashion. 
3) the accuracy of the diagnoses and their incidence is ururnown. 
Even if the measurement sectors are complete for all individualsp the 
problem of reliability of the data remains, since there are still plenty 
sources of gross errors, from patients as well as fl:'om laboratory results (72). 
Physicians linow, indeed expect their patients to be unreliable and u~predictable 
sources of information. Cascaded inference (73) stepwise inferring one 
element from the other - can lead to unreliable inference from the side of the 
physician. This is because observation (of patients) cannot be value-free 9 
without a prior conceptual configuration in mind. The patient presents his case 
no more value-free than the doctor observes it. Besidesp the fact c~not be 
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stressed that the same symptoms and signs can be seen in several different 
diseases as they represent altered pathophysiology or anatomy and do not reflect 
a specific dynamic of the disease process itself (74). And which element is 
sufficiently deviant to call "abnormal"? Symptoms and signs are sometimes 
regarded as the fundamental elements of clinical data, but they are also liable 
to observer variation, because: 
real spatients are never identical in different situations (with 
different clinicim1s); 
- possible differing interpretations upon identical information; 
differing answers are possible by the patient, ewen upon identical 
questions. 
- there might be a different framing of the questions, as well as 
- misleading answers by the patient. 
- symptoms and signs might change in the course of the illness (75). 
The patient's data end the relation between the variables seem to have a 
probabilistic rather than a deterministic character. But these probabilities are 
neither fully investigated nor is probabilistic reasoning taught to medical 
students. A medical diagnosis can rarely be made with certainty; the end result 
of the diagnostic process almost a!i'Jays gives a "most likely" diagnosis. But to 
understand the consequences of this probabilistic character of the diagnostic 
process it is of crucial importance to define signs and symptoms and diseases as 
exactly as possible. 
Medical lrnowledge seems to be composed of two parts : one part concerns the 
general and explicit kn~Jledge as it is laid down in textbooks, journalsf 
reports etc. and is accessible to everyone who is interested in this stmject 
matter. tfuether this knowledge is fully reliable and can stand scientific 
investigation is irrelevant to this description.The other part is the personal 
component of medical knowledge, which is acquired by experience in routine 
practice. 
It is especially this latter component of the physician's medical kn~Jledge 
that is greatly emphasized in the medical world. Medical education is partly 
based on experience; vocational training for family physician is largely based 
upon experience, physician-teachers are selected by their amount of experience, 
and patients often make their choice by the years of practice of the physician. 
It is believed that experience plays a major role in the medical problem solving 
process. However, this belief has never been tested nor proven. Not only 
personal knowledge cannot be assessed by objective means, but we also do not 
know the validity a~d reliability of this professional and obviously widely 
used lmowledge. We do not know whether physicians do learn from experience. 
OOore and more it has been questioned. 
Lenoir & Chales (76) state: "if, in the happy cases, experience gives 
evident knowledge (but personal and difficult to transmit) to the physician, 
among others the unreliability of the memo1;v, the dangers of too personal 
retrieval, the major role of the environment and the personal emotions they all 
together may give him a very inexact representation of the underlying pathology 
a~d the symptomatology of the illness11 • Especially in the studies of Brehmer 
(19) the effect of experience on reliable k!llowledge is questioned. Brehmer 
showed clearly that people do not learn optimal strategies from experience even 
if they are given massive amounts of practice; that people do not always learn 
from experience, at least not when the experience consists of a series of cases. 
And if we do not learn from experience~ this is largely because experience gives 
us very little information to learn from. 
People overremember their own past successes and underrate their past 
failures. Physicia~s do not realize that in their therapeutic action by choosing 
one direction they exclude the other, perhaps opposite one, without the 
possibility to reverse. A person's experience will not necessarily tell the 
truth. We have come to have what only be called a perverse conception of the 
nature of experience. i'le remember \"lhat has happened to us in the past, bow this 
thing affected us and what we did about it, but it is filtered by what we want 
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te observe, want to feel, and wanted to do about it, excluding alternatives. 
This can lead to a kind of automatism, a "habit of mind", that makes us 
believe that we will see even more things of this kind. Thus, when we have seen 
five white swans, we tend to believe that the next swan ~1ill also be "'hite (77). 
It is this inductive way of reasoning that gives medical kn~4ledge its own 
peculiar and personal character. Or, to put it in other tli'ords, the extensive 
store of medical knowledge is limited for every physician by personal 
commitment. 
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Paragraph 4 
~lliat is a medical problem? 
Patients do not present 'problems' to the doctor: they present a n~ber of 
complaints or signs \I>Jhich they observe as deviant from their normal pattern of 
physic~l, psychical and/or social functioning. From these features they present 
ol!lly a small part: the part they think to be relevant to the physiciem. They 
present the signs according to their conception of the medical world and 
medical problem-solving: their notion of 'normality' and 'nor.nal functioning'. 
But what we do not know is the portion of the total picture of signs and 
symptoms the patient reveals his physician. 
Obviously, the patient presents his unresolved problem to an in his eyes 9 
more competent and professionai problem-solver: the physician. It is up to the 
physicj.an to understand what the patient's problem is. Boshuizen & Claessen (78) 
raise the interesting question whether the physician solves the patient's 
problem or is occupied with his own diSc~ostic task. The answer is that each has 
his o~m personal problem. · 
As we have argued previously, a problem can only be perceived as a problem 
when it is assimilated into a personal puzzle, which needs a translation into a 
familiar context ill order to catch and solve it. This does not imply that the 
physician immediately perceives a course of finding a solution, but he 
recognizes it as belonging to his task envir.o1~ent. 
The patient-physician contact can be sketched as follows: 
1. ) A person experiences some troubles which become a problem by some kind 
of social process. (e.g. Lay Referral System (79) Sick role (59, 61) 
2. Based on the patient's appreciation of his problem and his expectation 
about the medical competency, he may turn to the medical care institution(s), 
c,q. the physician. 
In our opinion, it -is noteworthy that only a quarter of the people who 
experience some signs of health disturbance visits a medical institution (44) 
3. The patient presents (pieces of) his unresolved problem to the 
physicia~ expecting some advice or prescription for some course of action which 
enables him to solve his problem. However, this ideally typified procedure 
hardly ever ta~es place. According to Redlich (61) the patient is expected to 
adopt the physician's system, in which case "the doctor solves the patient's 
probl'em". The implications of this behaviour may determine - for a large part -
the attitudes of the participants towards the processes of illnesss treatment 
and health experience. 
4.) From the presented data the physician creates his ~9.n problem. This 
means that every medical problem has its own personal character. 
A medical problem, therefores is the highly individualistic translation (by 
the physician) of a highly individualistic presentation (by the patient) of a 
cmmplaint. 
Attempts to categorize and classify medical problems seem questionable. 
Different ,perceptions of health disturba~ces, different abilities in coping, 
different social and professional ba~~grounds, different education, different 
social levels (to the physician), different culture and language, and different 
appreciation of the health care system, are all factors creating thresholds in 
the appreciation of the patientps troubles. The question of who is healthy and 
\I'Jho is not is a matter of great inherent ambiguity that is actively negotiated 
between people with complaints and the other people ranging from members of the 
immediate family, friends and neighbours to people presumed to know about health 
matters because of personal experiences~ special training, or connections with 
the medical care system (80). 
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Not only the presentatiou of the j llness varies, the illness behaviour 
influences the physician's identification of the probl~ also (81, 82, 83) The 
patient's behaviour cail ·direct the physician's a:ttention to certain features 
while he neglects other ones. E.g. a physical presentation can distract the 
physician from psychical or social aspects of the ~resented illness and vice 
versa. 
ft..nother disturbing factor can be the way in which patients and physicians 
comll'!l..micate. "Talking. to people is a doctor's game th:at doctors don't play". 
This exaggeration from the part of the author illustrates the 1dnd of 
difficulties which may arise in patient-physician .contact. The extensive 
literature on patient-physician commtrnication examplifies this parti~~lar issue. 
"Doctors observe little a11d they observe badly", as Lasegue noted more than 
a century ago. This rather cynical statement points to the question of the 
precise and accurate observation, by the physician, of the symptoms E".J:~d signs in 
the patient, in order to lrnow what the medical problem iso Same studies (84 9 85 9 
86) about inter-observer (recordings of clinical observations beb1een various 
physicians) and intra-observer (recording of observations ·of one physician over 
periods of time) variabilities underscore the difficulties physicim1s face 
observing the patient's symptoms and signs. ~"ulff ( 48) expresses the 
impossibility to determine the prec:J.slon of the questioning &'"'!d examining 
procedure as the patient cannot be questioned several times about the same 
symptom without one answer affecting the other ones. Howeverp the truth 
(accuracy) of the patient's answers must usually oe taken for granted. 
The presented. health problems represent abstractions of disease 
manifestations. They are largely generalisations based on e:~t.."Perience~ and it is 
not expected that all (or even most) patients with a given disease will present 
signs and S}~ptoms which exactly match the predefined pattern. 
Nevertheless, the chief complaint, its allied symptoms, related physical 
sig~s and laboratory and X-ray information must be grouped into a category~ a 
diag~osis, a name of a disease. Having classified the disease the physicians are 
able to outline a course of action· and treatment. 
Hippocrates advises us: "From all the symptoms truren together one should 
form a judgment''. According to the Hippocratic view, clinical judgment is 
considered to be primarily a cognitive, value-free tasks applying basic and 
clinical knowledge to individual cases, to the point where value payments become 
a factor for making choice of treatment (68} It has been argued before that this 
schism between a value-free and a value-laden part is an artificial one. 
Judgment has t9 be differentiated from productive thought in that typically 
nothing is produced. Judgment :may, therefore, be identified as the evaluation or 
categorizing of an object of thought. t~en we want to try to get some insight in 
the physician's problem solving, clinical judgment can be i.4 ated as the :fo~:-emost 
attribute desired in physicians. The task of a physician is to render a 
judgment~ usually a diagnostic classification or therapeutic plan, on the basis 
of a set of data provided by the patient or the experimenter. 
Clinical judgment is an important human cognitive activity, typically 
carried out by a professional person, with the aim of the prediction of 
significant outcomes in the life of another individual. ~lhen the same type of 
prediction is made repeatedly by the· same judge, using the same type of 
information as a basis for his judgments, then the process becomes amenable to 
scientific study. Clinical judgments are a major determinant of the quality in 
medical practice. They enable us to evaluate the accuracy and the intellectual 
process of the physician's activities (6). 
It is suggested that t.he clinical judgment of a physician is, at the very 
least, related to his underlying intellectual ability, to the quality of his 
medical education and to the depth of his clinical experience (87). It can be 
viewed in two ways: an objective and a subjective way. In the fo1~er one 
clinical judgruent can be understood as occuring within an information-processing 
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syste:m 9 which has as its input a specification of observed characteristics of 
the patient and perhaps some laboratory data and as output a differential 
diagnosis (88). On the other hand clinical judgment is often viffiqed as being 
reached by intuition. 
Physicians often assert that they can only :make adequate judgments on the 
basis of actual experience and a "clinical viet1111 • 
The claim is that lin~Jledge gained on the basis of years of clinical 
experience is not reducible to explicit rules, recipes, o~ basic principles 
(49). However, these judgments are significantly influenced by the knowledge of 
the outcomes. Even some data and the notion of frequency evokes the physicisn's 
judgment upon only a faci.J alternative outcomes. Scriven (63) cynically re:mGJr~rs 
that most judgments are like astrological advice, they are perfectly 
reconcilable with any outcome. This simple fact explains the vast power of 
faghion in even the field of the family physician. Goldberg (6) comes to the 
conclusion that clinical judgments are: 
a·.) rather unreliable; 
b.) minimally related to the confidence and the amount of experience; 
c.) relatively unaffected by the amount of information available; 
d.) rather low in validity. 
While the relatively few investigations of judgmental stability have 
concluded that judges show substantial inconsistency in their judgments over 
time9 the vast majority of reliability studies P~ve focussed upon judgmental 
consensus and have come to widely disparate conclusions (89). 
Oskamp (89) found that the judges' certainty about their decisions is 
entirely disproportionate to the actual correctness of th~se decisions. The 
increasing feelings of confidence as the clinician works through a case are not 
a sure sign of increasing accuracy for his conclusions. 
So called clinical validation, based on the personal feelings of confidence 
of the clinician, is not adequate evidence for the validity of clinical 
judgment in diagnosing or predicting htDan behaviour (89). 
According to Komaroff (54) 9 the rather loTt.r validity of clinical judgments 
may be attributed to the disturbingly "soft" :medical data. These data are 
defined, collected, and interpreted with a degree of variability and inaccuracy 
which falls short of the standard which (knowledge) engineers expect from most 
data. Va.x·iability in the medical history may stem from the patienes description 
of his illness~ the physician's conduct of the interview, of the d.ynavnic 
interaction between the patient a~d the physician during the course of the 
interview. The physician~s conduct may be reflected in his selection of 
questions to ask. Several ~filters' will affect the data. collection and 
interpretation. Komaroff (54) distinguishes a number of ~filters' like: 
motiy~:t,,!on~1 'Qia§§~ : physicians have a tendency to recognize evidellJ!ce 
which supports a position already taken~ and to disregard contrary evidences; 
£Q~iiiY§ 11mitat!QQ§ resulting in bias in data interpretation and 
decisionmaking. Tversky and Kahnemann (90) listed a number of such properties 
lilte : 
a.) representativeness the mind fails to mali:e proper quantitative 
assessment of immediate experience~ 
b.) availability : the mind fails to recall pertinent past experience. 
c.) anchoring and adjustment: the .mind places undue emphasis on its 
initial estimate. 
§1tu~1!Qna1 f~£tQrs like pressure of time, exhaustion and other 
psychological or organizational distractions. 
It is because of the rather pessimistic view on the law validity of 
clinical judgment, and the relation to the optimization of medical care, that 
some people turned to a search for a more objective way of investigation and 
assessing clinical judgment. In their view (based on Decision Theory) cuesp 
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preferably independent from each other, can sequentially be processed by a 
number of statistical procedures. These models are :formally analogous to 
decision models and cm1 be considered as possible process models for clinical 
decision maldng (7). These models may serve a'S examples or stand.a:~.nds for 
physician~s problem-solving, because several :models do a rema:drably good job of 
predicting human judgments. These researchers, howevew, forget that although 
physician's procedures perhaps sometimes fall short because of a nv~ber of 
o1ases, the medical data to be processed are beyond desirable accuracy also. 
Here the two concepts split. The clinical decision-m~ters believe that improving 
and optimizing the data-processing strategy eventually will lead to a~ jmproved 
clinical judgment. PeysiciansJ however~ believe that they use the more or less 
accurate cues in a variety of - most nonlinear - ways. They sv~gest that thsy 
are accustomed to these ''soft" data and are able to ply their strategy to the 
case at hand. 
Researchers on medical ~ecision-ma~ing have attempte~ to capture these ways 
with more and more complex equations (91). These researchers expected: 
l.) judgments to be sensitive to configura! in:fonnation 9 and 
2.) judgment to be based on a weighed additive summation of information 
(7)• 
Physicians, however, mould their configuration, of symptoms and disea~es, 
to their own knowledge and opinions. Not only do they trru~slate their knowledge 
ir.rto personal degrees of association betli'l1een symptoms and diagnoses (71) but 
they also consistently indicate that in patient descriptions in which there 
existed a correlation between symptoms it was more likely that disease 
occurred than in patient descriptions, that did not preserve the correlation 
(7). This latter finding contradicts an independent cue model. 
These notions are reflected in clinical practice, where different (groups 
of) doctors will attach different diagnostic labels to the same patient. 
One explanation is to assume differential knowledge between vario~9 groups. 
Another explanation is that different groups of physicians will give differing 
definitions of the same situation and that this would be the explarJ~ation of 
multiple diagnostic labels (23) The former explanation will find some support by 
the study of Nobrega et al (92) who investigated the records of 138 patients. 
They fou..V!d that: 
49% of the items were not listed in the medical history; 
43% of the items were not listed in physical examination; 
25% of the suggested lab tests were not requested; 
30% of the special diagnostic procedures were not done; 
21% of the treatments were not prescribed; 
86% of the follow-up items were not recorded. 
Especially, while physicians were educated to try to e."'l:plain all clues by 
one diagnosisp it certainly can be a hard job to recoll'lstruct the physician's 
jud.g}nents. ~11hen we assume that physicians reason. by analogy of past e~q>erie:aces 
differential knowledge .may be the expla..vtatory result. 
The high incidence of. social and behavioural problems, especially in 
primary health care, can lead to confusion in physicians. The lack of a 
structure for these types of data, forces the physician to choose between data. 
Thereby it is important to kn~J which he will leav~ out and which he will 
include. Frequently this is an intuitive process accompanied by a state of 
uncertainty. 
tVhy is there so much case-to-case variation even among the more 
e2q;erienced physicians? (93). Wb.y are judgmental accuracy and confidence not 
related to one another? (6, 89). Why is the amohnt of available information and 
diagnostic accuracy not related? (89). Why are e2cperience of the physician and 
judgmental accuracy not related? (6~ 94~ 95). ~~y do physicians not rely on 
prior probabilities (prevalence or incidence of symptoms and diseases) but o~ 
attribute similarity and are judging by representativeness? (93) 
Several explanations are given in literature. Not scientific explanations, 
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but rather assumptions, ha~ches. Medicine is a good example of ill-structured 
problems. Ill-structured problems are the ones in which initial and final system 
states are often not known. Hereby the space of possible sohltions is large so 
that general method~ of searching this space are likely to be unproductive. 
Success in solving ill-structured problems depends 0n having . good 
problem-solving heuristics and large amounts of well organizeii!., domain specific 
knowled.ge (11). 
This latter condition contrasts l'l7i th the domain of more general physicians 
like family physicians and general internists. They must struggle with many 
unresolved and difficult clinical and non-clinical issues~ They are subject to 
such things as observer variability, dehumanized data, abse~ce of desig1:1ation 
c1~eria and deficiencie~ of medical information dealing with patient care (96). 
They often rely on deficient prototypes, some a~sumed correlations~ or rewember 
relationships becat~e of some common denominator which may be rather obscure on 
superficial examination of the actual logic used at the bedside. 
This is, according to Ma'So:n & · Bulgren (cited in 97) , the e~t:perience of 
which physicians are proud of. This is what appears to be th~ artistic ability 
in the practice of medicine and why it :may seem to many physicians that they are 
gifted in :maldng correct decisions without definable data a11d why they profess 
that rare diagnoses can be correctly made when no statisticiap would dare stick 
out his neck on the basis of the data (97). They overestimate the importanc~S 
they place on minor cues and they underestimate their reliance on a fe;t :major 
variables. 
Barrows and Be~net (74) were amazed that by almost all physicians the 
judgment was reached before all the available data from the patient had been 
obtained. But hotrJ can a physician in a real life situation know that he has 
obtained all data? How can a physician distinguish relevant from irrelevant 
data? RovJ can he memorize these data? Kleinmuntz (94) demonstr(Stted that data not 
related to the physician's mental hypothesis or di8.cdnosis are totally forgotten 
by the physician. During physicia_~-patient interviews doctors often ask the same 
questions twice or thrice» and cease to inquire further when a stereotype 
pattern had come to his mind. 
It is this type of deterministic reasoning that ha{S intrigued mcmy 
investigators. They argued that owing to the inherent uncertainty of a 
diagnostic task, the problem solving task should be perfoxEed in a probabilistic 
way. Since the late fifties a lot of effort has been invested in constructing 
probabilistic diagnosis rules. Regrettably, much less has been done to revise 
rational tools for evaluating them (98). These efforts could only be of 
norEative origin, because nobody taught students and physicians really "how we 
do t-Jhat we do". There are rules of thumb, there are options aLf!d there is 
19experience'\ and "intuitionn j but how all this '11orks in practice is rather 
uncertain (99). 
If probabilism should play a part, it had to be invented before it can be 
detected. Besides, the advantage of a deterministic way is that it can restrict 
the problem space quicker than the probabilistic way. A positive answer can be 
most rewarding. In 27 different diseases the symptom nosebleeding is mentioned, 
not in another 3225 ones. In positive finding, ass~ing that it is 
pathognomonic, you select 27 diseases, in negative, 3225 (15). Moreover, man 
is very bad in making probabilistic estimates {100). 
People largely rely on estimates from inferred frequency of occurrences or 
assumed resembl611Dlces in their :memory of "experience", usuaily based on striki11g 
successes of gross failures. Every physician ha~ anecdotes about brilliant 
examples of clinical insight, but which of · us has a logbook with validated 
counts on our own or anyone else's long-term track records? {63). ~!Jhen people 
have to learn about the validity of their judgment, they will not have acccess 
to all four outcomes (true positive, true negative, false positive, false 
negative (See Chapter V). Then, it may not be surprising that people have not 
leerned the optillillal way of coping with tasks of this sort. 
It illuminates an important difference beb1een the expert in prad::ice and 
the expert as often pictured in literature or folklore. The epitome of the 
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expert in fiction is the detective who, thro~gh superior deductive powers and by 
sheer force of logic, organizes ·the facts at hand in a way that lead to a 
single~ inevitable conclusion. By contrast~ the realworld physician seems to 
rely much more heavily upon "g'Uessing", his initial hypothesis being typically 
based on precious little data. These 1'guesses" are apparently prompted by 
patterns of clinical findings. The physician then tl}ies to demonstrate the 
correctness of his "guesses", I!loving to net'IY hypothe~es only if his initial 
impressio-ns prove untenable (101). 
These two conceptions of reasoning processes in medicine raise the question 
of strategies, methods or procedures in medical problem-solving. 
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Impl:lci t in the definition of th.e diagnostic process is the assumption that 
there: is an t.mder·lying sb.·ucture, preferably a logical one. Au; sketched before, 
hoNever~ this str.ucture is hardly h·:nowa~ and, to say t.h.e lea~t, uncertain. The 
way in li1lhich. doctors thir.<k is thus a matter of some speculation. Perhaps 
physid.ane; behave "heuristically11 (102) or in an "inductive algorithmic fashion 9' 
(103) i pe;:-ha(p~s. by the pay-off's of the presumed outcomes (102) ~ p.erJ:r._aps they 
thin].~ in matl?,emathical sets 81'1d symbolic logic (104). Several speculations about 
physicisms' thought processes have been made. They almost all have one thing in 
col.ml1on: the conviction that the clinician's description of what it is like for 
lhd.lli to :mruc:e clinical dia>.tnoses is a rationalization (88). 
Gene:::·ally, v,;e ha~;e no access to higher order reasoning processes. 
Re·t:rospecti·'ile desc:dptions a-re largely flawed by hindsight verification. In 
sem~ct of a. theoretical structure of clinical :medicine, and of diagnosis in 
psrticu1:a:r ~ most models b·y to im:n:ate a process the nature of which we are 
largely ig11or.m1t (105). One ca.?! roughly d.istin&.ruish two types of investigation: 
a.) an information processing approach: formalized modelling of rational 
and logical medical processes; 
b.) the "real-life" process approach: observation of patient-physician 
encounter and/or physician's thought processes in a real or simulated situation. 
The former approach encompasses studies in the field of statistical and 
artificial intelligence t-Jays of decision-mrudng. This :matter will be discussed 
in chapter V. 
The real-life studies encircle a variety of studies ranging from 
intervietniing physicians to descriptions of pathophysiological processes. 
Especially these studies are confronted with the question: 'what is medical 
proble~ solving?' Two definitions were found in literature~ both by Sadegh-Zadeh 
( '"91) ' iCI<:..> " 
t\11ledical problem- solving is, 
1. ) z·Ji.rhe st7m total of the mental and non-mental activities undertaken by 
the physid.an in helping a patient ~,1ho consults him; and 
:2o) A reconstructive and constructive inquiry into the fotmdations, 
strUJ.ctu:ce e_ud processes of clinical judgment". 
'I'he latte!i.· definition forces us to a m.o:rre precise and detailed 
circumscription of the features of the medical process. Some elements of the 
foUY.l!dations and structu:rre of clinical .judgment are described concisely. We are 
l]O'l\F i:r.d:;erested in its processes. The number of investigations into the processes 
is :.~dither small. lt~fl.ost aids to decision-making and human thinking are devised 
without 'W."ltd.erstanding the process they aided - the thought process itself. The 
p:rrospect before us nooJ is that we shall tmderstand that process." (106). ~~we 
need to fir·st tsearch for a<"'ld then analyze the individual physician, preferably 
the p.lbtysici~:om that can outperform normative formulae (63). The problem to 
clinical diagnosis resides in the tmclarity of what should in fact be diagnosed. 
If Oklle really thinks diseases differentiable by :means of individual 
symptoms or git~oups of symptoms or even contrasting then one must attempt to say 
hy 11Jhich c:dteria one can recognize a particular disease (Proppe,cited in 49), 
becc~tl~J.e: 
l.). only identical criteria all0>'\1 a comparison both with the lmowledge 
s tm.·ecl in o!De 7 s o~;vn experience a:.i1d the one in literature. 
2.) only identical criteria allo'V'J an increasingly important communication 
with colleagues, especially about the inference for prognosis and therapeutical 
3.) oDly identical criteria, acknowledged by all persons concerned, about 
the concept(s) of disease allo-1'-' judgments in the medical aild social world (107). 
Gross (107), in fact. susl-rs for the recognition and description of those 
elel!11eE'Jd.:s h1 the diag-nostic proces upon which unequivocal consensus is reached. 
He ask;s for the 19atoms 11 of the clinical process. The question is i:f we CB!Jil :find 
and ii.Necognize these atoms. Newell .g, Simon's theory (70) emphasizes that rational 
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problem solving is characterized by the adaption to the problem to be solved. 
Since it is adaptive, the behaviour of a person solving a problem tells us more 
about the structure of the task than about the process or the personality 
dynamics of the problem solver. 
For real-life studies, therefore, there are at least two conditions: 
a.) a clearcut circumscription of the task defining its 'atoms'; and 
b.) a description of the characteristics of the medical process in order to 
recognize these features in content analysis. 
The most important and ambitious ,real-life' study on medical 
problem-solving is, unquestionably the one by Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka (108). 
In a 'high fidelity' simulation 24 physicians interrogated three "patients", 
actors, each of them playing a •iifferent role. The physicians were allowed to 
collect data in any sequence thev wished. The actor had no fixed script beyond 
the opening statement of the chie~ complaint. Data beyond the verbal mode, e.g. 
physical examJnation, laboratory results etc. were provided by an assistant. 
Between medical history and the provision of the other data a "natural break" 
was provided. The scene was videotaped for reasons of "stimulated recall"~ a 
method in whJch the candidate is ·~onfronted with a playback of his procedure(s) 
and is stimulated (by an interviewer) to think aloud about each step of the 
replayed videotape. 
The structure of the task, the elements and characteristics of the three 
diseases were only briefly communicated in the book. The determination about the 
relevancy of a certain symptom to a disease or a hypothesis (so-called 'cue') 
was delegated to a judging-committee of experts. Neither explicit criteria for 
the relevancy (weights of a cue) of the symptoms nor the number of items in the 
task structure were described. 
Elstein et al. used three units of analysis of the process: information 
search units, cues and hypotheses. Information search units were all elements 
that seek information or instruct patients regarding their present of previous 
illness(es) of psychical or ::JOctal baclrground. Symptoms asked by a physician 
which were apparently not related to any diagnosis or hypothesis in the 
scope of the investigators were listed in a different manner. Hypotheses, 
although not defined, served as stepping stones which could be manipulated by 
specific questions towards a satisfactory diagnosis. The process was supposed to 
proceed along a logical, sequential, deductive line. This hypothetico-deductive 
method is ''a nearly universal characteristic of human thinking in complex, 
poorly defined environments" (108). 
In our opinion the paucity of results partly reflects the limitations 
within the research model. Nevertheless, one of the major achievements of the 
Elstein c.s. study is the approach, the development and the methodology of a 
simulation study of medical problem solving. Their 'high-fidelity' simulation 
model proved to be a sound basis for this type of investigatic,n. 
Another major achievement is the insight in the course of hypotheses during 
the worlr-up. First of all there is the hypothesis gen<:·ration early in the 
work-up of the case. These hypotheses have, as was expected, not a broad and 
vague character but are closely circumscribed, which must be attributed to an 
associative process with materials of past knowledge stored in memory. 
The other hypotheses generated during the worlK-up of the case did not 
always follow the logical, sequential system of the first one. They give rather 
the impression of hunches induced by some data. Although this observation does 
not substantiate the foundations of deductive reasoning, Elstein et al.P 
nevertheless, speak of a hypothetico-deductive method in a 'hypothesis-driven' 
process. The investigators found the performances of the physicians to be case 
specific, which is a substantiation of the Newell & Simon theory about the 
adaption of the individual to the problem. 
The propositions of Newell & Simon were, however, explicitly made for 
rational human problem-solving, in the frame-work of 'objective' or 'accessible' 
knowledge as contrasted to 'personal' or 'tacit' knowledge. In the former type 
of reasoning one can expect a deductive outcome of the inference process, in the 
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latter type an inductive one. The personal and subjective character of an 
'inductive outcome' poses a dilemma. On the one hand the problem orientation of 
the solving process, on the other the personal task concepts and subjective 
appreciation of the problems. 
Feinstein (47) notices that different problems have different structures 
and demands. People can learn to solve them all, but a theory of problem-solving 
must firstly be a description of how different kinds of problems are solved. 
Descriptive studies of physician's thought processes are small in number. 
The first attempts to elicit diagnostic decision-rules were based on personal 
interviews. Kleinmuntz (94) investigated inference-rules for patient's profiles 
by using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Wortman (14) 
interrogated a neurologist for his thought processes on solving patient's 
problems. His description of hierarchical structures in memory formed the basis 
for various decision models. Goldberg (109) studied psychologists on MMPI 
profiles, and constructed a model of linear inferences. 
However, the biases inherent to verbal reports on mental processes have 
been vividly reported by Nisbett & Wilson (100). To our knowledge Barrows & 
Bennet, (74) were the first to use simulated patient scenarios in studying the 
problem solving processes of physicians. Smith & McWhinney (110) studied family 
physicians and general internists for some striking elements in their 
problem-solving behaviour as confronted with simulated "patients". Gale & 
Marsden (111) confronted 22 final year medical students and 44 physicians with a 
real patient. The interviews were videotaped and reviewed for content analysis 
to reveal the specific thinking processes involved. 
Gerritsma & Smal (112) studied 12 family physicians and 12 general 
internists by means of a written simulation on a limited number of features in 
problem-solving behaviour. 
Along a different line some investigators tried to relate physicians' 
opinions to pathophysiologic disease-processes. These models make use of 
knowledge of the patho-physiological inter-relationships in the a~sease or 
disease-class under study and the physicians' opinions with regard to these 
relationships. They try to link symptoms to the disease in a logical system. 
Examples of these studies are: 
Edwards (103) studying a logical system for dysphagia, de Vries Robbe 
(113) nephrologies! diseases and Van der Werf (114) about physician's opinions 
on gastric symptom-disease relationships during the last century. 
In our opinion, both lines have to be amalgamated in order to come to 
reliable observation of physicians' thought processes. To observe these 
processes a model is needed. A model which enables the investigator to perceive 
features and landmarks in the problem-solving process thusfar unknown. A model 
can also prevent wishful thinking of the experimentalist. 
To our knowledge, only a very few models have been developed to map the 
physician's problem solving. Apart from the models of formal decision making, 
there are some models like the ones from Hull (115) and McWhinney (116) in 
family medicine and more general ones from e.g. KleiP~untz & Kleinmuntz (35) 
and Reichertz (117). 
The existing models are largely based on the traditional view of clinical 
medicine, or upon decision theoretical concepts. The developments in human 
problem-solving theories are scarcely met in models on medical problem-solving. 
A similar lack can be observed with regard to the foundations of scientific 
reasoning. 
From general sources it has been indicated that most physicians reason in 
en analogical way. Several analogies springing from the physician's memory as a 
result of past experiences are related to the target problem. The incomplete 
mapping between the aspects of the memorized case and the present one may 
harmfully influence the inference process. However, according to Gick & Holyoak 
(118), subjects often fail to notice the relevance of a strong analogy to a 
target problem when a hint to use the story is not provided. Do people just 
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'stumble' upon an analogy, or do they use a specific search program? How 
complete or ·defective are case characteristics stored in memory, and·hm"1 
complete or defective are the mapping' processes? In analogical reasoning 
processes we may distinguish three interrelated activities: 
1.) comparing one instance to another; 
2.) deriving a schema for a class.of instances; 
3.) comparing an instance to a general schemata. 
~.IJe discU.Ssed that schemata, and especially general schema, are hardly 
provided in medicine. It may be concluded that the analogical reasoning 
processes must have a highly personal character. Not a logical or algorithmic 
way of reasoning is present, but an inductive and heur~_stic way. Kleinmuntz & 
Kleinmuntz (35) described their viewpoint into a model of two types of 
strategies: 
a.) Heuristic Decision Strategy: it uses heuristics to arrive at a 
diagnosis and then picks an acceptable treatment. This st.rategy considers people 
as satisfiers, who indulge in .. limited amounts of search, until a satisfactory 
rather. than an optimal solution is reached (see Simon~s Satisficing theory) .• The 
general procedure is to develop a hypothesis about the patient's disease and to 
try to confirm the hypothesi~. It assumes that only positive evidence is sought; 
b.) Generate & Test Strategy: it is a concise itinary of the for.mer 
strategy. The problem-solver does. not even bother about symptoms and signs but 
chooses a treatment that happens to come by. 
We do really hope that this latter strategy does not stand for the ordinary 
physician. But we can surely fall behind Lusted (119) who wished: 9'0ne could 
hope that a small group of problem solving strategies would u:nderly all medical 
di~~osis and treatment. However, if such strategies exist they are not yet 
U..'ldlerstood." · 
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CHAPTER III 
In science we can distinguish two main ways of reasoning : deductive and 
inductive. The use of scientific methods in medicine seems obvious, because 'the 
power of science is to make contact with reality in nature by recognizing what 
is rational 1n nature! (l). (The question of metaphysical aspects is beyond the 
scope of this study). We can regard as scientific any purposeful human activity 
designed to provide tentative and refutable hypotheses about the nature of 
events, which means, in clinical medicine, the name of a disease explanatory to 
a number of observations to the patient. According to Feinstein (2) the 
diag~ostic reasoning in modern medicine is a process of converting observed 
evidence into the names of diseases. The evidence consists of data obtained from 
examining a patient and substances derived from the patient; the diseases are 
conceptual medical entities that identify or eJq>lain abnormalities in the 
observed evidence. The diagnostic reasoning also comprises the strategy and 
tactics to evaluate evidence, select manifestations and adjll!Dctive tests, 
evaluate them, ru1d ultimately choose the name of the diagnostic entity. 
But these strategies and tactics as inference processes in a problem 
solving situation are largely unkno~m. Inference processes~ especially the 
everyday inference, may be viewed as a reflection of a more general contrast 
that can be drawn between explicit and implicit inferences. Inferences that 
underlie a scientific way of reasoning are often slow, voluntary, and at the 
forefront of awareness; they are explicit. The inferences that underlie the 
daily process of perception and comprehension are rapid, and outside conscious 
awareness: they are implicit (3). 
Most patient-physician encounters seems to be of an implicit character. 
Physicians appears to dig into their bag of cognitive tricks, and use whatever 
strateg~ seems most appropriate in a particular situation at a given moment. 
This varied repertoire used in medical inference has not yet been decomposed 
into sets of formal procedures, nor has it been shown to be decomposable in such 
a manner (4). Because of this implicit character physicians are largely unable 
to accurately break down their diagnostic thought processes into explicit, 
understandable steps. Neither can they appeal to the fact that there is a 
generally accepted problem situation, for there is no such thing as the one fact 
that is generally accepted. 
It seems that the whole process of diagnosing and confirmation ultimately 
relies on our o~m accrediting of our own vision of reality.The physician is 
merely drawing a portrait of his conceptually prefigured conclusions, while he 
does not lmow how he arrived at them. This is the usal process of unconscious 
trial and error by which we feel our way to success and may continue to improve 
on our success without specifiably knowing how we do it, for we never meet the 
causes of our success as identifiable things which can be described in terms of 
classes of which such things are numbers (1). We can e.g. assimulate a symptom 
as a clue if we believe it to be actually useful to our diagnosing. The act of 
personal knowing can sustain this relation only because the acting person 
believes that it is apposite; that he has not made them but discovered them. The 
effort of knowing is then guided by a sense of obligation towards the truth: by 
an effort to submit to reality. 
Moreover, since every act of personal knowing appreciates the coherence of 
certain particulars, it implies also submission to certain standards of 
coherence. All personal kn~wing appraises what it knows by a standard set to 
itself (1). This reappraise that we credit ourselves with much wider cognitive 
pmvers than an objectivist conception of knowledge would allow, but at the same 
time reduces the independence of human judgment far below the extent claimed 
traditionally for the free excercise of reason. It is also useless to accumulate 
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more evidence unless we can first master what has been given so far (1). 
We still continue to feel that there is some consistent relation between 
our beliefs and the factual evidence presented to us. We can regard this (with 
Hume) as a mere habit, without acknowledging any justification of the 
convictions expressed by this habit. The reflecting person is then caught in an 
insoluble conflict between a demand for an impersonality which would discredit 
all his commitment (to the case) and an urge to make up his mind which drives 
him to recommit himself (1). In this sense there will always be some discrepancy 
between someone's belief and the truth. Bertrand Russell defines 'truth» 
cynically as a coincidence between one's subjective belief and the actual facts; 
and it is impossible to say how. the two could even coincide. 
The answer to this dilemma may be that the actual facts are accredited 
facts, as seen within the commitment situation, while subjective beliefs are the 
convictions accrediting these facts as seen non-committally by someone not 
sharing them. Most of the time physicians do not reconsider their assertions 
(diagnoses, therapies), because of their personal commitment to the statement 
they have made. Reconsidering the statement means denying one's personal belief 
in it. The utterance "I believe p" expresses more aptly the heuristic 
conviction, while "p is true", will be preferred for affirming a statement taken 
from a textbook of medicine. So we would never use a hypothesis which we believe 
to be false, nor a policy which we believe to be wrong. 
But this means to Polanyi (1) that any act of factual knowing presupposes 
somebody who believes he knows what is being believed to be known. This person 
is taking a risk in asserting something, at least tacitly, about something 
believed to be real outside himself. Any presumed contact with reality 
inevitably claims universality. And universality opens possibilities for 
creating a system, a rational one based on scientific logic, or a system based 
on subjective beliefs. The remarkable stability of the latter one is based on 
two factors: objections to the (system of) beliefs can be met one by one, 
because of the circularity of such systems any contradiction between 
experience and one mystical notion is explained by the reference to other 
mystical notions. 
The second aspect of stability arises from an automatic expansion of the 
circle in which an interpretative system operates. It readily supplies 
elaborations of the system which will cover almost any conceivable eventuality, 
however embarrassing this may appear at first sight. Some scientific theories 
possess these self-expanding capacities. Nevertheless, the inborn urge of every 
human being toward universality, the claim of subjective experience to be 
applicable as a law of nature to all people, or at least a large group of 
people, is obvious. It is partly based on the conviction that we applied solid 
and accurate observation, and that we correctly inferred the conclusion from 
the data. 
It is tempting to think that accuracy of observation automatically yields 
improved certainty of predictions. Accurate observations are · essential to 
accurate predictions, but certainty is another matter. The certainty of a 
conclusion is the certainty of the weakest link in the chain of deduction, i.e., 
of the least certain premise (5). The rules of inference, largely implicit, are 
like maxims: they can serve as a guide to the practical knowledge of an art, but 
they cannot replace the knowledge (1). 
Practical wisdom is thought to be more truly embodied in action than in 
rules of action. The physician's action is considered more authentic than what 
he says he is doing. Without explicit knowledge of the rules, the practioner is 
more like a connoisseur. And connoisseurship, like skill, can be communicated 
only by example, not be precept. It would be science's prime concern to elicit 
these rules. But, as Medawar (6) says, "one cannot but wonder at the fact that 
scientists themselves are so seldom deeply interested in scientific 
:methodology." 
A scientific theory must refer to the mechanisms of nature, not just to the 
quantitative results obtained by studying those mechanisms in action. (5). It is 
assumed that in logic we study the ideal form of reasoning. This form includes 
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trying to find the rules for valid and sound arguments, rules which can direct 
our thought in the pursuit of truth. What we want to avoid above all else is the 
drawing of false conclt~ions from true evidence. The point where one starts in a 
piece of reasoning will be those statements or principles which one supposes one 
knows~ or for the moment pretends one knows in order to see what are their 
consequences (5). 
It also tells us that a physician, in the supposition a hypothesis or 
conclusion based on observed evidence to be true, mv~t be able to predict a 
nL~er of elements or positions to be correct; he then forms his law and tests 
it against the evidence. The active perceiving physician can fall, at least, 
into possible traps with regard to the presented evidence: subjectivity and 
error, which can give: l) a correct satisfaction of normal standards; 2) a 
mistaken satisfaction of normal standards; 3) action or preception satisfying 
subjective, illusory standards; and 4) mental derangement issuing in meaningless 
action (1). 
Building his 
physician can go 
~11e can distinguish: 
diagnostic system from observed evidence and lmmded.ge, the 
astray with regard to the application of the inference rules. 
l) correct inference within a true system; 
2) erroneous conclusions arrived at within a true system (like an error 
committed by a competent physician); 
3) conclusions arrived at by the correct use of a fallacious system. This 
is an incompetent mode of reasoning, the result of which has subjective 
validity; 
4) incoherence and obsessiveness: an 
systematic delusions (1). 
erroneous reasoning in a system of 
There are several traps which can lead the doctor to fallacious prediction. 
It requires a firm conception of explicit rules, to elicit the medical reasoning 
process, or, as Popper says, ,in order to deduce predictions one needs laws and 
initial conditions: if no suitable laws are available or if the initial 
conditions cannot be ascertained, the scientific way of predicting breaks down. 
Paragraph 2 
Levine's hypothesis theory states that the basic assumption is that, in 
solving any problem, the subject samples hypotheses from a universe of 
hypotheses until the problem is solved (7). According to Harre (5) science has 
1LS origin in a cloud of conjectures about how things go on. This body of 
hypotheses is progressively whittled down by the work of experimentalists whose 
results falsify certain of its components. This view contradicts the so-called 
Bacon's myth: a scientific method starts from observation and experiment and 
then proceeds to theories. Bacon's method rested on the induction by simple 
enumeration. Collecting all sorts of cold, warm and intermediate temperatwred 
bodies and elements he hoped by listing all the qualities of these bodies and 
elements to find (induct) universal laws of nature with regard to heat. 
It must be said that he himself abandoned this method and adapted another 
inductive process: induction by elimination, without changing the fundamentals 
of his theory. Contrasted to this conception is the deductive way of reasoning 
which starts with theories as "bold ideas, unjU.'Stified anticipations, and 
speculative thought as our only means for interpreting nature" (8) and from 
theory a downward eh~lanation to the facts. Every experiment to the explanation 
is planned aCL10n in which every step is governed by theory. Obviously we deal 
with two types of hypotheses: inductive and deductive ones, according to the 
ways of reasoning. 
Inductive hypotheses cannot be regarded as scientific as in an 
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hypothesis-deductive reasoning process (5). In the inductive c~e many facts can 
lead to many laws, all equally correct, because they are derived from the same 
source, the acquired facts. One of the postulates in induction is leading to a 
solution according to the Principle of Simplicity: only the simplest law should 
be accepted, a law that proves itself upon the acquired facts, which in their 
turn give rise to a law etc. (circular reasoning). In medicine the improving or 
the deterioritation of a patient is based upon a prediction which covers only a 
(limited) number of facts. Every alteration of the facts can generate a series 
of hypotheses each justified and verified by the underlying facts, especially 
when they are so vaguely worded that they might with equal facility explain a 
dozen other disabilities as well. Their complete lack of logical immediacy 
deprives them of any serious explanatory power (9). 
In the deductive way a hypothesis is like the premise of an deductive 
argument, and as soon it has been explicitly formulated it can be elaborated 
into a theory and tested deductively. If the predicted consequences do not 
follow, the hypothesis can be rejected as an explanation. This is the essence of 
the hypothetico-deductive method (7). 
The crucial question, however, is where the hypotheses come from in the 
first place? The traditional answer is opposed to the deductive method: they 
come from the method of induction. Reaching a hypothesis, let 5 s say a bold 
statement, including predictable consequences, dema~ds a certain amount of 
information, although it need not to be derived from systematic observation. For 
problem definition an insight in the case is needed. Without this information it 
is only "jumping to conclusions". Popper's emphasis on bold conjectures 
necessarily disregards the .kinds of ~aywards thinking in which conjectures may 
have their origin. 
We believe that there is a personal universum of hypotheses from which a 
(or some) particular hypothesis(es) arise(s) when confronted with a 
(recognizable) problem. In this way, a hypothesis can be thought of as a draft~ 
and the everyday scientific process consist essentially of examining the logical 
consequences of hypotheses to see if what results from them or what they predict 
does in fact correspond to real life. In this process falsification - in effect 
disproof is logically a stronger process than corroboration, which always 
falls short of completeness, so that no general hypothesis, however solidly 
established it may seem to be, is even proved beyond the possibility of further 
critical examination or questioning (6). 
Opposite to this conception of falsifiability is the view that hypotheses 
can be refashioned in the light of the degree of correspondence with reality of 
their implications and logical predictions. This conception couples a universal 
statement (hypothesis) to a probable correspondence to (finite number of ) the 
facts. According to Popper, probability hypotheses do not rule out anything 
observable; probability estimates cannot contradict, or be contradicted by a 
basic statement; nor can they be contradicted by a conjunction of any finite 
number of basic statements; and accordingly not by any finite number of 
observations either. 
Let us assume that we have proposed an equal-chance hypothesis (50-50% 
being right or wrong) for some alternatives ; e.g. that we have estimated that 
tosses with a certain coin will come up '1' or '0' with equal frequency, so that 
F(l) =F(O) = l/2; and let us assume that we find, empirically, that '1' comes up 
over and over again without exception; then we shall no doubt abandon our 
estimate in practice, and regard it as falsified. But there can be no question 
of falsification in a logical sense. For we can only observe a finite sequence 
of tosses. But this means that probability hypotheses are unfalsifiable because 
their dimension is finite (8). Every hypothesis may not be falsifiable but it 
might be in a unilateral way falsifiable within a probability segment, say - a 
certain amount of time. When a certain observation does not come up immediately, 
it can be said that it falsifies a probability statement unless the boundaries 
(of time) are infinite, which they aren't practically. 
In these cases the test to the hypothesis can be temporarily defined as 
verified; a verification made for the existential consequences. It stands to the 
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basic statement in the relation which appears to be characteristic of 
probability statements. But this also means that any critical verification of a 
scientific statement requires the same powers for recognizing rationality in 
nature as does the process of scientific discovery and deduction, even though it 
exercises these at a lower level. Unfortunately, when philosophers analyze the 
verification of scientifi~ laws, they invariably choose a specimen of such laws 
as are not in doubt, and thus inevitably overlook the intervention of these 
powers. They are describing the practical demonstration of scientific law, and 
not its critical verification (5). 
But can a hypothesis itself form an element of a sequence of hypotheses? 
One way of interpreting it would take, as elements of such sequences, the 
singular statements (constituting. the hypothesis) which can contradict, or agree 
with, the hypothesis. The probability of this hypothesis would then be 
determined by the truth frequency of those among these statements which agree 
with it.But this would give the hypothesis a probability of l/2 if, on the 
average, it is refuted by every second singular statement of this sequence.There 
are two expedients to that: 
- an estimate of the ratio of all tests passed by it to all tests which 
have not yet been attempted.But here this estimate can be computed with 
precision, and the result is always that the probability is zero; 
- an estimate upon the ratio of tests led to a favourable result to those 
which led to indifferent result -which produce no clear decision (8). 
The reason why this attempt fails is that the suggested definition would 
make the probability of a hypothesis hopelessly subjective; the probability of 
an hypothesis would depend upon the training and skill of the experimenter 
rather than upon objectively reproducible and testable results, as defined for 
deductive reasoning. 
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Paragraph 3 
A special technique in trying to solve certain sorts of problems is 
deductive inference. For medicine this method has been clai~ed to be the only 
possible one (Elstein et al. 10). A valid deduction is one in which the 
conclusion is a logical result of the premises: if the premi13es are true, then 
the conclusion is necessarily true. It is usually state~ in the form of a 
syllogism: 
All Greek are mortal (Major Premise) 
Socrates is a Greek (Minor Premise) 
Socrat.es is mortal (conclusion) 
Or in a more abstract form : 
Vx (Px -- Qx) 
Pa 
Qa 
Deductive reasoning means: from theory to facts. This can be examplified 
physically and medically. The physical example is borrowed from Braithwaite, 
describing the Galilean system. 
The system has one highest-level hypothesis: 
I Every body near the earth freely falling towards the Earth falls with an 
acceleration of 32 feet per second per second. 
From this hypothesis follows: 
II Every body starting from rest and freely falling towards, the Earth 
falls 16 t2 feet in t seconds, whatever number t may be. 
From II there follows in accordance with the logical principle permitting 
the application of a generalization to its instances, the infinite set of 
hypotheses : 
Ilia Every body starting from rest and freely falling for 1 second toward 
the Earth falls a distance of 16 feet. 
IIIb Everybody starting from rest and freely falling for 2 seconds toward 
the Earth falls a distance of 64 feet. And so on. 
In this deductive system the hypotheses at the second and third levels 
(II,IIIa, IIIb) follow from the one highest-level hypothesis (I); those at the 
third level (Ilia, IIIb) also follow from the one at the second level (II). 
The hypotheses in this deductive system are empirical general propositions 
with diminishing generality. The empirical testing of the deductive system is 
effected by testing the lowest-level hypotheses in the system. The confirmation 
or refutation ' of these is the criterion by which the truth of all hypotheses in 
the system is tested. The establishment of a system as a set of true 
propositions depends upon the establishment of its lowest-level hypotheses. E.g. 
when the distance in hypothesis III is different from 16 feet, the hypothesis -
and, therefore, the whole system- must be rejected (9). 
The medical example is derived from Scandellari & Federspil (11). They 
describe the 'Thyreoid' System: 
1. which patient with an autonomous thyreoidal adenome has tachycardia? 
(Explanandum); 
2. the thyreoid gland produces hormone capable of augmenting the cardiac 
pulse rate, if not otherwise diseased. This patient presents a thyreoidal 
adenoma. This adenoma produces a raised amount of hormones(Explanans) ; 
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3. this patient has tachycardia because of a rai~ed serum hormone-level 
(Conclusion). 
Although the form is the same, the differences with the former example are 
striking. E.g. the highest-level hypothesis cannot be a universal one. Not every 
patient with a thyreoidal ad~noma has tachycardia. Besi~es, the question rises 
whether the patient is an exemplar from a parti~ular population. The 
second-level hypothesis can only function as explanatory when the condition "if 
not otherwise diseased" is added. As the exact figure for the raised amount is 
not defined, this hypothesis can only be a probabilistic one. From the second 
and the lowest-level hypotheses several propositions can follow, all to be 
submitted to severe tests. 
Although the form looks like a deductive one, the m~thodology certainly is 
not deductive. The various level hypotheses do not follow unequivocally from 
each other. Instead, a supernumerary hypothesis (heart otherwise diseased) is 
added. But to do this would be to make the observed fact$ evidence for a set of 
hypotheses which includes one which played no part in their deduction from the 
set, and would then make them indirect evidence for the supernumerary hypothesis 
and for its consequences. Since the supernumerary hypothesis might be any 
generalization whatever, this would have the undesirable result that any 
observable fact would be indirect evidence for anY generalization whatever.To 
avoid this result one has to stipulate that each of the highest level hypotheses 
in a system must be necessary for the deduction of the lower level hypothesis in 
the system. Similarly, two syst~g whose sets of highest level hypotheses have 
no hypothesis in common, must not be conflated (9). 
Symptoms indicating different diagnostic hypotheses, especially differing 
organ systems, can only be explanatory to any of the specif1c hypotheses 
considered in the . particular case. Where in the lowest-level a general 
proposition (of the II-level) is applied to a special case (the application 
principle), the deduction of II from I is made by using integral causal 
relationships as laid down in medical science itself. The derivation from I to 
II is implicit to the medical knowledge base. Regrettably, there are only few of 
this kind of logical derivations in medicine. Struggles in this area can be 
examplified by the attempts of Betacque & Gorry (12) and de Vries Robbe (13) in 
nephro-pathology. The derivation from II to III comes from knowledge on the 
basis of statistics from specific populations of this particular disease. It is 
the conjunction of the two knowledge bases which give rise to many medical 
problems and shows the trifling results of medical decision making. 
The general characteristic of a deductive system is that the logical 
strength of the hypotheses increases with the height of their level. Sometimes, 
although each of the hypothesis at a certain level is weaker than the one 
hypothesis at the next higher level (from which they are all deducible), yet the 
conjunction of them all is equivalent to the highest level hypothesis. This 
will happen when there are a limited number of special cases of the higher level 
hypotheses, each of which is asserted by one of the lower level hypothesis (9). 
One of the main purposes in organizing scientific hypotheses into a 
deductive system is to mrure direct evidence for each lowest level hypothesis 
indirect evidence for all other lowest level hypotheses; although no amount of 
empirical evidence suffices to prove any of the hypotheses in the system, yet 
any piece of empirical evidence for any part of the system helps towards 
establishing the whole of the system. The ultimate testing of a hypothesis is 
against a particular case. The hypothesis system consists out of a number of 
levels, the highest being the most general one, the lowest the most detailed. 
(The levels in the medical diagnostic system will be discussed in chapter VI). 
The system can be described as: (with a slight modification to Braithwaite) 
1) according to the evidence the underlying disease is of origin A (the 
pathophysiology of an organ or organ system). There is e. g. a lung disease, or 
there is a hyperfunction of the thyreoid gland). From this hypothesis follows: 
2) the observed evidence (symptoms and signs) can only be explained by the 
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B explanation of the A origin.The former diseas8 can e.g. only be explained by 
an inflammation of the lungs, the second by nervousness, we&kness, sensitivity 
to heat, sweating, restless overcapacity, weight loss, tremor, palpitation, 
stare, lid lag, and exophthalmus ( the Merck Manual, 12th ed.). 
3a) in case of B explanation there must be a C test of D level confirmative 
of the B (e.g. the demonstration of pneumococci in the sputum of the patient, or 
a raised blood level of thyreoid hormone corresponding with a certain weight 
loss). 
3b) In case of B explanation there must be a C test of E level (E F." D) 
refutative of B (e.g. when microorganisms of the origin Baqt. pneumococci are 
demonstrated there cannot be a raising antibody titre for a different 
microorganism, or, a raised blood level of thyreoid hormone i$ not a consequence 
of glycosuria in case of weight loss). 
Tested against this particular case: 
fl in all cases of A disease the level D of test C is within the range R 
(e.g. above a certain number of microorganisms, or, more than x pounds of 
weight-loss.) 
gl : in this case the level D of the test C is within the range R. 
The conjunction of fl, and gl, which conjunction will be called an instance 
of a hypothesis, support the hypothesis.But it may be clear that this one piece 
of evidence is insufficient to prove the hypothesis. It would only do so if the 
hypothesis were a logical consequence of the conjunction gl with fl. This is not 
always the case. It is perfectly possible for the hypot~esis to hold in this 
instance, but to be false as a general proposition. This is the case however 
many times the hypothesis is confirmed. However many conjunctions of gl with fl, 
g2 with f2 etc. have been examined and found to confirm the hypothesis, there 
still will be unexamined cases in which the hypothesis might be false without 
contradicting any of the observed facts. 
In suitable cases we may say that the hypothesis is established by the 
empirical evidence of its instances, but it never proves it in the sense that 
the hypothesis is a logical consequence of the evidence. The situation is 
different if gl is observed false. For the conjunction of not-gl with fl is 
logically incompatible with the hypothesis being true. Calling this conjunction 
a contrary instance of the hypothesis, we may say that a hypothesis is proven 
false, or refuted, by one known contrary instance. 
From the examples it may become clear that where in the pneumonia case 
there is some logical system, in the thyreoid case this internal logic is 
absent. Not only there is no unambiguous explanation of the symptoms to the 
disease, there is also no obligate weight loss in all cases of thyreoidal 
byperfunction. So it seems that a deductive system is not only case dependant 
but also subject to the state of medical knowledge. Where several underlying 
pathophysiological processes are unknown or partly known, it is hardly plausible 
that deductive systems can be built or function in medical problem solving 
practice. 
Paragraph 4 
We often say: "Well, it is just plain logic!" explaining some problem to 
another person, without realizing that our explanation is only our 'logical' 
interpretation of the problem. Obviously this type of 'logic' is different from 
the 'logic' in the deductive system. The common, daily 'logic' is a 'logic' 
stripped from nearly all conditions, consequences and precautions as attached to 
the deductive form. It expresses an insight, a firm belief in one's own 
statement, being not only casual but of general importance also. 
Inductive inferences are supposed to be based on observations, and they are 
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more general than the observations on which they are based. E.g. "red sky in the 
morning, shepherd's warning". From having frequently observed the conjunction of 
two events (colour and weather) we feel compelled to assert a connection between 
them. As Hume pointed out, there is nothing else than 'habit' or 'custom' to 
justify induction. It has no logical warrant. In the 17th and 18th centuries, 
especially in the Anglosaxon sphere, inductive inference was supposed to provide 
the method of the empirical sciences. Philosophers ~uch as Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), and John Stuart Mill (18.06-1873) formulated ~;t variety of methods to 
secure its validity. Bacon formulated two types of inductive inference: 
1) iHQY£iiQH Q~ §imE!~ ~num~r~tiQn~ In order to find the real character 
of heat, Bacon listed all ~orts of cold and warm bodies, objects etc., ·hoping 
that one day a "happy thought", would present itself. From this "happy thought" 
he expected to find various laws which stepwise could be constructed to some 
sort of 'logical system'.Later, Bacon himself castigated induction by simple 
enumeration as "childish and puerile". This kind of induction draws conclusions 
by counting positive instances of the association between events. Bacon ·himself 
proposed another type: 
2) induction Qx ~!iminatiQH~ This induction must analyse nature by proper 
rejections and exclusions; and then after a sufficient number of negatives come 
to the conclusion on the affirmative instances. 
Inductivism treats laws of nature as general statements of correlations 
among phenomena, and evidence as particular statements of correlations among 
observables(5). Unlike the hypothetico-deductive, it merges the distinction 
between acquiring a hypothesis and submitting it to test. As Medawar put it: 
"Inductive logic embodies both a rite of discovering and a ritual of proof". 
Karl Popper points out that answer can only be given to questions; they do not 
emerge in some mysterious way from the assembling of data. When we collect data 
we do so with an implicit or explicit question in mind. Popper makes this point 
for his students: "My experiment consists in asking you to observe, here and 
now. I hope you are all co-operating and observing! However, I fear that at 
least some of you, instead of observing, will feel a strong urge to ask: what do 
you want me to observe?" (14). 
Observation is not an unprejudiced principle, but it conveys an a priori 
conception of nature. Inductivism is a complex of beliefs of which the salient 
points are: Truth lies all around us in Nature, so that the scientist's main 
task is to discern and record matters of fact and then to classify and appraise 
them according to certain more or less well-defined rules - whereupon the Truth 
will certainly reveal itself (6). 
Now it will become obvious from a logical point of view that induction 
leads to circular reasoning. Hypotheses arise from experience which in its turn 
becomes evidence to test the hypothesis that has generated from this evidence, 
and so on. To justify an inductive hypothesis we should have to employ inductive 
inference; and to justify these we should have to assume an inductive principle 
of a higher order,etc. These attempts to base the principle of induction on 
experience break dotm, since it must lead to an infinite regress (8). Indeed, 
inductive judgment cannot be justified in the way deductive judgment can. The 
judgment may very well be true, and serve as a guide to action, but it cannot be 
shown to be true. The fact that it works tells little about its truth, it just 
tells us that it works, an!i the explanation why it works may be very different 
from what we think it is (15). But why, you will ask, so much attention to a 
method which seems scientifically inferior? The answer is that inductive 
reasoning is the most frequently applied way of thinking in daily life.The 
weather forecast, the politician's utterances, as well as the physician's 
predictions, almost all are based on inductive reasoning. We have got acquainted 
to it. We have learned this way of reasoning implicitly from parents, at school, 
from newspapers and television etc. It has, as Hume said, become a 'habit of 
mind'. 
And, indeed, what is more appealing than looking about and observe, and 
while observing the hypotheses as universal laws of nature come to you all by 
themselves. But the 'habit of mind' also make us believe that we can predict 
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things on the mere ground of assumed foreknowledged similarity. It is far from 
obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring 
universal statement, from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any 
conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false, no matter how many 
instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the 
conclusion that all swans are white (8). 
Nevertheless, the prediction that the next swan we sh~ll see is a white 
one, can momentarily fulfil the demands of plausibility, our reasonable belief. 
It is in this direction that philosophers have created conditions to strengthen 
the method and conclusions of induction. An important exponent of the inductive 
method is John Stuart Mill. He created "Mill's canons": (as described by Harre 
(5). 
I Th~ £~On Qf ~gr~~~n~ If two or more instances of the phenomenon 
Wlder investigation have only one circmustance in comon, the circumstance in 
which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given 
phenomenon.E.g. if patients suffering from an infectious disease have the same 
bacteria in common,the particular bacteria is assumed to be the cause of this 
specific infectious disease. 
II ~he £§nQn Qf giff~r~n£~ : If an instance in which the phenomenon under 
investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur have every 
circumstance in common save one, the one occurring only· in the former,i.e. the 
circUmstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the 
cause, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon~ E.g.if two 
depressive patients, both from the same types of family and social back~round, 
differ in their marriage relation, this relation is assumed to be the cause or 
the effect of the depression. 
The method of agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be 
eliminated is not connected with the phenomenon by any law. The method of 
difference has for its foundation that whatever cannot be eliminated is 
connected with the phenomenon by a law. These two main canons Mill offers as the 
principles or among the principles of inductive reasoning, for, having found the 
cause we have found the law, or so he thinks.Here are principles by which we can 
pass from facts to general laws (5). 
These canons illustrate the typical character of inductive reasoning: the 
first canon stands for a heuristic search program eliminating those symptoms and 
signs which are not consistent with an a priori statement. The second canon 
tests this statement for internal consistency in order to confirm it. When there 
is more than 1 causal factor, one has to do another e'~eriment, with the 
exclusion of one (or more) of the factors involved. 
So every stage or cycle in the physician's reasoning process is an 
experiment in including or excluding a (number of) factors. The dilemma is when 
there are actually two or more factors equally involved in the case under 
investigation. One can assume a ranking order, according to probabilities or to 
define some ranking order. But this again leads to a series of new experiments. 
This is one of the reasons why Popper postulates the inductive reasoning as to 
be leading to infinite regress. 
And if we find another, a third, fourth etc. factor, how can we be sure 
that these are the explanatory factor? We judge by force of certainty, whether 
we are sure or not. Our belief in this theory will depend on how certain we are 
that we have uncovered the true mechanism. Whether any particular application of 
Mill's canons yield information of value is determined by how good a theory we 
have to explain the processes we are investigating. It looks as if Mill's canons 
are at best a preliminary to deeper studies of scientists (5). 
We cannot assume laws produced by inductive reasoning as true. Suppose the 
only reason for believing an inductive law is the experiment one did. But there 
is nothing in (most) experiments that leads us to think that we would get 
similar results in another year, or in another place, with another person etc. 
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And yet enunciating the results as laws certainly suggests a strong expectation 
that the process under investigation has worked according to this pattern and 
will always do so (5). Doctors follow tracks of past sucpesses or failures with 
the supposition of repeating patterns in similar circumstances. And inevitably, 
the "laws" based upon coincidences or faulty experiments, almost always turn out 
to have exceptions. Harre listed the arguments of inductivism into three 
principles: 
l) the 2ri~£ipl~ QI ~cc~glat!Q~ 
knowledge base does not alter the latter. 
: augmenting kpowledge to an existing 
2) the pri~£i2!~ Qf inductio~ inference of laws from acc~lated 
singular facts can lead to the inference of true laws. The laws of Nature are 
the codified and generalized facts. As Mach put it: "They are the mnemonic 
reproduction of facts in thought;,. In modern science the operation of this 
principle is often seen in the effort to obtain numerical data and then find 
(mathematical, statistical etc. ) functions to express th~; 
3) t!!~ P!:i~£iple QI !~st~£~ £Onfi!:JIIatio!! : our belief in the degree of 
plausibility of (or our degree of belief in) a law is proportioned to the number 
of instances that have been observed of the phenomenon described in the law. 
Braithwaite (9) constructed a range of degrees of belief and the 
possibilities for sufficient criteria for ·the validity of an inference. 
Braithwaite recognizes three grades of belief: Belief, reasonable or rational 
Belief, and Truth. Belief is taken generally: the subjective, intuitive feeling 
of being right. We speak of reasonable Belief when the Belief forms part of the 
believer's rational corpus, or when that belief in the conclusion will 
inferentially be supported by the belief in the premise. 
These grades can be combined with three features of the inductive inference 
process which are: 
a) the premise, the assertion of the evidence for the inductive hypothesis, 
i.e. the successful past application of induction; 
b) the assertion of the effectiveness of the 'inferential policy' leading 
from the premise (a) to 
c) the conclusion of the inductive inference. 
Combination leads to ten possibilities for the validity of an inductive 
inference, which can be grouped into two headings: 
§gQj~£!iY~ Y~!!g!!~ Qf !h~ !~gg£!!Y~ h~Q!h~§!§ 1 when the person 
subjectively believes the effectiveness of the inferential policy; 
QQj~£tiv~ y~!!4!t~ Qf ih~ ingg£!iY~ h~Qthes!§ 1 when the effectiveness of 
the inferential policy is true. 
But whatever corollaries have been described, it does not alter the fact 
that the inductive statement remains part of the private and personal thinking 
processes individuals use to solve their - scientific - problems. The facts upon 
which the hypotheses are based, are not genuinely independent. We can believe 
them, or reasonably believe. them, but they are private and do not form a public 
domain of knowledge. If they are public facts they are affected by all sorts of 
influences, particularly from previous knowledge, and upon which their exact 
form, and our confidence in them, depend. Inductive hypotheses, therefore, are 
not 'strictly valid', but they can attain some degree of 'reliability' or of 
'probability' . 
Are there any possibilities 
we scientifically corroborate the 
process? Several people suggest 
the dilemma between our natural 
demand for refutation. 
to establish this 'degree of probability'? Can 
inference andd the conclusion of our reasoning 
that "Probabilistic Reasoning" can help us in 
inclination to confirmation and the scientific 
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Paragraph 5 
The number of techniques for analysing data has increas.ed enormously over 
the past decades. These techniques are almost all based on the probability 
theory, and they have beeri developed so as to end up wit~ some kind of 
inference, some statement about .the real world. The concept of probability, 
however, is rather abstract and hence the question arises: what is the 
interpretation of the notion of probabiliity in real world situations? In 
answering this question we reach the foundations of statistics and, as is the 
case in many sciences, it is precisely here that differences in opinion appear. 
The foundations of this concept have been object of much discussion. Different 
interpretations have resulted in different axiomatic systems. 
If one asks a scientist whether the term "probability" as used in science 
always has the same meaning, one will find a curious situation. Practically 
everyone will say that there is only one scientific meaning: but when one asks 
that it to be stated, at least two different answers will come forth. The 
majority will refer to the concept of probability used in mathematical, or 
'objective' statistics as it is generally applied in the natural sciences. There 
is, however, also a minority of those who regard a certain subjective, 
non-frequentistic, concept as the only scientific concept of probability. 
Usually we distinguish three types of probability: 
1) Objective, or mathematical, or statistical probability; 
2) Inductive probability; and 
3) Subjective, or personalistic probability. 
1) In the simplest cases, probability .in this sense means the relative 
frequency with which a certain kind of events occurs within a given reference 
class, customarily called "population". This theory of probability originates 
from gambling problems. In such situations the follot..ring definition of Laplace 
applies: " The probability of an event occurring is equal to the ratio between 
the number of cases favourable to this event and the total number of possible 
cases, provided that all these cases are · mutually symmetric". This latter 
requirement places a serious restriction to the general applicability of the 
statistical probability as we shall discuss later on. 
2) Inductive probability is aScribed to a hypothesis with respect to a body 
of evidence. Inductive probability measures the strength of support given to a 
hypothesis H by E (evidence) or the degree of confirmation (or credence) of H on 
the basis of E. The hypothesis may be any statement concerning unknown facts, 
say, a prediction of a future event: tomorrow's wheather, the outcome of a 
planned experiment, or the therapeutic plan for a patient. Any set of known or 
asstimed facts may serve as evidence; it consists usually of the results of 
observations which have been made. 
3) Subjective probability can be viewed as a subsequence of the inductive 
probability. It introduces intuitive weighings into our analysis. The 
personalistic probability model is characterized by a number of consistency 
requirements. It is just in this respect that this model has been criticized. We 
cannot expect that our intuition will automatically obey such requirements. For 
repetitive events, it is quite possible that the observable relative frequency 
will be completely different from our original intuitive feelings. 
We shall now discuss these concepts more in detail. 
Statistical or objective probability, or probability' of kind of events, 
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characterizes an objective situation; it is a translation of statistical laws. 
It .is the mathematical approximation of the conceptions of events governed by 
chance. It is a theory of certain chance-like or random sequences of events or 
occUrrences i.e. of repetitive events of similar character and in similar 
circumstances. T~e second part of Laplace's definition refers to this 
requirement of randomness. In a sequence of events each event has a certain 
character or property e.g. a number on a die, head or tail of a coin. In a 
sequence of die-casting (n) the property six comes up a certain number of times 
(a). The ratio between the number of occurrence of the property and the number 
of casts is the Relative Frequency a/n, e.g. in case of the die-casting l/6. 
It is easily understodd that when the sequence of casts becomes smaller and 
smaller, the "n" approximating to 1, the outcome of the calculation of the 
relative frequency will change respectively. The presumption of a relative 
frequency of 1/6 for the die-casting can only be made aSsuming the sequences to 
be infinite. So there is another element we have to know about a sequence of 
events: the way the property is scattered within this s~quence. We shall assert 
that the property six will come up a number of times i:Q a random fashion. When 
we depote the property six as 1 and the non-six as 0, the sequence of events can 
be represented as follows: 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 I 1 0 1 0 1 
The scattering can be noted as: 
1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
number of casts. 
Here we have a new sequence, which is called after Popper, The Sequence of 
Relative Frequencies (8). The two estimates, Relative Frequency and Sequence of 
Relative Frequencies, or property probability, can be calculated under the 
assertion of a number of conditions. 
Von Mises made a substantial contribution by defining the conditions 
relevant to the frequency approach iil probability theory. These conditions are 
known as Von Mises' axioms which run as follows. 
1) "Random" experiment in finite sequences. Definition: A random (or 
chance) phenomenon is an empirical phenomenon characterized by the property that 
its observation under a given set of circumstances does not always lead to the 
same observed outcome ( so that there is no deterministic regularity) but rather 
to different outcomes in such a way that there is statistical regularity. By 
this is meant that numbers exist between 0 and 1 that represent the relative 
frequency with which the different possible outcomes may be observed 'in a series 
of dbservations of independent occurrences of the phenomenon. Thus the empirical 
law of stabilizing relative frequencies holds for this phenomenon. 
2) A "Random" experiment implies "stable" relative frequencies. but these 
frequencies depend on n (as mentioned before). The empirically established fact 
that relative frequencies stabilize in long sequences of trials is of utmost 
importance because it has become the basis of a frequency definition of 
probability. To be more precise; the frequency (or objective) interpretation of 
the probability formalizes the property of stabilizing relative frequencies. 
3) The impossibility of a winning gambling system. To put it differently, 
we study sequences which are "iinpredictable" or "random". 
People often deny this requirement. People are very much inclined. to assume 
orderly patterns where, actually, randomness is the case. Most gamblers assume 
some kind of order in roulette, many people predict an observed trend to 
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continues in the future. All this implies a reference to a type of orderly 
patterns which such events can simulate only by coincidence. To test the 
probability of assuming that they have taken place, there is the method of Sir 
Ronald Fisher for establishing a contrario to the reality of ap orderly pattern. 
This raises the question whether orderliness is merely a coincidence or a 
man-made assumption. If our appraisal of order is an act of personal knowledge, 
exactly so is the assessme~t of probability to which it is allied. This is, of 
course, quite evident when the ordered pattern is contrived by ourselves (1). 
If gambling is continued long enough (infinite sequence), the relative 
frequencies in the sequence of the cases supposed to be favourabie will approach 
the same limits as those in the sequence of all casts (lim ni/n = p. n _oo ). 
Probability, according to Von Mises, can, therefore, be aefined as the 
limit of relative frequency in a collective (this term will be defined in the 
next condition). Polanyi's statement about orderliness refers to this axiom, but 
differs in the sense of personal imposed orderliness versus the coincidental 
randomness to be overcome by assuming unlimited boundaries. 
These conditions lead to the following definition of a collective. 
4) A QQ!!~£tiy~ is a long sequence of identical observations, each 
observation leading to a definite numerical result, provided that the sequence 
fulfils the two conditions: existence of "stablei• frequencies and "randomness". 
As can be inferred from this definition, Von Mises replaces the infinite 
sequences condition by a finite one. Within the finite sequence of reasonably 
long extension it also defines the limiting frequencies and the randomess. It 
sets the conditions for samples as they are drawn from their parent populations. 
Probability calculus teaches us to compute the probability distributions in 
derived collectives from given distributions in the collectives from which have 
been derived. By means of four operations (place selection, mixing, partition, 
and combining) the new collective can be derived from a given one (19). 
However, one can raise several objections to the Von Mises' theory, which 
fall under two headings: the axiomatic structure and the applicability of the 
theory. The objection to the first heading is put into words by Jeffreys who 
stated that "a definition is useless unless the thing defined can be recognized 
in terms of the definition when it occurs. The existence of a thing or the 
estimate of a quantity must not involve an impossible experiment". This 
objection is very serious because the notion of probability as defined by Von 
Mises is completely hypothetical, being a limit in an infinite sequence. It is 
an abstraction; it can never be verified nor falsified. 
The applicability of a model requires that the model has its counterpart in 
reality. This implies that there are two relevant aspects for the connection 
between model and reality. Firstly, we need input for the model, i.e. certain 
theoretical variables should be given values derived from reality. Secondly, 
conclusions derived from the model should be translated back to the real-world 
statements. In Von Mises' probability model this means that from a finite number 
of observations we should be able to derive the probability values in the 
collective, and from the probability values in new collectives we should be able 
to derive properties of finite samples (19). 
Our question should be whether there is any possibility to conclu4e 
anything logically about the relative frequency of occurrence of a particular 
event in a finite sequence of elements otherwise than in case of the relative 
frequency will be close to the probability p of that event. But what shall we do 
when that frequency is not approximately. equal to p? To this end, in our 
opinion, implicitly two rules have been introduced. 
a) An event with a very low probability of occurrence will not occur at an 
individual trial; and 
b) All probability properties (e.g. distribution functions) are introduced 
~ ~!:iQ!:i • 
In a frequentistic, or statistical, sense the first rule is often, 
-62-
implicitly, applied. This situation can be compared with a lottery: if the 
number of winning tickets is small in comparison with the total number of 
tickets (low relative frequency), it is thought to be impossible for any ticket 
to be a winning one. Nevertheless there must be some winning ticket. Von Mises' 
axioms restrict the domain to the application of mass phenomena where experience 
has taught us that rapid convergence exists, i.e. the frequency limits are 
approached fairly rapidly. It might be clear that this situation is not often 
met in medicine. 
Sometimes a statement of statistical probability ref~rs not to an actually 
existing or observed frequency, but to a potential one, e.g. the probability of 
obtaining a six when casting a die. There are two possible outcomes: 
where sufficiently long series of casts were made the relative frequency would 
be approximately 1/6 (objective probability); 
as a guess whether the next cast will be a six then the only conjecture can be, 
a six or not, so the probability is 0.5 
The second outcome refers to the probability p of a die falling six, where 
six is a property in a sequence. This probability is of course a probability in 
an appropriate. collective. What we need is the probability distribution in that 
collective which is the theoretical counterpart of the casting of a six, noting 
its p-values and putting it back in the urn (sequence). Here we see how a 
probability distribution, which is often called the prior distribution of p, is 
of importance because the required probability depends on it. Unfortunately this 
distribution is usually unknown. The theory can be saved by the remarkable fact 
that the influence of the prior distribution decreases with n and finally 
becomes negligible. This is the fundamental reason why inference for large 
numbers becomes possible without knowing the prior distribution exactly, which 
follows from Von Mises' theory. Probability statements about single observations 
or events are excluded by the theory. This implies that it is meaningless to say 
that the probability of a die falling six in the next cast is equal to 0.5 or to 
speak of the probability of a certain individual dying next year without the 
speci£ication of the distribution which is, as we already know, in contradiction 
with Von Mises' third condition. 
Bayes' theorem, as a law of large numbers, seems to solve the problem 
because roughly speaking, it says: if, in one set of observations, n being a 
large number, the relative frequency of success (casting six) is equal to rn , 
then we expect ~!!h gr~~! £~r!~!n!~ that p is equal torn. This means that in 
the derived collective {p. , r } the majority of elements possess an inferred p. 
value close to n. /n. BJt lo2ically nothing concluded about a specific element~ 
out of the colleciive. For a specific element the theory admits the possibility 
that p. deviates substantially from n ./n. We should, therefore, realize that 
when a 1prior distribution is unknown we h~ve to determine how large n should be. 
Probability statements only make sense if we are able to define a collective. 
The existence, however, of a collective is purely hypothetical. It can be said 
that the idea of a collective is an assumption. But if we do make this 
assumption we run into the following problems: 
1) all probability properties (e.g. distribution functions) must be 
introduced a priori; 
2) the number of observations is usually so small that many assumptions 
cannot be verified; 
3) it is usually impossible to increase the number of observations because 
of structures changing, time is running out, or because of ethical obstacles 
etc. 
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4) in this way we construct procedures which lead to solutions consistent 
with the a priori assumptions. 
With the latter problem we run in a circular reasoning process. And there 
is no way of knowing whether we are far from reality or not. 
In medicine we meet a number of obstacles with regarp to the objective 
probability approach among w~ich are: the acquisition of "sufficiently" large 
numbers and the unequivocally defined similar properties. Moreover, physicians 
are actually interested in the question whethe.r the next patient has a 
particular disease given a certain amount of evidence. This situation is 
ascribed as Inductive Probability. Inductive Probability mea~ures the strength 
of support given to a hypothesis H by E (evidence) or the degree of confirmation 
(C) of H on the basis of E, which takes the form of 
C(H,E) = r 
or the quantified subjective probability C(H,E) = r is the degree of credence an 
individual X believes a hypothesis H being true given the evidence E. 
The hypothesis may be any statement of a future event. Any set of known or 
assumed facts may serve as evidence; it consists usually of the results of 
observations which have been made. In this sense, inductive probability theory, 
as it is developed by Carnap, is a principle of learning from experience which 
guides, or rather ought to guide, all inductive thinking in everyday affairs and 
in science (16). It expresses ·in quantitative terms our confidence in the 
outcome of a particular process(l6). 
The Degree of Confirmation (C) is sometimes reflected in a fair betting 
quotient, and studied as such. To say e.g. that the hypothesis H has the 
probability p (say 3/5) with respect to the evidence (E), means that to anyone 
to whom only this evidence but no other relevant knowledge is available (the 
principle of "fair bet"), it would be reasonable to believe in H to the degree p 
or, more exactly, it would be unreasonable for him to bet on H at odds higher 
than p I (1-p) ( in the example 3 : 2). A probabilistic diagnosis is such a "fair 
bet system". 
In most cases in ordinary discourse, even among scientists, inductive 
probability is not specified by a numerical value but merely by the fact as 
being high or low or, in a comparative judgment, as being higher than another 
probability. Every inductive probability judgment is related to certain 
evidence. Probability as understood in contexts of this kind is NOT frequency. 
If we want to know the outcome of a proposed action, or the plausibility that 
the next cast of the die will be six we have to assume an orderly trend which 
contradicts the objective probability theory. The same can be said about the 
prediction whether a hypothesis in a scientific system may be true or false. 
This type of (inductive) probability belongs, strictly speaking, not to science 
but to the methodology o:f science i.e •. the analysis o:f concepts, statements, 
theories and methods. It does not occur in scientific statements, concrete or 
general, but only in judgments about the strength of support given. by one 
statement, the evidence, to another, the hypothesis, and hence about the 
acceptability, the credence; of the latter on basis of the former (16). 
Inductive probability can be defined as a way of judging hypotheses 
concerning unknown events. In order to be reasonable this judging must be guided 
by our knowledge of observed events. More specifically, other things being 
equal, a future event is to be regarded as the more probable, the greater the 
relative frequency of similar events observed so far under similar circumstances 
(16). 
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It seems plausible in daily practice, that from the ~bservation of what has 
in former instances been the consequence of a certain cause of action, one may 
make a judgment that is likely to be the consequence of it another time; and 
that the larger the number of experiments we have to su~port a conclusion, the 
more reason we have to take it for granted. Our confidence that a certain 
therapy will work in a present case of a certain disease is the higher the more 
frequently it has worked in past cases. 
From the viewpoint of Logical Positivism Carnap considered an objective 
concept as possible: "if a certain probability value holds for a certain 
hypothesis with respect to a certain evidence, then this value is entirely 
independent of what any person may happen to think about these sentences, just 
as any relation of logical consequences is independ~nt in this respect. 
Consequently a definition of an ex!?lanation for probability must not refer to 
any person and his beliefs but only to the two sentences and their logical 
properties within a language system" (Carnap). In the form C(H,E) the 
expressions H and E are logical statements, void of any interpretational 
meaning. While in deductive logic expressions like "if E then H" occur, in 
inductive logic these types of expressions will have the form " if E, then H 
with a degree of confirmation C(H,E)". This conception can only apply in those 
circumstances that the hypothesis H ~!f ang on!x !f~ can be inferred from the 
evidence E. This situation, however, is rarely.met in medicine. 
When we rely on experience as source of evidence it must be clear that we 
cannot determine, at least no't with any certainty, to what degree repeated 
experiments confirm a conclusion (17). 
Experience largely reflects the contents of thought not its process, as we 
have described in Chapter II. In reflecting on the way in which we are 
performing we may feel to establish rules for our own gpidance. But we are, at 
least for a large part, guided by feelings of intellectual satisfaction, of a 
persuasive desire, and a sense of personal responsibility. This personal act can 
only partly be formalized. Such formalization is likely to go too far unless it 
acknowledges in advance that it must remain within the framework of a personal 
judgment. But, being a personal judgment, is there any justification for 
assigning numerical values to the probability judgment? 
Principally, we can distinguish two main 'sources' of our hypothetical 
estimates of frequencies (8): 
1) equal chance hypothesis: a hypothesis asserting that the probabilities 
of the various primary properties are equal: it is a hypothesis asserting equal 
distribution. Equal chance hypotheses are usually base~ upon consideration of 
symmetry. Making this kind of hypothetical estimates of frequency we are often 
guided solely by our reflections about the significance of symmetry, and similar 
considerations. This is comparable to Polanyi's conception about the assumption 
of orderliness. 
2) estimate based upon an extrapolation of statistical findings e.g. 
mortality rates. It is based upon the hypothesis that past trends will continue 
to be very nearly stable. We 'derive' estimates of probabilities - that is, 
pr~dictions of frequencies from past occurrences which have been classified 
and counted. But these 'derivations' are not logical. What is done is to advance 
a non-verifiable hypothesis: the conjecture that frequencies remain constant and 
so permit extrapolation. 
The inductive probability theory points out that any hypothesis having a 
finite initial probability will, if it happens to be true, be confirmed by 
subsequent evidence until its degree of probability approaches complete 
certainty.' Testing in these cases means that we shall eventually come to believe 
all hypotheses which are true with a degree of probability approaching 
certainty. This theory rules out the deductive system which postulates that 
however many hypotheses are verified when there is one logical impossibility the 
whole set of hypotheses must be rejected. 
But in probabilistic reasoning there is no question of logical 
impossibility of consequences but a plausible explanation for the hypothesis 
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given the evidence. Just as the rejection of a statistical hypothesis by 
observation is not a matter of deductive logic but is a matter of a special rule 
of rejection (k-rule of rejection), so the choice between alternative 
statistical hypotheses is not a matter of deductive logic but a matter which 
requires first choosing a policy before making such choices (e.g. choosing 
cut-off points on a curve). And it is by no means obvioUs which policy is best, 
nor indeed what is meant by calling a policy a 'best' policy for this purpose 
(9). 
Sadegh-Zadeh (18) made clear with the help of a logical example of the 
co-occurrence of two disease entities in a patient that there cannot be a 
deductive system because of logical external and internal contradicthm. The 
internal consistency in the deductive system is based upon the logical 
independence between premises and the conclusion. External inconsistency is due 
to the attachment of the probabilistic character to the conclusion (the 
probability of a patient of having a disease ), and not to the steps in the 
inference process. 
In a descending hierarchy of hypotheses in a deductive system when each 
hypothesis is a logical consequence of the preceding one, the rejection of one 
of the hypotheses involves rejecting all the hypotheses of higher level. Sadegh 
Zadeh comes to the conclusion that in the probabilistic approach in medicine 
there is not a deductive but an inductive process. 
This raises also the question if it is possible to assign numerical values 
to the estimates. Carnap states that it is not frequency. John Maynard Keynes 
thought it highly improbable to assign a numerical value to the probability of 
any hypothesis. He believed that this could be done only under very special, 
rarely fulfilled conditions (cited in 16). · 
According to Popper (8), a numerical probability value cannot be attached 
to a singular hypothesis. According to this interpretation, the statement "The 
probability of the next cast with this die being six equals 1/6" is not really 
an assertion about the next cast; rather it is an assertion about a whole class 
of casts of which the next cast is merely an element". It can be compared with 
the statement "the probability of the next patient having a flu according to the 
presented symptoms", which can only be the assertion about a class of patients 
with influenza presenting similar, or supposed similar, symptoms. No one can 
really predict. Yet it is widely concluded that the calculus of probability can 
be applied. 
But the main reason for introducing the concept of probability is the 
incompleteness of our knowledge (Waisman, quoted in 8). Acknowledging the 
incalculability for future singular events, how can we draw conclusions which we 
can interpret as statements about empirical frequencies, and which we thus find 
brilliantly corroborated in practice? (8). The answer to this question is that 
it is just the corroboration (Popper), or confirmation (Carnap, Polanyi), or 
credibility (Hempel), or reasonableness (Braithwaite), that seemingly justifies 
our inference. The peculiarity of a probabilistic hypothesis is that it is 
neither conclusively refutable nor it is convincingly verifiable by any 
experience. Empirical criteria can be given for rejecting the hypothesis, but 
the rejection will always be provisional and liable to cancellation. 
In (medical) decision making, nevertheless, the calculation of the 
probability estimates may direct the choice between alternative hypotheses and 
choosing among a number of possible actions. The choice is to be determined by a 
comparison of the desirable effects of believing one hypothesis if it is true 
and the undesirable effects of believing it if it is false with the desirable 
and undesirable effects of believing the other hypothesis if it is true or 
false; commonly described as true and false positives and negatives. The 
criteria for this choice will be in terms of the arithmetical relationships of 
four values - the gain or loss obtained by choosing one hypothesis if it is true 
or false respectively, the gain or loss by choosing the other hypothesis if it 
is true or false respectively. The different assignments of these four values 
will give different choices (9). 
The numerical values come from extrapolation: the calculation of 
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probabilities which are not given from probabilities which are given. However, 
this type of calculation only gives rise to subjective interpretations. It 
treats the degree of probability as a measure of the feelings of certainty or 
uncertainty, or belief or doubt, which may be aroQSed in us by certain 
assertions or conjectures. In connection with some non-numerical statements, the 
word 'probable' may be quite satisfactorily translated in this way. But an 
interpretation along these lines does not seem very satisfactory for numerical 
probability statements (8). 
In our opinion, every attempt to employ mathematical statistics to this 
type of inductive reasoning will fail in the end. Popper (8) expresses his 
opinion as: "I do not think that it is possible to produce a satisfactory theory 
of what is traditionally called "induction". On the contrary, I believe that any 
such theory - whether it. uses classical logic or prob&bilistic logic must for 
purely logical reasons either lead to an infinite regress, or operate with an 
aprioristic principle . of induction, a synthetic principle which cannot be 
empirically tested". 
The degree of confirmation only expresses the degree of belief, the degree 
of certainty a physican has in his own inference and conclusions. This belief 
is, by lack of an objective reference, mainly based upon his personal experience 
and his personal conceptions about health and disease. His conclusions only 
resemble the proximity of the singular statement to his personal knowledge and 
conceptions but tells us nothing about the real situation. There cannot be a 
plausible reason to treat inductive conclusions (e.g. medical diagnoses) 
otherwise than preliminary hypotheses which can only be accepted as objective 
knowledge (and, therefore calculable and teachable) when they are submitted to 
severe tests. This raises two questions: "does th~ medical process pe~it such 
testing?", and "will the conclusion of a medical process always be a provisional 
expression of the doctor's belief about a patient?". 
We have considered several axiomatic systems, all of which pretend to give 
an interpretation of the probability concept. We have seen that the frequency 
approach is only suitable for applications when large numbers of observations 
are available. Carnap's approach has some features of the frequency appraoch if 
large numbers of observations are available, while at the same time it tries to 
allow for treatment of statements about unique events. The main objections to 
this theory are that all relevant experience must be made explicit (intuitive 
weighing of different kinds of experience is not permitted); and the 
irrefutability and unverifiabili ty of the probabilistic hypothesis. 
If one wants to introduce intuitive weighing into one's analysis, one must 
use the subjective, or personalistic, probability models (e.g. Savage; 
Pratt,Raiffa,Schlaifer). Such models are characterized by a number of 
consistency requirements. It is particularly in this respect (consistency) that 
medical nomenclature and definitions often cannot fulfil these requirements (see 
also chapter !!,paragraph 3). Moreover, we cannot expect that our intuition will 
automatically obey such requirements, but one of the advantages of the model 
might be that it may detect and abandon any inconsistencies in our original 
intuitive feelings (19). 
For repetitive events it is quite possible that the observable relative 
frequency will be completely different from our intuition or estimation of 
chances. Thus it is necessary to extent the subjective probability model by 
including the possibility of learning by experience. This can be done in several 
ways. One could redefine the probabilities after each observation, in a purely 
personalistic way. This is, however, quite unsatisfactory; one would like to 
have some consistency in the changes of subjective probabilities. This implies 
that we need a methodology that t·ells us how to learn from experience ( 19) • 
Carnap's methodology can, unfortunately, only be applied in a rather limited 
(and mostly artificial) context. 
In the world of the subjective probability, it is quite common to introduce 
prior distributions and to learn from experience by means of Bayes' theorem. It 
is not, however, a logical consequence of the postulates that the process of 
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learning from experience should take place in this way. (The question whether 
people do learn from experience is still a matter of debate.) This essential 
part of the theory is left in the open. 
Subjective probabilities are always used within the framework of a model. 
It is, however, quite possible that the facts will not justify the choice of the 
model. It has proved necessary e.g. to assume uncertainty superimposed on the 
models, either because models are too simplified to reflect the complex reality 
or because of random factors like human free will. 
If only a limited amount of information is available, as is often the case 
in particular medical situations, it is somewhat impossible to develop theories 
that are objectively true. In practice, this difficulty means that models in 
medicine have usually a rather w~ background. Advanced statistical methods, 
sometimes used for various models in medicine~ result in an accuracy that is 
misleading if it is considered against the background of the possible absence of 
a well-founded theory for such models. This causes an extra inference problem 
because a suitable th!3ory of inference and reasoning should specify at what 
moment the model should be rejected. 
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CHAPTER IV 
As we have discussed in Chapter II there are no uniform definitions or 
general agreements upon the basic elements of medical knowledge. But in 
practice, physicians can understand each other perfectly on a number of 
reference points in what we will conveniently call: The medical process which 
can be described as the total sum of procedures and actions taken by the 
physician between the entry of the patient in the health care system and his 
leaving it. This in disregard of all the activities of subsidiary health care 
workers because of our focus on the physician. Wit·hin the medical process a 
number of characteristics is .perfectly recognisable to each physician: data 
collecting and data processing, making a diagnosis, determining the prognosis, 
establishing a therapeutic action and evaluating the outcome~ These are gross 
features of a very complicated process of problem solving. Two main elements 
dominate the medical process: diagnosis and prognosis. That is exactly what the 
patient is asking : "Doctor, what is it, and what is going to happen with me?" 
when the physician is unaware of the underlying process his prediction is 
vacuum based. The prognosis as based upon the knowledge of tb.e (natural) course 
of the disease, primarily demands the diagnosis of the disease. 
Paragraph 1 
There is no general·agreement on the term 'diagnosis'. Originally the word 
stands for 'distinguish'. In this sense, diagnosis can be conceived as the 
process of differentiating between a number of alternatives. This includes a 
preconception of the notion that there are reallyuthings to be chosen". This 
preconception consists of three components: 
a.) a preexisting series of categories or classes to provide the frame for 
the diagnosis (this matter will be discussed in par. 3.); 
b.) the particular entity which is to be diagnosed; and 
c.) the deliberate judgment that the patient belongs to this category 
rather than that (1). 
But the physician has not only to differentiate between disease 
alternatiyes, but between disease and health as well. Not every patient who 
enters the health care system is -medically speaking - ill, while not every 
diseased person is considered to be ill in social life. As we have previously 
described, health and disease are largely abstract concepts which are time, 
social and cultural based. The stress between these concepts makes diagnosing, 
especially in primary health care, a troublesome business. Judgment about the 
state of health and disease can raise conflicts between the patient's judgment 
about his well-being and that of the physician, which may largely differ. 
Medical knowledge left physicians virtually empty-handed in making 
(objective) judgments about the question: "ill versus not-ill"·. Nevertheless, 
society urges physicians to decide upon these questions in matters of insurance, 
social institutions, labour, etc. Definitions about both states are left 
conveniently vague. They do not permit physicians to decide unanibiguously upon 
ill versus .not-ill. 
We can agree with Gross 
designing clearcut descriptions 
(2) that only generally accepted definitions 
of the states of health or disease justify the 
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physicians' judgments on the insurance and social domains.However, these 
definitions and descriptions are wanting. 
There exist tremendous · differences between medic~! criteria used by the 
exam1n1ng physicians and the relativistic sociocultural standards employed by 
lay people to identify the presence of illness. This do~s not mean that those 
diagnosed as not-ill according to the medical criteria ~ere not suffering from 
some measure of discomfort, unhappiness, ·or inefficiency becau8e of their 
symptoms (3). Brown found . that non-sickness accounte~ for almost 25% of the 
diagnosis made on 12.835 patients: patients who labelled themselves as being 
ill. In England Balint estimated that 25 - 50% of all patients who go to doctors 
are not suffering from any pathological entity or nosolpgical syndrome (quoted 
in 4). Approx. 60 - 70% of people who experience some discomfort do not go to an 
official medical institution (5). 
The very notion of a disease is so nebulous, that tp deal with it in terms 
of recognition algorithms may just give the discussion a superficial and 
spurious exactness. Neverth~less, the physician is s~oned to differentiate 
between state of health and disease, and between dise~es. This latter aspect 
mainly designates the term diagnosis. 
The process of diagnosis is discussed in literature mainly in two ways: a 
deterministic way and a probabilistic one. The deterministic approximation can 
be examplified by two definitions: , 
1.) "The diagnostic process employed by a physician can be seen as an 
attempt to establish the similarity of the presenting SYl!lptoms and signs of the 
patient to a particular disease prototype" (6); 
2.) "The process of diagnosis is a representation of the problem-solving 
process wherein the problem-solver (a physician) is required to examine,evaluate 
and select information in order to reach a goal (a dlsease specificatioJ;t)(7). 
According to the first definition, the process of diagnosis consists of 
comparisons between the pattern of features which a patient presents with those 
of described diseases or memorized from personal experience by the physician. 
The degree of resemblance establishes the degree of correctness of the 
. I 
diagnosis. In this sense, the purpose of diagnosis·is to identify a patient's 
disorder as a classifiable entity. 
The second way refers to some kind of strategy in order to acquire and to 
·process data relevant and in accordance with a constellation explanatory to a 
disease. 
The term 'diagnosis' gradually shifted from the process of differentiating 
to the outcome of the process, the name of a disease. It can be seen as a 
process of converting observed evidence into names of diseases. The evidence 
consists of data obtained from examining a patient and substances derived from 
patients. When each symptom, each sign, each lab test etc. is regarded as a 
piece of evidence, also called indicant, then a disease can be cpnsidered as an 
ordered set of indicants. Diagnosis becomes the allocation of a set of indicants 
to a disease class (8). 
This conception of more of less fixed indicants constituting more or less 
fixed disease configurations led to a decision theoretical approach, in which 
indicants and diseases are related in a calculable probabilistic way. 
Card & Good (9) defines diagnosis as.: 
1.) the activity of deciding which of a number of diseases obtains; or 
which of a number of treatments is advisable; or of attempting by acquiring 
evidence to allot probabilities to the diseases in the hope of making one of the 
probabilities close to l; or of attempting to determine the expected utilities* 
of the various possible treatments in the hope that, with probability close to 
1, the treatment selected will be the one of maximum expected utility on all the 
evidence that could be collected"; 
2.) the disease whose probability is close to 1 after diagnosis has been 
made in the restricted sense". 
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* expected utilitv can conveniently 
attached to the expected quality of 
respective disease and treatment. 
be described as the value which can be 
a state of health with regard to the 
In the probabilistic version of diagnosis one has to make use of numerical 
values in order so calculate probabilities and utilities. The variability and 
the lack of consLstency in classification and nomenclature explains the great 
difficulty encount~red by the statisticians in modelling and delineating in 
mathemathecal terms the diagnostic process for in practice they are attempting 
to model something which does not exist as a single entity (10). 
Diagnosis as a procedure is often viewed as a stepw1se, sequential 
process. 
Dudley (63) vi~s diagnosis as a two-step process: 
1.) the physictan collects data, and only when this process is completed, 
2.) he refle·:ts upon it for the purpose of inferring a diagnosis (or a set 
of diagnostic hypotheses =differential iiagnosis}. 
In the discipline of medical decision making the diagnostic process is 
considered to be a sequential process in which the physician employs a test to 
obtain more information in order to test the new information, and so on until a 
'final hypothesis' or 'diagnosis' is reached. Every step i~ the process is 
considered to be quantifiable by means of numerical values. 
Actually, these numerical values are largely unknown, not only to medical 
knowledge but also, and especially to the physician. 
A stepwise approach consisting of three phases can be depicted as: 
Step 1. : select a diagnostic test (or question) 
Step 2. ; carry out the selected test and observe its outcome. 
Step 3. : either (i} select a further test and so return to step 1 or (ii) 
make a diagnosis in the light of the outcomes so far obtained (12). 
This conception presupposes that there is something to test upon. This 
'something' is ma1nly the preexistent idea (hypothesis) that comes up in the 
physician's mind after the presentation of the complaint. 
Because of variability and uncertainty of disease concepts, and people's 
-often- lacunar memory , we think that the theoretical stepwise-test approach 
does not always cover the reality of the diagnostic process in routine practice. 
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Paragraph 2 
Patients entering the physicJan's consulting room present neither symptoms 
nor data. The former ones present 1he medical translation of patient's feelings. 
The latter ones are artificial elements preferably written in a (alpha)-
numerical way based upon the symptoms of the patient. But before a certain 
feeling of a patient can be acknowledged as a symptom or a datum a number of 
conditions have to be fulfilled. 
1) A certain process takes place before the individual is acknowledged as a 
patient (the 'sick role'). That means that his feelings must be avowed as 
belonging to a possible disease or disability. This depends on: 
a) disruption of normal functioning 
b) visibility to others 
c) perceived seriousness 
d) elicited embarassment 
e) expectation of effective treatment 
f) incapacitating symptoms. 
2) The complaints must convey a medical significance. When the presented 
complaint cannot be related to a -known - disease-entity of some disturbed state 
of health, it is most of the time ignored by the physician. There are two 
possibilities for denying the symptom: 
a) the complaint indeed cannot related to any known disease entity e.g. 
"Doctor, when I blink my right eye, I feel an itch in the little toe of my left 
foot". 
b) the physician is unaware of the existence of the disease to which the 
symptom can be related. This possibility arises when the disease in question is 
-extremely- rare (global or to his environment), or there is really a gap in his 
knowledge memory. 
In extension, there are some communications about particular features in 
physicians' behaviour like: 
he only considers the prominent symptoms as he knew them from past 
sicknesses (20) 
- the physician is too prone to see things in patterns (21). 
he only looks for positive answers. The power of the positive respons is 
more than 100 times greater than a negative one for a single attribute (22). 
in physical examination, a sign is noted when certain sensory stimuli 
have passed from the observed entity to the doctor's cerebral recognition. 
Errors can occur before the stimuli reach the doctor's mind because of sensory 
defects. Alternatively the doctor's cerebration may still fail to recognize and 
identify the entities (13). 
most physicians take into account the unreliability of patient's answers, 
physical signs, laboratory tests, reports etc. (23). 
When we consider the pace in which the physician performs his consulting 
hours, the overload of information and the extreme variability of presented 
problems (especially for family physicians), then we can become aware of the 
extreme difficulty of data collection and the construction of a reliable data 
base. 
3) The symptoms and signs presented must be sufficiently deviant from the 
range before they are acknowledged as such by the physician (13). Problems may 
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arise because of: 
a) a lack of reference values for the symptoms and signs in medicine. Of 
course, everybody has some intuitive perception of norms, largely related to 
one's own feelings, but it disregards the variability of the norms as they vary 
over sociocultural values, age and time. It does not take into account the 
personal variability of the physician. Different physicians place different 
emphasis and interpretation on deviations from the normal in similar recordings 
(14). Striking differences in apprec~ation between physicians are found when 
performing estimations of the attributes: "obesity", "thinness", or "normal 
weight" ( 15) . 
b) the difference of presentation of complaints and bodily signs by the 
patient. Zola (16) describes the different types of presentation of complaints 
by Italian versus lrish patients and their physicians' reactions. Mechanic (16a) 
described the social psychologic factors affecting the presentation of bodily 
complaints. 
c) the doctor-patient communication. About this item an extensive 
literature has been published. E.g. doctor-patient communication in pediatric 
clinic (17); Talking with the doctor (18); Assessment of Nonverbal communication 
in the Patient-Physician interview (19). Physician's enquiry techniques, 
physician's non-listening behaviour, physician's attitude towards patient's 
emotions, physician's inabilities to meet the patient etc. are all subject of an 
extensive amount of most psychological studies. Because most of these 
studies focus only on one or two elements of the doctor-patient communication, 
which in turn is part of the data-collection procedure of the physician, their 
contributions are fragmentary. 
Data processing in medicine is a method by which the data base is 
transformed into a problem list. It 1s the important step whereby information 
gathered about the patient is filtered and the clues are selected and grouped 
into meaningful problems (24). However, an ideal data base has never been 
formulated. The medical record is too often accepted without proper criticism 
(25). Often physicians are blamed for their inappropriate records, but one has 
to admit that there are few guidel~nes for physicians. A major attempt to 
streamline the medical record has been delivered by Weed (26). He stated that 
the Problem Oriented Medical Record (P.Q.M.R.) can help in ameliorating a 
variety of difficulties now besetting medicine, among which are: 
1) medical problems dealt with or without context; 
2) inefficiency in practice; 
3) lack of continuity in care; 
4) the apparent inapplicability of "basic science" facts and principles; 
5) inefficiency in education; 
6) the absence of meaningful audit in the practice of medicine; 
7) increasing complexity; 
8) explosion of technologic tests; 
9) withdrawal or apathy of the supervisory personal. 
All these bottlenecks to a sound medical practice are fully recognisable, 
but to blame them almost exclusively to the medical record seems to go too far. 
We agree with Feinstein stating that "the medical record was a reflection rather 
than a cause of the difficulties; a symptom of the intellectual maladies but 
not the disease" (27). 
Anyway, Weed's proposal was an attempt to set guidelines to a 
standardization of a medical data base. Unfortunately, this did not much alter 
the main problem: the reliability of the stored data. While proclaiming the 
P.O.M.R., Weed forgot to define what problems are. The only difference was the 
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remodelling of the source-structured recording into a problem-structured one. 
Doing so, he lifted the record into a kind of vacuum, because people cannot 
handle problems as singular data, nor is there any e:h.rplicit or ~plicit context 
to process them. 
Data collection is inefficient when the information collected does not lead 
to the formulation of useful hypotheses or to the testing of existing ones and 
may, therefore, be circumstantial or irrelevant. Besides, data have to be 
assessed to determine whether the information is true. Next the data have to be 
evaluated to determine whether they reflect an altered body state or are a 
normal variant (28). 
Data can be described as symptoms, signs and tests (laboratory, Xray etc) 
for which some degree of reliability and I or relevance have been assessed. 
Although the reliability of a symptom, the prec1s1on of the questioning 
procedure and the accuracy of the truth of the patient's complaint, cannot be 
assessed in numerical terms (29), the carefulness of the medical procedure is 
often considered as a qualitative norm. The relevance of the symptom is often 
seen as its degree of contribution to a particular disease. The diagnostic value 
of a symptom is disease-conscious and its relevance is likely to be different 
for different diseases (30). This relevance is often expressed in a weight to 
each symptom for each disease. The disease which produces the largest ratio of 
the patient's weighted symptoms to the weighted sum of all characteristics for 
that disease is considered the correct diagnosis. 
The scor1ng process (the measurement of the weight) uses numerical values 
which reflect the likelihood with which various clinical findings will occur in 
a given disorder (7). The values are found with the help of 
mathematical-statistical procedures (as in medical decision making, see chapter 
V) or with the help of fuzzy set theory (e.g.20,31,32,33). The mathematical 
theory starts from the principle that symptoms are the atoms in medicine. When 
we know the symptom configuration of the disease we only have to weight the 
symptoms, or rename them to pathognomic or corrollary symptoms, symptoms part of 
the rule, valued attributes, distinctive features etc., and everything can 
easily be fitted into the right place, using only a program to find the 
"goodness of fit". 
Regrettably it is not as simple as that. Every physician knows that the 
same symptoms can have different meanings not only to different diseases but to 
the same disease also. Pain in the breast with a younger man can be indicative 
for a pneumothorax, while in an elderly man it can point to a myocardial 
infarction. It can make a lot of difference if a symptom comes in an acute, an 
interrupted or an insidious way, even if it concerns only one and the same 
disease. 
There is some evidence that symptoms are not the often assumed atomic 
pieces. They can vary according to a number of subsidiary aspects related to 
the symptom (we shall discuss this matter in greater detail in chapter VI). But 
to describe these minor and often very subtle details explicitly is hard labour 
and largely unrewarding. However, the variation can account for large 
differences and yield disagreement between different physician's data bases, 
and perhaps even within one data base over time. The suggestion that feeding 
back the information to the examining physicians which could help to reduce the 
differences between physicians and improve the results may only scarcely be 
sustained ( 34) . 
Information gathering is the accumulation of a profile of data concerning 
the patient. There are innumerable "facts" to be gathered and there are many 
reasons why physicians can go astray or misinterpret the results of their 
labour. This may especially be true for elements the physician is less 
acquainted with, e.g. laboratory and X-ray results. Physicians often feel 
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reassured with laboratory tests they neither need nor really use. Zieve (35) 
listed 10 items concerning misinterpretation and abuse of laboratory tests. 
The present 'habit' to order multiple tests seems not to contribute to a 
clearer understanding of the problem or to help in diagnosing. They are only 
helpful when: 
a) all test-results are normal thus tending to exclude a disease; 
b) all test-results are abnormal thus tending to confirm a disease. 
They are least helpful when some are positive and others negative (36). 
The interpretation of the result is also influenced by the definition of 
the cut-off point, the ;>oint where the calibration change from normal to 
abnormal. When this point is directed towards diseased patients, specifity 
(defining non-patients) increases but sensitivity (defining patients) decreases, 
and as it l.s moved in the direction of patients without disease, the reverse is 
true. 
This dilemma of the interpretation of results leads to another peculiar 
phenomenon in the medical process: the observer error. It is the physician's job 
to observe. However, as we have discussed before, observation is said to be 
'theory-laden': we observe particular things in a situation because we have 
theories which impute relevance to some of them and not to other (37). There 
cannot be a purely neutral and indifferent collection of clinical facts. 
Each observation is person, time and place based. What really worries in 
constructing a reliable data base is that these highly personal valued data give 
rise to several errors in the data processing storage and retrieval. These can 
be 
neglect to observe 
fail to observe 
4) ~!!Q!~ !~ r~£Qrg!~g : only a limited number of symptoms, perhaps only 
relevant to the doctor, is recorded. (see also 38). 
5) 
patterns 
inaccurate recall of assumed similarity of 
6) ~!!Q!~ Qf r~!r!~Y~! : fail to find recorded symptoms, therapies etc. 
7) ~!!Q!~ Qf £!~~~!f!£~!!Q~ : incorrect classifying of patients into the 
data system. 
The main problems to these errors can be summarized as: 
a) what is the magnitude of observer error? 
b) how can this error be minimized? 
c) what is the significance of the residual variation? and 
d) what are the effects of observer variation (39). 
Two major drawbacks from observer variation can be detected: 
I. the variability of observation and recording by one physicim1 of 
repeated observations (intra-observer variation), and 
II.the disagreement of observation and recording between two or more 
physicians (inter-observer variation) of the same phenomenon. 
In literature these features are described in two ways, dependent on 
viewpoint: intra/inter-observer errors and intra/inter-observer agreement. 
The review of Koran (40,41) discusses intra- and inter-obs~rver agreement 
as observed in literature. Intra-observer agreement for a number of physical 
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signs valu~s ranged between approx. 60 and 80 per cent. The inter-observer 
agreement scored lower, ranging from about 40% to around 80%. It was not.iced 
that the more diagnostic categories there were to consid~r, and the less severe 
an abnormality, the lower the inter-observer agreement. From all sources of 
information history taking is the most important but also the least accurate. 
Agreement among physicians concerning patient's questionnaire was only 2 in 25 
patients (42). 
The overall diagnostic error rate of even the mo$t senior clinician has 
been shown to around 21 per cent (39). According t.o Gill et al. (39) the error 
rate in diagnosis due to observer variation forms a small proportion of the 
total error rate in diagnosis. In fact, somewhat less than one quarter of all 
diagnostic error observed can be attributed to the acquisition of 'faulty' data 
by the doctor. 
Spitzer & Fleiss (43) found striking unreliability of psychiatric 
diagnosis. · They also report marked differences in diagnosing a particular 
disease. The. percentage of psychiatrists diagnosing schizophrenia ranged from ·2 
per cent in the British Isles to 69 per cent in ·the United States. In a similar 
way • Baumann et al ( 44) found diagnostic disagreement between psychiatric 
clinics in Zurich and Berlin. 
Strong disagreement of the diagnosis of chronic non specific lung disease 
(asthmatic bronchitis) between Great Britain and the U.S. was found by Reid at 
al (45). 
Wagner et al (46) collected about 1000 papers on errors in medicine, of 
which 383 about errors in diagnosis. "Although we know it (making errors), 
nevertheless, we hold the most striking judgments, data and findings for pure 
gold, and build with these elements our judgments, albeit in general their range 
is unknoWn to us" (47). 
Medical records are of the utmost importance to the medical practitioner 
and his patient, and, when legible, to his colleagues while attending to the 
practice. A data base is an important tool in building the foundation of 
medicine or of the specialty to which it concerns. We, physicians, are urged to 
search and research for guidelines in delineating reliable medical records and 
medical data bases. Let us hope the statement of Cochrane et al. (48) ttAlthough 
medical disagreement has long been recognized as common and was published by 
Alexander Pope (1723), there appears to be some general reluctance to recognize 
it as due to the subjectivity of medical judgment and even more reluctance to 
investigate it quantitatively." has become obsolE~te from now on. 
The (over)load ·of information in diagnostic data processing is another hot 
item in this field. It is one of the main claims for computerizing or 
computer-assisting the diagnostic process. Better than man, the machine can 
easily deal with large amounts of data. It is hypothesized that a heavy 
information load may lead to simplification. Information load is generally 
conceived as the amount of data to be processed per unit of time. In one of his 
studies, de Dombal et al (49) showed, in an artificial setting, that accuracy of 
processing data declined after 8 elements of information load, substantiating 
Miller's theory on channel capacity (see chapter II). However, the study 
disregards Miller's suggestion, about the creation of 'chunks' with increasing 
experience and skill. 
"Massing of data" was a phenomenon found by Lichtenstein et al. (50). It 
enables people to economize their information processing, but on the other hand 
influences people's estimation of occurrences. In the judges' op1n1.on, 
occurrences tend to be massed rather than distributed over time. E.g.: People 
believe air crashes to occur in crops, physicians believe myocardial infarction 
to happen in outbreaks. 
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The "massing of data" may be an explanation for differences between 
laboratory and real life experiments, the former mainly derived of sensational 
or emotional charges of i terns. People heavily respond to eJJlotionally charged 
events, especially when stressed to be catastrophic. They eXhibit strong and 
often consistent biases. Some portion of these errors may be d~e to the 
unrepresentative coverage of these events in news media. Zetlrowski (quoted in 
50) notes that "fear sells": media dwell on potential catastrophes and not on 
succesful operations. The more is published about some kind of disease, the more 
the physician tends to diagnose it. Not only the physician but the patient also 
is influenced by this psychological effect. It effects the presentation of the 
complaint. Lichtenstein et al (50) found two explanations: 
a.) encoding variability: spaced repetitions are more likely to ·receive 
differential coding than massed items; 
b •. ) deficient processing of massed items. The studies of Tversky and 
Kahnemann (51) made clear that people tend to estimate weights of events and 
their frequency by a number of erroneous heuristics. As estimates play en 
essential role in medical decision making, this matter will be discussed in 
chapterV. 
Uncertainty is another element in data processing and diagnosing. Before a 
patient enters the consulting room, uncertainty as to the true state of the 
individual is maximal to the physician. But by means of a number of manoeuvres 
from the part of the physician and the patient, information is obtained which 
reduces or attenuates the uncertainty to the point, it is hoped, where the 
information is prescriptive of a course of action. Several studies have shown 
the influence of uncertainty on the diagnostic process. Slavic et al. (52) 
define decision-maldng as "reducing uncertainty in a problem situation (not to 
acknowledge and quantify it)". Members of professions such as law and medicine 
frequently are confronted with uncertainty in the course of their routine duty. 
In these circumstances informal norms have developed for handling uncertainty, 
so that paralyzing hesitation is avoided. These norms are based upon assumptions 
that some types of errors are more to be avoided than others; assumptions so 
basic that they are usually taken for granted, seldom discussed, and therefore 
slow to change (53). These errors can be described as: 
Type I error, or error of the first kind: judging a sick person well 
(rejecting a hypothesis which is tru~), and 
Type II error, or error of the second kind: judging a healthy person sick 
(accepting a hypothesis which is false). 
Many medical judgments are based on avoiding type I error, which can be 
examplified by the proverbs: "when in doubt diagnose illness" and "Better safe 
than sorry" (53). 
Another feature of uncertainty is described by Driscoll & Lanzetta (54). 
They describe information search as a monotonic function of uncertainty. The 
amount of information declines under high levels of respons uncertainty. Both 
stimuli and response uncertainty influence the physician's state of uncertainty. 
This observation has been underscored by the perceived differences of behaviour 
between family physicians and (general) internists. Family physicians, operating 
in more vague task environments, asked fewer items of information, fewer history 
questions, fewer questions about life situation and mental status, used fewer 
items of physical examination, and ordered fewer laboraty and related tests 
(5"5,56). 
Eventually, the medical data processing leads to diagnosis and disease 
classification. We shall proceed to this latter item. 
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Paragraph 3 
"The process of classification, the recognition of similarity and the 
grouping of organisms and objects dates back to primitive man. He must be able 
to perceive similarities in stimuli for survival. The study of classification 
has always had two major interrelated components: "how do we classify?" and "how 
should we classify?". The first component belongs to the domain of the 
psychology and philosophy of sense perception: What is similarity, how do we 
know we recognize similarity, how do we perceive regularity and relationships, 
what are the criteria, how does classification affect everyday life etc. The 
second component is the subject matter of taxonomy, the science of 
classification". (The theoretical background of classification is borrowed from 
Sokal,57). From these components three characteristics have to be distinguished: 
1) there must be something to perceive, to identify; 
2) we must be able to place these identified objects into a class of 
similar objects; and 
3) we have to know how these classes have to be interrelated. 
Identification will be defined as the allocation or assignment of additional 
unidentified objects to the correct class, once such classes have been 
established by prior classification. The definition of classification is the 
ordering or arrangement of objects into groups or sets on the basis of their 
relationships. And finally, the definition of taxonomy will be defined as the 
theoretical study of classification including its basis, principles, procedures 
and rules. 
We can examplify this with an example of botany:take e.g. a flower. One 
could easily identify it as being cultivated or not,but it needed a genius like 
Linnaeus to set up a taxonomy of plants in order to give you the possibility to 
find the exact class and subclasses and name. Finally, a more or less 
experienced person must be able to find the category and name of the plant. 
All classifications aim to achieve economy of memory. The world is full of 
single cases. By grouping numerous individual objects into a class, a taxon, the 
description of the taxon subsumes the individual description of the objects 
contained within it. By grouping the plant into a taxon we know, although 
perhaps they might not be there yet, that eventually all flowers of this plant 
(these plants) will become yellow. 
Another purpose of classification is manageability The objects are 
arranged in systems (that may or may not be hierarchic) 1n which the several 
taxa can be easily named and related to one another, e.g. the Mendeleiev system 
for chemical elements. The paramount purpose· of classification is to describe 
the structure and relationships of the constituent objects to one another and to 
similar objects and to simplify these relationships in such a way that general 
statements can be made about classes of objects. It is easy to perceive 
structure when it is obvious and discontinous. But much of what we observe in 
nature changes continuously in one or another characteristic with equally steep 
gradients for each characteristic. 
Classification that describes relationships among objects in nature should 
generate hypotheses. In fact, the principal scientific justification for 
establishing classifications is that they are heuristic and that they lead to 
the stating of a hypothesis that can be tested. (Heuristic is meant here as a 
force stimulating interest as a means of further investigation). 
Two kinds of classification can be distinguished: 
a) Monothetic: Classes differ by at least one property which is uniform 
among the members of the class; 
b) Polythetic: The group or sets of individuals or objects that share a 
large proportion of their properties but do not necessarily agree in any one 
property.No single propperty is required for the definition of a given group nor 
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will any combination of characteristics necessary define it. 
Medical classification. obviously falls within the latter distinction. In 
the polythetic classification there is a strong need of weighting characters, 
especially the ones that highlight the class to which they belong. But how to 
weigh? Should certain characters be weighted more heavily than others? Who 
determines the importance of the characters to be weighted? It is important to 
note that most classificatory labour is not based on fundamental scientific 
principles but largely on considerations of practicality. This practicality 
often leads researchers t.o weight discordant characters less than others. The 
difficulty with such weightings is that one needs initial classification to 
provide weights for the characters. But once classifications are established 
there is a reluctance to change, especially when the classification is assumed 
to be correct (57). 
In medicine a firm basis for classification was laid by pioneers like 
Morgagni and Virchow, using gross morb.id anatomy and microscopy for explaining 
the clinical manifestation of a great number of diseases. From the second half 
of the 19th century on the diagnostic process was directed towards the name of a 
disease, explaining all/many of the phenomena observed. Regrettably, the history 
of medicine almost always deals with 'ideal types' which are approximated, by 
the majority of disease entities, and ultimately defined explicitly by their 
joint pathology and etiology. It may explain why medicine is more interested in 
the "presence of a disease" rather than the presence of a "diseased state". This 
presence of a disease encompasses the assumption of the presence of causal 
factors that are likely to produce illness (58). 
In medicine, the classification must take into account both the history of 
disease in nature and the history of disease in persons, universal and singular 
phenomena. Therefore, the capacity to form a unifying theory is severely 
restricted (59). 
The human body changed relatively little over millennia, but since medicine 
expanded its purview to include the concerns of mental health and illness, and 
since medicine in general must subserve, the deterministic ideology and ulterior 
goals of given societies, the actual conception of diseases cannot but reflect 
the state of the technology, the social expectations, the division of labour, 
and the environmental condition of those populations (58). 
"Disease is a normative concept, indicating a state of affairs as 
undesirable and to overcome, dealing with lesions, organs, functions etc, while 
the patient speaks about illness, suffering, incapacitation etc". This is why 
physicians customarily talk about diseases as if they exist as real entities. 
But the names of diseases, according to Scriven (60), must be accepted as 
no more than a verbal shorthand by which to refer to as the conclusions of the 
diagnostic process. And this shorthand is highly personal. Differences between 
two or more clinics, or between two or more countries, have been studied 
regularly (44,61). 
Difficulties arise because of ill-defining. But it also includes an 
ill-defined classification, descending from the morbid' anatomy classification of 
the pathologists of the former century. The physician observes, inferes, 
deduces, induces etc of what is presented to him as the patient's problem, and 
translates these observations into symptoms and signs, more or less causally 
related, to a proposed disease. The pathologist classifies what he sees. But 
what makes that what the pathologist observes classifiable as disease? Both the 
physician and the pathologist provide a basis for claiming that physicians 
observes symptoms and sig'"Ils. 
Criteria for the inclusion of symptomclusters and diseases into 
classification system can be formulated as: 
1) stability, or reliability across time, for the same judge and the same 
data; 
2) consensus, or reliability across judges, for the same data and the same 
occasion; 
3) convergence, or reliability across the data sources, administered on the 
same occasion and interpreted by the same judges (62). The majority of 
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reliability studies have focused upon judgmental consensus and have come to 
widely disparate conclusions: from extremely high to virtually no consensus. 
Besides these conditions there remains the demand for unequivocal 
terminology. Much can be improved by agreeing on the same terntinology, 
techniques, rules, criteria, elements, classification etc. The assumption that 
accurate diagnosis will be reached despite disagreement regarding particular 
signs and symptoms remained to be proved (40). 
The art of diagnosis consists of classifying patients into a group 
corresponding to some pathological entity. If we know everything about the 
patient, provided we can use a standardized t~rminology, then this 
classification could correspond to a logical decision. But, of course, this is 
an idealised situation and we must be able to classify a patient with only 
partial information about his medical status (40). 
But first of all the definition of identification has to be fulfilled, i.e. 
the establishing classes by prior classification. The need for such a 
classification (of diseases) was first formulated in 1893 by the International 
Statistical Institute. It originated an International List of Causes of Death, 
I.C.D. This classification was revised every decade. The sixth revision of 1948 
enlarged its usefulness for morbidity applications by increasing the specificity 
of rubrics and by emphasizing manifestations of disease rather than etiology. 
For family medicine the need of a standardized method of recording diagnoses was 
formulated by Abercrombie in the early fifties. But it was only in 1963 that a 
practical classification for primary care was edited, the so-called E-book after 
Eimer! & Laidlaw (63). 
In 1974 the World Organization of National Colleges, Academies and Academic 
Associations of General Practitioners/Family Physicians (W.O.N.C.A.) initiated 
and adopted a new classification and coding system, the international 
classification of health problems in primary care (ICHPPC) which was updated in 
1979 and related to the ICD classification, 9th edition. The difference between 
the ICD9 and the ICHPPC-2 classification is in the various levels of 
sophistication. In the ICHPPC system it is recommended to enter each problem at 
the highest level of diagnostic refinement the user can be confident of at the 
time. Thus the interpretation is left to the doctor. That means: 
1) a subjective interpretation of the observed symptoms and signs;( when 
observed); 
2) a subjective judgment about the aggregated symptoms and signs 
("diagnosis"). 
When the diagnosis depends on many variables including training and 
experience, habits of thought, acquired skills and the availability of 
diagnostic technology then we must ask: what is diagnosis I diagnostic 
refinement in practice? Can diagnoses of physicians be compared to each other 
(condition of consensus)? Can this type of classification provide the 
reproducible data necessary for building a knowledge base of medicine? 
Meanwhile, various types of these classifications are in use. 
Next to the ICD classification a new kind of classification was originated, 
Reasons for Encounter, based on a taxonomy of problems. However, this poses a 
new difficulty caused by ambiguity and imprec~s~on in the concept of a 
"problem". In replacing the diagnostic nomenclature of disease by a pragmatic 
nomenclature of problems, it has exchanged a standarized but inadequate taxonomy 
for a, perhaps, less inadequate but unstandardized taxonomy (27). Again, like 
Weed's book, the word 'problem' is not actually defined whatsoever. But when 
we do not know whether an individual phenomenon is a separate problem or 
collectively forms a single problem or a collectivity of problems we are unable 
to register it, or in a reverse way we shall ignore the certain phenomenon. 
Moreover, when we do not know which patient is diseased or not, how can we 
definitely define its classification? Stating that X is a patient, Tautu & 
Wagner (64), designed the scheme (Di being an abbreviation of disease). 
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Assert X = Di 
Assert X = nonpi 
Schema 1 
X = really a Di 
a 
correct 
classification 
b 
misclassification 
---------------------. 
X = rea:lly a non-Di 
c 
misclassification 
d 
correct classification 
--------------------~-------------------~----------------------
square b misclassification stands for type I error; 
square c misclassification stands for type II error. 
The proportion of correct diagnostic bids is known as the Non Error Rate. 
This proportion is unknown, and varies among all kinds of diseases, 
physicians, cultures, societies etc. Because of natural variation in disease 
manifestation, the original disease entity can shift into another one. If we 
really want a classification system, and we have to have one because of its 
fundamental significance for medical knowledge, it has to transcend the 
variation and physician's disagreement. Unless we are able to (re) build a 
reliable system, we cannot really gain insight in what is the paramount feature 
of the medical process, the prognosis, the prediction. 
Paragraph 4. 
"Doctor, what is going to happen with me?" is the essential question with 
which the patient addresses his physician. Most of the time he asks it 
differently but the essence remains. He is not really interested in the name of 
the disease otherwise than the distinction between catastrophic (e.g. cancer, 
heart-disease) and non-catastrophic ( e.g. influenza, superficial infection) 
diseases. Besides, medicine has invented, and still invents lists of 
especially to patients meaningless names, or adjectives like rheumatic, 
essential, idiosyncratic etc., which really mean nothing. Neither is the patient 
interested in the names qf the medical treatment apart from some global 
indications as drugs, operation or physiotherapy. The pharmaceutical industry 
provides physicians and drugstores with an innumerable variety of drugs under 
fancy names, differing from country to country, covering only a couple of 
thousand chemical compounds. The patient, and who is not, is interested in what 
lies immediately ahead of him. Unfortunately, predicting is very difficult, 
especially when it concerns the future. The physician, although it is often 
assumed otherwise, is not an exception to the rule. He has the advantage of the 
layman that he has some knowledge about the natural history of the disease just 
diagnosed in the patient. Supposing the diagnosis and the classification is 
correct, the physician has the knowledge or can find in textbooks some general 
statements about the course of the disease. Principally, three types of actions 
can be distinguished: 
l) in case of a self-limiting disease, no action has to be undertaken to 
change the course. 
2) the disease has a more serious character, and therapy is - easily -
available: the physician will not hesitate to influence the course. 
3) the disease is fatal, no causal therapeutic action is really known. The 
physician will try and prescribe all kinds of actions known to mitigate and 
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alleviate the symptoms and possible incapacitating outcome of the disease. It 
presumes a triad of conditions: 
a) the diagnosis is correct 
b) the natural course of the disease is known 
c) the actions and effects of the proposed therapeutic management are 
known. 
The qualities of the first condition have been discussed. 
With regard to the second condition the answer can be very simple: about 
most diseases the natural history is unknown. What we know about the natural 
history of diseases is descended from medical knowledge of about fifty to a 
hundred years back. Nowadays practically every patient is 'treated' w.ith all 
means medicine can provide. We are only able to observe a therapy-induced course 
of a disease, superimposed by varying reactions to the therapy. 
This evokes the dilemma of the third condition: ~11hen we introduce some 
therapy e.g. a particular drug, into a patient, whose diseased state has an 
unknown course, how can we possibly know what the (re)actions of this drug are? 
Without the possibility to make accurate predictions how can we possibly know 
that we shall reach what we want to reach? Or in the famous words of Mager: "If 
you don't know where to go, you may very well end up somewhere else, and not 
even know it" . 
The most fundamental characteristic in the medical action is its selective 
nature; doing one thing precludes doing another. It is selective in two ways: 
selective to the nature of the therapy, and selective to the receiver of the 
therapy. One can only study the reactions of one drug in one patient, excluding 
other and/or similar drugs. And our actions are selective to the receiver in 
that while giving some kind of therapy it precludes the not-giving of it. 
On the part of the receivers other problems are posed. What are the 
selection criteria for the particular drug? Is the physician especially 
interested in this disease? Which patients with the disease will be selected: 
the most ill ones or not, men or women, old or young etc. Or is the physician 
especially interested in the drug? And in the latter case, will criteria be 
different from the target population in the former domain of interest? When the 
physician chooses the most ill patients he almost inevitably will find a change 
in their condition. While improving, there may be a very likely alternative 
explanation to this finding: he observed simply a regression effect, because of 
his higher or lower judgments between the first and the second encounter. 
To say anything about the validity of the judgments, it is necessary to 
disentangle the effects of the treatment. This can only be done by random 
distribution. But this is not likely to happen while the resources mostly are 
scarce and the randomized sample is not always randomly distributed. Action is 
always selective, meaning that as we select certain cases for treatment, we by 
that very act also select other cases who do not get treatment. The only cases 
we can observe, therefore, are the true positives and the false positives. 
Subjects tend to focus only on the number of true positives i.e. they follow the 
strategy of using only confirming evidence as we have observed earlier (65). The 
second and third condition about predictions can scarcely be fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, prediction is medicine's almost exclusive and powerful 
instrument for measuring the effects of treatments and the performance of 
physicians. With regard to the former question, the necessity to establish 
criteria becomes more and more urgent. In the time of Alexander Fleming things 
were easy. The physicians and the whole medical world had a clearcut notion of 
the natural histories of the known infectious diseases. The introduction of 
penicillin could be easily observed. Nowadays we can only rely on global 
descriptions, maybe obsolete, or on minor details in the symptom patterns of 
diseases or their inanimate data from laboratories. 
It becomes extremely difficult, both for medicine and pharmacy, to develop 
and, moreover, to test new drugs and therapies in order to judge them as a 
substantial addition and improvement to the pharmaceutical and medical arsenal. 
The performance of the physician may be measured by the accuracy of his 
clinical judgment, aimed at the prediction of significant outcomes in the life 
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of another individual. When the $ame type of prediction is made repeatedly by 
the same judge, using the same type of information as a basis for his judgments, 
then the process becomes amenable to scientific study (62). But, alas, we are 
far removed as yet from this goal. Meanwhile, medical audits. have the status of 
exchanges of views, not more, not less. Unless we realize thi$. primitive status 
of the testing of performances, we shall remain like the ~edieval scholars, 
preferring discussion to scientific experimentation, which will eventually lead 
to a convenient standstill. 
Paragraph 5 
When one tali:es a glance at the contents of most medical journals, the 
number of papers about all kinds of treatments is impressive. Some journals are 
exclusively dedicated to -mostly- drug therapy, partly because they are 
sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry, partly because they focus on one of 
the physician's main interests. One can wonder why so much attention is paid 
to a subject that is, as I argued before, of no great importance to the medical 
process. Drugs and therapies come and go, the latest hardly any better than the 
previous (ones). 
Of course, it is essential to keep in touch with developments in the 
medical and pharmaceutical world. But real innovations in pharmaceutics are 
rare. After the discovery of penicillin in the late thirties, the principle of 
antibiotics has not changed. The first benzodiazepines have been introduced in 
mental health care in the beginning of the sixties, and afterwards hardly 
anything has changed with respect to the basic compound, except for an 
overwhelming variety of derivations, all with similar qualities as the basic 
substance. Many drugs have existed for decades without any change. One can 
hardly observe any need for the abundance of articles, reviews, survey, books 
etc on treatment. Nevertheless, medical congresses are predominantly dedicated 
to therapy. Sessions of physicians are almost exclusively dominated by one 
subject: treatment. So there must be an explanation for this remarkable 
phenomenon in the medical world. We can think of two possible explanations: 
1) Often, and especially in primary care, the physician is confronted with 
an tmclassifiable complex of complaints. No diagnosis· or only a rudimentary one 
can be made, while the patient is in trouble, or supposed to be. The.patient 
looks expectingly at the doctor, who is left empty-handed by medical knowledge. 
The only thing which remains is to act like the ancient Greek doctors and 
prescribe drugs for the various symptoms, without possibly knowing what the 
(re)actions will be. Every communication with a colleague in a similar, or 
assumed similar, situation is to be welcomed. Every hint in literature, even the 
remotest, may be of help in forthcoming acute or chronic but unexplained cases. 
For diseases, for which cure is unavailable or unknown, various types of drugs 
are prescribed. Feinstein (66) states: "every treatment is an experiment", but 
we have to realize that it is not a scientific experiment. 
The drug is seen as a tool in the hands of the doctor; an tool of 
extraordinarily powerful tool without which no health can be gained, no real 
help can be offered. "Are you quite sure, doctor, that there is no other drug 
for my complaints?" Instead of resolutely denying, the physician prescribes 
another drug which he has vaguely heard of. He is part of the belief in health 
and the health bringing medicaments as they are loudly advocated in the news 
media. 
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2) the physician makes a straightforward diagnosis. He can choose among 
widely available and powerful drugs. Within a couple of days the patient 
be cured or at least restored from the most incapacitating symptoms. But in 
case the illness remains or even deterioriates, there may be a number of 
possibilities: 
a) it is a variant of the natural history of the dise~e; 
b) the disease, or cause of the disease, is resistant to the drug; 
c) the patient is not compliant with the advised regimen: e.g. he does not 
takes the tablets as prescribed; · 
d) the physician made an inaccurate diagnosis. 
Approximately in this order the physician considers these alternatives. 
Although the latter alternative may be the most probable one, it often does not 
enter the physician's consideration, because the physician's personal judgment 
and commitment about this case (and diagnosis) hamper ~n objective and renewed 
view. Every physician is acquainted with a great number of variants. Needless to 
say that these variants, if existing, are unmentioned in the textbooks. Every 
physician feels a rieed to compare his variant and its treatment with those of 
colleagues, verbally or from literature. Resistance to particular drugs is often 
mentioned in a somewhat vague and general way (it has to be distinguished from 
specific items like the resistance of a particular bacteria to a specific 
antibiotic). It is often blamed to a number of disturbances like: insufficient 
resorption, insensibility to the drug, pharmacological processes etc. In these 
cases a similar drug is prescribed, with varying results. To be in touch with 
all possibilities of 'resistance' the physician consults other e~perts and 
experienced colleagues, and of course various sources of information. 
Literature about non-compliance is grot'lling. The importance of this problem 
is unknown. Its discussion is beyond the scope of this paragraph. 
Unmentioned, thusfar, is acting in emergency. Sometimes the physician has 
to initiate a treatment before a diagnosis is made and approved. Fortunately, 
these emergency cases are relatively rare in practice and do not require an 
e~tensive knowledge of pharmaceutical compounds. In relevant cases only a small 
number of drugs is used. Janis & Mann (67) listed some conditions to this 
emergency decision making: 
1) awareness of serious risks if no protective action is taken; 
2) awareness of serious risks if any of the salient protective actions is 
tal{en; 
3) moderate high degree of hope that a search for information and advice 
t-Jill lead to a better solution; 
4) belief there is sufficient time to search. 
Each physician has to be aware of his actions. The powerful drugs, 
extensive surgery and other interventions make the consequences in contemporary 
medicine so far-reaching, that no one can afford to stay in the wings. 
Paragraph 6 
The original aim of this study has been the question, "Do recognisable 
strategies exist according to which a (family) physician reaches a decisio.n?". 
The answer to this question cannot be disentangled from the contents of the 
medical process. We now face the question whether there are strategies which 
can be generalized. It is claimed that, because of the uniqueness of the 
patient-physician relation, every physician has not only his particular way of 
working, but he also has a manifold of strategies at his disposal, for each 
problem a different one. Leaper et al (10) denied a specific diagnostic process 
in physicians' problem solving. But the remarkable phenomenon exists that 
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physicians all over the· world, providing they a:re using 'Western Medicine', 
recognize each others methods, schemes and problems. It reaches beyond the 
borders set by cultures, societies or health care syst~s. What is this 
peculiar thing that connects physicians all over the world?. What is the 
characteristic (are the characteristics) that makes physicians recognisable to 
each other? 
Of course, one of the elements is the patient presenting his problem.But 
this cannot provide all explanations. We suggest that (a) joint strategy(ies) is 
a major element in connecting physicians all over the world. Literature on this 
subject is scarce. The first signs of interest can be traced back to the 
fifties, when investigators, mainly working for departments of education, tried 
to restructure medical examinations. Rimoldi (68) tried to si~ulate the medical 
process by means of written information and instruction. (an survey of this 
subject will be given in chapter VI). 
In 1959 Ledley, a mathematician, and Lusted, a radiologist, wrote their 
fundamental paper on "Reasoning foundations of medical diagnosis" (69). They 
analyzed the medical process and structured it into a logical and probabilistic 
system, following the line of Meehl (70). They introduced Decision Theory into 
the medical discipline, which enabled them to calculate the "predictive value", 
the probability that the patient has a particular disease given the presented 
symptoms. Using a series of nQtched cards and a rod these cards could be sorted 
in order to provide calculable probability estimates. This device can be seen as 
a predecessor to the Hollerith machine and the computer. 
Soon after this intriguing study the first attempts to mathematize the 
diagnostic process were published (e.g. Warner et al, 1961 (71), Nash, 1963 
(72),and in 1967 one of the first surveys about the mathematical- statistical 
(Meehl originally called it actuarial) foundations in diagnostics was 
published (73). As a consequence, investigations in medical decision maldng 
strategies and schemes were largely modelled according to the probabilistic and 
hierarchical system. Several authors express their belief that physicians 
actually do work in this way. "It is assumed that expert clinicians may use 
logical methods in their everyday work" (21); "a linear sequential process of 
hierarchical steps" (74); the primary aim( •. ) is to express the activities of 
the clinician in mathematically recognisable terms" (75); "Ideally, a physician 
needs to calculate and compare the probabilities of various diseases that could 
have caused the patient's problems (76). 
Next to this trail two other methods were developed, both originated in 
cognitive psychology. In a non-chronological order these trails can be described 
as 1) multiple branching method, and 2) artificial intelligence. 
The first one goes back to the pre-war Gestalt psychologists, Duncker {on 
problem solving) and Wertheimer (Productive thinking), 1945. The theory of 
concept formation was further developed in the fifties by Bruner, Goodnow and 
Austin (77), Miller (78) and Hovland (79), leading to experiments with 
psychologists ( (Mandler (80), Kleinmuntz (81)) and clinicians (Wortman 
(82,83). The latter author tested Mandler's theory about the organization of 
information in memory into hierarchical structures. Wortman found three stages 
of a recoding process: a) the perception of the hierarchy of categories. b) 
chunldng within a subordinate category, and c) the establishment of the 
hierarchical relationship between superordinate and subordinate categories. This 
led to a multiple branching scheme of organizational hierarchy like the 
following abbreviated scheme of Wortman (83) 
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Figure 1 
MULTIPLE BRANCHING SCHEME OF ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY 
LOCATION SHAPE MATERIAL COLOR NAME 
white ------ Pie container 
plastic/ 
. / --red 
/Triangular"" gr.,.,., 
Home/~ cloth< 
/ 
---.. yellow ---pillow 
ylindrical 
ashtray 
napkin 
OBJECTS 
~ ~ ........... . 
~ •·········· 
Multiple branching can be seen as a logical progression down one of the 
many possible paths in which the response to each test or question automatically 
determines the next step. This scheme is more widely known as a decision-tree 
giving each step the weight of a probability estimation towards a previously 
determined outcome. 
Artificial intelligence, although it seems a brand new branch of science, 
goes back to the beginning of this century. The experiments of Wundt gave a 
fresh impulse to epistemology. Especially the philosophical theories of Selz 
(Ueber die Gesetze des Geordneten Denkverlaufs : About the laws of regulated 
thinking processes, 1913, and "Die Gesetze der Produktiven und Reproduktiven 
Geistestaetigkeit: The laws of productive and reproductive mental activities, 
1924), influenced investigators to more practical theories as Cybernetics 
(Norbert Wiener, 1948) Cybernetics was a general name encompassing three 
systems: 
1) information theory, 
2) theory of feedback systems (servomechanism theory), and 
3) the system of electronic computing. When we know what is going on in the 
human mind, we must be able to mimic this process. It gave rise to 
investigations with observation and thinking aloud protocols of human problem 
solving behaviour. The thesis was, that an explanation of an observed behaviour 
of the organism is provided by a program of primitive information processes that 
generates this behaviour. One of the first studies was performed by A.D. de 
Groot (84), studying the problem solving behaviour of chessplayers. He laid one 
of the foundations for what is nowadays known as artificial intelligence. 
Especially the thorough and highquality investigations by Simon and Newell, 
stretching over three decades, must be mentioned in this particular context. 
Several diagnostic computerprograms using theories and techniques of artificial 
intelligence science have been developed. There are three main reasons for this 
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development: 
1) the rapidly increasing storage capacity; 
2) the sheer quantity of medical research and knowledge; 
3) the greater volume of data physicians have to handle (85). 
The most ambitious program now is Caduceus containing diagnostic elements 
to diagnose more than 500 diseases (86). Whether these thre~ trails mimic the 
actual daily work of the physician is an open question. Neither of them have 
been developed in the original setting of medicine. They all share a number of 
assumptions about the medical process among which are: 
1) all diseases are unequivocally classifiable entities; 
2) all hypotheses, as intermediaries towards a diagnosis, fit in a 
hierarchical structure; 
3) all tests to hypotheses can be expressed into probabilities; 
4) symptoms can be -invariantly- assigned to diseases in terms of weights 
(mathematical-statistical) or grades of membership (fuzzy set theory, Boolean 
algebra). 
5) each outcome of a diagnostic process can be expressed in terms of value 
estimation. 
6) to each value estimation a probability can be assigned. 
7) because we know (or at least ought to know) the frequency distribution 
of a disease in a (or the physician's practice) population, we can calculate its 
prevalence. 
These concepts are elements necessary towards the organization of a 
formalized decision-making system. Newell & Simon (87) claim that the benefits 
to be gained from the computer or information processing approach are: 
a.) it provides a formal language for dealing with complex problems; 
b.) requires a precise formulation of the theory; 
c.) allows for a direct and unequivocal test of the theory by raqning a 
program. 
The outcome of the program can be compared with the outcome of the 
physician's problem-solving activities in similar cases. The advantage of the 
information processing approach is its possibility to retrack the various steps 
in the process. As the problem solving activities are supposed to be directed by 
the problem, the problem solving space reflects the organizational structure of 
memory in information processing as well as in hum~n problem-solving. In other 
words, an information processing approach can simulate human behaviour problem 
solving. It will lead to the formulation of a number of conditions for a problem 
solving program or simulation. 
1.) It should predict the performance of a problem-solver handling specific 
tasks; 
2.) it should explain how human problem solving takes place; 
3.) what processes are used; 
4.) what mechanisms perform these processes; 
5.) it should predict the incidental phenomena that accompany the problem 
solving process (88). 
These conditions are not always met in simulations and investigations in 
medical informatics. In our opinion the omission alienated the physicians from 
this formalized approach in medical decision making. The information processing 
programmes became less and less recognisable to the practising physician, which 
resulted in desillusion and lack of interest. On the other hand, information 
scientists became annoyed by the physician's behaviour. Their straightforward 
and clear (in their opinion) programs and algorithms were not accepted by the 
physicians, indeed, they were rejected although proven superior in some fields. 
In our op~n~on, three obstacles towards amalgamation of the formalized and 
the 'informal' ways of decision making can be distinguished. 
1.) The strategies used in both procedures differ too much. 
2.) physicians know, or at least intuitively feel, the relativity and 
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unreliability of the medical data necessary in the information processing 
approach to calculate the various ptobabilities. 
3.) the restriction of formal decision making to a number of sometimes less 
interesting (to the physician) fields. Indeed, the restriction itself hampers 
interest. 
The strategies were supposed to happen according to a hierarchical 
structure: a strict relationship between superordinate and subordinate 
categories, as we have described in chapter III, paragraph 3. The physician 
moves in a top-to-Qottom direction, starting at the lowest possible level (82). 
E.g. the physician begins to choose between the option somatic versus mental 
illness, and via a number of down-grading subordinate hypotheses comes to a 
specific diagnosis, respectively decision. The test to the former hypotheses 
automatically determines the following step. However, e"cept for a small number 
of simulations or theories (22,89,90) a hierarchical structure has never been 
ascertained in routine medical practice. In our investigation we challenge this 
formal, deductive strategy. 
The structure can be delineated as a sequence of hypotheses and tests, the 
first hypothesis reflecting the prevalence of the disease in a - circumscribed -
population: the prior probability. Each test and test result can change this 
probability estimate towards a final estimation: the posterior probability. Each 
test to a hypothesis can have four outcomes: the predictions that the disease is 
present or absent given the test result is positive or negative. It can be 
schematized as follows: 
Table l 
BIVARIATE PROBABILITIES OF DISEASE STATE AND TEST RESULT 
(frequencies) 
~ PRESENT ABSENT T E 
POSITIVE a b 
NEGATIVE c d 
The probability that the test or procedure result will be positive when the 
disease is present, is called Sensitivity and is calculated as: 
a 
a+c 
The probability that the test or procedure result will be negative when the 
disease is not present, is called Specificity, and is calculated as 
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d 
b+d 
Assuming that the test is meticulously and perfectly executed, the results 
are influenced by several variances of natural and non-natural origins: regular 
human variance, drug-induced variances etc. One of the major obstacles in 
judging test results is the establishment of the margin(s) between 'normal' and 
'abnormal'. Several test results e.g. vary with age or sex, sometimes vary from 
culture to culture, race to race, hour to hour, day to night. Generally, the 
line between 'normal' and 'abnormal' is drawn on basis of the mean values for 
that particular test found within a sample of 'normal healthy' adults. This 
·value, the cutoff-point, should mark the difference between a diseased and a 
nondiseased state. However, this cutoff-point is seldom based on firm, i.e. 
scientific, foundations. The cut-off point determines to a certain extent, the 
sensitivity and specificity. The more the point is shaven to the "normal" side, 
the more people are included in the diseased group and the more excluded from 
non-diseased group. The test influences not only the sensitivity and specificity 
values, they diverse in their directions: the higher the sensitivity the lower 
the specificity and vice versa. 
The next schemes may elucidate these relationships (see Wulff (29)). It is 
assumed that the results of a particular test follow a so-called normal or 
Gaussian distribution ranging from absolute abnormal to absolute normal. The 
upper curves in the schemes present the negative test results (specificity) and 
the lower the positive test results (sensitivity). On the left side of the 
vertical line the negative or 'normal' values (true and false negative) are 
depicted, on the right hand side the positive or 'abnormal' values (true and 
false positives). Moving the vertical bar in either direction clearly influences 
the values in all four quadrants. 
FP 
FN TP FN TP 
after Wulff (29) 
The predictive value of the test in case the disease may be present can be 
calculated as: 
a 
a+b 
The prevalence being the percentage of the numbers of diseased people 
proportional to the total population: 
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a+c 
. --~------'*"f-
a+b+<t+d 
With the·help of some fonQUlae the probability that a disease is present or 
absent given th~ sympto,il!S . being presen_t or absent Call. be: c·alcul~ted. This matter 
will be discussed. in chi;lpter V. :._ :.. ·. ·· · · · · · : · :· '. · . > 
Although · t:Q.e thepry ·is t~pting,: one can scarcely s~e. haw t.he conditions 
tow~dm ·u1e. calculations . ·can be · fuifilled •. Even· if. w~: Unequivocally and 
unanimously agr:e~ on . the.', value5 for a, b, c, and d, the .baaic questions about 
the .medical 'fr.amewor:k r~ain. ·It may may take a ve:ry, yecy .long time to obtain 
that kind of figures whicil:enf:l.ble us to ealc11late the Pred~ction. Meanwhile we 
can underline Feinsfetn',s statement (91)' that "iatremath-.tical enthousiasts 
could make . sUb$tantia~ · · _coitfriJmtions · t(). cliniqa~ med;ic,ine_ .if the efforts now 
being expended on Bayesian and decision-analYtic fantas~es-were directed to the 
major challenges of algoritmnicillly dissecting clinical Judgment, based on the 
way the judgments a,re a~tually .performed".· . . 
We hav.e to acknpwledge thai medical decision making actu~lly contributed to 
the understanding ·of strategies l.tsed in medical pFoblem sol.ving. 
Several investigat<;>rs ·formulated one or more strategies. In a concise 
version we shall give some short descriptions. 
1.) Elstein and c~rkers {90) found in a simqlated environment one 
strategy practiced by all ·.participants, the hjrpot4etico-deductive one: on the 
basis of the earliest ciue~.a short list of potential diagx,oses is formulated, 
successively testeduntil a final hypothesis, the diagnosis,·remains. 
2.) Sackett (quoted in 92) analyzing the literat~e, found 4 strategies. 
a.) ~~h~Y§!iY~ ID§!hQg : noting every detail of the patient's history; 
b.) ~ll~m · recognH.Mm : conformation to a previously learned model, 
triggered by sensory stimuli; 
c.) MY!!ie!~ Q!~ChiBg 
paths in which the response 
the next step; 
logical , progression doWn one of many possible 
to each tes~ or question automatically determines 
d. ) h~2!b~!i£2=geduc:UY~ ID§!:bQf! 
3. Simon & Newell (88) mention·two str~tegies: 
I • 
a. ) Scan & Search · mode a smci!ll number of nodes on a decision tree 
(multiple b~anching)~r~-sea;ched over a short distance: n~ nodes are generated 
when searching fails; . . 
b.) fr2m:essiy~ R~~!!iBi §:!:!:!!~ : the top~to-b~ttom deductive way of 
reasoning. 
~.) Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz (93) tested three strategies: 
a.) g§!!~!:§!~=~4=T~§! §!r~!§SX , which picks treatment randomly, until an 
accep,table o:qe is f<;>und: there is no attempt to diagnose the disease; 
b.) !!~Y!i§!i£ §:tra:t~gx this strategy views PeOple as satisfiers who 
indulge in a limited amount of search, until a satisfactory rather than optimal 
solut'ion is reached. Qnly positive evidence is sought to confirm a hypothesis. 
Their concept is supported by the study of Balla (21). 
c.) ~~r~§i~ g~E§£!~g Y~i!i:tx §~r§~§gy this strategy is based on 
probabilistic reasoning using Bayes' theorem for calculation. 
I 
With the latter strategy, we are back with the formalized decision-making 
strat1egies. Its achievements and obstacles shall be ·discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CIIAPTER V 
Humans make decisions 1 a tremendous number everyday, consciously or 
LIDconsciously~ ranging from small ones, 'how do I like my egg in the morning?' 
till large ones, 'how many million dollars to invest in an Uncertain business 
prrospect?90 ; flr'om the move of a chess player t'ill the generaP s decision to 
sacrifice the lives of several hundreds of soldiers. Most of these decisions are 
based on intuition or ~'common sense'9 , or what is assUJ.mad to be a more firm 
basis, experience. The various unsatisfying outcomes, ~ot to speak of disasterrs9 
resulting from this kind of decision making0 urged people to look for strategies 
yielding more successful outcomes, end ways were sought to originate and define 
strategies which enable us to predict more reliably the outcomes of our 
decisions. 
It can hardly be coincidental that a large part of investigation in this 
field has been focused on that particular situation whe~e personal gains and 
losses are so obviously demonstrated: the ·gambling table. When decision mru{ing 
is seen as the optimalization of the reliability of predictions, the study of 
decision making started in the 17th and 18th centuries with philosophers and 
mathematicians like e.g. Descartes 9 Poisson, and de Moivre (doctrine de Chances) 
in l!i'r11mce, Gauss and Cramer in Ge::rmany 9 BernouilB. i:i.-n Switzerland~ and J'ohn 
Stuart Mill and Thomas Bayes in England. Cramer and Bernouilli were the first 
who, in the 18th century~ began with the rational economic man concepts (1). 
Whether the formulated mathematical solution really brought what their 
principals (high-ranking noblemen) expected, is highly questionable. 
People still continue to lose their :money in the various gambling houses in 
the world, to the intense joy and pleasure of the owners of these houses. 
Besides, the very complicated mathematical statistical procedures prevent 
routine application of the proposed statistical ·formulae in these types of 
gambling I decision making $ituations. The various theories and procedures 
remained dor~ent till the introduction of equipment that made the calculation of 
the proposed formula much easier and quicker: the computer. Th~ second world war 
accelerated the process, and in the fourties and fifties of this century, a 
'revival 9 of the gambling theories, mostly renamed 'Decision Theory9 , could be 
greeted. 
The first applications of these theories to practical situations were in 
the areas of warfare and economics • In the next decades these theories and 
their various modifications were applied and tested in other fields of science, 
e.g. medicine. It is against this background that medical decision making 
developed as an independent di~cipline not actually related to the actual 
process of medical practice, but by using 'medicine' as a means to test the 
theories. In this way it had to be 'normative' or 'prescriptive9 to the actual 
decision making. 
Patients more and more question the -sometimes fallible- predictions of 
their physicians 9 extreme variance in therapeutic outcomes 9 variabilities of 
morbidity and mortality figures, rising cost in health care without a 
substantial increase in health status, yes sametimes even decreasing, and 
several other elements which worked together to question the ~va-et-vient' of 
the medical practice. Several attempts to gain insight in the medical process, 
and to optimalize it, have been made and are made. Among these attempts are 
e?g. Problem-oriented-Medical Record (2), Medical Audit 9 Protocols (h~~ to 
diagnose and act in certain cases prescribed by experts), Flow Charts (3), and 
the several variants of medical decision m~Ell.ki.ng (som!letimes also called medical 
or clinical decision analysis) 9 'rhu'3far, the results of all these a·ttempts are 
disencour&giJrng. 
Decision theory has much to learn from medicine without trumping up their 
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methods, and medicine in its turn can gain much advantage from the views and 
procedures of decision theory. Outstanding people lU~:e Simon &. Newell, 
Kleinmuntz, Feinstein etc. are more and more sought after to try and bridge the 
gap between medical problem-solving and medical decision. 
ParagTaph 2 
Decision theory is a group of related constructs that seek to describe or 
prescribe how individuals or groups of people choose a course of action when 
faced with several alternatives and a variable amount of knowledge about the 
determinants or the outcomes of those al terna.ti ves ( 4) . The theory cSll!l be 
distinguished into two types, a theory concerning descriptive (how people do 
behave) or prescriptive (how people should behave) decisions, both for either 
individual or group decisions. Decision making can be defined as the process of 
tho~ht and action involving an irrevocable allocation of resources that 
culminates in choice behaviour. In ~cing a decision, a decisionmaker is dealing 
with environments, characterized by risks, uncertainty, complexity. changes over 
time and conflict (1). 
The decisionmaker invariably has to choose among a number of alternatives 
either diagnoses or therapeutic actions. The quality of a decision depends upon 
how well the decisionmaker is able to acquire informationp to analyee the 
information, and to evaluate and interpret information such ss to discriminate 
between relevant and irrelevant bits of data; it also depends upon how well the 
decisionmaker is able to cope with the stress which is invariably encountered in 
important decision circumstances (1). It is essentially for human decisionmakers 
to bring order into their information acquiring and processing activities. when 
confronted with an excess of information, unreliable information or a lack of 
sufficient information. 
People are flooded by information which must somehow be reduced and 
simplified to allow efficient processing and to avoid an othe~ise overwhelming 
overload (something like trying to read all medical journals at once with no 
system for ordering, reducing, or altogether avoiding data overload). However, 
this reduction and simplification process, called a~ter Mischel (5) "cognitive 
economics", involves various dangers. Mischel is especially concerned about the 
routes of simplification end the growth of self-knowledge and rules for 
self-regulation with maturitioD. 
Decision theories give rules for optimal processing of data. One of the 
best-known ( and on which most of the decision procedures are based) is the 
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Von Ne"~.moom & Morgenstern, 1947), which 
proposed several decision rules to handle decisions of complete ignorance; "to 
find mathematically complete principles whicl1 define 'rational behaviour 9 ( ••• ) 
as a set of rules for each participant which tell him how to behave in every 
situation t-Jhich may conceivably e.rise11 • Decision theory rests on five main 
conceptual components:states of nature, actions, outcomes, probability and 
utility functions. 
a) 11 the set of states of nature" is assumed to form a mutually exclusive 
and e'dtaustive listing of those aspects of nature which are relevant to this 
particular choice problem and about which the decision maker is uncertain. In 
decision theory two possibly very different states of the world which are 
generated or are related to the same outcome for a given action, will be labeled 
the same ( 4); 
p) The set of possible actions and outcomes is finite, complete, and 
invariant for a given problem; 
c) The optimal solution depends directly on the probability assignments 
(weightings to the component elements of the state of nature) 
d) The sum of the probability of all outcomes for a given action must be 
'Wllity; 
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e) The probability assignment reflect the confidence of the decisionmaker 
in the likelihood of outcomes (4). 
OUtcome directed distinctions are: 
1) Decisj,QJg§ ynde,r g~rta.!g!x : where each alternative course of action has 
e ~ingle well-specified outcome; 
2) Degision~ ung~!: risk or ~rtaintx , where each alternative course of 
action has a well-defined set of possible outcomes each with a probebility of 
occurrence; 
3) ~ecisiO!!§ ynd~r !ggoran£~ : when each action results in a range of 
possible outcomes but the probability of occurence of each outcome is unknm~ 
(Luce & Rlsiffa) (4,6). 
Distinctions 2) and 3) especially refer to the medical situation. The 
physician mainly has to make a choice among a number of alternatives of which 
the outcomes with their probabilities concerning this particular patient al~e 
either uncertain or completely unknown. His choice will depend~ to a large 
extent, upon the decision si tuations.l ~ structural :model as reflected in the 
comtiJnl'gency tasl(. He chooses the most preferred alternative generally from 
partial or total ordening or prioritization of the alternatives (1). 
Implicit in this description is the assumption that there is an underlying 
logical structure (7). Lec:Uey & Lusted (8) proposed three mat.hemaatical-logics.l, 
disciplines to the medical process: symbolic logicp probability and value 
theory; each of them had led to seps..ratep although interrelated, &reae of stUlldy, 
based on the Von Neumann & Morgenstern theory. 
Most decision theorists base their constructs on a cybernetical disease 
concept l:"egardless of medical substantiation. "Since doctors themselves donpt 
take active part in itp the main thrust is carried by people coming from 
informatics as such. tlnat the physician needs, if even, is a decision support 
for the steps in his clinical decision, not the ultimate classification of the 
proble!lM.l" (9). 
Although comparisons with physicians' work are regularly made, and are 
spoken of as 'computer-aids' to doctors, physicians are often blamed for not 
behaving in a 'probabilistic fashion', or 'unable to estimate probabilities end 
Ulltilities', suggesting that doctors should think and act in theae ~'lays. 17They 
wiolate the principles of rational decision making when judging probabilities~ 
Iileldng predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasksv' 
(10). But, the cybernetical concept of medicine as it stands may be questioned, 
as was discussed in the previous chapters. 
The stl:"ess between theory and reality colours the discussion about medical 
decision making. It also differentiates decision making fl'om problem solving. 
Medical problem solving can be viewed as an analysis of the steps physicians 
t~<e to reach a solution. It is mainly descriptive in its nature. The theory of 
clinical decision making is a prescriptive approach to the process of clinical 
judgment and is based on a theory, which has not been originated within the 
medical world. It can be viewed as a multistep process which culminates in the 
selection of one alternative in preference to another.It delineates the steps a 
physician ought to make in order to arrive at an optimal decision. 
These step can be delineated as: 
1. Ascertain the need for a decision; 
2. Establish decision criteria; 
3. Allocate weights to criteria; 
4. Develop alternatives; 
5. Evaluate alternatives; 
6. Select the best alternative (11). 
It would be accurate to state that the theory of decision making is a 
noi'll!nstive theory, presenting how decisions should be made. Yet, there is a large 
body of descriptive literature on decision making which gives a different 
picture. It suggests that actual decision making is not nearly as objective and 
straightforward as the normative picture presents. It largely reflects the 
difference between the optimizing and the satisficing decision making theories, 
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as discussed in chapter I!. The optimizing man is completely rational, making 
~~optimal" choices in a highly specified and clearly defined environment. tJhen 
confronted with a problem the "optimizing .man9' should 
a.) clearly define the decision criteria; 
b.) be knowledgeable of all relevant alternatives; 
c.) be aware of all possible consequences against the decision criteria; 
d.) evaluate the consequences against the decision criteria; 
e.) rank alternatives in a preferred order of rational impact; 
f.) select the alternative 'l!Jhich rates highest in terms of health state 
(11). 
Simon rejected this economic man model in favour of one that he believed 
more accurately reflected reality. His "satisficing" theory, or fr'adminbltrative 
:man model", proposes that the decision. mslcer will 
1.) recognize only a limited number of decision criteria; 
2.) propose only a limited number of alternatives; 
3.) be aware of only a few of the consequences of each alternative; 
4.) formulate a simplified and limited model of the real situation; 
5.) select the alternative which presents a satisfactory solution. (11). 
(compare with heuristic strategy of Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz (12)). 
The decision criteria in medicine are largely defined by symptomss 
diagnostic hypotheses and the prevalence of the diseases in the diagnostic phsme 
and diagnosesp therapeutic actions and outcomes in the therapeutic phase. In 
this paragraph the main elements of the decision-theoretical approach of the 
medical process will be discussed. 
This approach is based on the a.eswnption of a linear sequential (logical) 
process of hierarchical steps. Its primary aim is to express the physician's 
activities in mathematically recognisable terms (13). As we have sketched in 
Chapter IV the structure of the cybernetical concept can be delineated as a 
sequence of hypotheses and tests. The hypothesis is generated by the physician 
on basis of the acquired evidence, his ~edical knowledge~ and his past la1owledge 
about the presumed diseases, mirroring their prevalences. Each test (which can 
be any question to the patient 0 any physical examination or laboratory test) end 
test result is weighed against the possible alternatives (hypotheses), as they 
are depicted in a multibranchi:ng decision tree. The weighing is calculated as 
the proportion that a disease is present or absent given the result as positive 
or negative. These proportion are called after Yerushalmy & Palmer (14) 
sensitivity respectively specificity. 
Sensitivity is the ability of a test to give a positive finding when the 
person tested truly suffers from the disease in question. It can be calculated 
as follows: 
diseased persons with a positive test 
Sensi ti vi ty = ----------------·---------------- " 100 
all diseased subjects tested 
Specificity is the ability of a test to give a negative finding when the 
person tested is free of the disease under study. It is calculated as: 
nondiseased persons negative to the test 
Specificity = --------- - X 100 
all nondiseased subjects tested 
These elements are customarily denoted as the probability of having a 
symptom (or positive test) given the disease: P [S:D], or the reverses the 
probability of not having a symptom (or negative test) given the absence of the 
disease, P [s:d]. The chance relation of a symptom (or test) to a- specified-
disease entity is called conditional probability, the probability of (not) 
having the symptom given the (non) disease. In the follm1ing we shall use 
capital letters for the positive results and lower case letters for the negative 
side. 
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As we have sketched in Chapter IV the bivariable distribution can be 
pictured as: 
Schema l 
Bivariate Probabtlity Distribution 
s~!~~E TOM-~ 
POSITIVE 
I NEGATIVE 
PRESENT 
p.P(S:D] 
p.P(s:D] 
ABSENT 
{1-p)P[S:d] 
(1-p)P[s:d] 
L----------~----------~----------~ 
The total population consists of a proportion (p) of subjects who actually 
have the disease, and the remainder of nondiseased subjects (1 - p).The 
proportion of these subjects yielding a positive test will equals p.P[S:D] {true 
positives), plus :he false positives [l -p][l- P(s;d)]. It follows that the 
proportion of subjects in the total population yielding a negative test will 
consist of [1 p]P[s:d] (true negatives), plus the false negatives p.P(s:d]. 
these relations will be expressed in the next table 
Table 1 
Proportions of subjects in the total population who have or do not 
have actual d1sease and the proportions of positive and negative tests 
{symptoms present or absent) in these groups.* 
Classification 
t 
Total Population Yielding Positive Yielding Negative 
Test Test 
-------------t-·---------------1-"' ---- ---------------- --------------------at:~ 
Diseased p* p.P[S:D] p.P[s:D] 
I 
Nondiseased I [1-p] fl-p]P[S:dj [1-p]P(s:d] l 
I 
----------- ... +-- ..... -·---------- - . - ----------------- ---- --·- ~ ·- - ·-
Total l p + [1-p] p.P[S:D] + [1-p]P(S:d] p.P[s:Dj+[l-p]P[s:d] 
* symbols are explained in the text 
If we know the prevalence p of a disease, and the sensitivity and the 
specificity of a test or symptom given the disease, we are able to calculate the 
various aspects of this type of disease-symptom relationship. 
For tests with a continuous scale of values (e.g. blood pressure, pulse 
rate, blood sugar levels) various cutoff-points can be selected to adjust the 
sensitivity and the specificity of the test in conformity with the decision 
maker's goals. These cutoff-points can be arranged in curves which are called 
after Lusted the Receiver Operating Curves (ROC)(l5). 
When test results are expressed dichotomously, the predictive value of a 
positive test result may be defined as the frequency of times that the presence 
of a symptom will detect a diseased individual. This can be calculated as 
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Number (or proportion) of diseased persons 
with a positive test/symptom 
Predictive Value = --------------------------------------------
number (or proportion) of persons with a 
positive test /symptom 
p.P[S :D) 
PV positive = P[D:S] = -------------------------------
p.P(S :D] + [1-p] [1-P(s: d)] 
The negative predictive value is given by 
[1-p]P[s:d] 
PV negative = P[d:s] = 
[1-p]P[s:d] + p(l-P(S:D)] 
It may be clear that positive predictive value or discriminative force is 
related to the frequency with which a disease is present in the population. When 
the presence of the disease in the population is practically zero the 
probability that a certain symptom or symptom configuration predicts its 
presence, or can discriminate among other diseases, is rather low. This can be 
examplified. When the sensitivity is fixed at 80% and the specificity at 90%, 
then the PVpositive and PV negative change with the disease prevalence according 
to the following table. 
Table 2 
The relation between predictive values and disease prevalence. 
Actual Disease Prevalence: Pv pos. : Pv neg. 
0.1% o.a% 99.98% 
1% 7.45% 99.78% 
10% 47.1% 97.59% 
20% 66.7% 94.74% 
50% 88.9% 81.82% 
With the sensitivity a~d the specificity prefixed the disease prevalence 
particularly effects the predictive values for positive test results. This 
is especially evident for the lower disease prevalences, the specific 
domain of primary care. 
(The relation between PV positive and PV negative with a fixed disease 
prevalence is exemplified in Vecchio's paper) 
The essence of the decision making is choice. The decision maker has to choose 
among alternatives, e.g. between diseases or therapeutic actions. The decision 
process is customarily depicted as a multiple branching tree, a decision tree. 
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Schema 2 
An example of a decision tree. 
-------
Outcome l.a.l 
Action a 
Disease 
Patient's~ 
Problem ~
Disease 
~ ---------_Outcome l.a.2 
1 ~ ---- Outcome l.b.l 
Action b 
------- Out~e 1. b. 2 
_.,............Action 
2·~ 
----Outcome 2.c.l c---- Outcome 2. c. 2 
~Action ------Outcome 2. d.l d----- . Outcome 2.d.2 
Where branches come together two kinds of nodes can be distingUished: 
Decision (or choice) nodes, symbolized with 0, and Chance nodes, symbolized as 
o. 
A decision node denotes a point in time at which the decision maker can 
select one of the several alternative courses of action; a chance node denotes a 
point in time at which one of the several possible events beyond the control of 
the decision maker may take place. 
A. branch or path (sometimes called scenario) in a decision tree is a 
particular sequence of actions or events beginning with a particular choice at 
the initial choice node and following a particular event or choice at each 
subsequent chance or choice node from left to right. 
(For a comprehensive survey on this subject see e.g. Weinstein & Fineberg 
(22)). 
The decision tree can be viewed as an aid in identifying alternative 
clinical strategies. The optimal strategy can be found by assigning 'weights' or 
'values' to the various alternatives. The choice between two diagnostic 
hypotheses can be calculated by means of the values of two ratios. The ratio of 
two related probabilities can be expressed in odds. When we assume e.g. p[D] to 
be 0.1, then the corresponding p(d] must be [1- p], and the odds are 
p [D] 0.1 
= = 1 9 
p [d] 0.9 
The ratio of two conditional probabilities is called the likelihood ratio. 
A likelihood of a hypothesis given an event is by definition proportional to or 
equal to the probability of that event given the hypothesis. The likelihood 
ratio for a symptom given a disease to the absence of the symptom if the disease 
is absent can be expressed as · 
P [S :D] 
p [s :d) 
As is described in Chapter III, section 5, it is a way of judging 
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· hypotheses concerning unknown events. A future event i~ to be regarded as the 
more probable the greater the relative frequency of similar events observed 
sofar under similBllr circumstances. The predictive value for a disesse 9 
symbolized as P [D:S], as calculated with the help of the mforementioned 
elements can, therefore, only express en inductive probability (whem~ we have 
seen five II'Jhi te swans 9 the ne1c:t one is asst!!!!ed to be 'ivhi te ~also) • 
Having decided upon a certain disease the decision maker is then assumed to 
make a choice between the various therapeutic actions. Only in rere instances 
the therapeutic action followm unequivocally from the knowledge about the cause 
of the established ~isease entity. Generally~ there are several ~~e leading to 
Rome, i.e. reaching the optimal state of helath for this ~ticular patie~t with 
this specific disease. 
According to the concep~ual components of Decision theo~J the likelihood of 
the outcomem must be expressed in the probability assignments the decisioliil ~er 
attaches to these outcomes. The quantified values ·as attached to the maximal 
attailiilable status of the patient is called 'Utility~v a teL~ borrowed from the 
economics. Since we have no guarantee to actually achieve this goal, we speak of 
"Expected . Utility". The physicimt 9 B objective becomes the mi3!Ximizatiom of the 
expected utility (18). 
"Utility theory" is an e..'"Ciomatic theory of decision :malldng Ullllder risk. It 
specifies the course of action a decision maker should choose to be consistent 
with his preferences and judgments. It states that the decision maker should 
choose that course of action which meximizes his expected utility (Luce & 
Raiffs,quoted in 19). It is~ as mentioned, measured in terms of probability end 
it is this unifoirmity of measurement that enables him to combine it with that 
other feature in the decision making process 9 the probability of the diagnosis, 
in order to produce a decisiop in favour of a specified therapeutic action (21). 
Utility has been studied by the odds that a subject would d~d when 
offered a "fair" bet (29). Utility or Value theory requires 
1) the neces.sity to assess utilities in all the consequences to be 
considered; 
2) if the likelihood of the expected outcome can be expressed as 
probabilities, it is possible, by working backwards through the various 
alternative actions to determine the expected utility of each course of action 
at each decision point (19). 
In Utility theory a number of elements is assumed to exist in the model: 
1) a set of policy alternatives, 'a'; 
2) the set of possible consequences of choice or future states of nature or 
decision outcomes called'S'; 
3) utility function 'U(s)' that is defined for all elements 's' of set 'S'; 
4) info~tion as to which outcomes will occur if a particular policy 
alternative 'a' in 'A' is chosen; and 
5) infonnation as to the probalbili ty of occurrence of any particular 
outcome if en alternative a A is chosen. 
This leads to the simplest form of eh."Pected utility of alternative A and 
can be computed ~~ 
:n 
E{U(a.)} = E P{s.(a.)}U{s.(a. )} (l) 
1 j=l J 1 J 1 
All utility theories (discussion of the various theories is beyond the 
scope of this study) assume that: 
a) preferences are governed only by the utilities and outcomes; 
b) complete ordering of the expected outcomem is possible; 
c) the preference order of the outcomes is transitive~ which mciom enables 
the decisionmaker to calculate the utility of one state if the utiiitie$ of the 
other states ai~e known; 
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d) independence exists between the various outcomes; 
e) enhanced expected outcomes are preferred if end only if a basic expected 
outcome is preferred (1). 
In practice single utilities are not assessed, but groups of them, 
comparing the various outcomes in different ways to understand aspeets of the 
utility structure (21). 
For a :medical example we consider lOoOOO patients for all of wham two 
tentative diagnoses, Dl and D2, have been made, with proba,bility 6/8 all)d. 3/8 
respectively. Suppose also that there exists a treatment T that is 80% effective 
against disease complex Dl, and 40% effective against disease complex D2. The 
expected value is the proportion ! 9 which is the sum of the products of the 
value of the treatment for curing the disease and the probability that a patient 
suffeJrS from the disease. 
80 5 40 3 
E= -- *-- + --- * -- * 10.000 ::: Oa55 
100 s 100 8 
which is the probability that an at ~andom selected patient recovers when 
he is treated (8). 
Hot'llever~ between theory and reality there yawns a gap. The theory, thusfar, 
counts at least two obstacles. 
1.) it assumes diseasesj symptoms, signs and tests as independent elements, 
which can hardly be the case in medicine; · 
2.) we bear no knowledge about the exact values of the various 
attributes.Some of the problems to these obstacles shall be discussed. 
The starting point of the decision making process is considered to be the 
prior probability. The prior probability is regarded as a summary of what one 
knows about the presented patient 9 s problem in general, before there ie ey 
specific infoma.tion available (23). But bow can we possibly know what 
physicians know in general about this particular situation? As en accomodation 
the prevalence or the incidence of the assumed disease is accepted a8 a value 
for the prior probability. However, the conception of Balla (23a): wthe 
strength of a physician»s initial disposition to regard his patient as having a 
certain illness is directly proportional to the incidence* of that disease in 
the population he serves", is contrasted by e.g. Weinstein & Fineberg (22) end 
many others, assuming the prevalence reflecting the prior probability. 
* note.(Incidence can be descr.ibed as the rate with which a certain disease 
in a circumscribed population is represented to a physician within a given time 
span.) 
Although incidence is a more realistic term to a physician than prevalence, 
he can est~ate what he observes -, customarily the prevalence rate is taken 
as value for the prior probability. Howevers reliable figures for the prevalence 
rate are not generally available. Figures available pertain almost always to 
(too) limited populations and medical fields. 
Gustafson et al (24) advocated subjective estimation of the various values 
by the expert physician. They define subjective probability as any estimate of 
the probability of an event, which is given by a eubject or inferred from his 
behaviour. Subjective estimates can be derived from experts, frequency data from 
literature or medical records or from interviewing a random sampled group of 
physicians. (Opposite to subjective probability is the objective, or 
statistical, or actuarial probability. Figures, mostly concerning disease 
prevalence rates, are derived from specific investigations or from 
epidemiological studies). The Gustafson et al (24) study concludes that the 
subjective model's developmental cost and time requirement is much lower (then 
objectively acquired figures), while it functions as well as either actuarial 
model. In most studies subjectively acquired probability estimates are used 
nowadays. 
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Several authors, however, question the validity ~d reliability of these 
estimates. They point to the highly unrelia~le estimation of chances of people. 
Physicians, they state, like other scientists end indeed like the ordinary lay 
persora~ easily tend to infer, generalizell Sl!!d predict t100 .much ~~hile observing 
too little. Problems inherent to prior probebilities are e.g.: 
1,) the estimates discriminate against rare dise~es; 
2.) prior pl"'obabilities as figures :for pre~,ralence ere (almost) not 
available, emd ~Jhen they are., they are hardly reliable. Incidence figuAJres are 
Jmot available at all; 
3.) sampling errors; 
4.) estimates may only be applicable to a given population in a particular 
geographical location; 
5.) estimates can eas.ily be distorted by seasb!lJ!al e.nd iravestigational 
influea11ces; 
6.) estimates may have a personal a~d situational emphasis. Physicians do 
not rely heavily on general accessible lmowledge li!!e textbooks, jm.1rrnalsp 
conti~uing education etc. Many estimates rely on direct experience with their 
own patients. Kochen (25) found that physicians primarily rely on: 
a.) mm experience 100% 
b.) literature 65% 
c.) medical school 24% 
About the reliability of the physician's memory, Kochan found that 
- physicians remembered cases and exactly what t11as done: 5% 
- only recalled names of past patients : 65% 
These findings question the reliability of subjective judgement. Moreover, 
the judgemerats are subject to certain systematic biases that can produce serious 
distortions and oversimplifications in infere1rnces and predictions (5). Because 
the very factors · th.at enhance the judge's subjective confidence are often 
negatively correlated with the accuracy of their estimationp the "illusion of 
validity'9 may be observed as a general trend. In their interesting studies 
T:verslr'IJ & Kahneman (26.27,28p29) sketched significalllt bias~es in people's 
judgment under uncertainty. People, like physicians, use very peculiar r~les in 
estimating figures from past events. Not only do these figures differ from 
background to background, population, and sample size but also from person to 
person, and in persons over time. The rules are commonly named heW"istic rules". 
'l'versky & I\al!memen investigated and described four heuristic l"1l!les: 
Re2r§~~~!ati!~~! When making inference from data too much weight is 
given to results of small samples. As sample size is increased, the results of 
small samples are taken to be representative of the larger population. The 
judgements based on this rule are: 
a.) insensitive to prior probabilities of outcomes; 
b.) insensitive to sample size; 
c.) liable to misconception of the randomness of a sequence of events: 
(gamblerPs fallacy); 
d.) insensitive to predictability: favourable description favour prediction 
more than the reliability of that description; 
e.) illusory validity: confidence in the representativeness orr similarity 
of an event. Unwarranted confidence in a good fit; 
f. ) liable to misconception of regression ( tOTI'Jards the mean) 9 concerning 
randomness of scores around a reference point. 
Av§i!§l't;!!lit~ : The decisiomnsker uses only eesily available information m1d 
ignores difficult available sources of significant information. An event is 
believed to occur frequently, that is with high probability~ if it is easy to 
recall similar events. These biases are due: 
a.) to retrievability of instances. Easy retrievability will appear more 
numerous than the reverse. In addition, familiarity and salience play their role 
in this heuristic; 
b.) to the effectiveness of a search set; 
c.) imaginability: the ease with which a certain instance can be 
constructed from memory; 
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dl.) illusory correlation; presumed eo:-OCC'Ul"rences of two or more elements 
e.g. peculiar eyem and suwpiciousness .' 
Agjust!!!~t §mg A!!£b2tl!m : the decisi<mmalcer is often flooded by em excess 
of data. He may reduce his mental efforts by fixing a refereuce point ss an 
initial value, a starting point suggested by the formulation of the problem. The 
fixed value CWll be every datum chosen at random in the amount of data e.g. the 
mean~ and then adjusts that value ·improperly in order to incorpm."'ate the rest 
of the data such as to result in flawed information SDalysis. Biases may arise 
from: 
a. ) insufficient adjustment; 
b.) the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events; 
overestimation of conjunctions and underestimation of disjunctive events; 
c.) anchoring (the fixed value or anchor) in the assessment of subjective 
probabilities distribution. 
We know for sure that e~ery reader recognizes several of these heuristics 
in his personal sphere. Otherwise he can hear and see them everryday on radio and 
television from politicians, news and advertising agents and the like. 
But, unfortunately, .these heuristics are not the only ones. In his 
inspiring review on information systems and processes and decision report 9 Sage (239) listed a total of 27 biases, to which Eraker et al (30) added several 
more. Nevertheless, people are quite confident about their fallible judgments 9 
as was described by Fischoff et al in their entertaining article: 'Knowing with 
certainty' (31). 
If there is a possibility for calculating a diagnosis, and it seems to be, 
medicine as a discipline is, up till now, uneble to provide really reliable end 
valid figures for such procedures on a broad scale. 
Nevertheless, a large number of exercises in this field show remarkable 
results. Several systems perform at least as well as physicians, often better. 
But we must realize that because of several built-in restrictions results are 
difficult to compare. Besides, differing classifications and taxonomies can 
distort conclusions. As a normative concept decision theory has to rely on a 
generally accepted medical taxonomy. As we argued before this conception may be 
different from the facts and actual medical practice. 
The most difficult and ambiguous element of medical decision making is the 
expected utility theory. Lindley (21) believes that "it is one of the great 
triumphs of modern thinking to show that only by assigning such a single 
numerical measure sensible decisions can be made. Only by measuring the quality 
of life can rational decisions be made". Still, it is an open question how to 
quantify the quality of life and who is to quantify it. 'People often exhibit 
patterns of preference which appear incompatible with the expected utility 
theory. Because of the impossibility to establish objective criteria for 
measuring someone's quality of life, one has to rely on subjective estimation. 
For expected utility theory .it is that believed that people react in a risk 
averse way. Kalmemem & Tversky (32) showed that the concept of utility as a 
concave function of money is violated in several ways according to the framing 
of the presented problem. 
People are risk averse when one has something to gain but risk seeking when 
one has something to lose. Risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied 
by risk l!!leeking in the negative domain (the reflection effect). Besides, people 
overweight outcomes which are considered certain, relatively to outcomes which 
are merely probable - a phenomenon which is labelled the certainty effect. It 
stands next to the pseudocertainty effect when descriptions of decision problems 
favour conditional evaluation with equal outcomes. (33). People often disregard 
components that the alternatives ahare, and focus on the components that 
distinguish them. This approach to choice problems may produce inconsistent 
preferences, as a pair of prospects which can be decomposed into common and 
distinctive decompositions lead to different preferences. Many carriers of value 
or utility are changes of circtimstances rather than final positions. Kahneman & 
Tversky (32) propose the Prospect Theory to accomodate the violations of 
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e~:pected utility theory. 
As long as the diagnosis is clearcutll the number of possible (therapeutic) 
actio~s very - limited. and the outcomes a~ states of h~alth can be defined in 
two states: dead or alive; the problem of utility can easily be solved •. But tl1hen 
do we, physicians, meet such a situation? ~~d if we m~t it, do we need theme 
11mcertain calculation to govern . our steps? Doctors~ problem ahreys are 
concerned 'fi'Jith nonsimple questions, with several posl!lible actions, w:Jid a variety 
of different outcomes, largely beyond determination. Re~arding medical options 
·in terms of life and death is inadequate. People are more than a mere biological 
phenomenon. 
Every individual estimates his own "utility", as t<ilell as society which l!!lle.y 
place m numerical worth upon its subject. But also the physicisn immplicitly 
places a utility upon the patient. Whenever physicians ~eke clinical decisions 
they integrate their mm value system to generate preferences for aH:erria:U ve 
diag!l!oses, therapies and outcomes. The greater the cultural gap bebJeen patient 
and physician 9 the more difficult this appreciation of values (4). This seems 
especially true for decisions mder risk. 
The. estimation of a utility value is submitted to the appreciation of a 
specific situation, in which the preferences of the physician and the patient 
can be conflicting. Apart from rough distinctions as life and death, and a 
:number of years to live {assuming it cmJ~ be forecast) 9 we csurmot see how 
nonnative, or objective, utility estU!!ates csn be determined. 
It means that for every specific process and for eve~J specific 
state-of--health a generally accepted numerical value has to be established. Of 
course, every physician makes this type of estimation every day to every 
patient. And indeed, most processes and most qualities of patients' health 
states show many resemblances. But apart from the question of ~ overall 
agreement among physicians 9 neither physician nor patient regard t~elves am 
part of statistics. Besides, the computation of subjective estimates of 
physicians does not make the value li!XO:re objective. Theories and standards 
applied in financial and economic disciplines cannot be transplanted to medicine 
as such. Analyses of preferences will often lead to ill-considered, often 
accidental incompleteness. Lindblom (34 9 35) indicates a nm.nber of limitations to 
analysis: 
a.) it is fallible 9 never rises to infallibility9 and can be poorly 
informed, superficial, biasedp or mendacious; 
b.) it cannot wholly resolve conflicts o:f val11e and interests; 
c.) sustained analysis may be too slow ·and too costly compared with 
realistic needs; 
4.) issue formulation questions call for acts of choice or will al!lld suggest 
that analysis must allow room for policies. 
The variability of disease characteristics, predictions, therapeutic and 
treatment possibilities and appreciations of health states makes fuoodamental 
establishment of utility theory and a normative classification of utilities 
illusory. According to Lindblom means end ends, treatment and outcomesp are 
often confounded. The identification of values and goals is not distinct from 
the snalysis of alternative actions. Agreement on a good policy does not 
necessarily include that it is the most appropriate means to &, end. Besides~ 
analysis may be limitedg important options neglectedp and outcomes not 
considered. It often seems that there is a greater preoccupation with ills to be 
remedied rather than positive goals to be sought (35). 
The changing views on health, disease end cost make normative utility 
valuation fallacious. What may be wisdom today, may be foolishness to-morrow. 
In daily practice the estimation of the utility is most of the times 
conveniently left to the physician: "Doctor lmows what is good for me 11 • When the 
expected utility is expressed on a scale between 0 and 19 the physician 
invariably aims at tbe upper p~t of the scale. People expect him to react in 
this way. Every result below this expected outcome leads to severe 
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disappointments· and the patient· urgE;w htm to diligent looki~g .for~. Powerf\11 
treatments.. Moreover,.· tlie.·. phy~ici~ .d$G!ides .· upqin · the •. wb.ol~·· .o.:f'>the ;~i~l 
process; in which each ·element c~,ePends .on and -intiiteneeei· · th.S= ~the~:- .A. ·phy~ician 
is really· amta.Zed · when. he .is asked to \taluate a single featui:'~ -frQ!i' ~h!Ql ~cal 
process. Besides D 'the ' personality.' of the physicielil influences fo~ a gi:-'$St -deal 
the estimation, as ·was stud:!~ and. shown ·by sevetral psyclwlog;i.sts (e.g. Tvereky 
& KahnEilllml. 33, 28, Lichtenstein et $L 36 .• · Slo~lic et al.l()) • · · : . · . 
But when objective · valu~is ~~ot be ·provided ~d 19Ubjec~ive utfJ.iti• m-e 
unreliable. what about decisioo . theory? ·ne Do.mbal · (90) epok~~ about ~utiU:ty am 
"the chief usolved problem in ·Dtedical deeision mak_iiig". ·: · · · · · 
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Paragraph 3 
We shall now consider the process along which solutions can be found for 
presented problems. In contrast to what might be thought on the basis of a 
decision theory, there is no uniform model for thim process. Instead9 an 
unlimited number of publications on various models have been published~ and 
possible will be still more in future.Most modeb sure based. on a couple of 
similar principles, but authors claim variation. The number of revi~~ an this 
subject is still increasing (e.g. ~leiber, Gachowitz & Huber found in the period 
1971-1975 more than 1000 relevant references about the application of decision 
:models using Bayes' theoremj Wagner, Tautu tmd ~~olter published a 
not-exhaustive bibliography of over 800 titles in the twe~ty year period from 
1957 (37); Koehler, Wagner & Wolber compiled Interactive Data Processing in 
Medicine in the period 1970 till 1976: they found 617 papers.It is beyond the 
scope of this chspterpand my ability to present a review on this ~stter. Thim 
paragraph presents nothing more than a personal opinion about the subject as it 
was "senl\lled" from literature. 
Because in medical literature the issue has been left vague, one has to 
decide whether physicians process the information in a parallel or a sequential 
way. Ledley & Lusted's paper (8) assumes a parallel fashion. The first 
application of mathematical-statistical decision making has been performed in 
this \i11ay. Warner et al (38) compiled data on 83 patie.nts e.md generated a 
symptom-disease matrix consisting of 53 attributes (symptoms & signs) and 35 
disease entities. The system required that all 53 attributes had to be observed 
for every patient. The processing used a lot of computer time, and patience from 
the part of the physician. It became clear that a parallelled processing system 
was hardly feasible, especially with regard to the state of equipment in those 
days. Using a kind of slide-rule Nask (1963) constru.cted a Mark IIIA "logoscope" 
to find data on the rule in a sequential way, but processing had to be performed 
in a parallel fashion. The logoscope had a repertoire of over 700 million 
combinations (39); as far as I know this model never found practical aplication. 
In 1968 Gorry & Barnett (40) introduced a sequential model in which observations 
were to be considered ~tepwise. In the same year Edwards et al 41) introdced a 
Probabilistic Information Processing (P.I.P.) system also based on the principle 
of sequential processing. Sequential strategy seems to be the p~eferable choice 
in medical decision making, realizing the total amount of facts within medical 
science. Pauker et al (42) estimated the number of facts within intel~al 
medicine at about two million. 
The sequential statistical inference is based on a definition of 
probability as a particular measure of the opinions of ideally consistent 
people. Statistical inference is modification of these opinions in the light of 
evidence (42). Starting at the level of prior probability every n~~ piece of 
evidence (symptom, sign, lab result etc) can stepwise change this measure 
towards the posterior probability: the probability of suffering from the disease 
in the light of the acquired evidence. Each piece of evidence can give rise to 
choice among alternative paths. In order to select an alternative plan or course 
of action for ultimate implementation, the decision maker applies one or more 
decision rules which enable comparison prioritization, and ultimately, selection 
of a single policy alternative from among a set of choice alternatives. 
The purpose of a decision rule is to specify the most preferred alternative 
generally from a partial or total ordering of alternatives (1). The choice of a 
decision rule depends largely on the contingency task structure. Sage (1) 
recognizes three types of decision rules: wholistic judgment (reasoning by 
analogy and intuitive affect), heuristic elimination (simplified approximations 
to holistic decision rules are used), and holistic evaluation: (an attempt to 
consider all aspects of a decision situation in evaluating choices by means of 
disaggregation of various choice components). The latter type has been 
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subdivided· in th~ .variotis uUHt;y theor.ies, ~4 .willbe ia.r(!EilU-'9~ide~here. 
The holistic decision rule ComPrises·. t~ follOwing requi~t$: · . ",. ·, ."· :. . . . . .·: 
1) outline the struct~·o'f the~·proo~em i.e. fm8ke a deqision-:tlriW-,.,diai$ram 
or decimio:n tree .s~illS . each . pO.sidb;!e . Cf.)UK'Se of actio~ .. and th~ POOI$ible 
outcomam of each actiqn; . ·· · " · . · · · · 
2) at each branch point· whe&--e the outcome ·is .determined !rot by chQice 
(decision nade) but is left ·tQ ·ch.arlce {cha!lee ·node) .. estiJmate n~rioof~y the 
probability of OC~urrence -Of each OJJ.tC0me; . . • . . . . . . . 
3) for each possible outco~·, mseign a relative value ci;.\lli$d .. a Utility;· 
4) multiply .~ach utility \rf$1Ue:by t~ amsooiated· prObahilit,Y of oCCm'~·ence 
to obtain a ~cofe f.o~r that o~tcome~St.m the moores of the postdble OVJ;t~ at a 
chance node to obtain ml ~~ed, utility for t,bat llBOde •. Then S\BI the scores at 
the cllumce node ueoci&ted w;ith an adtion to obtain the expa(lt~· utility of that 
action; · . · · · · · · · · ·· " · · ·· · · 
5) choose the ·ini.tial · action ·that: W&S .. ·t~ highest ealmlated. ~ted 
utility (44). •. ~' . • • I • ._ • . • ' • . ' ' . • • • . ; . . • ' • .. 
Distortions can arise at ~ach PQint of this. progr"a!ll~ At ~irst the 
constructing of a flow chart or outlining a .decisioo tree is: not only ~ 
exhaustive task but is also liable ·to incorrectness, ·omiesio:ne9 · personal 
preferences ·or opinions etc.' A flaw·cl:lart consists of ahier~cbYor ·sequential 
system of progressively· more-specific questions.leading. ultimately to the most 
specific diagnostic output justified by the evidence at he.nd. This encompasses 
the relationships of each set ~f alternativ~ acts and outcomes to ·ea~ s.tage of 
decision. It had· to contain provision for every contb!gency that· is pert~ne!llt. 
Most of the time these charts·. or trees are crude9 incmi,wlete, ~d.. sometimes 
indeed misleading (45). It assumes that all pathophysiologic, predictive and 
management facts ·are available, known orr at least trsc~le in medical 
knowledge. In our opinion, this i.s ~. illusion. And as. far as the facts can be 
elicited, relia'Qle data fot · ·:most of the necf)St~~ary probability valu~s ere not 
available. These values are not avaiieWle from literature beca.u~e the reported 
cases can greatly differ from the presented problem~ · 
However, as Ka.Ssirer ·( 46) · points . out, when literature provides 
unsatisfactory answers, the situation requires the "ju~t of an experiel!lced 
clinician" or applying "comoo sense"~ It implies relying on per$onal ·Ju.dgment 
and personal intuition, because there is no evidence that prob~bility estbmtion 
of experts is more reliable than of laymen. But this is· putting the' cart before 
the horse: if you want to improve the decision, don»t use inadequate figures or 
dates. We have to ackn()Wledge that by ·screening the medical literature .we will 
come across large gapm in · existipg knoWl~e. It may only be sug~estive for 
future research. · 
When constructing and analyzing a complete decision tree ·seems too 
elaborate, it is suggested to cut a number of bralllches, li!miting the .breadth and 
the length of the deeision · tree to the depth of 5 or 6 .step& and 3 or 4 
different branches. But here we meet another obstacle: who and what detemines 
the cutting and controls the heurietic (limiting search) process? Criteria and 
rules to this 'cutting procedure' are· generally not provided. Moreovmr, 
heuristics :may not · only vary fr~ problem to problem, but also nobody tells us 
what these heuristics are. · · 
Most models do not allow the. patient to suffer from :more thEm ooe disease 
at a time (19). In their study Alpeirovitcb. et al elimirnated 22%·of the subjects 
from the total population under study. It seems to us that the effectiveness of 
:models becomes questionabl~. 
Decision tables may be convenient to portray certain·diagnostic decisions 
that depend on a particular array of information, rather thaD on a specific 
sequence in which each component of the array is noted ( 47). These t®les are 
often illustrated with flow charts, which contain diagrama and gr~aphic aymbole 
for each act of reasoning in the strategy. 
Sequential strategy is l!lC>metimes referred to as algorithmS &ld protooolm. 
The word algorithm is commonly used·i:n. computer act:tvities_to refer to the plan 
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or strategy to solve a problem. Algorithms may be statistical and logical: 
statistical refers to algorithms which calculate the most l~kely diagnosis from 
explicit statistical analysis of disease-symptom frequencies end disease 
probabilities; logical refers to algorithms which usually proceed in a 
sequential branching fashion! a decision is made at each step based on a logical 
~if A then B' or similar type of reasoning (48). Algorithms have been discussed 
in detail in Williams (49), and published in medical journals like JAMA, Patient 
Care, Practitioner. Protocols have been produced to as<:ertain prescriptive 
courses of actions. They have especially been developed for the use by 
paramedical personnel. Their scope is lU!ited because they cannot meet the 
requirements of the data assessing stage (50). 
Flow charts for single medical problems have been des~gned by Edwards (on 
dysphagia,51), and Essex (covering rural care in developing cotmtries, (52) 9 and 
published in books (Patient Care, (3). More complex systems are e.g. ONCOCIN, 
which used some of the formalisms of the Mycin program based on Artifici~l 
Intelligence (53). These latter devices are mainly based on a personal or group 
interpretation of the specific medical knowledge pertaining to the diseases 
under study. 
The formal decision theoretical models are customarily classified into two 
groups: 
a) mathematical statistical; 
b) artificial intelligence. 
The former group has been widely investigated and applied, and has an 
extensive list of literature. Within this group another classification can be 
made: 
1) statistical models using Bayes' theorem; 
2) models not using Bayes' theorem. 
Because several techniques as linear discriminant function, cluster 
analysis, and the like can easily be incorporated into this theorem, the "Bayes 
:models" far outrange the latter group. The 'Bayes' Eodels' are generally 
classified according to a proposal of Card (54), (also used by Wardle & Wardle 
(55)), into three types: 
1) Mark I models which allocate each complete set of symptoms and signs to 
a disease class, regardless whether a parallel or a sequential structure was 
used; 
2) Mark II models which are diagnostic tree searches in t'l7hich measures of 
greatest expet:ted informativeness are used to direct the selection of the next 
step in the medical process. 
3) Mark III models which introduce positive and negative utilities 
('costs') in a maximizing expected utility decision tree. 
Who was Bayes and what is his theorem? 
Reverend Thomas Bayes, an English minister, who lived from 1702 to 1761, 
left "An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances" (56), which 
was communicated to the Royal Academy of Science by his friend Mr. Price. In an 
introduction Bayes wrote "that his design at first in thinking on the subject of 
it was, to f~nd out a method by which we might judge concerning the probability 
that an event has to happen, in given circumstancea 9 upon supposition that we 
know nothing concerning it but that, under the same cir~tances, it has 
happened a certain number of times, and failed a certain other number of times". 
"This problem is by no means merely a curious speculation in the doctrine of 
chances, but necessary to be solved in order to (provide) a sure foundation for 
all our reasonings concerning past facts, and what is likely to be hereafter". 
Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and 
failed,the problem can be defined as: 
THE CHANCE THAT THE PROBABILITY OF ITS HAPPENING IN A SINGLE TRIAL LIES 
SOMEWHERE BETWEEN ftJMY TWO DEGREES OF PROBABILITY THAT CAN BE NAMED. 
Bayes stated the following definitions: 
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are inconli!istent, when, if one of tb• heppes~Eh ·non~ pf .. 
. ·-·. ... . 
1: Several events 
the rest can. 
2: 'f-wo events are contrary when one, or other of tl!em :must~· end ~th · 
together cannot happen. 
3: An event is said to fail, when it cmmot happen, 
or (which comes to the same thing), when its contrary has hap~~ 
4: An event is said to be detemined when it either ~ppen19d ·or failed~ 
5: The probability of any event is the ratio betw~n. the value at wh~ch ·@11 
expectation depending on · the happening of the event ought to. be eompu:ted:, ·. Sllld 
the value of the thing expected u~n its happening. · · · · · · · · · 
6: By chance I mean. the same as probability. 
7: Events are independent when . the ~pening. of amy one o'f. t~em 'does· 
neither increase nor abate the probability· of the rest. 
In the- first· four definitions Bayes defined the events ·and theirr 
relationships, in . definition seven the requirement of · indepandwce ., to the 
essential formula as it was desc:dbed in. definition five. . · · .. · . 
This formula can be approached in the classical doctrine of chances. The 
probability of a die showing a 1 is the ratio of this single facet' to the total 
number of all possible faces, or the computed number of ones and non-ones: · 
1 1 
p [1] = 
l+[non-1] 1 + 1 
(the negation is denoted in .lower display). Essential to Bayes' Theorem i$ 
the notion of the conditional probability: the probability of en ev~nt given. 
another event, not contradi'cting. the fomer one. It involves tW() ev~ts, with 
the occurrence of the second event depending on the previous occurre!!Ce o£ the 
fi:rsto In our jargon we can denote this as the probability of a symptom or sign 
or test given a disease-entity, (P [ S :D] ) • This meems th1;1t in an arra,n,eti!ie:nt of. 
two sets of elements, s. and D, in a finite population, we are interested in the 
intersection of the sets S and D, diagrammatically shown in a Venn di_e.gram ·(see 
e.g.45,17). 
This intersection means nothing else than the true positive.symptoms given 
the disease. In this way we can denote four possibilities in conditiOl'lal 
probabi 1i ty: 
P[SlD] = sensitivity 
P[slD] = false negative rate 
P[sld] = specificity 
P[S:d] = false positive rate. 
If N is the total number of. people under study, the constituent groups· can 
be enumerated as n(S), n(s), n(D), 
n(S D) etc. By definition of conditional probability: 
n[SlD] 
P(DIS)= ----
n[S] 
n 
P being---
N 
which can be transformated to 
-112-
P[SlD] = P[SlD] * P[D] 
Since tve now have two things equal to PfD: S] , Wle set them eqtml to one 
another so that 
P[DlS] * P[S] = P[SID] * P[D] 
Solving this equation for the left hand term, we get: 
P[S ID] x P(D] 
P[DIS] = 
P[S] 
In this equation we did not consider the. other possi~le ·outcomes. 
Remembering the example with the die, the single event hasto be compared.with 
all other events. Having the latter in the denominator we can write the 
classifical formula as 
P[S :D] * P[D] 
P[DlS] = ---------------
P[SID] * P[D] + P[Sld] $ P{d] 
or in words 
Sensitivity * Prevalence 
Predictive value=----------__...;.---·------------------------
Sensitivity 
* 
Prevalence + (!-Specificity) 
(!-Prevalence) 
The particular feature of Bayes' theorem is that it strives to combine the 
two types of statistical probabilities:the pro~ability of relative frequencies 
and the sequence of relative frequencies. As'we may remember from chapter III 
according to Carnap, Keynes and Popper numerical values cannot be attached to a 
singular hypothesis, which P(DIS) is. The statement "the probability of the next 
cast with this die being 1 equals l/6" is not really an assertion about the next 
cast. Nevertheless, Bayes' Theorem strives to predict future events from pest 
ones, provided that a number of restrictions is fulfilled. Bayesian statistics 
are based on a definition· of probability as a particular measure of the 
opinions. Bayes' theorem specifies how such a modification of opinions can be 
made. 
The tools include the theory of specific distributions and the principle of 
stable estimation, which specifies when actual prior opinions may be 
satisfactorily approximated by a uniform distribution (43). This means that 
quite a number of requirements have to be fulfilled before reliable calculations 
can be made. Some of them will be mentioned: 
a) a set of reasonable beliefs can be represented by a probability function 
defined over propositions S and D; reasonable changes of belief can be 
represented by a process called "conditiona:lizationu, i.e. construction of new 
statements in terms of conditional probabilities (57). It is believed that these 
beliefs and their changes can be expressed in numerical terms. 
b) the measures ~eflect the opinions of ideally consistent people. 
c) the particular set of diseases should be well-defined, so that the 
frequency of characters in the individual diseases and the frequency of these 
diseases in the particular population . under study are known (58). It requires 
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that this population, or sample size, is actually know.n, and of sufficient size 
to permit satisfactory estimation.The actual performance of a Bayesian 
calculation is difficult, because it depends on quantitative data that are 
seldom available. 
To apply Bayes' theorem one has to make use of personal judgments of more 
or less experienced physicians about these probabilities. The drawbacks of this 
procedure have been sketched elsewhere. 
d) the diagnoses used must constitute a complete diagnostic system, i.e. be 
mutually exclusive and together cover all possible diagnoses (59). Especially 
mutual exclusivity is only rarely to be found in the setting of the context 
formation task which occurs when the physician is presented with the patient's 
chief complaint (60). 
e) for being useful the Bayesian approach encompasses also the assumption 
that the model captures the essential determinants of the judgmental process. 
Research suggests that it does not (27). 
f) posterior binomial estimates have to be determined by sample difference 
rather than sample proportion. In subjective probability estimation people tend 
to react in a reverse way. They also do not defend on the population 
proportion.In his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently not a conservative 
Bayesian (as is often believed): he is not Bayesian at all (27). 
g) Bayesian inference is aimed at specific diagnoses and actions, not at 
the uncertain decisions of clinicians (45). In other words, it lacks reality. 
h) each new piece of evidence acquired by research will change 
nomenclature, frequency distributions of disease and symptoms and their 
co-occurrence. It will hamper the application of Bayes' theorem. 
j) the theory requires that symptoms and diseases be independent. One of 
the most serious statistical problems outstanding in diagnosis is the one of 
symptom interactions. (61). Norusis & Jacquez (62) presented a simple example of 
the importance of the joint distribution of two variables. 
Schema 3 
-r--------------- r--- --
Disease 1 Disease 2 
Sl Sl 
present absent present absent 
- -------- --------
---------
f..-
present 0.5 0 present 0 0.5 
s 2 s 2 
absent 0 0.5 absent 0.5 0 
-
------ '-·------ ...__ _______________ 
Although both symptoms have equal marginal probabilities in each of the 
two disease states, considering them jointly permits perfect discrimination. The 
usual methods of analysis, based only on marginals, would have excluded these 
variables as unimportant. Norusis & Jacques found that the independence 
assumption can substantially decrease the effectiveness of a Bayesian 
classification system. Usually this is not recognized, for true 
:misclassification (of diagnosis, J.R.) probabilities are not known and a basis 
for comparison is unavailable. 
Even moderate perturbations of probability estimates may result in changes 
of the classification rule, which leads to increases in the misclassification 
rate. When diseases are easily differentiable, and correlations not extremely 
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large, the independence assUmption may be acceptable (6~). It may be therefore 
that results reported in iiterature usually focus on diseases for which good 
clamsifications have been obtained, and thus it cannot be recognized how 
deleteriotw the independence assumption can be for the more challenging 
situaticms. 
A ~umber of variations of the Bayesian model' have been propagated, smong 
which are the Bahadur expansion and Discrimination models. Bahadurps 
distribution specifies the order of dependence to be accounted for. The model 
can be set to take account of lesser order dependencies and ignore all higher 
order dependencies (64,65).The model always chooses that diagnosis which appears 
with the greatest frequency in the original sample for the profile in question 
(64). Examination of models which include only pain~i~e dependencies (linear 
discriminant ftmction, second-order Behadur, aund optmam111 dependence trees) 
suggested that higher-order interactions should be incorporated into estimation 
procedures for all three second-order :models and led to 1.mpredicta!'ole results 
when comoared to independence (62). Bahadur's complex mathematical model 
effectively asks for the relationships which existed , not realizing that 
patients with the same profile could have different diseases.(64) 
Fisher's Linear Discriminant Function also incorporates second order 
correlations in a multivariate normal framework. The method is s~ly to weigh 
the symptom values in such a way that the variation between the disease classes 
is :maximized, relative to the total vsris.tion in the sample. Interesting is that 
the independence and linear discriminant function models are affected ver,y 
little by sample size. An increase of over four times in sample size gave for 
LDF procedure an almost negligible reduction in misclassification (63). for very 
small sample sizes, the discriminant function :may lead to slight gains ov.er 
independence (63). Discriminant functions in their most widely available form 
are not really appropriate to the discrete data which arise from a study of the 
presence or absence of the ~linical signs and symptoms e.g. because they cannot 
cope with missing items of data which ofteri occur in practical clinical medicine 
(66). 
Croft (67) te~:rl:;ed 10 of the most commonly used mathematical diagnostic 
models to a same large set of data. He found. that their diagnostic accuracy ie 
more sensitive to variations between the diseases than variations between the 
mathematical models. He recommends future researchers not to continue with 
increasingly sophisticated mathemsrtical techniques 9 but, instead~ tackle the 
real obstacles to practical computer-aided m~dical diagnosis. These obstacles 
are: 
1) lack of standard medical definitions; 
2) lack of large, ·reliable medical data bases 9 and 
3) lack of acceptance of computer-aided diagnosis by the medical 
profession. 
Croft & Macho! (68) consider medical diagnosis ~ a pattern-recognition 
problem. Confirming the suggestions of Baron & Fraser (58)s they recommend to 
study and reex~:m~ine the entire taxonomy of diseases first. 
We have to consider that if little is known about the distinguishing 
features of a disease then there is no magic formula whereby the mathematical 
statistical procedure can .discover such knowledge. In illlost of the studies little 
attention has been paid to the dilemma of observer variation. It c~ largely 
deteriorate the accuracy of the procedure. One way of increasing accuracy is to 
eliminate patients because their disease (or disease structures) do not fit in 
the model. Fraser, who discarded 30 out of 100 patients, points out the fallacy 
of approaching computer-aided diagnosis from e.·set of diseS~Ses rather than a.set 
of symptoms (cited in 55) .• Sample size is _another Jmatter which influences 
accuracy. As we pointed out probability, and thus Bayesian statistics, depends 
on the frequency distribution of symptoms snd signs. If these probabilities are 
derived from a small sample of patients, they will be subject to a large degree 
of error (55). The most striking difference between ~~k I and Mark II ~9dels is 
the amount of information. Especially in Mark I the· amount is red:amdemt for 
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diagnostic purposes. Knill-Jones (69) and Taylor (70) found a marked increase in 
efficiency with a decrease of information items of approximately 20 items per 
case. The Mark III models are hampered by the previously mentioned troubles 
shout the estimation of cost and utilities. These models ere still in statu 
nascendi • 
Statistical programs normally require a block of data to be entered 
initially. Those that elicit data sequentially may use either an information or 
utility theory selection proceduret which may influence the outcomes. 
Apart from these statistical models a Fuzzy Set Theory to medical decision 
:making has been developed. This theory is, as far as we mow, hardly applied in 
practice. For some literature on this part see 71,72973 9 74. 
Furthermore, we have to realize that decision theory does not provide the 
l'ind of focusing mechanisms that pbysicim1s tend to use when they assume an 
initial hypothesis in dealing with a patient. As mentioned before, it may be 
alien to the physician. 
Artificial Intelligence approaches started in the early 1970's. The term 
"artificial intelligence" is generally accepted to include those computer 
applications that involve symbolic inference rather than strictly numerical 
calculation. It is based on the hierarchical structured cognitive models as have 
been originated by investigators like Newell & Simon (75)p Kleinmuntz (76)p 
Wortman (77,78) (see also chapter II). 
Their efforts have been aimed at understanding and, afterwardsp to a 
simulatir1g and delineating of the human -i.e. the physicians'- reasoning 
processes. In the renal failure program Gorry analyzed the processes. His 
conclusions include four points: 
1) clinical judgment is mainly based on gross chunks of empirical and/or 
pathophysiologic knowledge. From a good deal of experience rules of thumb 
(heuristics) are derived. 
2) physicians' knowledge is rather judgmental. The rules they learned allow 
them to focus attention and to generate hypotheses quickly. These rules permit 
them to avoid detailed search through the entire problem space. 
3) physicians recognize levels of belief or certainty associated with many 
of the strategies or rules they use. They do not quantify these concepts of 
belief or certainty, neither do they use them in a mathematical-statistical 
mmmer. 
4) experts can state their heuristics in response to perceived 
misconceptions in others easier then to generate them a priori (79). 
Crucial to the solution of simulating and delineating physicians' reasoning 
processes seems to be the knowledge of the heuristics they use. But, "the 
evidence on rational decision making is largely negative evidence, evidence on 
what people do NOT do"(7). 
Nevertheless, several researchers believe in the 'primacy' of technology, 
which asserts, in its boldest form, that we can only hope to understand what ~~ 
ourselves have made, and, as a consequence, that which we have NOT made only 
insofar as we can handle it 'as if' we had made it. The history of human thought 
can provide many examples of the use of contemporarY technology as a source of 
explanatory concepts for acquiring an understanding of natural processes of 
various kinds, and 1.n retrospect we often comment to the effect that it was not 
possible to understand a given phenomenon until such a source of explanatory 
concepts became available (80). 
We are at the core of a great scientific dilemma: to develop technology 
before or after the knowledge and understanding of the speciality to which it 
refers. Should Medical Artificial Intelligence (AI) be developed as a 
high-qualified decision support for the physician or as an independent tool in 
medical decision making? Thusfar, the former approach have been chosen, although 
real understandig of methods in medicine has not been attained. 
Principal factors in order to enhance rapid high-qualified decision support 
involve a number of fundamental limitations: 
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1) the need to insure substantive or input-support rationality, such that 
evaluation of plans and decisions are veridical; 
2) the need to insure process rationality, such that the information system 
accomodates the capabilities of, and the constraints placed upon the user; 
3) the need to understand and cope with .human cognitive limitatiom as they 
affect the formulation, the analysis, a~d the interpretation of decision 
situations and alternatives, and 
4) the ·need to understand and to integrate the normative or prescriptive 
components with the descriptive components of the decision situation in order to 
evolve realistic adjuvants for the formulation, analysis, and interpretation of 
decision options (1). 
AI systems represent knowledge in the logical structure of If (premise), 
Then (action) syllogism, which is known as the Production rule model. It is 
claimed that this model allows the coding of general w1d specific ~edical 
knowledge, module structures, explanation and checking.Some authors assume it 
to be too rigid (53) • 
The inexact medical reasoning is vi~Jed as one of the main stumbling 
blocks to the strict algorithmic structure of AI programs. Shortliffe and 
Buchanan (81) have turned to "Confirmation Theory" 'ii11hich. is descended frailR tbe 
distinction of Carnap between two types of. probability:"degree of confinootion19 
(53~ 82 3 83) and "relative frequency" s which was incorporated and impla!llented in 
Mycin, one of the first AI programs. As inference rules to these probability 
estimates do not exist, one has again to rely on subjective estimations. 
In one of the most sophisticated AI programs, CADUCEUS, the inference ~les 
are largely based upon the introspection of one or more internists (84).The 
contents part was derived and updated from medical literature 
(pathophysiological conferences etc.). Unfortunately, because of its inductive 
inference rules there is no automatic learning function built into the 
system. The crucial notion the system employs is that of 91evo1dng strength" (ES), 
relating manifestations (M) to disorder/disease (D). The various possible 
diseases are organised into a hierarchy generated as information about each 
disease. Each disease corresponds to a node in the tree and is described by a 
set of atomic findingss each having two associated weights: an evoking strength 
ES and a frequency number ( FN). ES depends on the likelihood that D and M in 
the pertinent population are causally related, estimated by the physician on an 
integer scale running from 5 (high) to 0 (low). ES, therefore$ depends on the 
availability of alternatives to D as causal explanation of M. The strength with 
which M evokes D will depend on whether M brought about by other causes Dl,D2 ••• 
Dn, that is the liltelihood of M:D, (84). Ors in other ~>Jords, when one encmmters 
manifestation M how seriously would one entertain the hypothesis of D? Such a 
question, however;~ is contents dependent (85). 
When some manifestations in M accompanying D are not found in the presented 
illness pattern CADUCEUS uses a second measure to weigh the causal st~ength of M 
to D. This measure is called FN (frequency number), ranging from 5 (all) to 0 
(none) which measures the frequency in the target population with which D is 
accompanied by M. If FN is 5, then the anomaly is serious. FN is based oir! 
frequency counts in medical records, not on estimated likelihood. An nimport 
number" (IN) weighs the clinical importance of each M to D, ba'Sied on 
pathophysiological theories and knowledge. However, the physician does not 
consider each M separately and implicitly assign measures to it. He looks for 
large scale patterns of a familiar sort where the M's are interrelated in a 
causal way (84). McMullin mentions two inadequacies to the system: 
a.) the absence of patterning ability that would allow the recognition of 
common manifestation-clusters (M); 
b.) the inadequacy to stimulate the developmental aspect of diseases, the 
way they present over time (84). 
In my opinion Shortliffe hits the Mark about AI systems when stating: 
nThey try to model their system on human cognition. The probl~s of course~ 
is that we must first learn how human cognition works91 • (81) 
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Paragraph 4 
Medical decision making would have been unthinkable without the existence 
of the computer. What can computers do? E.g. 
a) read and translate a symbol; 
b) move a symbol from one storage location to another; 
c) compare two symbols and execute one program COB!Psnd when they are 
identical, but execute another program comsnd when they are not; 
d) associate two symbols, allowing access to one symbol when the other is 
given (86). 
Some more advantages of computers are the following.They can: 
l) store large quantities of data without distortion over long periods of 
time; 
2) recall data, on receipt of the appropriate message9 ex~ctly as stored; 
3) perform complex logical and mathematical operations at high speed; 
4) d:i.splay many diagnostic possibilities in an orderly fashion (87). 
As the limitations of man as en effective problem solver has been 
repeatedly demonstrated (26,31,75,88), and overloading by information is assumed 
to be one of the important stumbling blocks to rational decision making, tbe 
computer may be a major tool for aiding physicians in their routine Radical 
problem solving. 
Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz (12) have raised some questions towards the 
application of computers in medical practice: 
1) what cognitive processes underlie judgment and choice? 
2) can computers be used to predict human inference? 
3) what strategies are optimal for humans and machines? 
4) do humans benefit from the feedback about their optimal and suboptimal 
rule application? 
5) how are discrepancies between optimal models and hwnan judgment to be 
evaluated? 
Most of these questions still "'Jait for an answer, which marks the 
computer-assisted medical decision programs as they stand. The results of the 
application of computer-aided systems in real medical practice (apart from 
administrative purposes) thuefar have not been very successful (89). It seems to 
me that after the over-enthousiastic period of the seventies, a period of 
reflection, but also of hesitation and lingering has enter~ the scene. Maybe 
researchers do not always reflect questions like the above-mentioned, switch the 
goals and the means, zealously overl'tm practical applications, sanctify the 
program more than the physician, do not reflect the specific conditions? We do 
not know, but t:'ihen computer-aided decision making promises insight into the 
physician's thought processes (42) and a resulting better understanding of the 
human diagnostic process (87), it thusfar failed its mission. 
What are the problems met in originating computer programs for medical 
decision making? (90) 
1) ~~ley~t !~fQrmation~ The problem is that we do not know the relevancy 
prior to the solution. A study of chest pain (91) showed that out of 498 
information items under study, 55 was the maximum required for effective 
differential diagnosis and nearly 90% of the total information available was 
either redundant or irl'elevant both for the description of the disease entities 
end the differential diagnosis. But Pipberger et al could only dete~ine this 
figures afterwards 9 not during the diagnostic process. 
2) r~PrQdU~!Qi!!t~ Qf infQrm~!io~L cl~~ term!~QlO~~ Indeed, this is 
another stumbling block in medical practice, as we have discussed earlier. Not 
only the names of diseases but also the names of symptoms.are sometimes 
confusing. The symptom 'dyspnea' can :mean 'tightness· in the chest' as well as 
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'afraid', 'nausea' or 'dizzy', varying from situation, time, geographical areap 
culture etc. Besides symptoms can be accompanied by a number of adjectives e.g. 
whether the 'oppression' is attackwise or continuous, day or night, with 
exertion or in rest etc. Computer programs require the use of vocabularies that 
are free of ambiguity (92). Unless medical science solves this problem, computer 
directed diagnostic aids will play only a small part in medical decision making. 
3) £QIDEar§Qi!!!~ Qf !~rminQ!Qgy~ Especially, classifications and 
taxonomies of diseases must be revised in order to develop a uniform system for 
unambiguous USc:" by all physicians in the ~11orld. 
4) t~§! Q~!im!~~!io~~ The paper of Zieve (93) about 'misinterpretations 
and abuse of laboratory tests by clinicians' outlines of the problem involved in 
this condition. 
5) ~~!Y~!~ of Q~!~ and allocating the patients to a problem/disease 
class. The current taxonomic system of 'disease' is grossly unsatisfactory for 
both science and care in classifying the difficulties that patients present to 
doctors (94). By abandoning this nomenclature and allowing each problem to be 
expressed in its own observational terms, Weed (2) provided an intellectual 
liberation from the nosographic shackles imposed by the restricted scope of 
entities in the conventional taxonomy of "disease". But in replacing the 
diagnostic nomenclature of disease by a pragmatic nomenclature of problems, Weed 
has exchanged a standardized but inadequate taxonomy for an adequate but 
unstandardized taxonomy (95). 
6) lim!ta~!Q~§ Qf ~rQh!~ £!~~~~~ Unfortunately, present medical 
taxonomy is more lilcely to expand its classes (e.g. with psychosocial 
disturbances) than to restrict them. In a study by Lipkin 21 b.aematological 
diseases were (conveniently) grouped into 9 classes, apparently chosen because 
the grouping reduced the time for the computer to process the data. This 
resulted in some remarkabe appositions e.g. of uremic anemia and acute 
post-hemorrhagic anemia- in the same class, while megaloblastic anemia could 
only be found under the headings 'pernicious anemia' and 'tropical sprue' (96). 
This can lead to highly confusable situations. 
7) 2r!Qr ~g £Q~9!!!Qg~! 2r2h~!!!!!~~~ This matter has been discussed in 
former paragraphs. 
8) §!~~li!l of !b~ 2rQh~!!!!!~~~ It is far from plausible that these 
probabilities remain stable. Changing views on health and disease, health care 9 
:medical research as well as progress in treatment possibilities make stable 
probabilities illusory. 
The problems these items pose are assumed to be unsurmountable, as was 
discussed before. 
Apart from de Dombal's list of conditions, computer programs meet some 
other hindrances (68): 
a) change of symptoms during the course of the disease. The diagnostic 
pattern of a disease in medical circumstances when the patient is at home, can 
largely differ from that of the same disease in hospital because of time lag. In 
chronic diseases various phases of the disease are known to exist, each phase 
with its own specific pattern, and, unfortunately, not always in strict order. 
b) changes in prior probabilities with seasonal or epidemic conditions. 
c) assumption of statistical independence on each datum. 
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A special limitation comes from the part of computer science. Each computer 
program has to make use of an a.lgori thm. A computer algori tmn is co:mpoaed of the 
logical or statistical processes used to derive a solution to a diagnostic or 
therapeutic problem, from the information included in the data base am.d the 
information obtained from the new patient. HO".t~ever, algori t.b.m nomenclatuure is 
inconsistent from author to author (87). The computer program, in essence, 
consists of a large data base and a set of rules to which the specific cere of 
the individual patient is compared. It has been scbematized by Rogers, Ryack, 
mld Moeller (87) 
SCHEtlA 4 
COMPUTER 
DATA patient data DATA BASE ... 
SOURCE update physicians· 
~ !disease-symptom data base estimates rei ationships, 
disease-
probability etc 
--- -+-- --
ALGORITHII 
RULE heuristic ~ logical !rules for making diagnostic 
approaches diagnostic alternatives STRATEBIES statistical decisions new 
""' calculations patient data 
Rogers,W.,Ryack,B,,Moeller,6.!87) 
The computer data base consists of 
a) disease - symptom relationships; 
b) disease probabilities; 
CONFIRMED 
DIABNDSIS 
USER 
~ n atient data cl~ng 
biopsy, 
surgery etc 
hist~y 
physical exam 
p lab tests etc. 
NEW 
PATIENT 
c) other medical information 
particular disease involved (i.e. 
etc) (87). 
pertinent to diagnosis and treatment of the 
drug interactions, further diagnostic tests 
The diseases included in the data base are summarized in three ways: 
1) general disease class to which they belong (according to a 
classification system e.g. ICD9); 
2) specific disease category or major symptoms which best describes the 
disease problem explored; 
3) the actual number of diseases included in the system (87). 
A set of rules assigns the patient's data set to the disease classes. In 
most computer programs all diagnoses are pursued equally and ranked strictly 
according to their probability. We must infer that they are given the same value 
or utility. However, this equal ranking of diagnoses is neither necessary nor 
realistic (4). Computer assisted decision aids can only ensure a certain amount 
of completeness, perhaps diminishing variation of interpretation, possible 
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diminishing emphasis differences, and maybe enhance comparability (97). 
Sterling et al (cited in 53) identified three possible areas of 
application: 
1) initial structuring of a clinical problem with little prior infonmt!on; 
this is especially applicable for AI but which doctor wants a (very) lengthy 
dialogue with such a system? Lengthy because the computer must ask questions 
humans can see at once: in case of peritonitis a computer has to ask: "Is there 
en arrow piercing your abdominal wall?" 
2) differential diagnosis within a restricted clinical problem a~ea; 
3) automatic interpretation of test results such as EEGs and ECGs. 
This humble approach contrasts with wider scopes as "supporting the 
physician improving the quality of his decision making", "improving medical 
education", and "act SG . an intelligent interface to medical databases". But 
perhaps it is more realistic. There are presently too many uncertain elements 
and too many unresolved problems to proclaim a more or less comprehensive 
support system for physicians. No computer-aided system presently has the 
capability of diagnosing a large number of diverse diseases accurately (87). The 
systems almost always work in highly circumscribed areas. The fewer diseases and 
the more diseases are differentiated from each other, the higher the resulting 
diagnostic accuracy, whether diagnosed by physician or computer. The generally 
higher accuracy of the thyreoid studies is assumed to be due to the smaller 
number of diseases and greater distinguishability among the diseases involved 
{87). This accuracy is also affected by the exclusion of atypical patients in 
the data base, and by the way the assessment of the system is ~cecuted. 
Frequently in constructing a decision aid system the more typical patients 
are included. This will result in an underestimation of the number of difficult 
cases to be expected, an overestimation of the performance of the decision aid 
and also in an atypicality detection mechanism which will too readily label new 
patients 'atypical' (physicians recall often more the 'atypical' patients over 
the 'typical':estimations of 'atypicality' are therefore distorted) {98). 
Altho~n the use of a new test sample (evaluation sample) is fundamental to 
realistic assessment of a system's accuracy (Fisher et al, 1975) many studies 
ignore this requirement and report diagnostic accuracies testing the system on 
the developmental sample (87). Fleiss reported that the statistical algo~itbms 
(Bayes, Linear Discriminant Function) produces higher accuracy when tested o~ 
the developmental sample than when tested on a new sample from the same 
population (99). The explanation may be that since any new sample will be 
somewhat different, the algorithm cannot be expected to perform as well on the 
new sample as they do on the developmental sample. 
In his review Reggia (100) distinguishes five types of computer-assisted 
medical decision systems: 
I Conventional Programming Methods, including simple branching sy~tems, 
flow charts etc, inferences by simply executing the statements in the program. 
II Statistical Pattern Recognition, including 
a) Bayesian approach 
b) Linear Discriminant Analysis 
c) Matching procedures 
Alternative statistical approaches give only marginal improvement, if any. 
III Production Rule System, including various Artificial Intelligence 
Systems. 
IV Cognitive models: such programs are an explicit attempt to model the 
abductive reasoning of the expert human physician ss it is understood today. 
V Data Base comparisons. 
We shall discuss some of these types of systems, being aware that only a 
limited survey can be provided in this chapter. Koehler et al (101) already 
listed a bibliography on Interactive Data Processing in Medicine: man-machine 
Dialogue of 854 titles. Since then the number of publications increased 
tremendously. Krischer ( 102) collected 110 studies covering 15 years of study. 
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It i$ estimated that about 25% of the studies has not been published. 
The studies were executed in vario~ categories as: 
a) Health care policy evaluation. 
b) Diagnosis 
c) Treatment 
d) Diagnostic treatment 
e) Other 
f) Conceptual issues. 
The methods and emphasis of the studies were mainly:: 
1) Probability assessments or analyses: they are mostly pertained to 
populations rather than individuals or from estimates based on clinical data or 
experience. The studies revealed systematic biases in. subjective. estimates. 
2) Single Attribute Utility applications: only rudimentary analysis of 
utility structure was performed. No consensus has yet been formed sa to whose 
utilities should be included in the analysis. In most studies simplifications 
were introduced:the utility function is arbritrarily assumed to have a specified 
form and is assumed linear in terms of the outcomes considered. 
3) Multiattribute Utility Applications: they focus on for.mulation and 
assessment of utility structures for situations involving potentially fatal 
outcome~ and long term degradations in the quality of life. Restrictions being 
the same or worse as in single utility applications. Because of its extreme 
difficulty sample size is often restricted e.g., the first study on M.A.U. model 
based on a sample size of 15 (103). 
4) Application of group utility analyses. These studies, related to group 
utility functions in health care settings, are limited to only analytical and 
conceptual issues in group preferences. 
In various reviews on this subject (e.g.4,55,100,102,104,105) it becomes 
clear that the statistical approach and more special the Bayesian model 
outnumber the other types. 60% of all studies included in Rogers et al review 
used Bayes' theorem; up to 90% combined Bayes and L.D.F. (87). Differences 
between the various approaches were hardly found. Scheinok & Rinaldo (106) 
reported differences on diagnostic accuracy between Bayes and LDF of 1%. Birk et 
al (cited in 87) found 4% difference between Bayes versus matching procedure. 
Croft found up to 13% differences in diagnostic accuracy for 10 statistical 
algorithms on a same data base (67). Inconsistency between accuracy rates t~ 
more due to number and variance of the diseases than to different algorithms. 
Modifications of Bayes~ Theorem have shown to score only slightly different from 
the original. Sometimes it is stated in a more general form, and hence useful in 
situations one would hesitate to apply the theorem because of the uncertainty as 
to what the true state is. Applied to a well-circumscribed set of sy~toms and 
diseases in a stable populationp Bayes formula seems to be a robust approachg 
and regardless of the independence assumption, will give satisfactory results. 
But Scheinok & Rinaldo (106) found for the application of Bayes under the 
assumption of independence a total correct ratio of 0.5700s while with the 
Bsbadur extension the ratio should be reconsidered to be 0.7668. 
Salamon et al (59) question the Scheinok & Rinaldo figures because this 
ratio, which is the number of correctly diagnosed patients divided by the number 
of patients, is not really the measure of efficacy of a specific model~ because 
patients with the same profile could have different diseases. They reported that 
223 out of 300 could be diagnosed correctly by any static non-randomized 
mathematical model.De Dombal et al.(l07) showed that a computer program can even 
outperform senior physicians. The proportion of correct decisions was 91% for 
the computer and varied between 42% and 81% for the different physician groups. 
On the other hand Dannenberg et al (108) found in a group of 20 physicians 12 
perfo~ing better than the computer. 
Politser (7) raised the question whether these studies that test physician 
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ability to make probability judgments 9 may be testing the ability of physicians· 
to represent their beliefs with numbers rather than their ability to predict 
events. Knill-Jones (145) found a computer program diagnostic accuracy of 71% 
for the 65 cases in the original test group. In 55% of the cases in which a 
"certain" diagnosis was reached, the accuracy was 89%. But there are sU\ggestions 
that an accuracy of 85-87% is usually reached by clinicians faced with a 
jaundiced patient. The overall accuracy as having one of the 11 diseases for the 
computer progrW!ll was 69% ( 69) • 
Several investigations were founded on only a small amount of symptoms. 
For example, Cumberbatch & Heaps (124) using the data of Scheinok based 
their calculations on 11 binary valued symptoms for SlX upper abdominal 
diseases. Gustafson et al (24) used a total of 38 symptoms and test results of 
which 20 symptoms were mentioned more than ouce. Taylor et at (70) used 30 tests 
in three diseases. 
Warner et al (38) used 50 symptoms and signs, Horrocks et al (110) 19 
symptoms of which the symptom pain was subdivided into 10 aspects of this 
symptom for diagnosing dyspepsia, and de Dombal used 25 elements, among which 10 
aspects of the symptom pain for acute abdominal diseases (111). Noticing that 
Pauker et al (42) estimated the total number of symptoms and signs in the field 
of internal medicine at about 2 million, the figures used in the c~uter 
programs seem relatively small. 
To build a program based on reliable estimates, the sample size- the 
number of patients enclosed in the data base -, is important. Regrettably, this 
information is not always provided in the papers. The figures range from very 
small, 55 (Boyle et al. (112), 175, Horrocks (113), 300 Scheinokp (64), 1033 
referred patients (Warner (38); 1991 Croft, (67) and 3431 patients, Sebag & 
Hall (114) . 
The evaluation of the program on a test population poses new problems to 
comparability of studies and their validity to patient care. A wide range of 
population sizes are mentioned, and many more papers do not mention any size at 
all. A few examples are: Horrocks (115) tested the case of dyspepsia in 50 
patients; for lower gastrointestinal disorders in 82 patients, Warner (38) 
tested in 36, Stein et al (116) in 20, Gustafson et al (24) in 200, and Croft 
(67) in 437 patients. 
Another phenomenon is often vague: the judgmental procedure for the 
estimation (subjective) probabilities and utilities. Its importance was stressed 
by e.g. Oskamp (117) : "Their certainty about their decisions become entirely 
out of proportion to the actual correctness of those decisions") and Goldberg 
(118): ("the emount of professional training and experience of the judge does 
not relate to his judgmental accuracy"). Oskamp consulted 32 judges, of which 8 
experienced psychologists, and Goldberg 29 psychologists, Sebag & Hall 1 
physician, de Dombal et al (119) the available clinicians in the hospital and 
Ginsberg and Offensend (120) two physicians. 
Some investigations base their system and program on the description of one 
or two patients I case histories: Ginsberg & Offensend (120), end Card (20) each 
on one case history, and Pauker & Kassirer (121) on two case histories. 
Sometimes the researchers base their model on former studies. Pauker & Kassirer 
(122) based their study on the data described by Rifkin & Hood (123) and Diamond 
& Forrester; Cumberbatch & Heaps (124) on material of Scheinok. 
In this latter example 7 case histories were used to exemplify the model; 
no testing was performed. Testing of the program to the performance of 
physicians have been reported in only a few papers, and sometimes without 
defining the numbers: e.g. Miller et al (125) - hospital clinicians and case 
discuesents.-Lahay et al (126) five (groups of) physicians. The numbers of 
physicians are relatively small e.g. Spicer & Lennard Jones (127): one 
physician, Ginsberg & Offensend (120): two physicians, Taylor et al (70): six 
internists, de Dombal et al (119): nine, and Gustafson & Holloway (103) twelve 
physicians. 
There also is an 
for the investigation. 
unequal distribution for the type of diseases as object 
Rogers et al. (87) reviewed 54 articles: 60% of them 
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. ,,. ~ . 
. involved only · 3 of th~ 17 
· clae~e8: 
J..C.D. (International Classification of Diseases) 
22% for class III:endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases; 
17% for class V mental disorders; 
21% for class IX : diseases of the digestive system. 
General availability of computer-aided medical decision programs in routine 
practice is also hampered by their poor transferability. Spiegelhalter & 
Knill~Jones (53) listed some of the problems in this respect: 
· 1) the different clinical data may be routinely collected; 
2) the observer variation in eliciting indicants (symptoms highly 
·Characteristic for a certain ·disease) may vary from situation to situation, 
whiqh may bias the probabilistic prediction; 
3) the prevalence of diseaSe may vary from place to place, either due to 
genuine geographical variation (128) or to different reasons of referral to 
clinical centres; 
4) the presentation of the disease may vary. These variations have shown to 
affect considerably a system based on a conditional independence. 
In our opinion, computer-aided medical decision-making is still in its 
infancyp and perhaps not even that. It is far too early to assume a broad 
application of computers in a wide field of practical health care. 
Nevertheless, the more constraint economics place upon health care, the 
more the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system is questioned. 
Same authors translate this question in a need for computer assistance in 
medical practice. Wardle & Wardle (55) listed five items in favour of 
COllaputer-aided diagnosis: 
a) to improve the accuracy of diagnosis. The necessity for computer 
assistance is given in a number of examples of physicians' inaccuracy. 
Rosenblatt found an accuracy of 80-100% for cancer, but only 44% for cancer 
of the lung. 
Gwynne found 33.4% false negative diagnoses in a sample of 1627 patients. 
Prutting found an average inaccurate diagnosis of ca 50% in various series. 
In France 9 in a report of 100 autopsies, in 55.4% the diagnosis was missed. 
33% of the vascular lesions of the C.N.S. were not detected in a series of 
1478 cases studied by Kagan. Garland reported m1 accuracy of 44% for myocardial 
infarction. This figure is consistent with the investigation by Van der Doe~ & 
1ubeen ( 129) 
Moore et al (130) report that the pattern of decisions made by a nurse did 
not differ significantly, either statistically or clinically from that of three 
· doctors. They recommend to substitute the general practioner for a nurse. 
b) to improve the reliability of diagnosis. Every doctor has his off-days: 
boredom, fatiguet illness, situational end interpersonal distractions all plague 
him with the result that his repeated judgments of the exact same stimulus 
configuration are not identical (131). 
c) to increase speed, to reduce costs. Taylor et al (70) report that some 
physicians required many more tests than either other physicians or the 
computer. Zieve's paper (93) lists a large number of misinterpretations and 
abuse of laboratory tests by physicians. Redundancy of information has been 
discussed world-wide. 
d) to improve training in diagnostic techniques. The educational aspects of 
medical decision making (and additional computer programs) is still in 
discussion without a substantial outcome up till now. 
e) research. The study of a particular set of diseases and symptoms 
enhances collecting and analysing data in detail required for diagnostic 
programs. The reasoning processes were studied for close connection of computer 
programs with the routine practice of the physicians. 
When the statistical or actuarial model cannot provide the necessary 
support, perhaps different systems can supply the wanted assistance. Various 
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aids have been developed, some of them (flowcharts etc) have already been 
discussed. 
Patient-f1lled questionnaires, with or without a computer, must enable the 
physician to save time and at the same time to acquire a more complete history 
of the patient. Examples are the Cornell Medical Index-Health Questionnairep the 
Multiphasic Health Checkup, Computer-based Medical-history system (132), 
Patient-filled questionnaires (133), Gladys (134). Although enthousiastically 
reported on, as far as I know, none of these devices is now in routine practice. 
Consultant-type aids: mainly there are two types: 
a) Data-base systems. The computerized system collects various kinds of 
information, categorizes, analyses according to certain rules, and store this 
information in order to provide the busy physician updated knowledge and figures 
about a host of various diseases. 
b) Expert Systems, to be distinguished into two types: 
1) capturing the special knowledge of experts in the given subject matter 
and make this joint knowledge base accessible to physicians. 
2) Using Artificial Intelligence models for the same purpose as 1) These 
models can make use of 'expert lmowledge' but not as a necessary condition. 
Miller et al. (125) e.g. made use of reports of clinico-pathologic conferences 
as they were published in journals to model Internist-!. It differs from the 
former mode 1n tne embodiment of a certain type of logic in the information 
supplied to the user. In this sense, it is a prescriptive device. 
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Basic features are: 
a) patient data are entered into the system, only some elements of these 
da.:ta will r-e:lmlt in any action by the system; 
· b) the data base holds relevant information on patient care; 
c) the data base is wholly or partially organised into decision~'ing 
mQdels; 
· · d) the system will suggest specific lines of action depending on the 
· patif:1ltrt data; 
· ·e) the system will show the basis of its suggestions; 
f) the user decides what· action to take (50). 
Sage (1) formulated recommendations to build a reliable data basis: 
1) sample information .frQm a broad data base and be especially careful to 
include data bases which might contain disconfinning information; 
2) include sample size, confidence intervals, and other measures of 
information validity in addition to mean values; 
3) encourage use of models and quantitative aids to improve upon 
information analysis through proper aggregation of acquired information; 
4) avoid the hindsight bias by providing access to information at critical 
p~t times; 
5) encourage decision making to distinguish good and bad decisions from 
. good and bad outcomes, in order to avoid the ' illusion of validity'; 
6) encourage effective learning from experience. Encourage understanding of 
the decision situation and methods and rules used in practice to process 
information and make decisions such as to avoid outcome irrelevant learning 
systems; 
7) use structured frameworks based on logical reasoning, in order to avoid 
confusing facts and values and wishful thinking and to assist in processing 
information updates; 
8) both qualitative and quantitative data should be collected, and all with 
appropriate 'emphasis' ; none should be over-or unde:rweighted in accordance to 
personal beliefs, values and the like; 
9) remind the type or size of the sample so as to avoid the 
representativeness bias; 
10) present the information in several orderings so as to avoid recency and 
primacy effects. 
And we should like to add one more item 
11) define as strictly as possible the medical data to be included into the 
base, avoid ambiguous and inconsistent classification, and employ an unequivocal 
taxonomy of all medical entities. 
Several types of these consultation bases, or medical information systems, 
are now in use. 
Systems like PROMIS,COSTAR, TMIS, CARE, ARAM!S, CASNET etc are more or less 
successfully in use. Some of these systems provide the possibility to the 
physician to create and maintain a computerized medical record for every 
patient. It will be clear that these systems can provide very precious sources 
for clinical and epidemiological research. On the other hand, the discussion 
about the privacy and ethics around these data is in its very first phase. 
The 'Expert systems' are mainly Artificial Intelligence systems~ using 
experts' knowledge or data-base information (an A.I. system called MYCIN uses 
information from CASNET) and a couple of rules which lead the user through the 
information towards the conclusion: a diagnosis or plan of action. Yu (135) 
views two types of obstacles: minor and major ones, although, in our opinion, 
the minor are major and vice versa. Yu considers as minor problems: 
a) inprecise medical terminology; 
b) non-independence of clinical parameters; 
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c) incorrect information supplied to the computer; 
d) static representation of a patient's medical history (and physical 
examinations and tests, J.R.). 
The major problems include: 
1) requirement of massive data base; 
2) representation of medical knowledge which tends to be general rather 
then specific; 
3) physician error or misinterpretation. 
One of the major problems of computer-directed medical data collecting is 
the outsize number of questions to ask. E.g. a patient with meningitis need not 
be asked: "Is there a spear sticking in the middle of your head?" because even 
physici<ms do observe such a striking phenomenon, but the computer has to ask 
this (135). Simple, basic information gathering processes then become a tedious 
task. Since so many concepts and so many facts are necessary in order to came 
to even the simplest diagnosis representation of knowledge for such purposes 
tends to be global in nature. But physicians need narr~~r subsets of knowledge, 
subsets which are hardly provided in general medical textbooks. The computer 
programs need very specific knowledge though; but doing so it goes beyond the 
possibilities and limits of medical knowledge. Therefore~ most existing systems 
are limited to a -very- restricted province of medicine and/or concerned with a 
limited amount of alternatives or domains. Puff e.g.is designed to interpret 
pulmonary function tests results; Mycin allows optimal choice among 
antibacterial drugs. [~ore substantial programs are Caduceus ( o:dginally 
Internist II but for legal reasons renamed) and its predecessor Internist I. 
These concepts of Myers and Pople now covers the diagnostic potency to elucidate 
several hunderds of diseases in the field of internal medicine. 
Advantages of these types of programs are distinct: it can store enormous 
amounts of factual data, easy retrievability, accessible to an almost unlimited 
number of users at each time and in each place, it is physician nor patient 
bound. But disadvantages are also obvious. There is a risk of over-reliance on 
computer read-outs, mechanization can lead to dehumanization~ but - important 
for the user - it lengthens, rather than shortens, the time spent on a typical 
case (136). McMullin (84) in a critical review describes the pro's and conps of 
the Caduceus system. Recently Clancey & Shortliffe (137) gave an survey s.bout 
the first decade of medical artificial intelligence. 
We disagree with those people, especially in the field of informatics and 
computer scientists, complaining about the lack of interest physicians and the 
medical world show with regard to these developments. Physicians are really 
interested in the attempts and progress made in this field. But Medical 
Informatics has to realize that unless it can offer devices of real aid and 
assistance to the practicing doctors, physicians will remain standing in the 
wings. 
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Paragraph 5 
For more than two decades attempts have been made to ~se computers in 
clinical diagnostics. Interest in these techniquee persists despite little 
practical success in their application. The explanation of this lack of success 
is comple~'~ and, according to Taylor (138), cm1 mainly be focused to two 
headings: 
1) the ladt of 'Wlderstanding of the decision making process itself, and 
2) the need for a theoretical fr-amework within which such systems can be 
developed. 
The existence of a computer program that solves a medical problem does not 
prove that its method is the one physicians use to solve the same problem (139). 
With regard to this dilemma two explanations may be mentioned: 
-the "diagnostic process" does not exist (140) i:md- hence, every attempt to 
elucidate something that does not exist is unlikely to be rewarding (141). The 
mental processes are assumed to be so comple~c that attemps to make coE!iputers 
mimic this procedure are doomed to fail. 
-the ~diagnostic process" exists but physicians are oowilling to define the 
contents in such explicit ways to accomodate the needs of computer programs. If 
the physician is willing to define the medical problem in terms of actions~ 
outcomes, probabilities and utilities, he can delegate to the pro~cam the 
computational task of playing out the consequences of his judgment (142). 
This state of affairs hardly offers a promising view for the future. Both 
explanations start from unproven statements: the former conveniently negates the 
existence of some kind - or kinds of a method in the physician's 
problem-solving behaviour, the latter blames the doctor. We agree with Taylor 
(138) stating that the emphasis must be laid upon decisions rather than data and 
on people rather than statistics. The choice of appropriate statistical or 
computing techniques will become apparent during the analysis. In the preceding 
decades emphasis was mainly laid upon these techniques. 
The question became: "to what extent has Bayesian diagnosis begun to 
replace conventional diagnosis?" (45) Feinstein (45) notices that almost all the 
publications have been isolated proposals. The authors have not supplied any 
follow-up publications. "I know", Feinstein says 9 "of JZno published work, or 
clinical setting, or specific world situation, in which Bayesian methods have 
made a prominent contribution that could not have been achieved just as easily 
without the Bayes formula. Bayesian inference rests on the idea that the 
posterior probability of an event is proportional to the product of its prior 
probability multiplied by the likelihood ratio. But the Bayesian statistician 
does not know the prior probability. He must make a subjective, personal guess 
called an estimate. When Bayesian methods depend on intuitions and h1!mches, we 
only replace clinical by statistical hunches which does not bring us any step 
farther". 
Physician's guesses are assumed to be based on their knowledge of the 
prevalence of diseases and symptoms and their interrelationship in a finite 
population. The latter being essential, because if we do not know N, 
P(robability) is undefined and can picture all sorts of numerical values ranging 
from 0-1. Quantitative estimates about events with which we are not directly 
familiar are notoriously unreliable because they are frequently based on a 
superficial image (143). Another matter is that the ailment nor the symptoms are 
clearly defined and cannot be assumed as a clearcut entity. It is not the 
probability the physician has in mind but the spectrum of people with the 
presumed specific disease under observation. W11ile Bayesian logic is aimed at 
specific diseases and actions, it deviates from normal routine medical work 
which deals with unspecified ailments and uncertain decisions. 
Studies have also been, for the most part, confined to the well-structured 
areas of medicine. However, the bulk of decisions in medical practice are much 
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less clearly defined ( 138) • The general opinion appears to be that the. 
statistical approach is often too simplistic for realistic clinical problems, 
inapplicable because there are insufficient data, and incomprehensible to the 
user (53). Leaper et al (140) warn that studies based~ artificial situations 
should be treated with extreme caution. Statistical modelling of conditional 
distributions of variables given diseases has been criticized for its 
over-simplicity, particularly for the frequent assumptions of conditional 
independence of variables and the restriction to mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive diseases (53). 
Croft (67) argues that no substantial improvement in computer diagnosis is 
possible until clinical profiles of major diseases are more accurately defined. 
But modern medical research emphasises identification of mechanisms and specific 
therapies rather than determination of clinical profiles based on patient 
history and physical examination. Gorry (79) stressed the need :for formal 
representation of medical concepts and for a dialogue which would include 
explanations in terms that a doctor could understand. The first question, 
however 7 should be whether the decision theoretical approach reflects the 
medical problem-solving process as it is practiced in routine health care 
delivery. If it proves to be an artefact the claim for being ~ aid or 
assistance to the physician must be dropped. 
This does not mean that decision theoretical approaches not have an impact 
on and value to health care delive~J, but as a separate discipline next to 
clinical medicine and not as a part of it. Computer-based processing systems may 
be valuable, but several investigators still believe that these technologies are 
unadapted to the medical decision-making process, that they are not applicable 
to complete and dynamic clinical problems ('7). Recent reviews have shown 
numerous medical applications of decision analysis, but most of them involved 
hypothetical situations (4,7,55,102). 
Friedman & Gustafson (89) discuss the failure of such computer applications 
in clinical medicine, and characterize the systems as having been inflexiblep 
with a poor interface with the user and of no readily perceivable benefit to 
doctors or patients. Thusfar, the running programs lengthen rather than shortens 
the time spent on a typical case. Analysis leads to the conclusion that the more 
extensive the utility assessments, the more extensive the use of drugs(l02), 
opposing the expectations of optimizing choice behaviour. There is little to 
show for the enormous amount of work invested in this area. 
It must be clear that physicians will reject systems that dogmatically 
offer advice without proven benefit in allround situations even if it displays 
impressive diagnostic accuracy (50). \1hen Schwartz (144) complains about the 
negative reactions of many students and physicians in trying to bring decision 
analysis into clinical use, this aforementioned dogmatism cm1 alienate 
physicians and students from this approach. The physician has to realize that 
even a highly educated adult relies upon intuitive considerations rather than 
the appropriate abstract principles. In the absence of the appropriate codep 
individuals rely upon their own experiencep derived from familiar content 9 in 
making an inference or judgment (143). 
Impediments to a successful computer-physician snd/or patient-computer 
communication have been listed in the publication of Friedman & Gustafson (89): 
1) many computer(s) (terminals) have been poorly engineered, resulting in 
mechanical breakdowns. Not only the construction but the 'bugs' in the program 
can drive the user crazy. Meanwhile the former impediment seems obsolete. 
2) the computer(s) (terminals) have often been placed in out-of-the-way 
places making them inconvenient to operate and useless for :rapid data retrieval. 
3) the computer response-time often has been quite slow beca~e of 
low-speed teletype output or excessive delay between responses. About extending 
response-time Warner reports another iE~ediment: the overload of the system by 
users' requests lead the computer to spend almost all its cycles controlling 
traffic and swapping programs and buffers back and forth to disc (145). Although 
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since 1977 equipment has been more and more sophisticated end memory-storage 
multiplied~ the innumerable number of data used in medical practice still makes 
the use of huge main-frames nece$sary. 
4) in order to obtain information from the computer the physician has often 
been required to twce part in a long and complicated technical dialogue. 
As programs almost always differ to a large extent frQm each other 9 and, 
therefore, the sign-on codes vary from program to program, and programs are not 
transferable, we are far from an easy handling of the machinery. 
5) the use of computers often requires knowledge of special passwords, 
codes 9 or computer languages. 
6) computer tenni11als have· been expensive and this :made it difficult to 
develop accessible yet· cost-effective applications. This impediment has by now 
been solved (a~ost). 
The most important impediment is perhaps, that although we have been able 
to demonstrate the reliability· and validity of information collected by 
computer-based patient interfaces, we have not demonstrated that providers can 
make better or less costly decisions because of it. Remarkably, where in several 
other fields the computer performs tasks previously incomprehensible to mankind~ 
in the field of health care one is quite satisfied when the machine can 
duplicate the physician's task. Setting the goal at such a low level, it is 
hardly astonishing to find a cool reception. 
Successful innovations are characterized by user identification of the 
problems. Computer research is characterized by computer scientists' working on 
a solution to health problems without drawing sufficiently on the advice of 
actual providers or potential users. Computer scientists are busy searching for 
a problem to fit their solution. In other words, the existing system must adapt 
to the program rather than the other way round (89). 
Friedman & Gustafson signalize six obstacles to computer assistance in 
medical care: 
1) patient-computer and/or physician-computer interaction; 
2) provision with equipment that exceeds the physician's capability; 
3) inability to prove a significant positive impact on patient care; 
4) difficult transferable system from one institution to another; 
5) research has thusfar not been change-oriented; 
6) man has not learned from previous mistakes. 
In our op1n~on, all questions, problems and pitfalls cannot be solved in 
the near future. Indeed, applications are decreasing: 
the Index Medicus cited 30 papers under Diaodnosis: computer-assisted in 
1982 compared with 83 in 1977 (53). It is essential to both disciplines, medice.l 
and computer science, to strive for one line of research, one common view on the 
medical process, one language. Both disciplines have to analyze their methods 
and content in a rational and objective way. From the medical part we may agree 
with Taylor, (138), when he states: "It is, therefore, more promising 'l::o begin 
projects of this kind with an analysis of the decisions :made by physicians in 
the appropriate area of the health care system so that from the beginning the 
proposed system will fit as closely as possible to the needs of the existing 
system and to the physicians who will use it". 
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CHAPTER VI 
Paragraph 1 
When one asks a physician "How d.o you make a medJcal diagnosis?" his 
explanation of the process might ~e as follows. "First 0 I obtain the case facts 
from the patient's history, then [perform physical examina1ion, and laboratory 
tests. Second, I evaluate the relative importance of the different signs and 
symptoms. Some of the data may le of first-order importance and other data of 
less importance. Third, to make a ·iifferential diagnosis I list all the diseases 
which the specific case can re•-iaonably resemble. Then I exclude one disease 
after another from the list until tt becomes apparent what the case can be19 (1). 
We do not know which physician Ledley & Lusted asked the question, but it is 
hardly representative for the phystcians as a group. We think Sober (2) is right 
in stating that "the clinician's description of his clinical diagnostics is no 
more than rationalization. It is false to the facts of b.is own psychological 
processes." I 1 also contradicts the observations of Leaper et al. (3) who 
conclude: 
I Tht~ diagnostic process - viewed as a monolithic structure - does not 
in fact exist. 
II : Each clinician has his own pathway to diagnosis. 
III: We aJ·e in no position to draw up algorithms for different individuals. 
It is th~ impression that we operate from rough guidelines and these cannot 
be adequately formalized either as statistical or as exact generalizations (4). 
A survey studying ·diagnostic pathways in family practice was described by Hull 
(5). He found a. o.: 
l) A great variation between methods of examination between doctors; 
2) The fact that previous knowledge of the patient by the doctor influences 
the doctor's decision how to examine his patients; 
3) and that presenting symptom influences the doctor's decision to examine. 
Also the energy with which a doctor pursues a diagnosis in family practice 
depends chiefly on the patient's presenting symptom (6). 
According to Howie (7) an important barrier is formed by language. The 
traditional diagnostic labels are no basis for meaningful discussions between 
consultants and general practitioners or even among general practitioners. This 
dilemma has aJso been mentioned by Scadding (8,9) and King (10). The fundamental 
problem is thP lack of an acceptable formal definition of the diagnostic process 
( 11) . Without agreement on this point, there are no criteria \\Thether there is 
such a thing ike 'the diagnostic process'. To get new incentives in medicine we 
need to first search for and then analyse the individual work-routines. The 
rationalizatioJ• behind th1s approach is that physicians. either consciously or 
unconsciously, make similar judgments daily; they are more or less faced with 
the same problems; they have practically all equal therapeutic possibilities 
available; and they find and understand each other throughout the world on 
matters of problem-solving and practice-burdens. That means that physicians can 
recognize common elements in their processes, that they operate along rough 
general guidelines distinctive to them all. But between recognisable factors and 
(a) formalized model(s) there is a large gap. Pauker et al (12) picture the 
difference between the expert in practice and the expert as often pictured in 
literature or folklore. The epitome of the expert in fiction is the detective 
who, through superior deductive powers and by sheer force of logic, organizes 
the facts at hand in a way that leads to a single, inevitable conclusion. By 
contrast. the real-world physician seem to rely much more heavily upon 
-137-
"guessing", his initial hypothesis typically being based on precious little 
data. These "guesses" are apparently prompted by patterns of clinical findings 
or by specific complaints which bring to mind particular diseases. The physician 
then tries to demonstrate the correctness of his "guesses" moving to new 
hypothemes only if his initial impressions prove untenable. Apparently, 
judgments seem to be made by the degree to which the displayed features 
presented by the patient appear representative of the stereotype the physician 
has in mind. The more numerable and the more specific the stereotypes the 
physician has in mind the more he has a 'clinical vie~', 'clinical intuition' 9 
'flair clinique'. But this theme only acknowledges the existence of pattern 
recognition as one of the elements in the diagnostic process, not its procedure. 
On this part models remain vague, informal. 
Ta;ylm:·' s model 
1) the physician acquires information from the patient; 
2) he interprets the information. performs some kind of analysis upon it, 
and 
3) he must make a decision concerning the individual patient(l3). 
But this mode~ does not support hypotheses that allow specific predictions 
as required in formal theories or models. Formal models are more easily tested 
than informal ones. Hence their inadequacies are more apt to be exposed. The 
relative lack of ambiguity in a formal model encourages people t.o test it. The 
major question remaining is whether such a model can be formulated (14). The use 
of models in studying medical problem-solving has been scarce. The motivation 
for a model may come from several sources. A model may isolate and illuminate 
certain relationsh2ps or properties of the modeled system and hence promote an 
improved understanding of that system. Also, manipulation of the model may be 
easier than experimentation with the modelled system (14). 
However 9 according to Gorry, there are two difficulties in modeling the 
medical process: 
a) many medical people seem to feel that a model of diagnosis must be 
complete, and hence so complex as to be infeasible. 
b) the potential advantages of modeling as an activity are not generally 
recog-nized. 
According to Pauker et al. (12), the development of the model will require 
the efforts of physicians experienced in diagnosis. To a certain extentp they 
should consider concepts developed in other fields including cybernetics, 
cognitive theory, utility theory, and computer science. Regrettably, they do not 
meke clear which elements from these dtsciplines are applicable to the modeling 
of the clinical process. Obviously, their preconception is that this process is 
a probabilistic one. Doctors tend to be deterministic rather thaD probabilistic 
though (3). People prefer to assume tha~ there is a rule, rather than that there 
is no rule; that this rule is determinLstic rather than probabilistic; that the 
values to be predicted from the cue values do in fact depend on these cue values 
rather than on other aspects such as trial number; that the rule is functional 
rather than nonfunctional, and that the rule is a positive linear function 
rather than any other function (15). Brehmer showed that when these rules fail, 
people tend to assume that there is no rule at all. Brehmer et al (16) provide 
considerable evidence that determinism, or causality, is a very basic schema 
used by people to make sense of the world. Wason and Johnson-Laird (17) found 
that individuals did not use the logical relation of "if, then", but tend to 
consider this relation equivalent to a double implication, "if, and only if", as 
would be appropriate for a causal task. The characteristic of probabilism is not 
manifest, but it has to be inferred. This means that the subject has to have an 
adequate notion of probabilism among the schemata for organizing his experience~ 
and that he has some criterion for when a task should be considered 
probabilistic (15). Of course, one can, like Jesdinsky (18) argues, postulate 
that a deterministic model is only a specification of the probabilistic model in 
that it assumes the values 0 and 1. In this way, however, one denies the 
characteristics of the deterministic system in order to establish a 
probabilistic style which may be alien to the physician and his problem-solving 
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behaviour. Knowledge of the actual process of problem solving or descriptive 
process tracing should serve as a useful guide to the design of the model. This 
involves requirements for a knowledge of the ways in which people apply 
strategies in order to reach judgments (19). That means that the :model must be 
intimately related to the actual system. 
The two aspects of a system are its structure and its behaviour. The 
structure of a system is the totality of the interrelationships among its 
elements; the behaviour is composed of the interactions between the system and 
its environment (see also Lens-model of Brunswik, (20,14). The aim of the model 
must be to "represent" or to "simulate" the hidden cognitive processes of the 
physician as he makes his judgments. 
It requires a) a search for some formal (i.e., specifiable) model(s), which 
(b) uses as its "input", the information (data, cues, symptoms etc.) initially 
presented to the judge, and (c) combines the data in an optimal manner, so as to 
(d) produce as accurate as possible a copy of the responses of the judge - (e) 
:regardless of the actual validity of those judgments themselves (21). Note that 
such a model is always an intraindividual one; that is, it is intended as a 
representation of the cognitive activities of a single judge. The test of the 
model is not how well it works as a representation of the state of the world, 
but rather how well it predicts the inferential products of the judge himself 
(21). 
If the model elucidates general principles of diagnosis, then it has both 
validity and value in teaching (12). Or, as Gorry states, the test of the 
validity of the model is the determination of whether, for each set of relevant 
inputs in the modelled system, the representation of these input produce output 
of the modeling system, which are representations of the output of the modeled 
system (14). In other words: predicted outcome has to be registered outcome. 
To model the medical process, Elstein et al. (22) recommend the following 
tasks: 
1) To identify the intellectual strategies and tactics characteristic of 
expert clinical reasoning; 
2)·To generate a psychological theory to explain these features; 
3) To relate this theory to current theories of thinking, human information 
processing, decision-making and problem-solving; 
4) To develop instructional methods m1d materials. 
The decisionmaker is dealing with environments characterized by risks, 
uncertainty, complexity, changes over time, and conflict (19). They can lead to 
different styles in medical problem solving. 
Paragraph 2 
Observing people solving a problem the impression arises that everybody 
operates in his own style as a kind of trademark. Scrutinizing these processes, 
however, it appears that they have much more in common than that they differ. 
The question is whether the common features can be classified into a general 
taxonomy. In our opinion, styles of problem solving can be arranged according to 
three categories. 
A. Personally induced; 
B. Problem oriented; 
C. Inferential approach; 
Each of the categories has its own supporters. The first category of 
supporters emphasizes the psychological and emotional features in problem 
solving like uncertainty, stress, intuition, cognition. As we discussed in 
chapter II these features, undoubtedly influence people~s problem solving 
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behaviour and information processing. In uncertainty or stress people tend to 
restrict information search, limit the amount of alternatives to be chosen 
among~ avoid risky solutions etc. The Janis & Mann (23) model, as discussed in 
chapter II, postulates that each pattern of decision stress for coping with 
conflicting problems is associated with a characteristic mode of information 
processing. It is this mode of information processing which governs the type and 
aumoultrt of information the decision malrer will prefer. It is suggested that these 
forms of ego-defenses may cause or contribute to dysfunctional behaviour (24). 
Mason & Mitroff (25) suggest that varying psychological personalities give rise 
to varying qualities of information. Their "Senli!lation" type relies primarily on 
data perceived by the sense, typified by terms like "objective, hard facts", 
whereas their "Intuitive" type perceives objects as they might be, and in their 
totality. The "Thinking" type relies primarily on cognitive processes, while the 
"Feeling" type focuses at affective processes. Hm.Jeverg these global 
descriptions and categorizations provide little explanation for the processes 
under study; at the most some information about the personality of the problem 
solver. It fosters stereotypes like the cool, logical thinking mathematician, or 
the soft, affectionate nurse. It might be conceivable that physicians by 
choosing their profession demonstrate in most situation an 
information-processing behaviour mainly based on affectiong intuition and hope. 
However, this is only one side of the taslt environment of the physician. 
Taxonomies of personal behaviour are not always applicable to the 
particular physician confronted with a contingency task. This kind of 
taxonomies, widely used in psychology, seems to be of only remote importance to 
the description of particular problem-solving behaviour (19). 
Problem-orientation of the problem-solving process has been repeatedly 
mentioned in literature (e.g.l2,20,26,27). The task governing the processes 
involved in problem solving, sounds as a reasonable proposition. However, it 
does not solve our dilemma: looking for common landmarks, recognisable across 
persons, tasks and situations. The classification of problems appears 
unsatisfying. Mason & Mitroff (25) arranged problems into bm categories, 
structured and unstructured ones. The structured ones were subdivided into: 
a.) decision under certainty: all values of actions, states of nature, and 
outcomes are known in a deterministic relationship; 
b.) decision under risk: the relationship between actions and outcomes is 
probabilistic; 
c.) decisions under uncertainty: probabilities are not known but the 
possible states of the world are known. 
The classification appears to be strongly related to the personal 
conception of the problem-solver and his processing capabilities. It does not 
provide independent criteria for classifying a particular task to a particular 
class of decision category. Moreover, the classification of the innumerable 
number of tasks a.s they are presented to the physicians does not only seem a 
Sisyphean labour, but also a~likely to provide the common landmarks. 
Thus we turned to the inferential approach of problem solving and decision 
:making. Decision malcing can be defined as the process of thought and action 
involving an irrevocable allocation of resources that culminates in choice 
behaviour (19). Strategies define the process along which the decisionmaker 
comes to a decision. Our aim is to discover and to elicit (a) strategy(ies) 
according to which a physician reaches a decision in the medical process. 
The Butterworth Medical Dictionary (1965) defines diagnosis as "the art of 
applying scientific methods to the elucidation of the problems presented by a 
sick patient. This implies the collection and critical evaluation of all 
evidence from every possible source ~md of the use of any method necessary." 
Dudley (28) regards as scientific any purposeful human activity designed to 
provide tentative and reputable hypotheses about the nature of events. In 
diagnostic reasoning as in many other processes of rational problem solving, 
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explanation of the observed symptoms and signs and testing of the explaining 
hypotheses play a dominant role (29)~ :Hypotheses h.elp to overcome limitations of 
memory capacity and serve to narrow the size of the problem space (20). They can 
be seen as "the physician's formulation of possible solutions to the problem" 
(20). Medical problem solving has been described as a process of generating and 
testing hypotheses. A hypothesis can be thought of as a law of Nature, and the 
everyday scientific process essentially consists of examining the logical 
consequences of hypotheses to see if what follows from them or what they predict 
does in fact correspond to real life (30). It is this process that ttle may 
observe, or assume to perceive, in medical problem solving. But do "scientific 
metbo®" have the same meaning to us all? In Chapter III we discussed two ways 
of reasoning, deductive and inductive; probabilistic reasoning being a. varitmt 
of the inductive way. According to Medawar (30) the traditional view of 
scientific method is the process of thought knO'WD as "induction". 
"Inductivism is a complex of beliefs of which the salient points are: the 
Truth lies all around us out there in Nature, so that the scientists' main task 
is to discern and record matters of fact and then to classify and appraise them 
according to certain more or less well defined rules - whereupon the Truth will 
certainly reveal itself. Thus the scientist collects facts much as entomologists 
collect beetles. The process of observation can be relied upon implicitly to 
reveal the Truth as it lies about him in nature. The scientistj therefore, is a 
shrewd spectator of the world who operates a Calculus of discovery or makes use 
of some formulatory of intellectual behaviour which reveals the truth to him " 
(30). 
Contrasted to the inductive inference process is the deductive reasoning, 
which can be described as a process of sequential and hierarchical hypothesis 
formation corrected by negative feedback. 
Thus our research question can be reformulated as "do physicians employ a 
deductive or an inductive strategy in their problem solving process?" This 
question raises the investigational task of 
1.) Modeling these strategies, in order to discover, to isolate and to 
illuminate landmarks in the medical processes to enable the differentiation; 
2.) Providing instruments to elicit the landmarks. 
Paragraph 3 
Models describe processes in gross features. The model delineates the 
landmarks within the process as they might be observed in the performance of the 
task. These landmarks can be viewed as points of emphasis as they have appeared 
in thought or have originated from observation or from literature. It may be 
clear that not all features and characteristics will be included in the model. 
The more we get i~to detail, the more we run the risk of emphasizing the -
personal- differences rather than the·common characteristics. 
The focus of this investigation should be the formulation of a model of the 
medical process and its subsequent comparing to "real" situations. The formal 
definition of what constitutes a model of either the behaviour or strttcture of a 
given system is not an easy task. The key issue is the elucidating of several 
features in the medical process in order to contribute to the understanding and 
- perhaps - to optimize medical problem solving and decision making. 
The concept of a model is intimately related to that of a system. 
Generally, the two aspects of a system with which modelling is concerned are its 
structure and its behaviour. The structure of a system is the totality of 
interr&lationships among its elements. The behaviour of a system is composed of 
the interactions between the system and its environment (14). Our question is to 
what extent the model(s) can serve as an explanation to a system, the cognitive 
and decision making processes. in medical judgment. 
Following our research question we have to model both types of inference 
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methods: the deductive and the inductive one. 
The deductive way of reasoning has been briefly discus$ed in Chapter III 
and cSl!! be depicted as in the following scheme: · 
NEW QUESTION 
NEW THEORY 
J)> 
v 
data collection 
" data analysis 
I 
"' HYPOTHESIS GENERATION 
I 
'II' 
HYPOTHESIS REFINEMENT 
..} 
LOW-LEVEL TESTING 
v 
REFUTATION 
..;, 
VERIFICATION 
''Translating" this scheme to the medical nomenclature it can be sketched as 
follm'lfs: 
:---~PATIENT'S COMPLAINT 
data collection 
I 
'¥/ data analysis 
v 
HYPOTHESIS GENERATION 
v 
HYPOTHESIS REFINEMENT/SPECIFICATION 
MORE THAN 
1 HYPOTHESIS 
LEFT 
I 
"'W 
DIAGNOSIS 
PROGNOSIS 
I y 
ACTION 
This scheme reflects the physician as described by Ledley & Lusted at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
This method has long been taught and recommended to physicians even if not 
always practiced (31). But training programs aimed at the education of problem 
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solving techniques with the principles of formal logic, incur a risk of 
transmitting a way of thinking that hardly exists in practice ~.d is 'pr()bably 
quite useless (32). "Most doctors do not practice in the fashiqn in whicli.they 
have been trained. The pressure of time, patients and competition leads the 
doctor to adopt a variety of short-cuts and other useful strategies which may 
detract from the quality he rendersp but which allow him to function more 
effectively within the context and settings within the world'' (33). The notion of. 
restricted search, limitation of alternatives, and the use'of taak-simplifying 
heuristics have often been mentioned in literature. It is assumed that the 
general procedure is to develop a hypothesis about the patient's dis.ea~Se end 
then to try to confirm the hypothesis (34). These th()ughts suggest a different 
method: an inductive strategy. Unlike the deductive method a general schema for 
the inductive inference process is not available, as far as we know. 
Following thoughts from literature (see also chapter III) we delineated the 
following scheme for inductive reasoning in medicine: 
PATTERN-RECOGNITION 
(some questions to 
(clarify patient's 
(complaint) 
MAXIMAL CHANCE I 
MINIMP~ UNCERTAINTY 
'Vi 
ACTION 
f!G~ Q 
IND!JCTI~ 
PATIENT'S 
COMPLAINT 
HYPOTHESIS 
,GENERATION 
HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING 
CUE 
ACQUISTION 
HEURISTIC ALGORITHMIC 
(some questions to 
(clarify patient's 
(patient's complaint) 
DIAGNOSTIC 
ALGORITHMS 
---------
Differences with the deductive strategy are the generation of (a) hypothesis(es) 
based on precious little data and mainly on past eXPeriences, and the (very) concise 
testing of the hypothesis(es) with elements which at the same time serve as (a small 
number of) data to the generation of a new hypothesis, which is stored next to the 
former ones(s). The ultimate testing is performed by the weighing of the hypotheses. 
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Again, in the centre of the model the hypothesis is placed.·. H~.gever,. we 
have to remember the different meanings of both hypotheses, the one :.i!l.dedU:ytive· 
and the other in inductive reasoning, as we discussed in Cha.P.ter I:Il.'the · 
functioning of deductive reasoning yields hypotheses from which testable 
consequences can be deduced; hypotheses which may be refuted by e:l@erience~ In 
case of verification these hypotheses serve as a temporary exp~anatiQn to the 
facts at hand. The deductive hypothesis is logically qeduced f~om t.qe,pr,esented 
evidence. 
In contrast, the inductive hypothesis can be based on :m~y sources: 
presented evidence, background knowledge, specific experience 'etc~ The 
conception about inductive hypotheses mainly refers to hypotheses. ·as 
reproductions or reflections on analogy and similarity; ~alogies with 'which we 
are familiar to guide us in new tasks. Since these hypotheses about 'the nature 
of relations between variables cannot come from the stimulus obje~t$, they have 
to come from the subjects themselves. Therefore, this type · pf hypqtheset.;~ 
involves a personal investment, a sense of commitment. The gene~ation of 
inductive hypotheses is triggered by only a small number of feat~ea recognized 
or presumed in the presented data. Inductive hypotheses can be viewed as highly 
personal "patterns" like we know from pattern recognition. 
Pattern-recognition may serve as the main characteristic.of the behaviour 
of the inductive model. It can be defined as the process of matching a patient 
symptom configuration with those configurations that the physiciap has memorized 
either from literature or through personal experience (35). 
Those physicians who ask only a few questions further (than the presented 
complaint), take a decision and then design a treatment plan, are making use of 
the pattern-recognition strategy. This strategy can be seen as the basic theme 
of the inductive method. 
In most cases however, this elementary process does not lead.to the goal, 
making a diagnosis or a plan of action. Second, third etc. cycles are necessary 
in order to arrive at a satisfactory decision. The Inductive-Heuristic strategy 
is the iterative process on the basic theme. It makes use of clusters of 
symptoms and shortcuts in a quick cycling process. Data to the cycle come 
mainly from the testing of the inductive hypothesisp whichp in fact, is a 
process of filling up and confirming the pattern in mind. Any answers to a 
particular question of the physician can serve as a trigger to a new pattern. 
·This conception of the cycling process has been sustained by Dorosz~JSld (36). 
The term heuristic indicates that there is not a structured scheme according to 
which data are collected; the sequence of questions, examinations or tests is 
quite casual. 
The third variant of the inductive method is the Inductive-Algorithmic 
strategy. Fundamentally it is based on the same cycling process as the preceding 
variant. It differs from the former one by its structured plan of strategy. In 
this study algorithmic has the mesning of: 
a structured plan of strategy by way of short runs of questions9 
examinations or tests in order to skim over the health or disease status of the 
patient and/ or trying to avoid information-gaps. •rhe plan :mainly consists of 
structured questioning each organ &~d/or behavioural system; 
the runs have a more or less characteristic form; 
-the algorithm(s) are physician- not problem-oriented (35). 
The fundamental feature of the inductive model, the cycling process, can be 
pictured as: 
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Contrasting to this cycling process is the principally linear one of the 
deductive strategy. The deductive strategy can be delineated as progression down 
a hierarchical logical sequence of hypotheses. In this system the high level 
hypotheses serve as universal statements about an observed phenomenon e.g. the 
patient is ill. In an increasing specification a sequence of hypotheses is 
constructed which eventually yield a hypothesis from which testable consequences 
can be deduced that may be refuted or verificated by the presented or acquired 
evidence. It can be pictured as a triangle. 
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DIAGNOSTIC PATH 
Jr 
argumentationstep 
H 
ar~umentationstep 
THERAPEUTIC PA1H 
~ t . 
argumentat1onstep 
J ~ 
argum. step 
The various hypotheses in the deductive method cannot be arranged in some 
kind of order. They are unique pictures induced from what Polanyi calls the 
"Tacit Knowledge". The condition of a deductive system is its logical ordering 
of the hypotheses. The question is whether such a logical ordering is possible 
in medicine. 
This question led to the meditation about methods and instruments allowing 
the distinction between these twos deductive and inductive, strategies. 
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Human judgment is usually 1 nvestiga:ted to employ three types of models: 
PROCESS studies of how human jurtgments are actually madep 0 RESCRIPTIVE models 
which :make use of a formal tht·ory of how decisions ou!!ht to be made, and 
DESCRIPTIVE models which attempt to describe the context and factors which 
influence judgments. Elstein et al. (37) have recently critically reviewed in 
detail the strength and weaknesses of all three approaches to the investigation 
of clinical cognition. 
Process studies can be distin~.ished into: 
A.) Process decision models. which can be typified by the information 
processing studies of Newell & Simon (27), and 
B.) Process tracing studies These studies have been mainly executed by 
subjects' reporting their cognitive processes of preceding judgmental 
procedures. The validity of the~e types of studies have been questioned by 
Nisbett & Wilson (38). Their main argument is that hindsight confuses reported 
data. tle are "telling more than we can lmow". Some of their conclusions have 
been arg~ed by Ericsson and Simon (39). These authors propose that verbal 
reports as data may be valid when registered at the time of action. 
From the previous paragraph it may be clear that pro·:ess tracing is the 
model to be preferred in our investigation. It includes the registration of the 
physician's problem solving activities in an as real as pos~ible situation. It 
states the problem to find and to distinguish the landmarks which enable us to 
discover the deductive and inductive way of reasoning when present. 
The main features of the deductive strategy are: 
1.) progression down the hierarchical hypotheses sequence; and 
2.) its conclusion is based upon the evidence at hand. 
The latter condition appears to be the easiest one: unambiguous 
registration of the evidence and the eliciting of the diagnostic "contents" 
(cluster of symptoms and signs) provide an easy comparison. 
The former condition$ however, is the more difficult ~ne. The problem is 
h~1 to structure and to recognize a hierarchical hypotheses svstem which enables 
a downward analysis. Only a few attempts have been made to originate such a 
system.. 
Elstein et al (20) distinguish two levels: complex multilevel formulation 
and fairly specific diagnostic. This system does not allow a downward analysis. 
A three-level structure is proposed by Gerritsma & Smal (32): Global~ unspecific 
and specific. These features, however, were not specified. 
Doroszewski (29) distinguishes four levels: 
-leading hypotheses, suggestive for the direction of the tnvestigation; 
- intermediate, explanatory to the observation; 
-working, nearest explanation in a given step of reasonin~; and 
- main diagnostic, describing an important bio-pathologic.d state. 
These levels do not permit an independent judgment of the hypotheses across 
the various cases and patient problems. 
For the present investigation a five-level physic-morphologic structure was 
developed, based on "systems view of illness and disease''. (Engel, 1980, 
reported in 40). This multilevel general systems model ranges from Biosphere in 
14 steps to subatomic particles. Within this model five levels within the human 
sphere can be distinguished: person, mental system, organ system, tissues and 
cells. From this conception the following model was constructed. 
Level I: ~Ym~ ~~!Bg Hypotheses referring to global descriptions 
comprising the total human being will be included within this category. It 
refers to descriptions like ill/not ill, psychic/ somatic, serious/not serious 
condition etc. 
Level II: MY!tiQrganic fQrmY!~!!Q~ • Hypotheses within 
pathophysiological states comprising more than one organ 
diseases of body systems and/or body parts. The class 
examples like: 
this class refer to 
system. It includes 
can be typified by 
Wlspecified infectious diseases, unspecified neoplasmata, unspecified 
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ailments of bodyparts ·("something in the chest", "abdominal pain'1 ). 
Level III: Org~ ~~§!~ This class follows the normal medical 
distinction of organ systems. E.g. respiratory tract, digestive tract, 
musculo-skeleton tract. All hypotheses referring to a certain organ system 
without further specification of the illness are included in this class. 
Level IV: Qrg§~ This class 
tissue-entities. It includes the nearest 
entity. Hypotheses nominating the specific 
It can be typified as: gall-bladder disease, 
refers to specified organs and 
explanation to the specified disease 
organ or tissue-~,tity are included. 
anaemia, eczema etc. 
Level V: : Q~!.!!!!~ . This class can be compared with. Doroszeto1ski' s 'tr~ain 
diagnostic", describing a specified bio-pathological state. It refers to al 
specific diseases as generally described in medical textbooks. The hypothesis 
provides an exact circumscription of the lesion and/or its cause. For instanceD 
duodenal ulcer, hyperthyreoidism, acute glomerulo-nephritis, myocardial 
infarction. 
In preliminary study the system was put to trial. Two independent judges 
classified 57 hypotheses according to the system. All hypotheses could be placed 
within a class; the interjudge variability numbered less than 5%. In the actual 
investigation general agreement could be reached for all 745 hypotheses. 
We judged the system fair enough to distinguish a hierarchical structure of 
the hypotheses mentioned in the physician's problem solving activities of a 
patient case. 
The characteristic of the inductive strategy is given by the circular 
process. This characteristic is typified by the peculiar arrangement between 
hypotheses and symptoms. As aforementioned~ the induced hypothesis is followed 
by a number of symptoms (answers to pertinent questions) which serve as testing 
elements as well as information towards a new hypothesis in a succeeding cycle 
of the process. In this respect, we ca.Vl distinguish three types of 91symptoms" 
(including signs and tests). Symptoms as testing elements related to the 
preceding hypothesis (Hypothesis Related Symptoms, HRS); symptoms as information 
data related to a forthcoming hypothesis (Hypothesis Prerelated Sympto~s, HPS), 
and symptoms unrelated to any of both hypotheses (Non Hypothesis Related 
Symptoms, NHRS). These latter symptoms may be characterized as data indicating a 
search behaviour in an uncertain situation. This mo~el of symptom arrangement 
according to pertinent hypotheses requests a method of unambiguous allocation of 
symptoms to hypotheses. 
To design the method two conditions have been framed: 
1.) symptoms must unequivocally be recognized across situations; and 
2.) symptoms must be coded* in accordance with the coding of the 
hypotheses. 
(note: this description of the code only refers to the particular aspect of 
hypothesis-symptom relationship. The storing, tracing and retrieval of symptoms 
follows a subsequent method of coding.) · 
Am we previously mentioned, difficulties may arise when indicating the 
special meanings of a symptom. These mem1ings can vary to a great extent 
according to the various characteristics of diseases, their courses and the 
patient. Besides, the variation of the physician's framing of questions for some 
symptoms can contribute to more confusion. 
Required for the application of the method is: 
a.) symptoms have to be recognized and coded in atomic states; and 
b.) coding cannot be allocated to the physician's questions but to the 
"atomic symptoms" themselves. 
The latter condition includes a classification of these "atomic symptoms 19 
throughout the medical facts, allowing a physician-subject to interview the data 
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base freely, in his own personal style. The outcome of this task will be 
discussed in chapter VII. 
It seems natural to code symptoms and hypotheses according to the various 
organ systems, being the level at which a non-committal allocation can be 
ascertained. Generally, hypothese~ and most symptoms refer to only one or two 
organ systems. Those symptoms covt!ring a larger domain were coded in conformity 
with all pertinent organ systems. ~he term 'organ system' must be conceived in a 
broad sense. The 'organ system' cod:ng refers to: 
a. - Circulatory tract 
b. - Nervous system 
c. - Skin 
d. - Digestive tract 
e. - General somatic illness 
f. - Endocrine system 
g. - Musculo-skeleton system 
h. - Respiratory tract 
j. - UrogEnital system 
k. - Blooc 
l. - Mental illnesses and ailmf!nts. 
The methoo operates as follows 
Suppose a hypothesis is generated referring to an organ system 'a' 
"testing" symptoms (as related to the physician's pertinent questions) can be 
traced as related (HRS) when coded for the same organ system. When the symptom's 
particular organ system code does not harmonize with the generated hypothesis's 
one, two possibilities can be distinguished. Either the symptom belongs to a 
non-committal search behaviour, and is unrelated to a particular hypothesis 
(NHRS), or the symptom is related to a forthcoming hypothesis, a hypothesis 
pre-related symptom (HPS). In the latter case the code of the next hypothesis, 
e.g. h, reflects the code of the symptom, which in that case can be allocated 
to the second cycle etc. 
The cycling process can be easJ!y traced from this procedure. 
Needless to say, that the collected evidence does not (always) cover the 
diagnostic contents. 
We shall now proceed to chapter VII, describing the instruments whic~ 
enabled us to register and to document the data pertinent to the investigation 
purposes: to identify the inferential strategies in the physician's problem 
solving. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Various methods have been described to study psychological and/or th.in.king 
processes. · The implici ty of the subject forces bllvestigators to make a selection 
of aspects or to choose among types of research models. As sketched before, 
:mainly three types of models can be d.istingu.ished: 
1.) process studies of ho'f•J human judgments are actually made; the human 
being, e.g. the physician, as a base for the study of professional, cognitive 
and/or behavioural processes; 
2.) prescriptive studies, which make use of a formal theory of how 
decisions. ought to be made. TheiE" aim is to build or to rebuild strategies 
according to ·which the medical process, the diagnostic as t'll'ell as the 
therapeutic P!!rt, can be shaped or reshaped irrl;o an easy - manageable 
structure which· allows improved performance and productivity of this process; 
3.) descriptive studies which attempt to describe circumstantial and 
situational factors which influence judgments (1). Descriptive studies involve 
the problem-solver's task environment. 
The process studies try to understand t1ho the doctor is, what he is doing~ 
how he functions and what his effectiveness as information processor is. In 
other words~ we refer to studies that try to understand all the medical actions 
which are laid down in the physician's professional duties and responsibilities. 
Surprisingly little research has been done so far on these professional 
activities. · Although there is a growing interest in this field, a number of 
methodological limitations seems to inhibit further investigations. Some of 
these limitations are mentioned before such as: 
the compleJdty of the :medical system; 
the lacking of an uniform, unambiguous medical classification system~ but 
also 
the difficulty of observation in a patient-physician encounter. This 
encounter encompasses two systems, the patient's and the physician's. Fr.am this 
the main problem arises, because studying the functioning of the physician means 
observing these two systems which, at the same time 9 influence each other in a 
special i:mplici t way. It is like focusing on a certain point on a turning \I!Jheel 
'II'Jhile sitting on another wheel rotating in an opposite direction. One observes 
flashes only partly recognisable. Uberla (2) notices some other problems such 
as: 
the difficulties inherent to the formulation of feasible tasks. 
Substantial segments of professional medical action have never been approached 
in a way amenable to empirical investigation. 
the high level of inconstancy and variability. Diseases change the 
unstable equilibrium of the body fUIDlctions. The equilibriu:m states claa'!1ge every 
time the organism tries to regulate itself. The variability fron1 one patient to 
another is a still larger problem; 
the rarity .of events. This rarity of specific phenomena is directly 
coupled with the huge variability inherent to medicine. Therefore, rare events 
can only be grasped by observing large numbers of cases, which represent another 
barrier to the feasibility of empirical studies; 
the incalculable totality of the phenomena involved. Dissecting the 
medical actions does not mean an understanding of the totality of the composing 
elements. 
the causal relationships are very difficult to comprehend and to prove in 
complex systems, of which ma~ is certainly one; 
-The inadequacy of theoretical models represents a serious limitation; 
the lacking of validated instruments for the collection of data relevant 
to medical dialogues and interviews, decision-mruting strategies, therapeutic 
procedures or management plans. Neither are we able to outline the utility of 
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the outcome of medical processes. 
Uberla concludes that: 
1) A science of professional medical action should be developed, centering 
around empirical research into precisely that action. Medical action, seen as a 
goal-oriented, systematic process including as elements the patterns of disease, 
resources~ doctor-specific attributes~ services and outcomes, should be more 
thoroughly studied than has been the case so far. 
2) To make this possible, a constructive and aggressive clinical 
methodology is required, one for which the essential materials will come from 
statistics, informatics, social science, epidemiology, medical science itself as 
well as from the clinician'·s experience and knowledge. 
The process studies can roughly be divided into two categories: 
~studies based on the decision processes in medical problem-solving. 
-studies investigating some aspects of- the physician's procedures. 
They try to analyse a number of aspects inherent to the decision making 
behaviour of physicians. 
To gain deeper insight in the working methods of physicians mainly three 
ways for investigation can be employed: 
observation, 
- introspection, and 
- simulation. 
The observational methods seem to be the track with the highest validity. 
But they meet some major obstacles such as: 
a) the influence of observation on the doctor-patient encounter. The very 
fact of being observed may alter the nature of. the situation which is tried to 
be observed and documented (3). Although both partners judge this influence of 
minor importance we nevertheless do not know its magnitude. 
b) the complexity of the process. If one does not exactly know what to look 
for, one tends to a superficial selection of observations not only liable to the 
observer's variation but also to confusion. Confusion may arise as the process 
consists of qualities and elements of various specialties and disciplines. 
c) The two-systems mode of the physician-patient encounter. 
d) The ethical issue the guarantee of the patient's privacy. and the 
physician's secrecy cannot be maintained (4). 
Apart from this direct observational way. indirect observation can be 
employed. We can identify three methods: 
- medical records survey; 
- intervie'I'Jing; 
- questionnaires; 
Medical record survey can elicit a number of aspects in a broad 
perspective. The study of Noren et al. (5) gives details about referral 
patterns, duration of visits, use of physician time, extent of diagnostic 
effects, efforts at patient education, and prov1s1on of personal advice or 
emotional support in a comparative study of 610 family practitioners and 347 
specialists in internal medicine. For gaining insight in the :medical 
problem-solving process this type of observational research is unrewarding. 
Generally, medical records do not represent the most completely documented 
information source. The physician takes down only a limited number of mostly 
positive directed facts and aspects which are of special interest to him and the 
special case. An unacceptable selection which does not allow to draw special or 
general conclusions. The attempts to standardize medical recording (e.g.Problem 
oriented medical record (6)) have failed to overcome a number of these problems. 
The strategies of interviewing and questionnaires fall mainly in the domain of 
introspection. 
Introspection focuses on 
encounter. It is based on 
individual and verbal reports 
one of the two persons in the patient-physician 
mostly retrospective interviewing of the 
of the preceding problem-solving task. Several 
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studies in the :medical field have been reported among which are famous studief-! 
by J!Ueimtt'.mtz (7), and WortmC!ll (8). Hot>-Jever several psychologists ql.lles:~ion the 
validity ·of· these approaches. Some. cogx.dtive psychologists (Mandleir(9), Miller 
(10)) have proposed that we may not have direct access to higher order mental 
processes such as those involved in evaluation, judg~ent, problem-solving, and 
the initiation of behaviour (11). Miller (10) assumes that it is the result of 
thinking, not . the process of thinking~ that appears I!Jpontaneously in 
consciousness. Nisbett & . t!Tilson (ll) :found that subjectsv ~vh~n asked about the 
answer they gave to report their memory of specific events "theoriZI!:l:1 about 
their processes. Miller exemplified this process as follows: "If a person is 
asked "~rfhat is your mother's maiden name?" The ans\'rJer appears swiftly in 
consciousness. Then if this person is asked : "How did you come up v!Jith that?" 
he is usually reduced to the inarticulate answer: "I don't knO"fl'l~ it just came to 
me". 
Nisbett & Wilson (11) came to three major conclusions: 
1) people often cannot report accurately. on the effects of particular 
stimuli on higher order, inference-based respo:nsef.l. They sometimes deny an 
inferential process of any kind. The accuracy of subjective reports is too poor 
to produce generally correct or reliable reports. 
2) When reporting on the effects of stimuli, people may not examine a 
memory of the cognitive processes that operated on the stimuli; instead they 
base their reports on implicit, a priori theories about the causal connection 
between stimulus and response. 
3) Even if the reports are correct, this does not mean that the instances 
of correct report are due to direct introspective awareness .• 
Slovic & Lichtenstein (12) have reviewed the literature concerning the 
ability of subjects to report accurately on the weights they assign to various 
stimulus factors in making evaluations. They come to the concla~ion that 
self-insight was poor and that of the studies which allowed for a comparison of 
the perceived and actual cue utilization, all found serious discrepancies 
between subjective and objective relative weights (see also chapter V). 
Unfortunately, most studies reviewed provide little data as to \'11hat 
information is heeded during the thought processes. In a number of 
investigations the subjects were forced to infer rather than remember their 
mental processes. Modern psychology has been vague about the use that can be 
made of these verbal reports. It may be clear that questions like: "HottJ do you 
do these tasks?" prod:uce different reports from mpre precise questions. The 
former question implicitly or explicitly requests a general, rather than 
specific, interpretation of hm<~ the individual was performing the task in 
question. In these cases the subject may be drawing on prior informations such 
as general knowledge on how one ought to do these tasks, to generate a verbal 
report describing a general procedure or strategy. In these cases, the verbal 
report may not bear any close relationship to the actual cognitive processes 
(11). In studies that use retrospective verbalization, subjects are seldom asked 
what they can remember a.boU:t specific instances of their cognitive processes. 
When subjects articulate information directly that is already available to them, 
verbalization will not change the course and structure of the cognitive 
processes, nor will it slow do~m these processes. (13). Brehmer et al (quoted in 
13) did not find any significant effect on performance when subjects directly 
wrote down their current hypotheses in a booklet. ~lhat is remembered, and how 
well~ will generally depend critically on the interval between past event and 
the moment of recall. This interval is an important consideration in 
classifying verbalization procedures. If information is verbalized at the time 
the subject is attending to it, Ericsson & Simon (13) label the procedure 
concurrent verbalization. If the subject is asked about cognitive processes that 
occurred at an earlier point in time, it is labelled: retrospective 
verbalization. Ericsson & Simon foul'l!d. that under certain conditions concurrent 
verbalization does not affect essentially the processes under study. No reliable 
differences were found between groups of which one was being instructed being 
:.:dlent and the other to "think-alm.lidu. Hm-Jever, the thinking-aloud group took 
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about 50% more time than the control group. Apart from this feature no effect on 
speed of performance was reported (13). 
In problem-solving situations with a heavy cognitive load (as e.g. in 
medical processes), initial instructions were found to be disregarded by the 
subjects. These instructions had to be monitored by the experimentor (78). When 
verbalizations were asl\ed before (blocks of') trials, effects of this 
verbalization were not found. Asking subjects what they thought was the correct 
solution before each trial in a discriminant-learning experiment general 
information was nqt found to change the proportion of correct responses. The 
Ericsson-Simon model assumes that only information in focal attention can be 
verbalized, which is in accordance with theories on h'Willan thinking. 
When the time-gap betw~en verbalization and the attending instance widens, 
people have to rely more and more on memory. However, memory retrieval is 
fallible and sometimes leads to accessing other related, though inappropriate 
information. It is in this light that the assumption about stable subjective 
estimations of probabilities and utilities is hardly tenable. 
Kassirer et al. (14) question the role of "stimulated recalltt in the 
Elstein c.s. study. Elstein and co-workers asked the physician-subjects about 
their previous thought processes while they watch~d videotapes of their earlier 
encounters with the simulated patient. Kassirer et al. think it possible that 
this retrospective verbalization may function as to suggest hypotheses that 
might not have been evident from the presented data. 
Retrospective accounts leave much more opportunity for the subject to mix 
current knowledge with past knowledge, making reliable inference from the 
protocol difficult.All theorizing about the causes and consequences of the 
subject's knowledge state is carried out and validated by the experimentor 9 not 
by the subject (15). We believe that an experimental design that relies heavily 
on retrospective observation is potentially flawed (16). 
Simulation of the medical process encompasses two persons, the patient and 
the physician.Studying the doctor automatically includes a "fixed" patient. A 
":fixed" patient can only be a simulated patient 9 because real patients are never 
identical in different situations, different times and with different 
physicians. It also includes: 
-different interpretations upon identical information; 
-different framing of queries; 
-misleading answers.; 
-symptoms and signs changing; 
-varying kinds of questions asked, and 
-differing sequences of questions (17) 
The simulated patient can present exactly the same clinical problem a~d the 
same clinical attributes to many different examining physicians. The variable 
has to be the physician, not the patient (18). 
Generally speaking there are three possibilities for ~atient simulation: 
1) 'actors' simulation: 
2) written simulations, with or without the intervention of a simulator. 
3) computerized simulations, with screen display and data storage. 
Each of these items has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Sage (19) listed a number of requirements for simulation, which, as he 
adds, are generally not met in practice. They include: 
a) comprehensive identification of all needs, constraints, and alterables 
relevant to planning and decision-making; 
b) determination and minimization of cost and maximization of effectiveness 
with regard to a); 
c) detached neutrality and a calculative orientation rather than 
arbritrariness, conflict and coercion; 
d) a unified process that will cope with interdependent decisions; 
e) sufficient time to use the method; 
f) sufficient information to enable use of the method; 
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g) sufficient cognitive capacity to tise the method. ·. . ..... : .·.·· .· . . 
For the purpose of the present in.vestigation we needed a devi~e~.tll~f.suited 
the purpose ~f storing a. large numbe:r . of ~ta. · Thest9 ·.di:d:t(iiA~st'·l,~<J;i{gbly 
fle~dble, have to cover a broad r;u-ea of symptoms and sig-as, and allow ph~ici6l'l!s .· 
freely to question the 'patient'. . The device should. be easy to· pro(l~ce, and 
mamage end :must meet the requir~ents of realism on the part of thv;J patie:i!t, and 
above all it must be cost-effective~ It should allm-.r to study pbye;ie;ian_;;sUbje~ts 
in their natural environment. . . . ·. · . ·· . · ··' · . . . · .· · . 
With a view on these requirements a :model of a 'rpmpe:r patten;t~· has been 
constructed. 
Paragraph 2 
THE P~2ER PATIENT 
--- ----- -.-----~ 
The "paper patient" can be described as a multipurpose device s~i~abl~q .for 
a number of applications such as: 
simulation in medical education; 
- simulation for research purposes; 
- data storage and retrieval system. 
Essentially, .paper patients are case histories narrated in the time 
sequence of the real patient. This case history is more or less forma~ly 
structured by its composer(s). The degree of structuring d~termines pei'tly'ite 
use. The more formally structured paper patients are mainly used in medical 
education for training and examination purposes. Examples of this type of 
simulation formats are the Modified Essay Question, a case history divided into 
several parts with a number of (Multiple Choice) questions .at every 
interruption, and the widely used Patient f.(!anagement Problem (PMP). formats aud 
its variants. 'l'hese types do not allow the physician (or the stw.ient) to follow 
his mm cognitive pathway. Besidas, displaying the written scenario can suggest 
questions, options or categories to the testee that otherwise not crossed his 
mind : the so-called 'cueing""'"problem' (20). 
T~is 'cueing-problem' also emerges in a less rigid format, the oldest 
simulation method, that of Rimoldi (21~22), as based on the tab-item technique. 
The case history is written on a series of cardS. Each card represents a patient 
attribute. The 'patient' is interrogated bypicking·cards. On the frontside of 
the cards preformulated questions are shown. The question that is nearest in 
conformity \'~lith one's own question is picked . up. 'fhe relevant clinical 
information is printed on the reverse side of each card. Modern examples of this 
method are Portable Patient Problem Pack (P4) and its extension P3 (23,24), the 
Diagnostic Management Problem (DMP) (25), and the [i.1iuisim Mode (26). 
In actor simulation an actor, mostly an interested layman, trained to 
simulate patients, is provided by a detailed synopsis of a patie).'lt problem. i.e. 
the personal and medical history part. It allows the testee to followhis own 
pathways, and it avoids the cueing problem. Although seemingly preferable, there 
are a number of disadvantages such as: · · . 
limited contents: the more facts the actor has to remember, the more 
liable he is to confusion and to forgetting, the more omission, the more 
constraint in the use of actors in simulation; 
restraint in the construction: the more complicated the patient scenario 
the more mistakes can be made; 
restriction of the mode: generally actors are not able to simulate the 
elements of physical examination or deliver the data base for their biochemical 
or X-ray properties; 
shift in role content: the repeated interaction with various physicians 
can lead to shifts in the contents and emphases of the patient scenarios 
limited use because of the availability of actors in various 
appointments. 
high cost: intensive training and the aforementioned restrictions count 
for high cost, because several actors have to be us~d to fulfil the demands of 
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more elaborate projects. 
Actor simulation is examplified by the "high-fidelity" simulation used by 
Elstein et al. (27) fn the first part of their study. 
Eventually, we chose a mixed fo:nn:a verbal presentation of a written 
patient scenario. The patient~s case history is recorded in a prestructured 
system (cards, books) . The user asks questions verbally to an operator as though 
he, the operator, is the patient. The answers were provi~ed through the operator. 
from the - written - system. The verbal mode was found to be most enjoyable and 
realistic, which is consistent with the findings of de Dombal et al (26). This 
mode allows the testee to follow his own cognitive pathways and grants various 
scoring possibilities according to the individual's workup. 
Formating this type of ~paper patient' a nu:mber of conditions have to be 
fulfilled. It requires a structure in which particularity ca~ be transformed 
into a system that is general to all physicians. For the construction we need to 
know how data are identified, how they are selected, how many data are 
appropriate, how to test data, how to process data. It is essential to know the 
content and structure of the medical process or the various medical processes. 
l) the contents: the data and symbols which compose the basis for diagl'losis 
and therapeutical management.The various constraints of these elements have been 
discussed elsewhere. 
2) the structure: 
verifiable or refutable 
the rules, the laws end sequences binding the data to 
concepts of disease or health status of the patient. 
Thusfar, most simulation models are built on a number of assumptions. From 
the various thoughts a number of wishes, conditions and criteria for a 
simulation model can be formulated. 
1) Case histories as obtained from medical records or compos~d by expert 
groups must be replaced by a patient's data base highly devoid of value 
judgments. 
2) Data acquisition and storing must be uniform and unambiguous. 
3) Data must come from as many sources as possible: the patient, his 
relatives, physicians, nurses, social background etc. 
4) Data storage must not be submitted to a predetermined processing mode. 
5) Data :must be gathered by an independent coilector from real situations. 
6) The data must easily and in short a time be stored in the system (high 
production rate). 
7) Retrieval of the data by the testee must allow an individual workup 
through the case. 
8) No cueing is allowed. 
9) Preferably the "patient" is addressed by the candidate in spolte:n word. 
This means the use of an operator between candidate and "paper patient". 
10) The operator must be a trained person acquainted with the :medical 
jargon and be able to handle a large number of scenarios (cost-aspect) without 
influencing the candidate. 
11) The system, including the operator, must allow for a realistic 
provision of answers in a given time (number of questions per minute). 
12) The simulation must approximate the setting and time constraints of the 
routine day-to-day professional activities of the physician. 
13) The scoring must be based on what really happens in practice. 
14) The scoring variables and their weights must be founded on a reliable 
and verifiable medical data base. 
15) The simulation must meet the qualities of validity and reliability (4). 
Trying to avoid a number of questions and limitations and to fulfil a large 
number of the abovementioned requirements we created a new system. One of the 
bottlenecks of the existing models is the discrepancy between the available data 
and the number of option~ that could be handled by a candidate. According to 
Gerritsma & Smal (28) a maximum of about 1600 options can be handled by a 
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candidate or simulator. But, apco!d;ing t;Q Pa'llkew et al.. (29) ·til,~?.: ¢,St'~~ted ~ot~l 
nmillber of facts in general internal.medic:irie ·a.nd .its subspeoialtie'~··c~~brQlogy~ · 
cardiology~ hematolog.J) is about. ttvo mill.ion . facts as· th~ ~core >J:?.Qdy . of ' 
information in this specialty. For general family practice tM.s' n1,!mber can be 
doubled, . even tripled or more. There seems no way of br~.nging this :m~bet$ ;in a 
manageable format,. 
However, it crossed our mi:!.1d that thusfar sUn11latiops were .adapted to 
medicine and, as far as i<\?e kmm, not vice versa. But trying to inf'Uct a: mote or 
Jess COl'lSistent system upon a rathe.r unsystematic huge body of data .. is: likely: to 
fail. 'l'he only possibility seemed to us to systemath:e the me~ic!!ll data. Out of 
these thoughts this :model was originated. The system is based on the elementaiy 
attributes of medicine : the :SY'.nptoms a.'ld signs. The system· can b~ 'vi$Wed .:as a 
medical data storage model. Classical data storage and claa!llification models 
almost invariably recommend the entering· data . and problems a·t the. h~ghe$t 
possible level of diagnostic refinement of which the user ·catt be :¢qnfident .a.t 
the time. This leaves the interp};'etation with the physician~ . . · 
It means : 
a) a subjective interpretation of the obserw.:d symptoms and sigris, when 
observed; 
b) a subjective judgment about the aggregation and the level of aggregation 
of the symptoms and signs ('diagnosis'). 
In a preliminary study we found only a small coufo:nnity among phy101icians 
about the content of a dia~1osis. This finding led to the construction of a 
system based on the level of symptoms and signs. Because there is no essential 
difference between symptoms and signs we.shall refer to signs as symptoms. A 
symptom is defined as: 
''Every functionally objective or subjective phenomen(m which can be 
observed directly or indirectly and which is indicative of either an illness or 
condition of the patient". It also includes laboratory and x-ray reports and 
data. 
The next problem is how to bring an estimated number of 5-10 million of 
facts into a maflageable system. Studying various medical te,ctbooks it occurred 
to us that several symptoms were mentioned more than once dependent upon the 
context in t'IThich they were u.sed. They appeared in different fo~ and different 
settings depending on their causal relationships to each other or to the disease 
to ~~hich they can be attributed. 
The symptom Pain e.g. was mentioned four, five, sill or :more) times for one 
and the same disease, describing various states like: localisation, onset, 
irradiation etc. It seemed that the entity 'symptom~ is not the basic element in 
:medicine. Russell and then Wittgenstein have proposed that the world might be 
susceptible to description in. terms of (atomic) statements', propositions so 
primitive that they require no further explanation.(30). In the same sense Blois 
advocated a ~downward analysis~: from high levels correspond~ng to humans, to 
low levels corresponding to molecules and atoms (31). Crucial to the reduction 
of the amount of symptoms, therefore, is the restriction of the descriptions to 
mere observation (leaving out causal relationships and/or inferences) and to 
find common denominators for equal reactions of the body or mind, functional or 
pathophysiological. A second objective was to create a set of attributes 
describing all various aspects of a symptom; a set of attributes which gives a 
symptom its specific significance. Preferably this set had to be pertinent and 
uniform to most of the symptoms. 
'f.he human body has only a lbnited pattern of reactions to illness provoking 
conditions, substances or infections. This notion has several implications. By 
renaming the similar symptoms the number can be reduced. Stimulation of the 
mucou.s membranes e.g. gives rise to discharge whatever the localisation may be. 
The aspects of the discharge are equal for all localisations: its character, 
colour, time of onset 9 course etc. When discharge is a typical functional 
reaction of the organism there is a strong motive to name it a symptom as such. 
The symptom 'Swelling' cannot be differentiated from beuign .or malign tumors 
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without causal interpretation by the physician. 
The symptom 'Pain' can be fully described by a number of aspects like: 
localisation, character, irradiation, intensity, seizures, relapses •. 
Inferences, predictions or. causal suggestions in the early phases of the 
diagnostic process can oft.en lead to confusion and erron~ous ways of reasoning. 
Atomization of the symptoms in medical history leads to an almost uniform set of 
aspects. They can be listed as follows (in parentheses some aspects that can 
vary according to the symptom to which they pertain): 
-localisation 
-character 
-intensity 
-irradiation (spreading) 
-(colour) 
-(odour) 
-way of onset 
-time of onset 
-preceded by 
-course of localisation 
-course of character 
-course of intensity 
-course of irradiation / spreading 
-(course of colour) 
-(course of odour) 
-(seizures) 
-(duration of seizures) 
-(distribution·of seizures) 
-relapses 
-combination with other symptoms 
-combination with a body function 
-worsened by 
-improved by 
-ahead of 
For the symptoms of the physical examination a slightly different set of 
symptom-aspects was created. Within the framework of an organ system a nearly 
uniform set of aspects was originated. Similarit~es across the various types of 
physical examination could be formulated. It will be exemplified for the symptom 
(Mal) Form(ation) = the description of the Form/Shape and its deviations of 
existing organs or body structures. 
Inspection Palpation 
-localisation -localisation 
-circumference -circumference 
-shape -shape 
-circumscription -circumscription 
-singular/multiple -singular/multiple 
-number -number 
-( im):mobility -(im)mobility 
-symmetry -symmetry 
-enlargement/reduction -enlargement/reduction 
-protrusion -protrusion 
-pain on pressure 
-ballottement 
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Remarl\~ably, also laboratory and roentgenologic data c;oul4 eaa:Uy be 
arranged to a limited number of headings,' e.ach split ·up into a limiteq :m.miber of 
elements. The same can be said for drugs, medical actions etc. · ' 
Furthermore, 
classes for the 
a. strict categorisation of the symptoms t'l1taS introduced, six 
diagnostic part, and three for the therapy part. These classes 
are: 
1) Patient's personal, social, mental and environmental background; containing 
data about age, sex, marital state, education, occupation, finance, etc~ 
2) Patient's past medical history, with items like: former diseases, operations, 
allergies, immunisations, child-birth, etc. 
3) Patient's present illness not related to the present complaint, e.g~ a 
diabetic patient ~'lith a new complaint of backache. This class in~ludes 
surveillance programs, mobility and activity scales, presently used d."'Ugs 
etc. These three classes combined can be described bY 52 various symptoms. 
4) Patient's medical history: the class of verbally communicated s~toms. This 
class is fully described by 68 different symptoms. 
5) Patient's physical examination. Traditionally this class is divided into four 
subclasses: inspection, percussion, auscultation and palpation, to which, for 
practical reasons, is added a subclass for instrumentally obtained and 
observed symptoms such as: temperature, blood presssure, ECG, fundoscopy etc. 
This class contains 141 separate symptoms. 
6) Patient's laboratory tests, including data from ·roentgenologic, 
bacteriologic, pathologic departments, containing 55 symptoms. 
Each symptom a~d symptom-aspect was coded according to the following 
attributes 
positive/negative, depending on being deviant from normal health or not. 
- class (of the paper patient) 
organ system(s): see chapter VI 
- a figure for the symptom 
a supplement figure for the symptom-aspect. 
For the complaint 'pain in the neck' it means the code 
+ D bg 10.03. 
The three classes for therapy are: 
7) Description of all possible actions a physician can take in therapeutic 
management and treatment. 
8) Description of referral destinations and types of consultation. 
9) A detailed list of drugs classified according to their generic names, 
fysiotherapeutic, ergotherapeutic, and psychotherapeutic treatments and a not 
exhaustive list of alternative drugs and treatments. 
The combination o:f these classes totals to 157 items. 
The total number of items in the 'paper patient' is approximately 6000. 
For the research project 9 real case histories were stored into the system. 
Each case history contained approximately 350 from normal health deviating 
items. These 3000 items could be stored for over 99%. This almost too favourable 
result was checked by means of a small test with 42 registered routine 
patient-physiciml encounters with three family physicians. Two. co-workers 
(unexperienced family physicians) scored independently the registere4 data into 
the system. The result is shot-.m in the next table : 
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Table 1 
STORING CAPABILITIES OF "PAPER PATIENT" 
-----~~ ------------ -- ------ --------
--...... -----..,..---------. ----------~---
Physician 1 2 3 Total 
--------------------------------
Number of consults 13 19 10 42 
Number of symptomS 69 94 100 263 
Number of 
classifiable symptoms 69 93 98 260 
Number of non-
classifiable sympta,ms 0 1 2 3 
Classification rate 100% 99% 98% 99% 
The described format is standard for all kinds of diseases with exception -
thusfar - of the psychiatric ones. For each patient scenario a standard book is 
used to which the patients' data are added by means of paper slips containing 
patients' answers to the corresponding symptoms and symptom-aspects. 
Computerizing of the system can easily be accomplished. 
It takes two days to construct a "paper patient" provided all material is 
collected. This material was acquired by thoroughly interviewing the patients, 
his or her relatives, family physicians, consulting specialists, nurses, social 
workers etc. 
The choice for the nine case histories was made according to the following 
criteria : 
- prevalence rates 
- age categories 
- sex 
- covering most organ systems. 
Excluded from the selection were: 
- rare diseases (very low prevalence rates) 
age categories for children because of possible difficulties in taking the 
medical history directly from the patient; and for elderly people over sixty 
because of possible multipathology 
-psychiatric diseases and disorders. 
We have chosen the following categories: 
1) 20 - 30 years :man high prevalence 
woman high prevalence 
2) 30 - 40 years :man middle-high prevalence 
woman middle-low prevalence 
3) 40 50 years :man high prevalence 
woman middle ranking prevalence 
4) 50 - 60 years :man high prevalence 
woman middle-low prevalence 
The prevalence rates are all derived from a special epidemiological study 
of the epidemiological department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
The choice of the various organ systems was made according to preliminary 
results from a classification project among family physicians in Rotterdam (32). 
These systems are, in a certain prevalence order: 
Respiratory tract (11.85%), Locomotor tract (9.03%), Dermatology (6.83%), 
Urogenital tract (5.19%), Digestive tract (3.99%), Circulatory tract (3.54%), 
Endocrinologic tract (1.48%), Hematologic tract (0.42%). 
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From these criteria emerged the following sample of "patients" 
1) WQ!!!~..t. !~ ~§!§.!:§ ~ l'Jith hypochromic anemia. (case 8) 
2) !Yi.§!!..t. g! ~~!!!:§ , with atopic eczema (case 3). 
3) ~Q!!!§!'!.L ~! :\:§§!!:§ , with extra-uterine pregnancy. (case 4) • 
4) M~..t. ~~ ~~§!:§ , with Asthmatic Bronchitis/(Chronic non-specific lung 
disaese)(case 7) 
5) WQ~gQ..t. ~~ y~~E§ , with gallstones(case 5). 
6) M~..t. 1! ~~§!!:§ ~ with Ischialgia/pseudoradicular syndrome (case 2). 
7) WQ~~..t. Q~ y~§r§ , with hyperthyreoidism. (case 6). 
8) M!ID..t. §7 Y§§[§ , with myocardial infarction. (case 1). 
9) ~Q!!!!m..t. ~7 :t~~!:§ , with diabetes mellitus. (ca<?Je 9). 
This last 'patient' was used a'9 an instructive example for introducing the 
procedure to the participwlt-physician. The patients were included according to 
the (sometimes preliminary) diagnoses of their family physicians, who in Holland 
are the first and only entry into the health care system. 
Most important to the simulation was a realistic procedure which comprises 
-freely questioning by the physician according to his daily routine; 
-an as complete as possible answering thephysician's questions; 
-answering at a realistic speed; and 
-a realistic daily practice routine, which means rather strict time 
constraints. 
The simulation procedure can be described as follows: 
After an appointment has been made, the research team consisting of a young 
inexperienced family physici&l (the simulator) and a technician (a technically 
slcilful student of social history and communication science) set up the scenery 
of audio- and videorecording apparat1m in the physician's own consulting room. 
Meanwhile the physician - participant was instructed in two ways: first, 
he received some printed instruction material headlining some of the items of 
the forthcoming procedure. Second, the simulator instructed the physician 
verbally in detail and answered questions which may have arisen in the 
candidate. Meanwhile the techL~ical part was completed and the procedure was 
continued by 'doing' the instruction paper patient. All together, this 
instruction and the set-up of the technical equipment took 20 minutes at the 
average. In all cases it satisfied the instructional requirements. 
The scenery was arranged in the way the physician was accustomed to. It 
means that the physician was seated in his ordinary place and the simulator in 
the place intended for the patient. The videocamera (and the student) was 
situated at an angle which enabled it to record the physician 5 his desk, his 
writing and a digital clock. Questions, m1swers, hypotheses 9 probabilities? 
uncertainty estimates, diagnoses, prescriptions (the latter five noted on a 
sheet of paper) could easily be traced in their real order and in conformity 
with the time sequence. The student was asked to watch over the proceedings. 
Three to seven days afterwards, the videotape was commented on by the 
physician-participants. In the presence of the investigator the physician 
answered questions about the (face) validity and the reliability of the 
simulation, the rejection of hyPotheses or hypotheses unmentioned, and his 
estimation of probabilities and tL~certainty. He was asked to break do~~ his 
diagnosis into its characteristic symptoms. (signs, tests, etc.) He then was 
allowed to denunciate his procedure and outcome. 
The candidate had to solve four patient problems within an hour. Although 
he was free to choose his time, he was at intervals reminded of the other 
"patients" waiting in the waitingroo:m. 
Sixty-eight physicians participated in the study : 60 family physicians, 8 
general internists. 
Of the 60 participating family physicians 8 of them solved three patient 
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problems. Six out of these .eight- family phyed¢i®s could not complete the 
simulation because. of Ur-gent calls of real patients~ they completed the three 
patients in an average ti~ of 4!5 minutes, lthic}:l is ·c(meiistent with the ave!r'age 
time of the total group~·· We were. conversant with . the fact that generally 
internists take more time per patient in real life. We urged them to do at least 
three cases, and they all s:ucce$ded except one, again for urgent reasons. 
The physician's expei-ie11ce of realistic E!imulation seems to depend on a 
number. of features such a9 !·~urrt>undings, the presentation of the patient's 
complaint, the recognition of this complaint l;U'J well-known, time constraints~ 
and frequency of questioning andanswering. 
We asked the particiPants to estimate to what extent the simulation met the 
routine practice situation. They denoted their estimation on a five point scale 
ra'llging from 1 - perfectly comparable - to 5 uncomparable. The results are shown 
per case history in table 2. 
Table 2 
----------------...:.------------ ------
Scale easel Case2 Case3 Case4 Case5 Case6 Case7 Case8 
----------- ---------
1 17(55) 18(58) 19(58) 19(58) 24(73) 22(69) 23(77) 14(47) 
2 13(42) 11(35) 13(39) 14(49) 8(25) . 8(25) 7(23) 14(47) 
3 1( 3) 2( 6) )( 3) 1( 3) 1( 3) 2( 6) 
4 
5 1( 3) 
31 31 33 33 33 32 30 30 
(in parentheses the percentages). 
The free questioning, ·the freedom to formulate the question in an 
accustomed way and in the order the physicians wished and were familiar with, 
contributed a great deal to this highly favourable result. 
On the oth~r hand, this freedom meant quite a hazardous experiment; one 
fool may ask more than ten wise men can answer. In an preliminary study we got 
reassuring results. The· proof of the pudding is in the eating, especially when 
the simulator, the unexperienced young physician, was confronted with all kinds 
of questions, ranging from ve~y complicated (asking several answers from the 
patient at the same time) to quite irrelevant questions (opinions about 
situations or about former doctors). At the end of all simulations the young 
colleague told me confidentially that he now knew how patients can have rather 
uneasy feelings when questioned by their physician. On the other hand he 
e'~erienced that physicians become so involved in their task that they 
completely forgot that it was the simulator and not a real patient they were 
interviewing. The simulator was~ after a hesitating start, able to answer most 
of the questions. The results are shown in table 3. 
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Table 3 
SYl!llPtom-cla.ss A B c D F 
--------~---~-------------------------------------------------------
Nr of questions 
Questions unanswered 
611 431 
7 4 
331 3345 2419 657 
2 42 1 5 
---. ---------·---------.----------------
% questions answered 99 99 99 99 100 99 
Total non-classifiable symptoms:6. 
The patient's complaint was presented in a verbal as well as in a printed 
form. This method prevented unmeant emphasis on some of the presented symptoms. 
According to Ericsson (33) 
a) the instruction has to be 'bland' and must not direct the subject to 
produce specific kinds of information; 
b) the instructions must be given in such a way that the subject assigns 
first priority to performing the task. 
The primary complaint always consisted of two uttered s-ymptoms. As the 
first clues are s.o important one has to procure a general comparability for all 
cases (16). It seems noteworthy that practically all participants rephrased the 
sentence a11d asked the same symptoms again. 
After the presentation of the complaint the time started. With regard to 
the frequency of questioning and answering ru1 average number of. three per minute 
was reported in literature (34). In this project we found for family physicians 
an average of 2.9 questions per minute, and for general internists 4.2 
questions I minute which underscores the findings of Dudley & Blanchard. A 
frequency distribution over the cases is showed in the next table 
Table 4 
Family physicians General internists 
Questions/minute Number Percentage Number Percentage 
0 -1 4 1.7 
1 -2 22 9.5 
2 -3 93 40.0 2 9.5 
3 -4 83 35.8 5 24.0 
4 -5 26 11.3 12 57.1 
5 -6 l 0.4 l 4.7 
6 -7 2 0.9 1 4.7 
7 -8 
8 -9 1 0.4 
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As shown in the table the speed. of. quest-ioning and answering is not 
influenced by the simulation-method. The method can meet speeds up to 8-9 
questions per minute. w~ did not find any influence for first or following 
cases as presented to the physician. The order in which cases were presented 
alternated according to a prefixed scheme. 
We asked the · participants about their feelings of uncertainty, of being 
e1ca:minated, at the beginning and during the simulation. It was hypothesized that 
mounting feelings of uncertainty would negatively influence the task 
performance. They noteddot-m this emotion on two five-point scales~ one for the 
start-position; one for the situation during the process, ranging from 1 : 
highly uncertain till 5: very certain, and no reaction of this kind. The next 
table shows the results. 
Table 5 
Degree of 
decreasing 
Uncertainty Start During 
-----------------------: 
1 8 6 
2 7 3 
3 9 5 
4 15 14 
5 6 13 
no reaction 23 27 
Total 68 68 
·----------------------------
There is a tendency to reduced stress during the simulation session. Most 
participants said, that they felt almost immediately at ease during the session. 
An important finding was their communication that their uncertainty W8$ not 
different from the feelings they experience during normal routine practice. 
This leads us to the question of the validity of this 'paper patient? 
instrument. All simulations are based on the assumption that the workup of the 
simulated clinical problem is comparable to the actions physicians have taken 
solving a similar clinical problem with an actual patient. The validity of the 
simulation therefore, is the comparison betw_een the registered values of the 
test and the values in the real world. The ideal validity would be: 
One of the basic problems, however, is that a large number of qualities of 
the actual process is unkno~m or at least cannot adequately be quantified. In 
effect, most people assume that there are as many methods and qualities in the 
medical process as there are doctors. Therefore 9 a formal judgment about the 
validity of the simulation cannot be provided. A number of procedures has been 
originated which give indications about the val~dity of any measurement. These 
procedures are 
l. QQ!!!:§!!!: -
intellectual 
Q~ E~£§ Y~!!~i!:X gives evidence about the nature of the 
process which the testee passes through in order to respond to a 
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simulation. The content, the diagnostic process, in the natural session must 
be (almost) the same as the one in simulation. 
2. QQ!!§!!Y£! Y~l.!~!.t~ ( 35) gives evidence about the extent to which the 
performance of different groups (in these e"ercises) corresponds with 
reasonable hypotheses about the degree to which such groups differ. In other 
words, the theory, the concept on which the construction of the model is 
based, is tested against empirical values in the real setting. 
3. QQB£YrK~~! Y~!!~!!~ gives evidence about the relation between scores on 
these exercises and the performance in other tests or settings. The comparison 
between the measurements of two (or more) instruments about the same elements 
gives an indication of the validity of (one of) these instruments (36). 
4. ~r~g1£i.!Y~ Y~li~.!!~ (37): gives evidence about a variable that can predict a 
desired criterion. The correlation between the forecasting variable and the 
criterion is an operational definition for predictive validity. Simon {33) 
defines this type of validity as:"If a simulation model of a problem-solving 
task predicts the relative frequency of different moves, and if the moves are 
observed actually to occur with approximately those relative frequencies, then 
to that extent the model is supported by the data - even though there has been 
no direct observation of the component processes of the model." 
The first and the last type of validity are of interest to this project and 
our instruments. The former type is more or less based on the subjective 
opinions of the participants. Or, as de Dombal et al. (26) states, "validity" 
for a simulation system can be acquired by two questions: one regarding the 
enjoyment of the mode and one regarding its apparent realism. When a simulator 
can induce behaviour similar to that of real life and the subjects accept the 
replacement and are motivated to use it, the simulation instrument has succeeded 
(26). 
In the current type of simulation, the relation between the theoretical 
quality and the empirical variable is very strong: both are based on the same 
data-base: the medical history of a real patient. Therefore, one must carefully 
see to it that, while constructing a simulated paper patient, the medical 
history is a true one. We asked the participants to score their subjective 
opinions about the mode of the simulation (with regard to the actual processes) 
and for each specific case. Again we used a five-point scale ranging from 0: no 
op1n1on, 1: high resemblance till 5 : no resemblance. The results for the mode 
of simulation are presented in table 6. 
Table 6 
~!~~!~Y!!QN§ QE ~~g~~§ QE ~~RQ~!Y~~ ~A1!§M QE §~~~~!!QN MQ~~ EQR 60 E~!~X 
~~§!Q!AN§ ~ ~ g~~~ !N~RN!§!§ 
Degree o f rea 1 ism Tot a 1 h Fam. P yscn G en. n erxns I t . t 
(decreasing) 
0 1 (2) 1 (l) -
l 27 (40) 25 (42) 2 (25) 
2 37 (54) 32 (54) 5 (63) 
3 3 (4) 2 {3) l (12) 
4 - - -
5 - - -
(the percentages in parentheses). 
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For the various patient cases face-validity estimates are presented in 
Table 7. 
Table 7 
Degree of realism Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 
(decreasing) 
1 19(61) 23(74) 16(48) 12(36) 19(58) 18(56) 22(73) 21(70) 
2 12(39) 7(23) 13(40) 18(55) 13(39) 13(40) 7(23) 9(30) 
3 - 1(3) 4(12) 3(9) 1(3) 1(4) 1(4) -
4 - - - - - - - -
5 
-
- - - - - - -
------------ ------
1-·---t------1-· --
31 31 33 33 33 32 30 30 
(the percentages in parentheses). 
In the predictive validity the question is whether the simulation mode 
permits the various moves and s.trategies predicted in the model(s) (see Chapter 
VI). The registered data and values enable us to meet our investigational goal~. 
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-- ------------ -------·--
Paragraph 3 
For reasons of cost and feasibility we chose exclusively physicians from 
the city of Rotterdam (approximately 600.000 inhabitants, 220 fam1ly physicians 
and 80 general internists) as our populetion. We chose for an emphasis on family 
physicians for a couple of reasons: 
- they are the most 1mportant. mair entry in the health care system; 
- they cover a - very - broad field of medicine in their daily practice; 
their daily workload and time ccnstraints might force them to adopt (a) 
strategies(y) different from those of clinical specialists; 
the working methods in family medicine are largely unknown. Research into 
this form of health care is lacking behind; 
as a consequence of the former item postgraduate traintng especially 
modelled for family physicians is still in its infancy; 
I have been a family physician myself, and at present ~orking at the 
department of fam1ly medicine at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam; 
- knowledge of the local situation. 
Specialists of internal medic1ne were chosen because of their close 
relation to the work of the family physician. Their position in health care 
(authority for consultation and referral) and their task environment (clinical 
and more advanced setting) place them 1n a different context. Our ~ypothesis was 
that these differences contribute to a different type of strategy ~ to be found 
in the problem solv1ng behaviour of general 1nternists. Partictpants for the 
investigation were recruted in various ways. 
All family physicians in the town of Rotterdam received a letter, including 
two forms . one for accepting, one for declining (to be specified by particular 
reasons. We received 61 forms of family physicians agreeing to participate 
(28%). One of them had to resign because of grave illness. Forty-five (20%) 
family physicim1s returned their form of non-participation. T~e reasons for 
non-participation concentrated on 7 items: 
a) no time ava1lable :20 (45%) 
b) not interested . 7 (16%) 
c) attending to another research : 6(13%) 
d) considered the design as insufficient 5 (ll%) 
e) resigning from practice 3 ( 7%) 
f) other reasons 2 ( 4%) 
g) no reason 2 4%) 
The internists, from 
experiment. Eight of the 
Because of a restricted 
for practical reasons. 
various hospitals, were personally asked to join the 
ten internists we approached, agreed to participate. 
hypothesis-testing for this group we limited its size 
The family physicians were stratified according to 
- age and sex 
- spread over the research area 
- a patient population between approximately 1500 and 3000 
- medical school of graduation. 
Because of the total number of family physicians in Rotterdam (220) and our 
aim to a research sample of at least fifty family physicians we could not 
strictly adhere to this stratif1cation, but tried however to strive for a 
representative sample of the population of family physicians. 
The criterion 'age' was subdivided into four classes : young, younger 
middle-aged, older middle-aged, older. This leads to the next table: 
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Table 8 
~g~ ~!§!R!~M!!QN !N §~1~ ~ ~Q~M1~!!QN 
Age Research Sample# Fam.Physcns Popul. * 
Number % Number % 
25-30y. 6 
31-45y. 37 
46-55y. 6 
> 55y. 11 
10.0 
61.7 
10.0 
18.3 
12 
131 
35 
42 
5.5 
59.5 
15.9 
19.1 
*figures kindly offered by the Dutch Institute for Family Medicine (N.H.I.), 
Utrecht. 
#figures acquired by a questionnaire 
A possible different relation between age and years of experience led to a 
question about the years really spent in general practice. 
Table 9 
Years in Practice Research Sample# Population of Fam. Physcns. * 
Number % Number % 
0 - 5 15 25 47 21.4 
6 - 20 32 53.3 103 46.8 
21 - 30 8 13.4 44 20.0 
> 30 5 8.3 26 11.8 
Among the participant-family physicians were three females, representing 
15% of the population of female family physicians. It must be kept in mind that 
not all 20 female family physicians practice in an independent practice 
situation on a more or less full time basis. 
The family physicians were recruted from the various districts of the town. 
The time consumption for each participant amounted to approximately 4 
hours: 2 hours for the simulation and another two for the re-examination of the 
video-tape. 
To describe the condition of the patient populations per practice a brief 
description of the Dutch health care system was needed. 
Health insurance is covered by two systems : an obligatory state system 
(National Health) for people with an annual income below $ 14.000.- and a 
voluntary system of insurance companies for people with a yearly income above 
this level. 
The obligatory insured patients (so-called Sick Fund Patients (S.F.P.) have 
to choose a family physician themselves. He, the family physician, earns a fixed 
year income for each SF individual registered into his practice administration. 
Customarily the private (P.P.) patient behaves in a similar way. Therefore, the 
Dutch family physician can count on a more or less fixed practice population. 
The national average of patient population per family physician is approximately 
2500, which is in accordance with the figure for the town of Rotterdam. The 
following table shows the frequency distribution of practices for a scale 
mounting with 500 patients. 
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Table 10 
Number of patients 
0 - 499 
500 - 999 
1000 - 1499 
1500 - 1999 
2000 - 2499 
2500 - 2999 
3000 - 3499 
> 3500 
Nr or Practices 
l 
1 
13 
17 
21 
6 
1 
The mean number of patients per practice in the sample was 2352, ranging 
from 695 to 3550 patients. The distribution, of 'sick-fund patient' and 'private 
patients' over the practices is shown in the next Cross-table. 
Table 11 
CROSS-TABULATION FOR SICK FUND AND PRIVATE PATIENT POPULATIONS IN THE 
SAMPLE PRACTICES 
PRIV.PAT. 0 - 499 500 - 999 1000 - 1499 1500 - 1999 2000 - 2499 2500 - 2999 
SICK FUND 
0 - 499 1 
500-999 1 2 1 
1000-1499 4 2 
1500-1999 18 7 
2000-2499 13 6 2 
~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~- 2 1 
The physicians are working in different settings. Most of them work as a 
solo physician, some of them in a duumvirate, sometimes in a group of three or 
more family physicians and some of them in health centres. We have no 
statistics for the types of settings of the Rotterdam family practice situation. 
Experts' estimates come close to our statistics, which are shown in table 11. 
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Table 12 
Setting Number <,f practices "' "' 
Solo 37 61.7 
Duo 13 21.6 
Group 3 5 
Healt.t Centre 7 ll.7 
The last stratification criteJ ion was the medical school of graduation. The 
Netherlands CNmt 8 medical schoo s. Although we did not estimate the influence 
of the medical education to be very high, former medjcal training might 
influence prof~ss1onal behaviour. 
Table 13 
Medical School Res·~arch Sample 
GU 
vu 
RUG 
RUL 
KUN 
EUR 
RUU 
Total 
Number 
5 
2 
6 
15 
1 
21 
10 
60 
The codes stand for 
% 
8.3 
3.3 
10.0 
25.0 
1.7 
35.0 
16.7 
100 
GU = University of Amsterdam 
VU = Free University 
RUG = University of Groningen 
RUL = University of Leyden 
KUN = Catholic University Nijmegen 
EUR = Erasmus University Rotterdam 
RUU = University of Utrecht. 
General Population 
Number 96 
15 6.8 
4 1.8 
14 6.4 
65 29.5 
7 3.2 
79 35.9 
35 15.9 
220 100 
Although acquired coincidentally, the research population appears 
to be rather representative for the general pertinent population. 
Having sketched the tools and the participants. we now proceed to 
the results. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The main objective of this study is to describe the problem solving of 
(family) physicians.In this two major questions arise: 
1) Have (family) physicians (a) specific strategy(ies) along which decisions are 
reached? (a decision is viewed as the ultimate point in a task process); 
2) Can this(these) strategy(ies) be formalized ? 
As we have delineated in chapter VI the former question can be reformulated 
as: 
~QQ {f~ilYl EhY§i£i~§ ~§~ ~ Q~Q~£tiY~ Qr ~ igQ~£tiY~ m~tggg ig m~4i£~l 
~r2Ql~m §Qly!gg 1~ 
The latter question concerns the model(s) and the various landmarks which 
mark the model(s). 
In the preceding chapters we outlined the conceptual framework in order to 
visualize these questions (chapter VI) and the instruments to achieve the 
goal(chapter VII). We defined the hierarchical nesting of hypotheses to be a 
distinctive feature of the deductive strategy. We also defined the typical 
hypothesis-symptom cyclical course, and the construction of a "hypotheses-base" 
as a distinctive characteristic of the inductive strategy. 
Within the inductive method we modeled three subtypes which might 
characterize the main methods employed by the various groups of physicians. 
Landmarks to elicit these subtypes have to be found in our material. 
As a complicating factor the task environment of the two groups of 
physicians differs. The interaction of these two elements,strategies and task 
environments, could not be predicted but has to be empirically elucidated from 
the material. 
Next to the more traditional characteristics of the medical process we 
originated a number of factors which may help to specify and to explain the 
methods and their functioning. 
In their psychological model of diagnostic enquiry Elstein and colleagues 
(1) used three features to account for medical diagnostic reasoning:information 
search units,cues (symptoms which may lead to a specific, diagnostic, 
hypothesis), and hypotheses. Cues and hypotheses were used as cross-cutting 
dimensions in a two-dimensional matrix according to which each simulation was 
structured. To determine the quality, the effectivity and the efficiency of the 
problem-solving process, cues as seen related to a particlllar hypothesis were 
weighted according to a pre-established arrangement, based on expert's judments. 
According to McGaghie (2) the selection of the variables seem to support 
partially the a priori thinking of Elstein et al. ( 1). 
To avoid interpretative variables we looked for objective criteria. Several 
landmarks within the medical process are submitted to subjective interpretation 
or can only be established in hindsight. Moreover, several of these features are 
interdependent. The weighing of a cue is a subjective interpretation relatived 
to a specific hypothesis and personal judgment; redundancy can only be 
determined in hindsight; whether the answer of a patient to a particular 
question will be positive or negative is quite coincidental. 
The physician has to operate in an uncertain situation. He does not lmow 
the answers beforehand; he can only be aware of the limitations in patient 
enquiry. Most of the time, however, the information does not come from 
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interrogation or physical examination but is generated by the hypotheses(3). 
"The sequence the physician assigns to the variables may originate from 
hypothesis rather than from observation"(4). 
Physicians' initial steps are aimed 
uncertainty(3). Uncertainty and the pressure 
look for simplifying and time-saving methods in 
time-limits the physician has to collect his 
decide upon action. 
at a striking reduction of 
of the clock urge physicians to 
their daily work. Within certain 
information,make a diag~osis and 
The amount of information is partially based upon the number of positive 
answers the physician collects (as positive is defined any symptom being deviant 
from normal function and form). However, whether an answer is positive or 
negative cannot be foretold. Inclusion of such an element for analysis means 
introduction of interpretation. 
Eventually, we decided on three basic features of analysis: 
- hypotheses 
- symptoms 
- questions. 
Apart from the main question of deductive and inductive methods,for each 
paragraph we shall focus on: 
- the subtyping of the inductive strategies; 
the characteristics of these strategies and the inductive method in 
general; 
- the characteristics of the deductive strategy; 
- the specifications for the two groups of physicians;and 
- the problem-orientation of the problem-solving process. 
The order of the following paragraphs are: 
1) strategies 
2) hypotheses 
3) questions,answers,time. 
4) probabilities and (un)certainties. 
5) patient management and treatment. 
6) experience and consequences. 
Paragraph l 
In chapter III we outlined the various ways of reasoning, concluding that 
only the deductive strategy can bring us the force of proof. In chapter VI, the 
deductive strategy for the medical process is schematized. Within this schema 
two major elements can be distinguished. A major characteristic of the 
hypotheses in the deductive method has been discussed: its progression down the 
levels towards a testifiable lm-1-level hypothesis. 
Two other dimensions may be mentioned: hypotheses and the rejection of 
redundant hypotheses. 
It may be clear that a progression down the levels requires not only the 
level recognition but also a classification towards the levels. Hierarchical 
nesting requires at least two hypotheses. This criterion excludes all work-ups 
of patient cases in which only one hypothesis was generated. 
In deductive reasoning the proof is given by the verification or 
falsification of the lowest-level hypothesis. It excludes the existence of 
hypotheses equally possible. 
At the end of each 
hypotheses different from 
left after the conclusion 
deductive reasoning strategy. 
work-up the physician was asked if he maintained 
the diagnosis. All cases with more than 1 hypothesis 
of the diagnostic process must be excluded from 
Generation of hypotheses 
Elstein et al. (1) found an 
is assumed to be based on acquired evidence. 
early hypothesis generation. Although time and 
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evidence,as a variable of the number of questions, are closely interconnected, 
the generation of hypotheses cannot be variable of time. (Early) hypothesis 
generation,therefore, can only be based on acquired information, which will be 
translated in a number of questions. 
Recapitulating the criteria for deductive strategy: 
l) QA!A QAT~R!NQ~ Deductive reasoning implies inference from the 
evidence;it implies the subordination of the real to the realm of the 
possible.Therefore,an indication of the true nature of the presented problem 
resulting from acquired information is a necessary condition to the generation 
of a hypothesis.On empirical grounds we defined the amount of information as the 
equivalent of at least 10 questions of search through the patient's data base. 
2) HYrQT~§!§ §~~Q1E!QAT!QN~ The progression down the levels (level I the 
highest, most unspecified;level V the lowest,most specified) has been discussed 
as the main distinctive feature in deductive reasoning.This criterion is defined 
as a one-way progression down level I or II to level V. 
3) ~QTINQANT ~QT~§~§~ As a consequence of the deductive reasoning the 
testing of a final ((lowest-level) hypothesis can only result in a verification 
or a falsification.A process which results in a number of hypotheses equally 
possible is incompatible with deductive reasoning. 
Applying these criteria to the data base of 253 cases deductive strategy 
could not be detected. As a consequence of our main research question all cases 
must fall within the domain of the inductive strategy. 
We may remember that the inductive strategy can be distinguished into three 
types: 
a.) pattern-recognition 
b.) inductive-heuristic 
c.) inductive-algorittanic 
As aforementioned the criteria fall within the domains of questions, 
hypotheses and symptoms. 
a.) ~A11~~=~QQQN!T!QN 
Distinctive to this type is the sudden flash of recognition of a pattern of 
symptoms on observing only one or two items. It is the 'Aha-Erlebnis' of the 
recollection of a quite familiar picture one has in mind. Whether this picture 
is true or false to the facts is not important. It is true to the man or woman 
who experiences it. We can deduce from this description the following 
distinctive features: 
-The- very- limited amount of data that trigger the 'Aha-Erlebnis'; 
- the conviction of correctness of the hypothesis; 
We define the following criteria for Pattern Recognition: 
1) NQ g~§T!QN§ may be asked before the generation of the first (and 
only) hypothesis. We may remember from the description of the "paper patient" 
that each presented complaint contained two symptoms. The 'zero' value in the 
tables refers to active enquiry by the physician; 
2) Q~ HY~QT~§!§~ As a consequence of the description only one h}~othesis 
is generated. The subject-physician does not consider alternatives. 
Applying these criteria we found 27 records of it in our data base: 26 
referring to family physicians and l to a general internist. 
To our surprise we found a group of records closely related to the former 
one, which we called: 
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~QI!~TINQ ~ATT~EN ~QQQNITIQN 
This group is related insofar that it is also characterized by the sudden 
recollection of a familiar pattern. It differs from the former type insofar that 
the preamble data gathering is more elaborate. Participants ascertained that 
this cautious character was due to the situation: uneasiness in an observed 
position. Whether this category must be considered as an artefact of the study 
cannot be established, because each descriptive study had to rely, one way or 
another, on some kind of observation. In our opinion, the sudden flash of 
recognition, the 'P...ha-Erlebnis', largely determines the strategy of 
Pattern-Recognition. Therefore,this type of strategy might be considered as part 
of the first type. 
It contains 26 records, all attributed to family physicians. 
The next subtype to be distinguished within the inductive way of reasoning 
is the: 
b. ) IN!!!JQTIVE=~!ffii§TIQ 
As discussed previously, this type of strategy can be considered as an 
iterative process on the former theme. In the course of the task performance 
several patterns as hypotheses jump to mind.These recollections are induced by 
some data acquired during the problem solving. Information and testing cues are 
completely mixed up and cannot be separated. The hypotheses collected, 
gradually, form a data-base from which in the end the physician picks up one of 
the hypotheses as a diagnosis. The problem-solver regularly visits his 
'data-base of hypotheses' in order to add a new one or to reconsider the 
existing ones. In this sense we can spe~{ of a cycling process as schematized in 
chapter VI. The hypotheses do not form a hierarchical structure of levels within 
a certain organ system, but are randomly generated regardless of levels and 
organ systems. In the end of the diagnostic process a number of hypotheses is 
maintained, perhaps in order to fall back on alternative hypotheses in the 
'data-base' in case of failing predictive outcomes. From these thoughts we can 
note down the discriminative criteria for this strategy. 
1.) NQ Q!J~§TIQN§ ahead of the generation of the first hypothesis.The 
first step in this strategy reflects the Pattern Recognition mode.In a small 
minority of cases (six) a limited number of questions was asked in this 
phase.Because of the following criteria they are enclosed in this subtype. 
2) ~QT~§~§~ As described,a 'hypotheses-base',a set of hypotheses,is 
constructed during the work-up containing a varying number of hypotheses; 
3) ~QT~§~§=1~Y~1§~ Because the hypotheses were generated randomly the 
levels do not follow a particular line or structure; 
4) QI~QNQ§TIQ 1~Y~1~ Because the diagnosis is picked up from the 
'hypotheses-base' the diagnostic level can take all values from I to V. 
We found 172 records, of which 6 records with a more elaborate preliminary 
data gathering. 
It constitutes the largest group in our-material, substantially attributed 
to the working-pattern of family physicians. 
c.) INQ!JQTIY~=A1QQRI~IQ 
The last type of our model is the Inductive-Algorithmic strategy. In many 
respects it resembles the former strategy. It differs in the method of data 
collection. While in the former mode the data collection is directed by 
intuition, the casual answers of the patient, questions arising at the spur of 
the moment, in this strategy more or less fixed runs of questions are asked; 
runs of questions covering most of the organ systems regardless to the organ 
system to which the patient's complaint refers (and most of the hypotheses can 
be attributed). It is a way of superficial screening of the patient. It is a 
kind of habit in which these more or less fixed runs of questions are applied 
across the various cases. These runs are typically person-bound and can differ 
in contents and order from physician to physician. Distinctive to this type of 
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strategy is the total number of questions, which surpasses greatly the number of 
questions in the former strategies. On empirical grounds, we found the number of 
65 questions a decisive point in the determination of the criteria, which can be 
summarized as follows: 
1.) no questions ahead of the first hypothesis; 
2.) more than 1 hypothesis; 
3.) hypotheses levels ranging randomly from I to V; 
4.) diagnostic level may range from I to V; 
5.) more than 65 questions asked. 
Applying these criteria to our material we found 28 records of which the 
majority must be attributed to the group of general internists. 
The research material was searched in a branching fashion.After the search 
for records in which a deductive strategy might have been applied,we followed 
the next schema: 
INDUCTIVE ALGORITHMIC 
inductive 
0/ 
~ 0 
deductive 
INDUCTIVE MORE OR LESS EQUAL OR MORE TK~ 
DEDUCTIVE THAN 65 QUEST. ZERO QUEST. AHEAD OF 
FIRST HYPOTHESIS 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0 
ONE OR MORE 
HYPOTHESIS(ES 
PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 
INDUCTIVE 
HEURISTIC 
HESITATING 
PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 
With this procedure we could easily trace the various strategies. Only one 
record caused a dilemma. It contained 1 hypothesis and 95 questions.This record 
was selected in the first round and automatically attributed to the Pattern 
Recognition mode. 
After studying this record we decided to classify this record into the 
Inductive Algorithmic mode mainly because of its nature of sequentially 
interviewing the various organ systems. This record belonged to the 
problem-solving process of a general internist. 
In paragraph 3, on Hypotheses, we observe 54 'one-hypothesis' cases instead 
of 53 (the sum of both Pattern Recognition and Hesitating Pattern Recognition 
strategies). 
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Table l 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE INDUCTIVE STRATEGIES 
SUBTYPES 
PATTERN RECOGNITION 
HES.PATT.RECOGNITION 
INDUCTIVE HEURISTIC 
INDUCTIVE ALGORITHMIC 
ABSOLUTE 
FREQUENCY 
27 
26 
172 
28 
-------
253 
FAMILY 
PHYSCNS 
26 
26 
168 
12 
232 
GENERAL 
INTERNISTS 
1 
4 
16 
------
21 
Subtyping of the Inductive strategy shows a 
predominance of the Inductive Heuristic 
strategy,large1y attributted to family physicians. The 
Inductive Algorithmic strategy is largely assigned to 
the group of the general internists. The Pattern 
Recognition method is presented in its dual form. 
RELATIVE 
FREQUENCY 
10.7 
10.3 
68.0 
11.0 
------
100 
These figures show an application of the Inductive Algorithmic mode by 
general internists in three-quarters of the cases; family physicians applied the 
Inductive-Heuristic strategy in three-quarters of the cases. Pattern Recognition 
seems an almost exclusive prerogative of family physicians. 
The strategies distribution over the patient cases is shown in table 2. 
The numbers of the patient cases represent the following "diagnoses": 
1 Myocardial Infarction 
2 Ischialgia 
3 Atopic Eczema 
4 Extra Uterine Pregnancy 
5 Cholilithiasis 
6 Hyperthyreoidism 
7 Asthmatic Bronchitis 
8 Iron-Deficiency Anaemia 
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PATIENT 
CASE 
Table 2 
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE STRATEGIES OVER THE 
CASES 
PATTERN HES.PATTERN 
RECOGNITION RECOGNITION 
INDUCTIVE 
HEURISTIC 
INDUCTIVE 
ALGORITHMIC. 
NUMBER 
~------~------~---- -------------,...----------- -------------- ;------------
l 7 1 22 31 
row% (22.6) (3.2) (71. 0) (3.2) (100) 
2 2 6 18 5 31 
row% (6.5) (19.4) (58.1) (16.1) (100) 
3 6 4 21 2 33 
row% (18.2) (12.1) (63.8) (6.1) (100) 
4 1 0 31 1 33 
rmlV% (3.0) - (93.9) (3.0) (100) 
5 2 11 16 4 33 
row% (6.1) (33.3) (48.5) (12.1) (100) 
6 0 l 25 6 32 
row% - (3.1) (78.1) (18.8) (100) 
7 6 2 19 3 30 
row% (20.0) (6.7) (63.3) (10.0) (100) 
8 3 1 20 6 30 
row% (10.0) (3.3) (66.7) (20.0) (100) 
r---------
-------------------------- ------------- -------------- ----------
27 26 172 28 253 
~--------------------~ ------------- ---------------------------- ------------
The distribution of the strategies over the cases indicates the variabilitty 
across the various patient's problems. The case of the problem orientation of 
the problem solving processes has been substantiated by the available 
literature. Specific case preference could not be traced. 
From table 2 no specific of a certain strategy for a particular case could 
be detected.Or, reversely, a special case apparently does not require a specific 
strategy. 
Apparently, next to the problem orientation personal preferences play a 
role.Within the field of personal problem solving behaviour strategy-preferences 
towards the cases must be assumed. 
We listed the occurrences in which a physician used 1 or more strategies 
for the (4) presented patient cases. 
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Table 2a 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE PHYSICIANS ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF 
STRATEGIES EMPLOYED. 
NUMBER OF STRATEGIE~ EMPLOYED 
lX 2X 3X 
NR of PHYSCNS 26 34 7 
38% 50% 10% 
Of the 68 physicians 38% used 
consequently 1 strategy for the 4 presented 
problems.More than 60% of them used 2 or more 
different strategies. 
4X 
1 
1% 
When the task were mainly determined by the problem, we could have expected 
a predominance of a particular strategy for that particular case. The 
variability,however, suggests that personal preferences and capabilities play as 
much a role as problem orientation. As we shall see in the following sections, 
the personal touch often dominates the contents fu!d the structures of the 
medical process. 
The cyclic process of the Inductive strategies can be visualized using the 
feature of the qualitative hypothesis-symptom relationship. Knowing the organ 
system of the hypothesis, it was easy to attribute symptoms with the same code 
of an organ system to this hypothesis. 
A symptom e.g. coded according to the organ system say 'f' can be 
attributed to a hypothesis coded with the same letter of the organ system. 
A hypothesis is circled by Hypothesis-Related Symptoms(HRS), 
Hypothesis-Prerelated-Symptoms(HPS), and Non-hypothesis-Related-Symptoms (NHRS) 
On the basis of the hypothesis-related symptoms the cyclic procedure can be 
pictured (by linear stretching of the circle) with the help of nine examples of 
hypotheses-symptoms sequences. 
Table 3 
THREE EXAMPLES OF SYMPTOM - HYPOTHESES SEQUENCES 
The first example is a case of Myocardial Infarction. 
The second example is a case of Extra-Uterine pregnancy. 
The third example delineates the process in a case of iron-deficiency 
anaemia. 
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CASE 1: MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION 
time/minutes Physician l Physician 2 Physician 3 
HPS HRS NHRS HPS HRS NHRS HPS HRS NHRS 
[ J [ I I J 
1 5 4 5 1 
2 5 2 3 1 1 l 
c I 
3 4 3 2 - 3 
c J 
4 2 1 2 1 2 
5 3 1 
~ 
2 2 3 
6 2 1 1 5 3 2 
7 3 3 3 3 
8 4 [4 2 1 1 2 [ I [ 
9 1 3 1 2 2 5 3 
10 4 3 1 
11 2 1 4 3 
12 1 1 3 - 1 
mnnnmm 
2 2 
13 3 2 
14 2 1 
15 5 
16 2 
17 3 
18 3 
19 2 
20 
·numnmmn 
=hypothesis 
mmr = diagnosis 
= diagnostic hypothesis, 
"hypothesis-base" as the diagnosis. 
i.e. the hypothesis picked from the 
The entries contain numbers of questions as related to a symptom. 
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CASE 2: EXTRA - UTERINE PREGNANCY 
time/minutes 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
10 
11 
12 
------ = Hypothesis 
illllffill = Diagnosis 
Physician 10 Physician ll Physician 12 
HPS HRS NHRS HPS HRS NHRS HPS HRS NHRS 
! 1 ] 
' 
2 l 2 L 4 
2 3 ,... 7 l 
4 - 5 ,3 l 
=] ' [ 
3 1 3 3 
D~ 
4 CQ - 3 3 1 2 2 1 . I [ I 
1 2 1 2 
4 4 3 4 4 
3 3 3 3 1 - 1 [ I 
4 4 l - - - -c I UmllllllM 
2 2 1 2 2 -
UlllllllUHD L 1 2 
27~ = Diagnostic Hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis picked from the 
"hypothesis-base" as the diagnosis. 
The entries contain the number of questions as related to a symptom. 
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CASE 3: IRON - DEFICIENCY ANAEMIA 
time/minutes Physician 20 Physician 
HPS HRS NHRS HPS HRS 
21 Physici&n 22 
NHRS HPS HRS NHRS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
; I 
1 
2 
1 
l 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
J 
1 
2 
1 
3 1 
~
1 2 
2 2 
[ 
1 2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
[ ] 
1 
1 
1 
2 
5 
2 
8 1 1 3 1 3 1 
I 
---2-----2 
·~ 9 
3 4 
10 1 2 3 2 1 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
(Ul\l[JHJID] 
1 
2 
1 
5 
[ 
16 1 
1 
1 
l 
17 3 
18 4 1 
19 1 4 
20 2 2 
6 
4 1 
3 2 
5 
[ 11 
1 
21 - 1 3 -------------------------------------i·-----~]--------------------------
= Hypothesis 
mmrrrr = Diagnosis 
~~~ = Diagnostic Hypothesis 
The entries contain numbers of questions as related to a symptom. 
These examples show a number of characteristics of the inductive reasoning 
processes in medical problem solving,like: 
hypotheses are sometimes generated upon a small number of symptoms within 
very limited time-intervals(!- 3 minutes); 
- most first hypotheses were generated immediately after the presentation 
of the complaint; 
- generation of more than one hypothesis at a time appears relatively rare; 
in four of these nine cases the physicians picked a hypothesis as 
diagDosis from previously generated hypotheses (the physician's base of 
hypotheses); 
- in the majority of cases testing was not performed. 
- the pace of questioning differed greatly during the work-up. 
the hypothesis-prere1ated symptoms and the hypothesis-related symptoms 
represent the relevancy of elements in a problem solving task; the 
non-hypothesis-related symptoms typify the redundancy. 
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Approximately three-quarters of the total number of symptoms per cycle 
refer to a particular hypothesis.It indicates a rather stable data acquisition, 
underlining Feinstein's (4) observation that variables come from hypothesis 
rather than from observation. The "screening-method" by means of short runs of 
questions in the Inductive Algorithmic mode contrasts more or less with the 
other ones. 
The next table shows the distribution of the HRS,HPS,NHRS typolog~ over the 
strategies. 
Table 4 
FREQUENC:Y DISTRIBUTION OF HYPOTHESIS(PRE)REL..J\.TED SYMPTOMS (HPS,HRS) AND 
NON-HYPOTHESIS RELATED SYMPTOMS (NHRS) PER CYCLE OVER THE INllUCTIVE STRATEGIES. 
(MEAN VALUES) 
Strategy j Hyp. Prerelated Hypoth. related Total Re.Lat. 
Symptoms Symptoms Symptoms 
==!~=~~~::. ",· :~~----::--- --~;~--=~~----r--1---- ---
Induct. Heur. . 3. 76 30 5. 47 44 ! 74 
~~~~~~~=r~;~ ~;~ ~~~~~~~~~t~I ~~;~~~it~~±=~~=~~- --
Non Hypothesis 
Symptoms 
Number % 
6.67 29 
5.04 17 
3.24 26 
9.90 41 
24.85 28 
The frequency distribution of symptoms as related to a particular hypothesis, as 
contrasted to non-relation, shows a rather stable picture for the Pattern 
Recognition and the Inductive Heuristic strategies (approximately three-quarter 
of the symptoms being related).rhe Inductive Algorithm~c strategy presents a 
slightly d1fferent picture. 
(*):symptoms may be assigned to more than one hypothesis, the preceding and the 
forthcoming one. In that case the same symptom can be HPS as well as 
HRS.Addition may surpass the total number of questions. 
Redundancy of symptoms ~s regularly mentioned in literature on medical decision 
making (5,6,7,8, ), and is often claimed for the propagation of information 
science in medical problem-solving (see also chapter V). In hindsight the 
authors may be right, but the medical process considered as a search process 
with an uncertain outcome, redundancy cannot be determined by considering the 
outcome alone.Redundancy can only be established by denoting the symptoms being 
relevant or irrelevant to a part1cular hypothesis. From the examples it may be 
clear that redundancy, denoted by non-hypothesis-related S)~ptoms, is not an all 
too pregnant feature in the problem solving process. 
We delineated the distribution of the three types of Hypothesis(pre)(non)related 
symptoms for 7 frequently mentioned hypotheses/diagnoses, standardizing the 
number of questions to 100, expressing the numbers of the various symptoms in 
percentages. 
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Table 5 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HYPOTHESIS (PRE) (NON) RELATED SYMPTOMS FOR SEVEN 
DISEASES IN THE. INDUCTIVE-HEURISTIC STRA·TEGY 
DIAGNOSIS Nr of questions Mean Mean r~1ean Mean 
standardized HPS :tms Related NimS 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Myoc.Infarction 100 52 35 87 13 
Ischialgia 100 10 73 83 17 
Atopic Eczema 100 8 53 61 39 
Gall-stones 100 40 49 89 11 
F.lyperthyreoidism 100 26 35 61 39 
Iron Def.Anaemia 100 28 37 65 35 
Extra-Uter.Pregn. 100 56 30 86 14 
Total Average 29.4 45.3 74.7 25.3 
Redundancy defined as Non-Hypothesis-Related-Symptoms ranges from ll 
to 39 %9 mean value 25.3%. Three disease entities score markedly 
higher. 
Approaching the question of redundancy by means of the NHRS method, we see 
for the main hypothesis/diagnosis a redundancy of 25%. However, the markedly 
different values for Atopic Eczema, Hyperthyreoidism, and Irotl-defiency anaemia 
indicate that redundancy :may very well be case-dependent. Redundancy, therefore, 
can be an attribute of problem orientation. From table 2 we can see that in the 
cases of hyperthyreoidism (case 6) and iron-defiency anaemia (case 8) 18.8 resp. 
20.0% of the chosen strategy is the Inductive Algorithmic one. From its criteria 
follow an excess of non-hypothesis-related-symptoms. 
For the Inductive Algorithmic strategy the figures for the main mentioned 
hypotheses/diagnoses are: 
Table 6 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HYPOTHESIS (PRE)(NON) RELATED SYMPTOMS FOR THREE 
DISEASES IN THE INDUCTIVE ALGORITHMIC STRATEGY. 
DIAGNOSIS Nr of questions Mean Mean Mean Mean 
standardized BPS HRS Related NHRS 
------------------------------------------------------------~---------
Gall-stones 100 61 20 81 19 
Hyperthyreoidism 100 19 33 52 48 
Iron-defic.Anaemia 100 23 47 70 30 
Total average 34.3 33.3 67.6 32.4 
Similar findings as in the preceding table are to be found in the 
Inductive Algorithmic strategy. The striking deviant values for 
Hyperthyreoidism, and to a lesser extent~ for Iron-deficiency anaemia, 
a~derlines the suggestion of problem-dependent solving processes. 
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' For the Pattern-recognition strategy only onne diseaae was mentioned a 
sufficient number of times to allow statistics: 
Table 7 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HYPOTHESIS(PRE)(NON)RELATED SYMPTOMS FOR ONE DISEASE 
IN THE PATTERN RECOGNITION STRATEGY. 
DIAGNOSIS 
Myocard.Infarct. 
Nr of questions 
standardized 
100 
Mean 
HPS 
Me ail 
HRS 
80 
Mean 
Related 
80 
Mean 
NBRS 
20 
This result, although of restricted value, underlines the predicted 
functioning of the Pattern Recognition 
method. 
Opposed to redundancy is Relevancy. The relation of a particular symptom to 
a hypothesis (a disease pattern) is essential to the eliciting of a diagnosis 
from the patient's data base. The more symptoms which can be related to a 
particular hypothesis in the least number of questions the more relevant the 
medical enquiry is. 
We designed a new variable, the R~!~V8!!£l: EactQ!: , which can be drawn as: 
liPS + HRS 
---------------- * 100 
HPS + HRS + NHRS 
With the help fo this factor we are able to test two hypotheses: 
1) The factor scores higher in risk-avoiding than in risk-seeking people; 
risk-avoiding typified by Inductive Heuristic strategy, risk seeking by Pattern 
Recognition. 
2) The factor scores lower in relatively less frequent, less prevalent, 
diseases. 
The risk-avoiding physician cautiously gathers information, heuristically 
searching for "filling the pattern he has in mind", and for plausible 
explanations of the presented symptoms. The risk-avoiding search method evades 
lingering in less promising directions. 
This behaviour must be differentiated from the Inductive Algorithmic mode 
in which 'redundancy' is a 'built-in' characteristic. In contrast, the physician 
using 'real' pattern~recognition is quite determined and does not avoid more 
'risky' questions. He knows that he is on the right track, and less favourable 
answers do not shake him in his conviction. 
The results are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
RELEVANCY FACTORS FOR THE INDUCTIVE SUBTYPES. 
STRATEGY 
Pattern Recognition 
Hes.Pattern Recognition 
Inductive Heuristic 
Inductive Algorithmic 
&~LEVANCY FACTOR* 
71.65 
86.16 
77.30 
69.75 
* percentage of symptoms related to a hypothesis. 
The relevancy of the medical enquiry process does 
not sig~ificantly differ for the various Inductive 
strategies. The runs of 'unrelated' questions in 
the Inductive Algorithmic strategy apparently 
produce in the end a level of relevancy equal to 
that of the other strategies. 
The results scarcely corroborate the first hypothesis. Evidently,.the 
relevancy factor does not suit an appropriate distinction among the strategies. 
But on the other hand, a relevancy of the diagnostic enquiry process of 76% on 
the average is an encouraging finding for the physician's ability and efficiency 
in data acquisition. In the Pattern-Recognition method and in the Inductive 
Heuristic mode this result stems from alert reaction of the physician to the 
patient's answers. In the Inductive Algorithmic way this result is accomplished 
by asking more or less fixed runs of questions in a fast pace. In the end both 
methods score approximately equal. 
Less prevalent diseases are assumed to· be less familiar to physicians. 
Physicians may be handicapped by their lack of ready knowledge or gaps in 
memory. It is asserted that the data collection in these cases adopts a less 
determined character. The search through the patient's 'data-base' is wavering, 
often leading to less relevant directions. In case of familiar types of 
symptom-arrangements physicians know how to react, how to ask, how to combine to 
a seemingly valid hypothesis. These are what physicians call the 'easy cases'. 
The results are shown in table 9. 
Table 9 
RELEVANCY FACTORS FOR THE DIFFERENT PATIENT CASES. 
PATIENT CASE 
l) Myocardial Infarction 
2) Ischialgia 
3) Atopic Eczema 
4) Extra-uterine Pregnancy 
5) Gall-stones 
6) Hyperthyreoidism 
7) Asthmatic Bronchitis 
8) Iron-deficiency Anaemia 
RELEVANCY FACTOR 
79.22 
'73.68 
76.28 
79.83 
83.21 
61.29 
85.29 
69.37 
The relevancy factor shows little variation across the 
cases. Apparently, this factor cannot be related to the 
(difficulty of the) problem. 
-188-
The Relevancy Factor can be viewed as a consistent characteristic of the 
hypothesis symptom relationship within a medical problem solving process. It 
underlines the intimacy of this relationship and its meaning for the reasoning 
process of the physician. 
The results of table 9 also indicate that when variability of medical 
enquiry is due to problem difficulty, this difficulty is hard to establish. 
Among other problems difficulty seems to depend on factors like prevalences or 
incidences, the life-threatening or incapacitating nature of the disease, the 
physician's personal knowledge, and (recent) attention which has been paid to a 
particular disease or case. 
In the research design we judged the cases 2 (low back pain, Ischialgia), 4 
(extra-uterine pregnancy), 6 (hyperthyreoidism) and 8 (iron-deficiency anaemia) 
as the more difficult problems, in comparison to the odd-figured ones. Apart 
from the cases 6 and 8 the relevancy factor does not fully discriminate for this 
aspect. An explanation for case 2 might be that, although the diagnostics for 
diseases and ailments in this body region are rather difficult, the physician is 
quite acquainted with these cases and knows how to ask relevant questions. As we 
shall see in paragraph 3 of this chapter the mean number of questions .and the 
average time until diagnosis was reached (per case) creates a better fit for our 
preliminary judgment of problem difficulty. 
Although the Relevancy Factor does not discriminate for problem difficulty, 
it can elegantly determine the physician's effectivity in medical data 
collection. 
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Pararagraph 2 
Hypotheses are considered to be the key-stones in reasoning processes. In 
the diagnostic reasoning the explanation of the observed symptoms and signs and 
testing of the explaining hypotheses play a predominant role (9). They help to 
overcome limitations of memory capacity and serve to narr~J the size of the 
problem space (1). Questions asked by a physician t~iing the history of the 
present illness are prompted by specific hypotheses, which are prompted in turn 
by patient's data. But the statement does not explain what hypotheses are. Are 
they the 'bold statement' in the •popperian sense? Are they the logical causal 
e'@lanation of the observed symptoms? Or, are they the 'chunks': the cluster of 
bits, as Miller hypothesized in his theory on the limited channel capacity of 
the human memory? (10). We do not know, although the Miller theory is a tempting 
one which may explain a number of qualities we found in our study. It might 
explain the variance within the problem-solving performances of our case and the 
highly personal character of the hypotheses. Defining hypotheses in a general 
way does not permit an explanation of their variation in medical problem 
solving. It is my intention to present a number of characteristics and qualities 
as they emerged in the problem solving behaviour of the participating 
physicians. 
In the 253 presented problem-solving tasks 745 hypotheses were generated, 
including the diagnoses. Obviously, one patient scenario stimulated the 
generation of hypotheses more than another. The less prevalent illnesses (case 4 
and 6) incited more hypotheses than more frequently occurring disease entities. 
Table 10 
ABSOLUTE AND AVERAGE ~ITW4BER OF HYPOTHESES PER CASE FOR THE I~~UCTIVE 
HEURISTIC AND ALGORITHMIC STRATEGY. 
Cases 
Number of 
Hypotheses 
Average Number 
per case 
1 2 3 4 
85 96 74 129 
3.7 4.2 3.2 4.0 
5 6 7 8 
86 109 67 99 
4.3 3.5 3.0 3.8 
The number of hypotheses differs across the cases. Realizing that the 
cases 2, 4, 6, and 8 are assumed to be the more difficult ones, a 
relationship between the average number of hypotheses and problem 
difficulty cannot be observed. 
(*for explanation of the figures (l-8)see page 179). 
In deductive reasoning the hypotheses successively generated during the 
inference process form a hierarchical structure.The hypotheses can be deduced 
from higher to lower levels of specification in a strict logical way (see the 
e"ample of the free-falling objects in chapter III). 
For our research purpose we constructed a multi-level scheme in order to 
detect hierarchical nesting and thus the possible existence of a deductive 
strate~1.The multi-level scheme is recapitulated in a concise form: 
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1~Y~l 1 :all matters affecting the total human being; 
]&vel II :multiorganie formulatio:n;diseases and illnesses concerning body 
systems and body parts; 
1~§1III :organ system,the nomenclature following the usual medical 
classification as defined fer these structures; 
Le~! !Y :organ:diseases and illnesses of specific organs; 
LevelV :"cellular level":the main diagnostic entity,the most specified 
hie-pathological state. 
Although we could not find a deductive strategy according to our criteria, 
we nevertheless were interested in the distribution of the hypotheses over the 
levels.(N.B. hierarchical nesting can only be established by screening each 
record). 
Table 11 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF R~THESES OVER THE LEVELS. 
LEVEL 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
Total 
NR of HYPOTHESES 
30 
100 
110 
229 
276 
745 
PERCENTAGE 
4 
13 
15 
31 
37 
100 
From this table we can see a gradual increase in 
numbers of hypotheses the lower the level, as can 
be predicted from the theory. 
Generally,during the work-up of a case a - considerable - shift from high 
level (I,II) to low-level (IV,V) hypotheses is expected.In the medical deductive 
way the problem solving procedure can be viewed as an increasing specification 
of observed (clusters of)symptoms to a specific clinical entity. 
As we argued before,the sequence of inductive hypotheses cannot be viewed 
in this way.Although a certain specification of the generated hypotheses may 
take place during the diagnostic procedure,these h3~otheses must be seen as 
patterns in mind,regardless of their state of specification. 
Focusing on the first and last hypotheses we found,related to the type of 
strategy: 
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Table 12. 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEVELS FOR i'HE FIRST A.I\ID LAST HYPOTHESIS IN THE 
INDUCTIVE jTRATEGIES. 
STRA'l'EGY FIRST HYPOTHESIS LAST HYPOTHESIS 
I 
Patt.Rec. 
Hes.Patt.Rec. 
Induct.Heur 12 
Ind.Algorit~. 3 
II 
4 
2 
32 
6 
LEVEL 
III IV 
3 
29 
3 
9 
16 
56 
4 
v 
11 
8 
43 
12 
I 
1 
1 
II 
4 
2 
ll 
1 
LEVI-:L 
III PI 
3 
20 
4 
9 
16 
55 
8 
A slight shift 
of hypotheses 
does not follow 
from the higher (I 9 II) levels to lower (IV. V) l&wels 
ts shown in this table. Seemingly. the hypotheses 
~he rules of deductive reasoning. 
v 
11 
8 
85 
14 
Because of tne one-hypothesis style there is no shift towards higher level 
hypotheses in the pattern-recognition methods. When we take the number of the 
hypotheses of the less specific levels ( I, II and III) together» a shift 
towards specificity can be observed. The levels I, II and III decreasing in 
numbers from 42% to 21%, and more the specific hypotheses increasLng from 58% to 
79%. Because of the relatively small numbers of the pattern recognition method 
it is difficult to draw some conclusions from the differences between the less 
(P.R: 26%, HPR: ~%) and the more specific levels (PR: 74% - ~hich is rather 
consistent with the the inductive types-. and HPR: 92%). We may ~ssume that the 
preliminary quest1~ning before generating the only hypothesis in the work-up 
leads to more specification of the disease in question. 
The conception of "level-less" patterns as inductive hypotheses is shown in 
table l3.The levels of the diagnoses for the eight cases.which may vary within 
each patient worli -up,show a marked distribution over the levels. The figures 
represent the numbers of diagnoses named for the patient cases. 
The numbers between the brackets represent the heterogenous diagnoses for 
that particular case within that particular level.The table gives the impression 
of diagnoses more or less scattered over the levels. In total, 77 different 
diagnoses in 253 records have been found: in 9 cases more than 1 diagnosis was 
mentioned. 
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Table 13. 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEVELS FOR Tfffi DIAGNOSES OF THE EIGHT CASES 
::::~~~~------~~~i~:_~::-c;> --~:0~---· I, 
2 l ( 1) 2 (2) 9 (3) ! 19 (8) 
3 12 (7) 5 (3) : 16 (6) 
4 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) j 2 ( 1) 28 ( 5) 
5 10 (4) 23 (3) 
6 I 1 (1) I 2 (2) 2 (2) 27 (1) 
7 J - 1 - h9 ( 9) 6 ( l) ! 15 ( 2) 
a 1 (1) 2 <2> - 24 (4) I 3 c1> 
;~;~i-------J:--;-z;)- ~~-,i~)- 2;-zi~)- ~00 ,28)1-i~~-zl5) ~er==~=~::__ --~:_~-- --~-----J--~--- --~~--- --~: _____ _ 
The figures show the numbers of diagnoses made for each patient case per 
level. The numbers between brackets represent the difference of 
diagnostic nomenclature. E.g. 21 diagnoses, level IV, case 1 stand for 3 
different diagnostic names; within level III 27 diagnoses are composed 
of 18 diagnostic names. 
Even on level V there are twice as many various diagnoses as there are patient 
cases. The one diagnosis for level I stands for "some somatic disease". For 
cases 2 and 3 a highly specified diagnosis could not be reached. 
The recognit ton of dennatologi cal symptoms (case 3) placed many family 
physicians for unsoluble problems. Indeed, many of them did not recognize the 
case and made a diagnosis on level II: skin eruption. 
The low back pain case (2) placed many physicians in a serious dilemma. This 
kinds of complaints is so often heard unjustly, that many physicians mistrust 
the patient's answers, and limit their examinations to some obligatory tests. 
But it may be possible, as ane of the participants observed, that deciding upon 
a diagnosis is a very hard job indeed,especially in this part of the body, as 
the complaints are also often caused by mental states.The more "difficult" (less 
prevalent) diseases (cases 4 and 6) led to more highly specified diagnoses. It 
might be that the detailed description of these diseases, their highly specific 
tests and their 'logical' structure may more easily lead to 'hi~~-leveled 
diagnoses'. In the case of the iron~deficiency anaemia (case 8) the 
participating physicians often diagnosed 'anaemia' but hes tated to choose the 
type of anemia. The asthmatic bronchitis case (7) is one of the most remarkable 
ones. Although this disease gets very high prevalence rate (in literature 
percentages of 10-15% of the total population are mentioned), ca 50% of the 
diagnoses fall within the level III i.e. rather unspecified An explanation for 
this phenomenon is hard to give, although it may be that the consequence of 
further diagnostics does not outweigh the scope of treatment. Broad-spectrum 
antibiotics replaced specification of diagnosis. Obviously, the cases 1 
(myocardial infarction) and 5 (gallstones) are so straightforward that there are 
hardly any difficulties for the physicians. 
Preliminary to the 77 various diagnoses a large and varying collection of 
hypotheses was generated. As mentioned before, each "patient case" gave rise to 
a large number of hypotheses. Although each patient scenario was designed within 
the context of one organ system, hypotheses pertaining to a case were generated 
in the framework of several organ systems. The - almost confusing - distribution 
of hypotheses over the levels, is also true for the distribution over the 
various organ systems. 
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The na~t tables show the frequency distribution of hypotheses over the organ · 
systems for each of the patient cases. 
The hypotheses '!-Jere arranged into the order in which they were generated (1-7): 
Table 14: 
HYPOTHESES ARRANGEMENT OVER THE ORGAN SYSTEMS PER PATIEt?r CASE. 
CASE 1: bWOCARDIAL INFARCTION 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % 
Circ.system 28 12 10 8 2 71 
Digest.system 3 4 2 11 
Loco-.anotor syst. 1 1 
Respir.system 7 4 2 1 16 
-----------------------------------------------
Total 31 23 17 10 3 1 85/100% 
CASE 2: ISCHIALGIA 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % 
Circul.system 2 1 1 4 
Centr.Nerv.system 12 9 lO 8 3 3 47 
Dermatol.system 1 1 
Digest.system l 1 
Somatic disease 1 1 2 1 5 
Loco:motor syst. 17 10 6 2 l 1 39 
Psychosocial 1 l 1 3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 31 23 20 11 7 4 96/100% 
CASE 3: ATOPIC ECZEr4A 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dermat.system 30 17 ·s 6 l l 85 
Somatic disease 1 l 
Endocrin.system 1 1 
Respir.system 2 5 2 12 
Total 33 10 6 l l 74/100% 
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CASE 4: EXTRA-UTERINE PREGNANCY 
ORGAN SYSTEJ.I.1 SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
------------------------
Digest.system 15 6 2 1 1 
Somatic disease 3 1 
Respir.system l 
Uro-genital syst. 15 25 25 18 10 4 
Total 33 32 28 19 11 5 
CASE 5: CHOLELITHIASIS (GALL-STONES) 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
1 
% 
19 
3 
1 
76 
1 129/100% 
7 % 
-----------------------------
Digest.system 32 19 14 9 3 2 92 
Somatic disease 1 11 1 3 
Uro-genit.system 1 1 2 5 
--------------------
Total 33 20 17 10 4 2 86/100% 
CASE 6: HYPERTHYREOIDISM 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 % 
Circu1.system 1 1 
Digest.system l 6 2 1 9 
Somatic disease 18 3 4 1 1 25 
Endocrinological 9 18 11 9 7 50 
Respir.system 1 1 
Uro-genital system 1 1 2 
Blood 2 2 4 
Psychosocial 3 2 3 2 9 
------------------------------------------------
Total 32 30 23 16 8 - 109/100% 
CASE 7: ASTHMATIC BRONCHITIS 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % 
Circul.system 2 
Somatic disease 1 2 
Locomotor syst. 1 
Respiratory syst. 29 17 11 3 
Total 30 22 11 3 
1 
1 
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3 
4 
1 
91 
67/100% 
CASE 8: IRON DEFICIENCY ANAEMIA 
ORGAN SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF GENERATION 
l 2 3 4 5 6 '7 % 
Circul.system l 4 l 1 l 8 
Centr.Nerv.syst. l l 2 
Digest.system l 2 3 3 1 10 
Somatic disease 5 3 2 1 1 12 
Endocrinol.syst. 2 3 •:) ..., 1 9 
Respirat.system 1 l 1 3 
Blood 14 8 7 6 3 1 39 
Psycho-social 7 4 l l 13 
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 30 26 21 14 6 l 1 99/100% 
The physician must often choose among - clusters of - symptoms overlapping more 
than one organ system. The symptom Dyspnea (breathlessness) can refer to cardiac 
as well as respiratory dysfm1ctioning. The presented tables might erroneously 
give the impression that physicians are 'wild guessers'. Apart from the cases 6 
end 8 this impression is unjustified. Taking into consideration the pertaining 
organ system and its adjacent one we can delineate the next table, showing the 
releva~cy of the hypotheses to the presented case (as percentages of the total 
number of hypotheses generated for the case): 
Table 15: 
RELEV~TCY OF THE HYPOTHESES PER CASE. 
(proportional to the total number of hypotheses per case) 
PATIENT CASE 
Hypotheses 
pertaining 
Hypotheses of 
adjacent 
organ systems 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
68% 44% 82% 74% 90% 48% 90% 35% 
18% 40% 15% 21% 7% 9% 4% 4% 
87% 84% 97% 95% 97% 57% 94% 39% 
Hypotheses can pertain to more than one organ system. The sum 
of the hypotheses ~~i thin a certain organ system and i:n its 
adjacent one gives a more realistic impression of the 
hypothesis-relevancy towards a problem solving process. 
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Again~ the cases 6 and 8 represent the exception. In the case of 
hyperthyreoidism the presented symptoms sometimes led the physician ' to 
erroneous but sensible directions such as a more common endocrino!ogicca.l 
disease, diabetes mellitus, or the ~ore frightening perception of carcinoma. The· 
latter direction represents al1nost 25% of all hypotheses mentioned in this case. 
Far more difficult to explain is the case of hypochromic anaemia: a yoang girl 
with iron deficiency mainly caused by profuse menstruation. Many physicians 
failed to inquire specifically after the menstrual cycle. These physicim1s 
missed the clue which often led to - almost desperately - extensive searching 
through a great variety of organ systems. 
The complaints also play a part in the generation of relevant hypotheses. 
Some symptoms evoke great uncertainty. Symptoms like tiredness (case 8) or va.:,oue 
pain in the leg (case 2) can point to various directions. A physician choosing 
the right direction immediately can accomplish his task in a minimum of time. 
However, when he chooses some blinded-epded course, which can easily be the case 
when confronted with multidirectional symptoms, the problem solving task can 
become bothersome and less motivated. 
In the inductive schema we modelled a cycling process circling round (a) 
hypothesis(es).In our material we found a total of 7 rounds.After the first 
round the physicians who employed the Pattern-Recognition methods (plus one of 
the Inductive Algorithmic strategy:see preceding paragraph) had finished their 
task.With each following round a number of physicians finished their task.This 
feature ca~ be more or less read from the decreasing numper of hypotheses in the 
next cycles.Table 16 pictures the decreasing number of hypotheses,reflecting the 
physicians who had accomplished their work-ups. 
Table 16. 
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE NUMBER OF HYPOTHESES PER CYCLE OF THE SOLVING 
PROCESS. 
CYCLE NUMBER OF HYPOTHESES PERCENTAGE 
1 253 34 
2 199 27 
3 147 20 
4 89 12 
5 41 5 
6 14 2 
7 2 0.2 
TOTAL 745 100 
~Ji th the increase of the number of cycles the number of 
physicians still working at their ta~ks decreases. This 
is reflected by the decreasing number (and percentage) 
of the hypotheses per cycle (of the inductive 
inference). 
As a consequence of the definition Pattern Recognition strategies contain 
only one hypothesis. The remaining Inductive strategies contain more than three 
hypotheses on the average. The figures are presented in table 17. 
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Table 17. 
ABSOLUTE ~~ MEAN NUMBER OF IrlPOTtlliSES PER SUBTYPE OF THE II~UCTIVE 
STRATEGY. 
STRATEGY NR of HYPOT:f:IESES 
PATTERN RECOGNIT. 27 
HES.PATT.RECOGN. 26 
INDUCT. HEU!UST. 585 
INDUCT.ALGORITBM. 107 
MEAN I\ffiiYIBER 
PER 'V~Olli{-UP 
1.0 
1.0 
3.4 
3.8 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
0.0 
0.0 
1.2 
1.4 
On the average 3.5 hypotheses were generated in the 
":multi-cycled" inductive strategies. A significant difference 
between the heuristic and the algorithmic strategy could not be 
found. 
As mentioned in our introductory paragraph we linked hypotheses to 
questions as non-interpretative data.In our opinion a certain amolli"llt of data is 
required to produce a picture in the mind.~Vhen this assertion is trueseach cycle 
in the process should contain a more or less constant number of questions.The 
next table shows the results from our material. 
Table 18 
Mean number of questions 
Cycle 1 17,20 
C:ycle 2 16,64 
Cycle 3 15,46 
Cycle 4 15~47 
Cycle 5 17,44 
Cycle 6 18,67 
Cycle 7 1,00 
A more or less constant amount of data 
is required to generate a pattern in the 
mind. This amount of data can be 
represented by the number of questions. 
Cycle 7 ca"Snot be reckoned as a full-scale cycle~ while it concludes the 
diagnostic process with one question testing a reached diagnosis. The figures 
seem to confirm the statement.The question whether the amount of clinical data 
can really be represented by the simple counting of questions,is a matter of 
future research. 
This does not include the question whether a certain number of symptoms can 
raise a hypothesis. One symptom can be questioned several times. Also, a symptom 
can contain more than 1 attribute. 
If a hypothesis is conceived as a cluster of s~~ptoms it is interesting to know 
whether these clusters are consistent across the various physicians who 
generated the same hypothesis. With the help of a computer-program the symptoms 
(&,d symptom-aspects) as mentioned in the problem solving tasks were cltwtered 
for a number of more frequently named hypotheses. 
~fuen symptoms were asked more than once$e.g. by asking different aspects of the 
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11\.:.!me symptom, they were denoted as 1 symptom. Figures less than fiv~ in t;h~ · 
.scatterdiagrams refer to these situations. 
The figures in the 'schemes refer to the 
physicians who asked these symptoms. We 
different patient cases. 
First example: myocardial infarction. 
various symptoms, the letters to the 
shall pref;llent four e:~,a:mples frrim 
This hypothesis (diagnosis) was mentioned by 23 subjects~ asking 283 symptoms 
of which 58 were different. We included in ~he cluster-program all symptoms 
mentioned more than 5 times in the data-base for this hypothesis, which was the 
case with 12 various symptoms. These 12 symptoms were asked by 12 out of 23 
physicians. This means that in the space of symptoms asked by all 23 physicians, 
the 'cluster-space' represents only 11% of the total area. 
FIGURE 1 
SYMPTOMS 
· .. : ..... 
. . . · .. . 
. . ·. · ... . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . 
The following scattergrams show the distribution of the symptoms within the 
~cluster-space', each cross representing a symptom. None of the symptoms was 
unanimously named by the physicians, and for only 3 symptoms agreement of more 
than 80% was reached. For all other symptol!lliS ag-reement among physicians counted 
for 50% or less. The three main symptoms were: pain, blood pressure and pulse 
rate. 
SCATTERDIAGRAM 1 
abcedfghijk 
1 +++++ ++++ 
2 ++++ +++ + 
3 +++++++ + 
4 ++++++++ 
5 ++++++ + 
6 +++ ++ + + 
7 +++ +++ 
8 ++++ + 
9 +++ + 
10 + ++ 
11 ++ 
12 ++ 
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Second example : Bronchitis. 
18 physicians asked 229 symptoms of which 56 were variant. 14 symptoms 
(mentioned more than 5 times in a case) were found in 15 physician-work-ups. The 
'cluster.-s.pace' represented 20% of the total symptom-space. None of the 
symptoms reached unanimity. 
On two symptoms 66% of the physicimls agreed, the rest counted for an ~~eement 
ci' 50% or less. 
The two main symptoms were: quality of sputum and coughing. 
SCATTERDIAGR~~ 2 
abcdefghijkliDn 
1 +++ +++++ 
2 +++++++ + 
3 ++++ +++ 
++ +++ ++ 
5 + +++++ + 
6 +++ + + 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
++ 
++ + 
++ + + 
+++ + 
++ 
++ + + 
+ + + + 
+ 
+ + 
++ 
+ 
++ 
+ 
Example 3 : Hyperthyreoidism. 
27 Physicians asked 543 symptoms of which 115 symptoms were different. 28 
symptoms (mentioned more than 5 times in a case) were found in 23 
physician-work-ups. The 'cluster-space• was 20% of the total symptom-space. One 
symptom reached an agreement among the physicians of 70%, the rest of the 
symptoms 50% or far less. The main symptom was: the hormone thyroxine level in 
blood. 
SCATTERDIAGHfl.M 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstu~~yz#* 
+++ +++++++ +++ ++++ + + 
++++++ +++ +++ +++++ + 
+++++++ + +++++++-!-++ ++ 
++++ ++++ + ++++++ 
+++ +++ +++ 
+ + ++ 
+ ++ ++ 
+ +++ 
+++ ++++++ + + + + 
++++++++ + 
++ + ++ ++ 
+++++ + ++ ++ 
++++ +++ + 
++ +++ ++ 
++++ + + 
+ + +++ 
++++ 
+ + 
+ + ++ + 
+ + + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + 
+ + 
+ 
++ 
+ ++ 
+ 
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Example 4 : Hypochromic Anaemia. 
25 physicians asked 407 symptoms of which 93 symptoms were var].ant. 22 symptoms 
(mentioned more than 5 times in a case) were found in 22 ~hysician-work-ups. The 
'cluster-space' was 20%. One symptom reached an agreement of 63%, the remaining 
of the symptoms came to 50% or far less ( 9%). The main symptoms is -as 
expected - the blood-haemoglobin level. 
SCATTERDIAGRAM 4. 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuv 
1 +++++++++++ + 
2 +++++ +++++ 
3 +++ + + + + + ·H· 
4 ++++ + + ++ + 
5 +++ ++++ + + 
6 +++ + +++ + + 
7 + ++++ + + + 
8 + + + + ++ ++ 
9 +++ ++ + + 
10 +++++ + 
11 + ++ +++ 
12 +++ + ++ 
13 + + + + ++ 
14 + + + ++ 
15 ++ ++ + 
16 + + ++ + 
17 + ++ + 
18 -t+ + 
19 + + + 
20 + + + 
21 + 
22 + 
These examples were chosen because they represent different tl~es of diseases, 
because they represent diagnostic hypotheses, and because they contain symptoms 
mentioned more than 5 times. 
In the majority of cases the symptoms varied so much that no real clusters could 
be found. 
In contrast with the rather consistent method of \\lorldng, the contents of 
diagnostics seem rather inconsistent. Physicians seem to agree upon only one or 
two symptoms within an extensive space of symptoms. A possible explanation for 
this phenomenon might be that most physicians are really looking for a (small 
number of) symptom(s) to discriminate with a high degree of certainty between a 
small number of hypotheses. In example 3 e.g., 70% consensus is observed one 
s~~tom, the hormon level in serum. Apparently this so-called T4 test is viewed 
by the participants as a test with a very high sensitivity (inclusion of all 
diseased people who really have the disease: hyperthyreoidism) and a very high 
specifity (excluding all persons who do not have the disease). In the opinion of 
the participants this test can practically certainly discriminate between the 
hypothesis Hyperthyreoidism and the hypothesis Non-hyperthyreoidism. Obviously 
physicians need tests or symptoms that help them sorting out hypotheses with a 
high degree of confidence which provide them maximum certai~ty towards the 
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solution of the problem. But at the same time we cru1 read from these 
scattergrams that some general consensus about these highly di$criminating (sets 
of) tests or symptoms does not exist in practice. Rather~ evet~ physicim1 uses 
his mm set of tests and symptoms. Each set is used by the physiciau with a 
strong conviction of properness. 
It would be of assistence to physicians to elicit and originate (sets of) proper 
discriminating tests and symptoms. The variation within the set of hypotheses 
resembles the variation within the set of syiliptoms, as can be observed from 
table 14. Recapitulating the variation~ table 19 shows the wide differentiation. 
Realizing the inconsistency of hypothesis contents we scrutinized the hypotheses 
as they were generated within the work-up of the case. As we already know the 
relevancy of the hypotheses to the pertaining and adjacent organ system is high 
(table 15) , but they sho~J a lot of variation over the physicians as appears 
from the next table. 
Table 19. 
VARIATION OF HYPOTHESES - NOMENCLATURE ACROSS THE CASES 
------------------------------------·----------·--·--·,-----·~ 
PATIENT CASES l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL 
-------------!-~-----1 
Total m.mber of 
hypotheses 85 96 74 129 86 109 67 99 745 
N11.1!!!1ber of different 
hypotheses 22 43 30 37 21 33 27 37 250 
Average number of 
homonymous hypotheses 
per case 4.0 2.2 2.5 3.4 4.2 3.4 2.6 2.5 2.9 
-----~----------------
-------------------------------------------------
Number of records 31 31 33 33 33 32 30 30 253 
----------------------
----------------------------------------------
Difference of hypotheses is rather 
problem solving.On the averrage not 
homonymous hypotheses. 
the rule than the exception in medical 
more than 10% of a case work-up contains 
Table 19 examplifies the personal work-up of the problem solving procedure as we 
have pictured it as a characteristic of inductive reasoning.It also indicates 
the personal character of the inductive hypotheses as patterns originated from 
personal experienced cases and '1practice-acquiredu lmm'lledge. 
Rejection of redundant hypotheses is a criterion for the deductive strategy. l"Je 
asserted a less rigorous behaviour in inductive strategy. Apart from the 
pattern-:recognistion :mode~ :more than one hypothesis was left at the clostrre of 
the diag-:nostic process. The table shows the results. 
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Table 20. 
REJECTED AND REMAINING HYPOTHESES. 
(Total number I strategy; mean number I case) 
---------------------------- ------------~-----------------
TOTAL NUMBER REJECTED ~>'lEAN Nm'IDER STANDARD REMAINING 
HYPOTHESES HYPOTHESES PER CASE , DEVIATION PER Cl~E 
STRATEGY 
INDUCT. BEUR. 585 142 0.83 0.95 2.6 
INDUCT.ALGOR. 107 21 0.75 0.89 3.0 
On the average 
results confirm 
less than 1 hyPothesis per case worl{-Up is rejected. These 
the conception of hypotheses - end-point - redundancy in the 
inductive strategy. 
These results sustain the theory. 
Rejection in inductive strategy is not the result of logical reasoning but of 
the loss of conviction in a particular hypothesis.Its probebiiity estimate falls 
below a -personally defined- threshold.This threshold can vary from physician 
to physicia~,from case to case,from day to day. 
The function of the remaining hypotheses does not become clear in this study. 
Generally,we may conceive it as a matter of uncertainty. It could be 
hypothesized that the rejection rate was problem dependent. The next table shows 
the results: 
Table 21 
REJECTED HYPOTHESES PER PATIENT CASE 
PATIENT CASE HYPOTHESES HYPOTHESES PERCENTAGE 
GENERATED REJECTED OF REJECTION 
1 85 11 13 
2 96 23 24 
3 74 7 9 
4 129 34 26 
5 86 20 23 
6 109 38 34 
7 67 12 18 
8 99 18 18 
-------------------------------------------------------
Total 745 163 22 
The table shows a variability of rejection across the cases 
between 9 and 34%. Apparently, rejection is as much 
case-dependent as the generation of hypotheses. 
The figures and the percentages show a rather. large variability of 
rejection across the cases. The percentages ranges from 9 to 34. The average 
rejection rate for hypotheses is approx. 20% for both the Inductive Heuristic 
and the Inductive Algorithmic strategy. Both deviations from this average exist 
for various cases: in the low region for cases 3 and 1 (9 resp. 13%); in the 
high region for cases 4 and 6 (27 resp. 34%). 'fhe variability indicates also 
problem-dependency for hypothesis-rejection. 
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We suggest that the lack of a proper discriminative factor or factors or 
the presence of it largely determines this rejection.The existence of a T4 test 
may contribute to the larger percentage of rejection of redooci!.ent hypotheses. 
Another explanation may come from hypothesis·-spr:Jcification. LotrJ-level 
hypotheses are more liable to falsification than the more U.lliversal state:me:nts. 
The levels of the rejected hypotheses are shot'm in table 2L Evidently~ the 
latter explmlation fails. 
Table 22 
LEVELS OF h'YPOTHESES REJECTED : Nl.JM."BERS AND PERCEN'Jt'AGES. 
LEVEL TOTAL NUMBER NUMBER REJECTED PERCENTAGE 
OF HYPOTHESES HYPOTHESES of REJECTION 
I 30 14 47 
II 100 23 23 
III 110 23 21 
IV 229 36 16 
v 276 67 24 
--------
Rejection of bypotheses is distributed over all levels. For the 
levels II to V a significant difference for the rejection rate 
could not be found. 
A hypothesis can be rejected during the problem-solving task or afterwards. 
Hindsight makes it easier to retrace on one's steps and reconsider the generated 
hypotheses. .Another question is which h-ypothesis, in order of its generatio:JQ, is 
rejected. 
It could be hypothesized that the first hypotheses were more or less "wild 
guesses" and more liable to be ove!"thrown by more appropriate hypotheses. With 
the progression down the cycles the rejection rate might decrease. 11~e results 
are shown in table 23. 
Table 23 
IfYPOTHESIS - REJECTION RATE PER CYCLE. 
CYCLE HYPOTHESES HYPOTHESES PERCENTAGE 
GENERATED REJECTED of P~JECTION 
1 253 92 36 
2 199 30 15 
3 147 11 '1.5 
4 89 l 1 
5 41 
6 14 
7 2 
The primary guesses are more liable to be overthrown than the 
following 
53 cases 
remaining 
rejection 
ones. Remember that the first cycle also contains 
of Pattern Recognition. Calculation for the 
cases in cycle l results in an increase for the 
in cycle l to 46 %. 
Thirty hypotheses were rejected after the process, representing 18,5% of the 
total sum of rejected hypotheses. 
On a global scale the diagnostic proc~ss of the 
harmonious, rather uniform picture. Observed 
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participating physicians shows a 
:more in deta:i.l hor,.Jever, this 
picture shows a number of very personal and,perhaps therefore,unexplained 
features. 
Paragraph 3. 
Physicians worlr mostly under pressure of time. "The essence of the 
physician's art actually is to make decisions, a tremendous number every day, 
often the on basis of insufficient evidence, under pressure of time ( .... ) and to 
make them with at least outwardly - the appearance of a calm, dedicated and 
warmly human personality "(11). It is essential to the physician to choose 
carefully the right questions in order to get the desired answers within a 
reasonable time. The simulation standardized the 'patient~ and, therefore, 
standardized the speed of answering, the reliability of the answers and their 
adequacy. On the other hand, there was awareness of being observed, the noting 
down on forms of several elements, like hypotheses, estimates of probabilities 
and uncertainty, prevalence- and incidence rates etc •• As was agreed in 11Medical 
Problem Solving91 (1) time constraint has to be part of the simulation. We 
estimated the average time for a routine patient-physician contract at 
approximately 10 minutes on the average for the family physician. Adding another 
5 minutes for the noting down, explanation and different situation seemed 
reasonable. On this basis we presented 4 patient cases to be solved within an 
hour. Although general internists generally claim half an hour for each patient$ 
we tried to persuade them to perform in high speed, which mostly meant three 
patients within the hour. 
In a questionnaire each participating physician estimated the mean actual 
time for each patient contact and the mean overall time in office (excluding 
visits to patients, hospitals etc.) each day. The next table gives the results. 
Table 24 
PARTICIPANT'S ESTif~TIONS FOR THE AVERAGE TIME USED FOR PATIENT CONTACTS 
AND AVERAGE TOTAL OFFICE HOURS IN DAY-TO-DAY PR..\CTICE. 
M.EAN TIIIt.lE ST.DEV. MIN - MAX 
FAM.PHYSCNS 9.27' 2.19 
PATIENT CONTACTS 
GEN. INTERNISTS 17.5' 5.98 10' - 30~ 
FAM. PHYSCNS 5.19 h 1.53 1 h - 9 h 
Ol!"FICE HOURS 
GEN. INTERNISTS 2.29 h 1.25 l h - 4 h. 
Our approximation was fairly consistent with these results. As we described in 
chapter 7 the participa~ts considered the simulation a good substitute for real 
life situation. We also learned that the speed with which the general internists 
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ask their questions is higher than of family physici&1s. From the 
above-mentioned table we learn that internists use almost twice as much time as 
their colleagues in primary health care for a patient contact. This leads to tR1e 
a:sstm!Ption that general internists need more than twice as mm.1y questions in 
solving the same problems as family physicians. 
The next table shows the results: 
Table 25 
TOTAL AND MEAl~ NUMBER OF QUESTIONS PER CASE FOR FAMILY PBlfSICIANS A!\~ GEr4ERAL 
INTERNISTS. 
FM~ILY PHYSICIANS 
PATIENT CASE i\JUMBER of !XiEAN N'ill-IDER I\TUMBER of ME: AN NUMBER of 
QUESTIONS QUESTIONS CASES 
--------- --------------------------- ----------
l 940 33.6 28 168 56 3 
2 1151 39.7 29 167 83.5 2 
3 717 23.1 31 196 98 2 
4 1025 34.2 30 184 61.3 3 
5 868 29.0 
30 J 256 85.3 rt .. ) 6 1301 45.0 29 235 78.3 3 
7 659 24.4 27 277 92.3 3 
8 1319 47.1 28 184 92 2 
----------
---------------------------- -----------------
The table shows marked differences in numbers of questions over the 
various patient cases. The (mean) values for the family physicians 
differ to a larger extent tham those of the general internists. 
The values for the number of questions differ greatly within the group of 
family physicians.More than within the group of general internists, the fig~~es 
indicate a case (problem)-dependent process.As aforementioned~the cases 
2,4,6,and 8 were assumed to be the more difficult problems, especially for the 
family physicians.The general internists seem (their number of records makes 
clear-cut conclusions hazardous) to be rather consistent in the number of 
questions which sustain the conception of the inductive algorithmic 
strate~J~which is largely attributed to this type of clinical specialists. 
On the average the results are affirmative to the hypothesis~ which leads 
to the conclusion that the relation between questions and time, albeit existing, 
must be differentiated for the various professions. The next tables give some 
overall results of the number of questions per group of physicioos related to 
time. Time is divided into two categories: time until the diagnosis ( the time 
course between the presentation of the complaint and the making of a diagnosis), 
and total time, including the preceding time course and the time necessary to 
establish~ describe and explain a course of action to the patient. The first 
table is delineated in plain figures for the total numbers, the next shm<Js the 
averages and their standard deviation. 
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'l'able 26 
TOTAL AND MEAN NUMBER OF QUESTIONS PER PA-~T.ICIPANT 
TOTffi~ AND MEAN TIME TILL DIAGNOSIS PER PAt1TICIPAl~T 
TOTAL AND MEAN TIME FOR THE MEDICAL PROCESS 
~7r~~ ~~.Q;;;s::~~ Mll~F~ ~~L DIAGN= MEAN-_;AL T~~.N~ 
FAM.PliTSCNS 7.796 130 2.437' 40.6'1 2.602~ 43.4' 
GEN. INTERN. l. 667 208 383' 47. 9' 398' 49. 8' 
TOTAL 9.463 139 2.820' 41.5' 3.000' !.IA.l' 
The mean values refer to the averages of the total work-up for the 4 
(with an exceptional case of 3) presented patient problems. General 
internists generally solved three cases. Family physicians asked fewer 
questions in less time than the other physicians. 
Although comparisons are hard to make (family physicians generally solved 
4, general internists 3 problems) it is be clear that the average number of 
questions asked by the family physicians during the total session is markedly 
l~1er (60%). Family physicians ask fewer questions in less time.This conception 
is consistent with the heuristic behaviour in intervii'*Jing the patient~as we 
have described in chapter VI. 
Table 27 
AVERAGE ~mER OF QUESTIONS - AVERAGE TIMES PER PATIENT CASE. 
FOR FM4ILY PHYSICIANS AND GENERAL INTERNISTS. 
QUESTIONS TIME t.DIAGNOSIS TOTAI, TIME 
FAMILY PHYSICIANS 34.1 + 12.1 10.7' + 3.87' 11.25 + 3.90 
GENERAL INTERNISTS 80.7 + 20.6 18.55' + 5.55' 19.25' + 5.8 
Total 37.4 + 20.66 11.15' + 5.53s 11.86' + 5.8 
----------------------------------------------------------------~----------------
This table 
table. The 
describes 
differences 
are obvious. 
per patient case what could be deduced from the former 
between the two groups of physicians in theses respeects 
(Time is counted in minutes) 
Comparing the results with the physician's own estimates (table 24) we 
learn from table 26 that for the simulation scene the physicians remained 
within the same limits for consulting hours as in routine practice. The same 
observation holds true for patient contacts. 
The differences between the group of family physicians and the group of 
general internists can also be traced to differences between the strategies. 
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Table 28 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ft_~ TOTAL TI~1E EMPLOYED PER STRATEGY 
STRATEGY Nr of QUESTIONS MEAN ST.DEV. TIME (min) MEAN ST.DEV. 
PATT.R.ECOGN. 592 21.92 8.54 182 6.74 2.61 
HES.PATT.REC. 794 30.54 13.98 269 10.35 4.68 
INDUCT. HEUR. 5765 33.52 12.67 1943 11.30 4.14 
INDUCT.ALGOR. 2312 82.57 14.77 606 21.64 5.29 
For these items the Inductive Algorithmic strategy largely deviates 
from the other methods. 
As might be eJ.."Pected pattern recognition scores loT.>Jest in questions and i:n 
time, while the Inductive Algorithmic strategy strikes by its large number of 
questions (more than 80) asked ill a twenty minutes~ time-span. 
It has been hypothesized that similar ranges and mean lengths of patient 
interview suggest similar distributions of case difficulty and complexity (21). 
This suggestion consists of two conceptions: a relationship between 
case-complexity and length of work-up, and the relationship between questions 
and time. Standardizing the problem case on the one hBA!d to the least number of 
questions and on the other to the least of time used in the problem-solving, we 
could construct correction factors for each of the eight patient cases. 
Table 29 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NITMBER OF QUESTIONS AND TIME TILL DIAGNOSIS PER CASE. 
PATIENT CASE Nl!MBER of NUlVffiER OF QUESTIONS TI~ill TILL DIAGNOSIS 
PHYSICIANS MEAN ST.DEV. ~"..EAN ST.DEV. 
1 31 34.77 13.46 10.13' 4.37' 
2 31 39.39 18.19 13.16' 4.60~ 
3 33 25.49 20.77 8.67' 4.47' 
4 33 30.70 12.93 12.18' 4.62' 
5 33 30.24 20.79 10.09' 4.61~ 
6 32 42.88 16.85 13.97' 5.28~ 
7 30 29.27 23.31 7.'70' 4.57' 
8 30 36.67 20.81 13.30' 7.97' 
The number of questions across the various cases fall within the range of 
approx. 30 40 questions per case l>Jodc-up. The large standard deviation 
indicates a great variability for this item. The time till diagnosis 
predicts about the ":more difficult" cases (2,4,6~8). The - rather- stable 
standard deviation indicates that this variable is a more consistent one 
across the cases. 
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The follo>-Jing correction factors can be calculated: 
Table 30 
D[FFICULTY OF THE CASES AS A QUESTIONS - TTI4E RE~~TIONSHIP. 
(Correction factors for the questions and time with regard to the 
difficulty factor of the presented problem 
PATIENT CASE CORRECTION FACTOR CORRECTION FACTOR 
QUESTION TIME 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1.364 
1.545 
1.000 
1.205 
1.187 
1.682 
1.148 
1.439 
1.316 
1.709 
1.126 
1.582 
1.311 
1.810 
1.000 
1.727 
The case with the least value was considered the standard 
Although the 'standard cases' were different for each of the factors, they 
approximate the suggestions of the hypothesis mentioned above. Especially the 
time factor underlines what we already lmow from the preceding descriptions, 
namely that the patient cases 2,4,6 and 8 were the complex and difficult ones. 
The relation between questions and time can be calculated crosswise.When 
the mean number of questions is corrected for the time factor and the mean time 
until diagnosis (the time used for patient interviewing) 1s corrected for the 
amount of questions,we may expect an ironing out of the differences in case of 
complete relationship.The result of this operation is shot~ in table 31. 
Table 31 
INTERRELATIONSHIP QUESTIONS - TIME PER PATIENT CASE 
Patient Questions 
corrected 
Time 
corrected 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
26,44 
23~07 
22,63 
19,40 
23,07 
23,69 
29,27 
21,23 
The variables seem to relate to 
differences make clear, that the 
complex than we might have expected. 
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7,43 
8,52 
8,67 
10, 11 
8,50 
8,30 
6,71 
9,24 
each other, 
relationship 
although the 
is much more 
The two variables seem to relate to each other,although some unexplained 
deviations remain (especially cases 4 and 7). The number on trihich these 
calculations is based does not allow for exact conclusions on this subject; it 
suggests for a serious relationship. 
There may always be an important point which might distort this 
relationship between questions and time. De Dombal e'!cls.imed: ~~ '.l.'he doctor has 
to ask the right questions, he also has to ask the questions right" (13). 
Whether ~our' doctors asked their questions right was beyond the scope of the 
investigation; they all faced a.11 intelligent patient responding; to all 
questionsp even the unclear ones, or in case of doubt, rephrasing the doctor~a 
question to a clear one. An ideal situation, doctors will say, and certainly not 
always met in daily practice. But the first part of De Dombal's exclamation 
pertains to the effectiveness of the physician's questioning. This effectiveness 
includes two characteristics: 
the relation of the questions to the pertaining hypothesis (as we 
described in paragraph 2), 
how many times a positive symptom is scored by a question: ~ ~Q§!~iY~ 
§~~~Qm Q§!~g § ch~r§£f~ri~1i£ QI th~ E~~i~g~ geviat!~g frQm ~Ql~~! {§§ 
~~f~iy~g 'Q;y :Q~~ien:t ~QLo:r: Ef!.~sigia!_!l f!:!!!gtion_!~g Q~ fo;rm . When the asked 
symptom is present in the patient's 'data-base' it is coded with +s when not it 
is coded with -. 
With the help of this coding, we could find this type of effectiveness of 
physician's questioning. The next table shm1s the overall results: 
Table 32 
PROPORTIONAL NUMBER OF POSITIVE SYMPTOMS PER TOTAL Nl~ER OF QlillSTIONS. 
FAMILY PHYSCNS GENERAL INTERNISTS 
Nr of Pos.Symptoms 4242 596 •
1 Nr of Questions 7796 . 1667 
p~~~~~--~ ~~~~~~J 
The acquisition of positive symptoms appears more effective 
for family physicians than for general internists 
The smaller percentage for general internists follows from the type of 
strategy he mainly applies: the inductive-algorithmic. The effectiveness for 
this type of strategy must come from the more extensive covering of the organ 
systems and the greater speed with t'IThich the users ask their questions. 
Aud these people are r&Narded! They collect a high count of positive 
questions at the cost of a large number of questions, as shown in table 33. 
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Table 33 
PROPORTIONAL NUMBER OF POSITIVE QUESTIONS PER STRATEGY 
Strategy 
Patt.Recogn. 
Hes.Patt.Recogn. 
Induct.Heur. 
Induct.Algorithm. 
Pos.Sympt. 
p.physcn 
13.2 
17.3 
18.7 
28.9 
Nr of 
physcns 
27 
26 
172 
28 
P~oportional to total 
Nr of questions 
60% 
5.6.5% 
55.9% 
35.0 
Total Nr. 
of questions 
592 
794 
5765 
2312 
The proportional numbers for the acquisition of positive sympt~~ are 
favourable for the pattern recog"'!lition and the heuristic methods. 
The effectiveness as the ratio of positive symptoms divided by the total 
number of questions, i.e. th~ R&~!Q eff§£tiv~n~~§ ~ is highest in the 
pattern-recognition strategy and lowest in the inductive-algorithmic. But the 
amount of elicited positive $ymptoms, the QQN~NT §ff§ctiy~ne~ ? is highest in 
the inductive-algorithmic and reverse in pattern-recognition. It seems that 
RATIO-effectiveness and CONTENT-effectiveness operate in opposite directions. It 
looks as if a physician has to make a choice: a high speed of questioning in 
order to collect randomly a sufficient number of positive symptoms or carefully· 
choosing the questions that will probably elicit the highest amount of positive 
symptoms. In my opinion physicians are hardly ever aware of this choice. In fact 
they act in conformity of their natural behaviour and at the spur of the moment. 
However, we have to realize that another feature of the process can be 
involved. It might be possible that the first steps in the process are more 
difficult than later ones. In that case, the physician with the least nt'!mber of 
questions runs the chance to elicit less positive symptoms than the persisting 
physician, who asks questions at great length. We calculated the 
RATIO-effectiveness for each block of 10 questions in the order of their 
questioning. 
Table 34. 
THE COURSE OF THE RATIO-EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE PROBLEM SOLVING 
BLOCK OF TOTAL ~illER NUMBER OF POSITIVE RATIO-EFFECTIVENESS 
10 QUESTIONS OF QUESTIONS SYMPTOMS % 
l - 10 4916 3060 62.2 
11 - 20 2265 1115 49.2 
21 - 30 1098 475 43.2 
31 - 40 444 162 36.5 
41 - 50 228 79 34.6 
51 - 60* 135 47 34.8 
* beyond the 60 questions calculations become unreliable. 
The decreasing numbers of questions is overtaken by the rate of decrease of the 
positive symptoms. In fact 7 ratio-effectiveness gradually diminishes during the 
work-up. 
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FIGURE 2 
Curve of the ratio-effectiveness during 
the workup. 
30~--~--~~--~--~--~ 
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Nr of questions. 
Evidently, the first questions are the 'easiest' ones to elicit positive 
symptoms. Gradually the effectiveness levels dOkm to a range between 30 and 35%. 
This figure is essentially important to everyone planning to produce a medical 
data base. This base must be up to its task for a number of approximately three 
times the attributes necessary to make a diagnosis, regardless whether it is 
right or wrong. 
The CONTENT-effectiveness is remarkably harmonious across the patient 
cases. 
Table 35 
CONTENT-EFFECTIVENESS PER PiriSICIAN PER PATIENT CASE. 
PATIENT CASE NUMBER OF POSITIVE 
SYMPTOJ.'VIS 
1 547 
2 598 
3 565 
4 804 
5 619 
6 635 
7 517 
8 553 
CONTENT-EFFECTIVE}lliSS 
p.PHYSICIAN (mean values) 
17.7 
19.3 
17.1 
24.4 
18.7 
19.8 
17.2 
18.4 
The Content-Effectiveness shows rather harmonious values 
across the patient cases. 
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In contrast to most variables the Content Effectiveness seems rather 
unaffected by the problem variation. 
In general,these results suggest that strategy and problem variation do not 
influence the acquisition of positive symptoms.Whether the amount of positive 
symptoms affects the strategy and the diagnostic o~tcome is a question for 
future research. 
Each patient scenario has a more or less standardized number of positive 
symptoms and symptom-aspects.We did not differentiate for symptom 
aspects.Clusters of symptom-aspects were too accidentally achieved and, 
therefore,cannot contribute to more general features of the process. 
When a symptom was asked more than once,partly because of the different 
aspects,partly because the physician obviously had forgotten the answer~we noted 
as positive the times the physician asked this special item. 
It is the physician's task to elicit effectively the positive symptoms and 
symptom-aspects from the 'data-base',whiCh can be a real-life patient as well as 
a simulated one.The effectiveness of this eliciting leads to the retrieval Tate 
of the questioning process. 
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Table 36 
RETRIEVAL RATE FOR POSITIVE SYMPTOMS ID'ROM A PATIENT DATA BASE. 
PA'i'IENT PA'l'IENT DATA BASE RETRIEVAL RATE for 
CASE SYMPTOMS SYMPTOM-ASPECTS SYMPTOMS S\IMPTOM-ASPECTS 
l 47 278 37.7% 6.5% 
2 49 281 39.~f. 6.9?~ 
3 54 306 31.7% 5.6% 
4 53 316 46.0.% 7. 7'Jf, 
5 46 274 40.7% 6.8% 
6 48 291 41.3% 6. 8'1& 
'7 51 293 33. 7~~ 5.9% 
8 49 299 37.6% 6.2~& 
Column II displays the standardized numbers of symptoms as they e~e 
incorporated into each patient scenario. ColUmn III displays the 
symptom-a~pects. The retrieval rate indicates that a relatively large 
portion of the symptoms in the data base is visited, but in a 
superficial way, as we can see from the last column. 
The Retrieval rate relates the acquisition of positive symptoms to the 
standardized patient scenario.It establishes the thoroughness of searching 
through this symptom/symptom-aspects data base.Like the content-effectiveness it 
shows a rather harmonious picture across the cases with the exception of the 
famous case 4. 
The elicitation of symptom-aspects is~according to these results,not a 
major characteristic of the sear~h procedure. 
Evidently, a large number of symptoms is visited during the questioning 
and/or physical examination or laboratory datap but only a very few symptoms are 
more deeply interrogated. It gives the impression of skimming-off the territory. 
Recapitulating the variables for the positive symptom elicitation we can 
distinguish three types: 
1) RA~!Q=~E~Q~!YE~§§ ,which relates the acquired number of positive symptoms 
per case to the total ntunber of questions asked within this case ~11ork-up. 
2) QQNT~NI=~EE~Q~IY~NES§ ,which relates the number of positive symptoms to the 
physician who collected them.The figures are given as mean values for a group of 
physicians solving the same problem.This variable allows co~parisons between 
physicians in this respect. 
3) ~IfiiEVA1 gATE ,which relates the collected number of positive symptoms per 
case to the standardized patient data base.It may measure the effectiveness of 
the search procedure. 
Each "paper patient model" is subdivided into a number of classes.(for the 
description see chapter VII). With the help of these classes comparisons can be 
made between the styles of the family physician and the general internist. 
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Several hypotheses have been made on this subject. 
It was hypothesized that family physicians asked more questions about social 
background and mental status thar' general internists (14P 15). Although family 
physicians may differ in their search methods, questions about social and 
emotional troubles constitute a considerate part of the history-taking (16). 
Physical examjnation constitutes a rather varying part of the diagnostic 
procedure( 16, 17). It ~11as hypothf!Sized that general internists spent more time 
on this feature of the diagnostic process than family physicians (149 15). The 
sSl!ile trend was present with regard to laboratory and >C-rray data. Smith & 
OOcWhinney (14~ could verify the~e hypotheses in two of their three simulated 
patients, while Gerritsma & Smal (16) did not found significant differences. 
Our results for the various classes were: 
Table 37 
VARIATION OF SEARCH THROUGH THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF THE "PAPER PATIENT" 
CLASS FAMILY PHYSCNS 
% 
Social bacll:ground 
Medical background 
Current diseases 
Medical history 
Physical examination 
Laboratory etc. 
7.8 
5.5 
4.3 
42.9 
31.0 
8.4 
GENERAL INTERNISTS 
% 
3.5 
4.9 
2.1 
37.9 
43.7 
7.9 
Family physicians asked more questions about the social 
background of the p~tient and performed less physical 
examinations than the general internists. 
These results partly corroborate the Smith & McWhinney hypothesis. 
Obviously 9 family physicians asked more questions about the social and emotional 
background of the patient 9 but histo~J-taking was almost as elaborate for family 
physicians as for general interni~ts. Physical eJcamination !which was performed 
by asking specific questions) played a slightly larger part in the diagnostic 
process for general internists than for family physicians. We found no 
difference for the laboratory and X-ray class between the two categories of 
physicians. Hq~~ever 9 these results should be cautiously interpreted, because of 
the relative y small number of participating internists. To interpret 
differences in style between these physicians on the basis of class variations 
seemss however a dubious foundation. 
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Paragraph 4 
19Decision-maki:ng is reducing uncertainty in a problem situation" (18). 
Initially, before a patient enters the health care system~ uncertainty as to the 
true state of the individual is maximal to the people in the system, but by 
meSJ!ls of a certain set of maneuvers on the part of the health care symtem and 
the patient, information is obtained which reduces the uncertainty, to a point, 
it is hoped, where this information is prescriptive of a course of action (3). 
In tet~s of information science, each bit is able to attenuate the 
problem-solver's mental state of uncertainty as to the possible solution of the 
prroblelil!. When 'cues' are defined as "items of meaningful informa1 ion'', they may 
point to certain or probable diagnoses. A cue (or a number of cues) may enable 
the physician to say with certainty what is wrong l'lith the pa1.ient (19). But 
this conception implicates that the problem solver recognizes this item of 
information as a 7 cue' orr a 'bit'. It means that it must match some prior 
infomation, or some pictUX"e in mind. Crombi & Pinsent (20) focus our attention 
on the obserrvation that the acquisition of clinical information is more often 
than not dependent on prior information of a highly selected kind available only 
to a personal doctor. But being aware of the enormous amount of information 
beyond the grasp of the physicim1 and/or the patient uncertainty can be 
:maximal.Given the available data, the physician estimates the probability that 
the patient is suffering from disease A, disease B, disease Cp and so on (19). 
But not every datum is a cue. When cues reflect the pic•.ures in mind, 
probability estimates might mirror the personal opinions of physicians in 
diagnosing diseases. 
However, we have to be sure which disease pattern one has in mind. Each 
disease might evoke its own personal pattern from the physician's memory. Family 
physicians, e. g., obset~ve diseases in an early stage before the full clinical 
picture has developed. Information on which to base a precise diagnosis - the 
kind of information discussed in textbooks is often not available to the 
family physician when he first sees the patient. 
According to McWhinney(l9) knowledge of the patient's background may be the 
most distinguishing feature of family medicine,and may positively contribute to 
the family physician's decision-making.But we must clearly be aware of the 
disadventages of this foreknowledge. 
Not only can it lead family physicians into prejudiced and erroneous 
directions~but because of the personal and implicit nature of this 
foreknowledge also to obsel"'Vation errors and misjudgment of presented 
complaints and signs.In their turn these observations and judgments lead 
physicians to implicit and personal apprehension of the frequency of occurrence 
of particular ailments and complaints within their pertinent practice 
population. 
The question is whether the morbidity and the symptoms presented reflect 
the prevalence of disease or symptoms in the community? (21,22). Decision-making 
approaches (e.g. Bayesian, Discriminant analysis) have to rely on this 
assumption of reflecting prevalences. 
As we discussed before (chapter V), there are at least two main obstacles: 
reliable morbidity figures do not exist, and, relying on subjective estimates 
means introducing biases in the form of a number of heuristics people use in 
judging frequencies and their distributions (Tversky & Kahnemann, 23). We may 
wonder whether the personal estimates of prevalences of diseases and symptoms 
are consistent among physicians. For that reason we asked the participating 
physicians to estimate the figures of prevalence, incidence and 
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disease-consultation for the particular disease they diagnose during the 
session. 
Table 38. 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, DISEASE-cONSULTATION RATE ESTIMATES FOR 8 DISEASE·, 
ENTITIES 
DISEASE PREVALENCE* INCIDENCE DISEASE-CONSULTATION 
MEAN ST.DEV. MEAN ST.DEV. MEAN ST.DEV 
---------- -------------- ---------------
...,.--------
l.\!lyoc. infarct • 2.21 4.69 48.32 23.95 114.32 128.75 
Ischialgia 133.80 203.77 460.30 981.96 707.60 1070.04 
Gall-stones 147.61 247.10 21.72 17.23 83.72 90.70 
Hyperthyreoid. 50.63 52.38 12.33 17.50 90.67 166.99 
Bronchitis 337.88 645.84 1287.38 1372.84 2918.63 3485.97 
E. U. preg!la11cy 3.05 10.89 8.38 6.26 9.67 9.45 
Iron-def.an. 206.35 510.83 64.35 165.41 194.90 254.77 
------------ ------------------- ----------------
-------
>!<the figures are standardized for a population of 10.000. 
The huge figures for the standard deviation challenge the assumption that 
subjective probability estimates could reliably be used for statistical 
approaches in medical decision making. 
*(note): 
Prevalence number of patients with a certain disease in a circumscribed 
population. 
Incidence number of new patients -vli th a certain disease seen in a 
circumscribed time interval (customarily one year). 
Disease consultation rate number of patients with a certain disease 
visiting the physician during a circumscribed time interval.) 
The huge figures for standard deviation challenge the assumption that 
subjective probability estimates can reliably be used for statistical approaches 
in medical decision making. (see Gustafson et al, 24) 
They underscore instead, Croft's (25) statements about the real obstacles 
to practical computer-aided medical diagnosis: 
1.) lack of standard medical definitions; the large variability among the 
physician's estimates can be explained by their different concepts about the 
diseases; and 
2.) lack of large, reliable medical data bases. 
The participating physicians obviously related their estimates to recent 
experiences. Recent calls for extra-uterine pregnancy made figures jump to a 20 
30 fold of the average. Because the investigation took place during the months 
of February till July, seasonal influences were evident. Figures for bronchitis 
were highest in the first two months and lowest in the last month. On a large 
scale, the variations of the estimates could be contributed to highly personal, 
situational and/or seasonal influences,and only partly related to the disease in 
question. 
From these figtrres it may be clear that several assumptions as they are 
made in medical decision-making like symptom independence, normal probability 
distributions, tightly clustered values for all patterns in one class, reliable 
morbidity figures etc. are not always met in a number of various diseases. And, 
as Croft remarks, "the more grossly the assumptions are violated, the less 
accurate the diagnoses are expected to be." 
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An assu:mption regularly sustained in literature is the relation of' !~~ 
estimates, especially their validity and reliability of them, to the experi~~ 
of t.he physician. It is expected that the more years the physician hu spent iD. 
real practice the more reliable and valid his estimations. Al~hough we shall 
discuss the relat ton of e'cperience to some elements of the med .cal process in 
paragraph 7 of t'lis chapter, we shall in this case mal{e an ex•!eptj.on far th~ 
estimates of prevalence, incidence end disease-consultation. W·~ shall pres@Dt 
the results for three diseases, myocardial infarction, bronchitis amd. 
iron-defiency anemia in the following fjgures. 
On the horizontal axis the years of experience of the physicians is 
presented. Because of the wide variat1 on of the estimates the ve;·tical axis had 
to be designed in a logarithmic scale. The black columns represent the 
prevalence rates, the white ones tre incidence and the potnted ones the 
disease-consultation rates. For each physician a series of three colmms is 
dr~~. The very tiny columns approximate the fig~re zero. 
,_ 
Figure 3: 
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The notion of expertise rests on the presumption that medical compei:;€i:'l:!l{.:e 
is an innate characteristic of experienced physicians that is generalized across 
clinical situations. If we assume that more than 10 years of re~Jlar clinical 
practice represents some kind of expertisep we may expect some conformity among 
the experienced participants regarding the various estimates.We remember that 
most physicians regarded the simulations as highly valid for real-life 
situations! 
Instead, we found tremendous differences. Moreover, we found approximately 
the same variations among the experienced and the non (or less) - experienced 
physicians, and between these groups.Any influence of experience or expertise 
upon the estimates of prevalence, incidence and disease consultation rate could 
not be detected. 
In decision theory it is hypothesized that generated hypotheses are 
weighed or ordered according to their prior probabilities reflecting the 
prevalence (or incidence) of the disease. Each bit of infor.mation can change 
these probabilities. When the probability of a certain hypothesis surpasse~ .a 
certain, predefined, threshold the decision-maker can consider the presence of a 
disease to be confirmed (26,27). We asked the participants to identify the 
degree of weight, or probability, to each hypothesis immediately after its 
generation. There were two possibilities for (re)adjustment of the subjective 
probability of a hypothesis.The participants could adjust their probability 
estimates in the light of an important cue, and they were asked to (re)consider 
their estimation of the previously generated hypotheses in the work-up,any time 
a new hypothesis came to their mind.To that purpose he could give a mark on an 
open horizontal bar, measuring 10 centimetres; each centimetre thus indicated 
10% (from left 0%- to right, 100 %). For each hypothesis three bars were 
available:one for a prior probability estimation,one for an important cue 
adjustment,and one for a posterior probability estimation.In case of a need for 
more scoring possibilities,the next bars were available. 
Neither of the physicians used the possibility of 'cue-adjustment 9 , or the 
extension of another ttrree bars.They all made their estimations on basis of the 
generation of another hypothesis,thus confirming the concept of the inductive 
nature of these hypotheses. 
\~en the physician wanted to re-establish a hypothesis,which he 
(temporarily) quit during· the work-up,he was able to note it again as a newly 
arrived hypothesis with its own prior probability,which could be quite different 
from the one the physician generated at an earlier time in the course. 
Our assumption was that in case of a - rather - consentient work-up the 
probability estimates could tell something about the physicians 9 subjective 
estimations of the pertaining patient population. 
If the physicians' estimates reflect the morbidity states in their 
pertaining patient populationst careful office registration cannot only provide 
each doctor with his disease-symptom data bases but also with the probability 
estimates necessary to process patients' data in a decision- theoretical way. As 
the reader already knows (paragraph 3) the variety of hypotheses within each 
case's work-up made testing of this assumption impossible. 
The ultimate point of the diagnostic process in inductive strate~r has been 
defined as a maximalization of the disease probability and a minimization of 
uncertainty. 
~l.hen we first take a look at the probability estimates, we are able to 
determine the subjective probabilities across the hypotheses of the work-ups: 
from the prior probabilities of the first hypothesis till the posterior 
probability of the last (diagnosis) hypothesis. 
For the four types of inductive reasoning some assumptions about their 
respective behaviour can be made. Physicians using the pattern-recognisition 
strategy must be quite determined; a relatively high increase of probability 
estimate and a rather high maximum. The hesitating pattern-recognition method is 
symbolized by a small increase and a rather moderate maximum probability 
estimate. The "inductive-heuristic physician" starts easily, making a slow but 
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certain increase and reaches a slightly lower maximmn than the quite determined 
first physician. The inductive-algorithmic method, in spite of the elaborate 
work-up, was presmned to stay on the safe side of the maximum: the :more 
information the more possibilities one has in mind, the less determined the 
judgment. The next table sho~\l's the results: 
Table 39 
FROM THE FIRST (HYPOTHESIS} PROBABILITY ESTIMATE TO THE LAST (HYPOTHESIS) 
PROBABILITY. 
INCREASE OF PROBABII,ITY ESTIMATES PER STRATEGY. 
---------------------------
STRATEGY FIRST PROBABILITY LAST PROBABILITY INCREASE 
PATT.RECOGN. 
HES.PATT.RECOGN. 
INDUCT. HEURIST. 
INDUCT.ALGORITHM. 
MEAN 'fOTAL 
MEAN VALUE 
47.48 
56.12 
41.28 
47.86 
---------
44.22 
ST.DEV 
20.25 
19.11 
21.67 
15.92 
21.16 
MEAN VALUE ST.DEV 
81.41 22.97 
73.38 26.00 
73.74 23.94 
69.96 28.11 
73.91 24.47 
--,..---------------------------
(figures are given in percentages) 
33.63 
17.26 
32.46 
22.10 
29.69 
The estimates represent the weights which is given to a particular 
hypothesis. This weight is an expression of the physician's confidence 
being on the right track towards a solution. Across the various 
hypotheses which are generated in the course of the solution these 
weights follow the line of the physician's search and reasoning. These 
estimates give us indications about the physician's problem solving 
behaviour, not about precise calculations. 
-· 
The great variability among the participating physicians is represented by 
the large figures for the standard deviation. Our assumptions about the 
behaviour of the various types of inductive strategy do not surpass the 
requirements of scientific · proof. They are a mere indication, perhaps 
speculation, worth~11hile to take it a more specific look in future. 
The variability can be sketched by the frequency distribution of the prior 
and posterior probabilities. In figure 6 the figures on the'horizontal axis 
represent the distribution of the probabilities, and on the vertical axis the 
number of hypotheses (in percentages) to which the particular probability 
pertains. The grey dotted line stands for the prior probabilities, the black 
line for the posterior probabilities. 
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~igure 6 
COURSE OF THE PROBABILITIES 
Subjective Estimations 
Distribution of the estimated probabilities for prior and posterior 
values. The dotted line stands for the prior probabilities and the 
black one for the posterior probabilities. 
The broad and shallow curve of the prior probabilities reflects the wide 
variability of the primary hypotheses. As the last hypothesis does not always 
represent the diagnosis, e relocated for reasons of comparability for this 
occasion all diagnostic hypotheses to the last place in the sequence of 
hypotheses.Therefore,all posterior probabilities can be considered to be the 
estimates for the diagnosis.From figure 6 we can find the suggestion that the 
end of the diagnostic process is partly characterized by a maximization of the -
subjectively estimated - probability to the final hypothesis. 
The asstmlption that people when uncertain about the direction or the 
outcome of a gamble generally choose a 'mid-position' (see also chapter III) is 
demonstrated in the grey curve. As the inductive-algorithmic strategy, the type 
with the largest number of specialists, gives the idea to be a more cautious 
strategy, we were interested whether the 'starting-position' and 'e:nd-position' 
differed between family physicians and general internists. It fl~as presumed that 
both estimates (prior and posterior probabilities) scored lower for the group of 
general internists than for the group of family physicians. This presumption 
could not be sustained by the fig~res as presented in table 40. The tendency to 
take a midposition in gambling situations with an uncertain outcome~as was 
described in chapter III,could be demonstrated. 
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Table 40 
FIRST FRO~ABILITY Ll~T PROBABILITY 
FAMILY PHYSICIJL~S 44.2 74.4 
44.3 68.6 
----------"""":"------..-----------. -.-----------·-
Both groups of physicians start with equal prier prGbability 
estimates. In tl1e diagnostic - posteri0r probability 
estimates a slight diff~rence ean be obseFved. Family 
physicians giv.e their predictions a higher value. 
We were alse interested im the differ®nce of behaviour metween physici~ 
primarily estimating a lm-.7-level pri0r probability, (less than 0. 5), contruted 
with those physicians who estimated at a higher level, (more than 0.5).In 169 
out of 253 records the prior probabilities were estimated at a less than 0.5 
level. 142 records of this group (34%) scored at a more than 0.5 posterior 
probability level.The group of records starting at a more than 0.5 level equally 
(88%) ended up at a more than 0.5 posterior probability level.More or la~s 
confidence in the first hypothesis does not lead to significant differences of 
the probability estimations of the outcomes.Prediction on basis of subjectively 
estimated prior probability values is quite hazardous. 
Tmble 41 
COURSES OF PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR 253 PHYSICIAN CASES 
PRIOR PROBAB.<0.5 PRIOR PROBffi~.>0.5 TOTAL 
number col % number col% 
----------------------------------------------~--------------------------------
POST.PROBABILITY <0.5 27 16 10 12 37 
ro~·l % 73 27 100 
~ 
POST.PROBABILITY >0.5 142 84 74 88 216 
row % 66 34 100 
- - '!""'""""" '= - --' 
TOTAL 169 100 84 100 253 
-------------------~---------------------- ---------------------- ---.o------
Comparisons between two groups 0f physicians, one starting at a less than 0.5 
probability level~ one starting at a more than 0.5 level, have been made. Both 
groups end up in equal extent in the high level probabilities. 85% scored in the 
end at the more than 0.5 posterior pr0bability level. 
These results underscore the graphics in figure 6. No matter at which level 
the physician started his e(:i!timation, hG: generally ends up in the high regions. 
The question was raised whether this result was an overall effect or had to be 
differentiated for the various problems. In the next table (42) the mean values 
for the prior probability of the first hypothesis (Pr.Prob.I) and for the 
posterior probability of the last hypothesis (Po.Prob.L) are given. The 
difference between these two values can be viewed as the increase of confidence 
over the succesive h~~otheses, and expressed as a percentage of prior 
probability I.It may be denoted as the rate of increase. 
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Table 42 
FROM PRIOR TO POSTERIOR PROBABILITY AS A MEASURE FOR INCREASE IN CONFIDENCE 
(per case) 
PATIENT PRIOR PROBAB.l POST.PROBAB.last INCREASE RATE of INCREASE 
CASE MEA.l\T VALUES MEAN VALUES % 
--------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
The increase of 
insight into the 
his increase of 
nmore difficult" 
reach the highest 
42.6 72.8 30.2 71 
42.9 73.5 30.6 71 
54.2 60.8 6.6 12 
36.7 76.9 40.2 110 
45.2 74.8 29.6 65 
34.4· 81.2 46.8 136 
54.0 69.6 15.6 29 
44.3 82.1 37.8 85 
probability estimates during the work-up gives some 
physician's conception about the case. It indicates 
confidence to find a solution for the problem. The 
cases (2,4,6,8) generally start at a low level, and 
increases. 
Four cases stand out: cases 4 and 6, for their hig_h increase, and cases 3 
and 7 for their low increase. The first ones started at a comparatively low 
level. But, obviously, the physicians found strong evidence to enhance 
confidence in their last hypothesis. As was discussed before, to find (or to 
invent) a strongly discriminating factor, a test or symptom with a high 
sensitivity (inclusion of real patients) and/or a high specificity (exclusion of 
non-patients) considerably reinfrirces the doctor's confidence in the proposed 
hypothesis. As we have seen (par.3) the T4 (thyroxine hormone serum level) test 
is such a symptom with regard to hyperthyreoidism (case 6). The same is true for 
vaginal examination in the case of extra uterine pregnancy (case 4). Apparently, 
such strongly discriminating factors could not be found in the cases of atopic 
eczema (case 3) or asthmatic-bronchitis (case 7). Although symptoms a~d tests 
with reasonable sensitivity and specificity values are mentioned in literature, 
they evidently are not in the forefront of awareness of the physicians. 
More or less parellel with the rise (or fall) of confidence in the 
hypotheses is the physician's confidence in the problem-solving itself. The 
values for this type of confidence were called the ~~certainty estimates. They 
express the estimation of one's own clinical competence to solve a particular 
problem. The values are expressions of one's subjective, emotional feelings of 
(un)certainty at a given phase of the process. These values were measured in the 
same m&1ner as the previous (probability) ones: giving an estimation by means 
of a line in an open bar. In contrast with the probability estimates, people 
preferred to dratv their lines of (un)certainty in a vertical bar 9 moving upwards 
with the rise of certainty aTJd vice versa. 'I'he bar, again ~Jas 10 em and a ruler 
could easily measure the values in percentages. The participating physician was 
urged to express his feelings of (un)certainty at two minutes intervals during 
the work-up~ starting immediately after listening to the patient's complaint. 
According to decision theory one of the essential aims of the 
decision-maker is to reduce uncertainty (18). According to Bohlinger & Altlers 
(3) it is really one of the first steps in the decision making process. 
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So our first step was to calculate the mean values of the ce~tainty 
estimate in the successive time score for each of the various types of inductive 
strategy. We hoped that the point of onset and the slope of the curve c0uld tell 
something about the behaviour of the physiciaqs applying the successive 
strategies. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 6: 
Figure 7 
Curves of certainty estimates per strmtegy. 
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The curves show a gradual progression to a maximum. The main 
difference between the subtypes of the inductive strategy is the 
rate of increase as expressed by the slopes of the curves. The 
Pattern-recognition methods show a more steeper slope (45 
degrees) than the other ones (both approx. 25 degrees). 
16 
In general,the curves show a gradual, rather uniform, progression to a 
maximum.The main difference between the subtypes of the Inductive strategy is 
the slope of the curves.For the Pattern-Recognition methods the slope (45 
degrees) is steeper than those of both the Heuristic and the Algorithmic 
strategies(25 degrees).These curves sustain the predicted behaviour of the 
strategies:the more determined pattern for the Pattern Recognition modes~and the 
gradual spiralling to a maximum of the other two. 
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Table 43 
CHANGES OF PHYSICIANS' ESTn~ATES DURING THE WORKUP 
PHYSICIANS 
ESTIMATING 
LESS TF.AN 0. 5 
PRYSICIANS 
ESTIMATING 
MORE THAN 0. 5 
TOTAL 
FIRST CERTAINTY 
ESTII~TES 
64% 
36 % 
100 % 
LAST CER'l'AIN'llY 
ESTIMATES 
14 % 
86 % 
100% 
In the beginning of the process 64 % of the 
physicians scored a certainty of less than 0.5. In 
the end 86 % of the physicians felt rather certain 
about the outcome of the process. 
Decision making is reducing uncertainty in a problem situation (18). The 
physician starts almost always in an uncertain situation. ~~a-thirds of the 
physicians started at a 'certainty-level' of less than 50%. The confidence of 
one-third of the physicia.l1S {with certainty estimates of more than 50%) at the 
start of the problem solving procedure cannot be explained from the situational 
circumstances.We expect that these physicians have personal reasons to be 
confident in finding a solution. 
In the end 86% of the physicians are rather certain about the achieved 
solution.This result corroborates our statement about the conclusive point of 
the inductive process:maximum probability with minimum uncertainty. 
However, as we know from figure 6, complete certainty does not exist.We can 
only speak of a minimization of the uncertainty.Table 43 shows that 14 % of the 
physicians still remained pretty uncertain at the end of the road. 
These figures support the op1n1ons about physicians' work as they are laid 
down in literature: in the end uncertainty remains. The doctor in his daily 
practice does not know the feeling of complete certainty,because there is not 
an absolute proof of a single hypothesis nor can the possibility of another 
explanation be excluded with certainty. Perhaps this is more true for family 
physicians than for general internists, whose presented problems are, at least 
in Holland, a selection of the patients first seen by his colleague in primary 
care. However, the figures as presented in table 44 do not sustain this 
suggestion. 
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Table 44 
FIRST AND LAST CERTAINTY ESTIMATES : FAMILY P}fYSICIANS - GENERA~ 
INTERNISTS. 
(mean values) 
FIRST CERTAINTY ST.DEV. f LAST CERTAINTY STRDEV. 
ESTIMATE ESTIMATE 
CATEGORY 
FAMILY PHYSCNS 42.1 28.51 ____ 67 ~~----;2.58 
GENERAL INTERN. 45.3 33.7 75.71 19.64 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Both groups of physicians score in the same ranges, for the first 
certainty estimates as well as for the last ones. According to 
the figures (un)certainty seems to be an innate characteristic of 
all kinds of physicians. 
For the various kinds of inductive strateg~ the values are: 
Table 45 
CERTAINTY ESTIMATES PER STRATEGY 
(mean values) 
STRATEGY FIRST CERTAINTY 
ESTIJ.V.!ATE 
PATTERN RECOGNITION 
HES.PATT.RECOGNIT. 
INDUCTIVE HEURISTIC 
INDUCTIVE ALGORITHM. 
48.9 
41.1 
41.1 
44.6 
LAST CERTAINTY 
ESTIMATE 
67.4 
70.3 
67.0 
70.3 
The boldness of the physicians employing the Pattern 
Recognition method in se contrasts with the more or 
less uniformly l~Jer first certainty estimates of the 
other strategies. In the end they all come together. 
We have to realize that the values of the second column (C.E.Last) do not 
represent the maximum within their category. Several wavering physicians were 
found at the end of the decision making process, and their estimates could 
influence the results. 
Eventually, as we did before, we wondered as to the effect of case 
dependency with regard to the values of certainty. 
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Table 46 
FIRST AND LAST CERTAINTY ESTIMATES PER PATIENT CASE 
PATIENT FIRST CERTAINTY 
CASE ESTIMATE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
41.9 
34.8 
37.6 
36.4 
45.4 
41.5 
54.0 
48.0 
LAST CERTAINTY RATE of INCREASE 
ESTilVIATE % 
56.0 '34 
65.8 89 
69.6 85 
64.8 78 
70.9 56 
69.9 69 
77.2 43 
68.0 42 
The certainty estimates for the various cases show a 
heterogenous picture, as could be expected from a notation of the 
physician's personal feelings. Therefore, interpretations from 
these figures can only have a personal meaning. The more 
recognizable (prevalent) diseases as 5 and 7 score highest for 
the last certainty. 
Expectation and confidence play a mysterious game. Highly confident 
physicians chose high estimates in cases 5, 7 and 8 but evidently their 
expectations were not fulfilled, according to their final certainty rate. 
Especially in case 1 (myocardial infarction) a moderate start resulted in a 
medium high estimation g1v1ng the lowest increase of all the cases. Is 
myocardial infarction indeed such a horror to a physician that even in 
simulation he trembles? We do not know and we cannot ]mow from these clustered 
figures and values. We have seen people slaving away, perspiring, we have seen 
them happy and desperate, drifting from one end of the certainty scale to the 
other. We have seen them pleading and shouting to the "patient" (the poor 
simulator), but also begging, advising with all conviction they had. They 
addressed the young (male) simulator as 'madam' seriously inquiring about her 
marriage, her experience in childbirth; they argued with the 'patient', they 
sent the patient away with an advisory list to be fulfilled for the next week or 
else ..... ! In short, we have seen the physicians at work, with all their 
emotions and feelings, their hesitations and uncertainties. It was a tremendous 
experience. But all these things cannot be caught in figua~es, values, curves or 
statistics. And perhaps so much the better. The human being is so complex and so 
unique that dismembering that being into small parts would deprive him of all 
his charm. 
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Paragraph 5 
Patient management and therapy are recognisable entities within the med:i.cal 
process, but these items are treated as Cinde~ella. 
On the average, less than one minute of attention is given to this subject 
once a diagnosis is arrived at. 
In contrast with the patients' views 011 the physician's professional 
activities, the decision maker himself apparently considers it as a negligible 
task. 
Nevertheless, in this very minute a judgment and a decision is made with 
sometimes far-reaching consequences to patients and physicians. Within the 
diagnostic process, as it were, the therapy has already been decided upon. It 
may be considered as putting a full stop at the end of a sentence. In this 
conception each therapy and treatment can only be understood within the context 
of the whole medical process. It is not this one minute that counts but the 
preceding process. As we discussed in chapter IV it is the prognosis~ the 
prediction of future development of the disease and the diseased state of the 
patient that really matters. Treatment might be seen as suggestive for a 
direction towards a better or preferablyp the best health condition. Becatwe 
predictive arguments can only be borrowed from the results of the diagnostic 
process, it is self-evident that treatment only takes up a small and brief part 
of the medical process. In the next paragraph we shall see that the utter 
personal character of the diagnostic process and as a consequence the 
prediction - is highly suggestive for this concept. 
In this paragraph we shall discuss a number of aspects which are regularly 
met within this "treatment part" of the medical process. To elicit these 
aspects we subdivided this part of the "paper patient" into three classes (see 
also chapter VII): 
a.) the description of all possible actions a physician can take in 
therapeutic management; 
b.) the description of referral destinations and types of consultation; 
c.) a detailed list of drugs, classified according to their generic names. 
This class also includes all kinds of fysiotherapeutic, ergotherapeutic and 
psychotherapeutic treatment and a not exhaustive list of alternative drugs and 
treatments. 
To explain 
Netherlands the 
care. 
the first two classes we have to recollect that in the 
family physician is the sole entrance to health and or social 
Therefore, a number of actions alludes to referrals and their destinations 
and to consultations of various practitioners and professionals in health and/or 
social care. Several actions in this class are self-evident: advising, 
medication, dietary advices, surgical or psychotherapeutical treatment, but also 
action to gain information from laboratories, X-ray departments, institutions 
etc. The destinations of referrals and consultations are listed a~d arranged 
according to a pre-established list of medical and paramedical workers. 
The third class is mainly composed of a list of medicaments and treatments 
annually published by the. Royal Dutch Association of Pharmacists. Because we 
used a limited number of patient scenarios, (and diseases) only a small portion 
of the 157 items of these classes were employed. 
It may be clear from the preceding description that we distinguish two 
features within the treatment stage, a phase of determination of the action, the 
direction of the treatment, the management of the disease process; and a phase 
of completion of the contents of the treatment, the medication. It is essential 
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to mru{e this distinction because some actions cannot be understood without this 
division. 
In the investigation we made a distinction between the time till diagnosis 
and the time of completion of each problem solving tMk, the 'total time~. 
"Therapy time", can be established by its subtraction. As we recorded time in 
minutes, we are only able to measure into this unit of measurement. 
Out of 253 records 128 come to a 'therapy time 9 of less than one minute; 
that means that no difference t'llas recorded in the data base between time till 
diagnosis and total time. The remaining 125 records scored as follows: 
Table 47 
"THERAPY - TIME" FOR THE MORE ELABORATE THERAPEUTICAL CASES (125) 
MEAN TIMES ST.DEV. 
--------------
TIME TILL DIAGNOSIS 11.02' 5.41 
TOTAL TI£'4E 12.46' 5.50 
THERAPY TIME 1.44' 
one minute and three-quarters are appropriated for the 
establishment of patient ma.11agement and treatment for cases 
for which a more elaborate deliberation was needed. 
From our conception of a problem-oriented task environment we could assume 
a variation of therapy-time over the cases. First we presented a table with a 
distribution over the cases for the two main categories: one with a therapy-time 
of less than one minute, the other with more than that. 
Table 48 
"THERAPY - TIME" MORE OR LESS THAN ONE MINUTE PER CASE 
PATIENT LESS THAN ONE MINUTE MORE THAN ONE MHIDTE 
CASE 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
NUMBER 
22 
12 
10 
21 
23 
16 
10 
14 
% 
71 
39 
30 
64 
70 
50 
33 
47 
iiDMBER 
9 
19 
23 
12 
10 
16 
20 
16 
% 
29 
61 
70 
36 
30 
50 
67 
53 
Cases requ1r1ng an (extensive) prescription take more time 
than cases which demand a quick referral to a hospital. 
Cases like Myocardial Infarction (l) and Extra-Uterine 
Pregnancy (4) which ask for an immediate referral score less 
than one minute, Atopic Eczema (3) and Asthmatic Bronchitis 
(7) score higher because of more elaborate prescriptions. 
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The :mean therapy-time flor the more-than-one--minute group: iii! presented. 
in table 49 
Table 49 
MEAN "THERAPY - TIME" FOR THE MOim-'l'HAN-ONE-MINUTE GROUP PER CASE. 
(125 records)(mean values) 
PATIENT CASE Tir4E TILL DIAGNOSIS TOTAL TIME THERAPY 
TIME 
---------------------------------· 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10.8 
12.0 
8.5 
11.8 
11.1 
15.8 
7.6 
12.5 
12.1 
13.6 
10.3 
13.2 
12.4 
16.9 
8.9 
13.9 
1.3 
1~6 
1.8 
1.4 
1.3 
1.1 
1.3 
1.4 
Apart from some slight variations across the cases 
significant differences were not foundt or expected. 
Apart from some slight variation, real differences were not found. 
We also matched 'therapy-time' with the various subtypes of the Inductive 
strategy. 
STRATEGY 
PATTERN RECOGNIT. 
HES. PATT. RECOGN. 
INDUCT. H.EURIST. 
INDUCT.ALGORITHM. 
Table 50 
"THERAPY - TII.\1E" PER STRATEGY 
TIME TILL TOTAL TIME JY.!ORE THAN 
DIAGNOSIS l MINUTE 
mean mean 
values values 
5.00 
10.92 
10.70 
20.08 
6.13 
12.69 
12.14 
21.54 
cases ~6 
15 56 
13 50 
84 49 
13 46 
THERAPY TIME 
mean values 
1.13 
1. 77 
1.44 
1.46 
Fast working people seem also to have the quickest therapy 
time (pattern recognition) in contrast with their more 
hesitating colleagues t"'ho react conform their (chosen) 
title. The other strategies come approximately to the same 
score. 
While the inductive-heuristic and inductive algorithmic strategies occupy a 
mid-position, both Pattern-Recognisition strategies are at the extremes. The 
P.R.-strategy in se, according to its overall outlook, results in the shortest 
time and, apparently, it tw<es the quickest decision. On the other hand, the 
hesitating pattern-recognitioner honours its name by taking the largest 
therapy-time of all strategies. However, we must bear in mind that these figures 
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stand for the more deliberate group of physicians representing only half of the 
total group of physicians. 
li.lhat do these physicians do during this short period? Are they asking 
questions about the patient's condition, e.g. his tolerance of certain drugs, 
allergies to certain medicaments, former drug reactions etc.? 
We found that four out of 68 participants asked questions after having 
arrived at the diag"!losis with a total of 15 questions. Of th~se 15 questions 10 
were about the patient's social condition, like his experience of labour or 
living situation, 2 about drug allergies and three were not classifiable within 
this context. 
The largest part of the therapy-time is destined for the decision which 
action has to be taken and to determine the content of this ac·tion. 
Of the 31 possible actions listed in the 'ipaper patient" the participants 
used 8 options. These options are: 
l. ~~Yi§i~g {~gyl 
etc. 
e.g. about life-style, staying i~ bed, stop smoking 
prescribing medicaments in a bro~d sense, 
3 • !!i§:i~!:X ~dV!£§: {~i§:} 
specific diet. 
advising and/or prescribing a more or less 
4. 1~QQ!:~!Q!:X !~!Qrm~tiQ~ {1~Ql to gain more specific laboratory 
information not immediately available to the physician e.g. serological~ 
bacteriological or very cqmplex biochemical tests. 
5. g=r~;r !~fQ~.§:!!Q!! {~!!l : asking more complex and specific information 
from X-ray departments. 
7. !!§.f~!:!:.§:1 .!Q g E.§:!:~§:Qi£~1 !!Q!:!f§:!: (RpW) e.g. a fysiotherapist, district 
nurse, midwife etc. 
8. QQ~~Y1!g!iQ!! Qf ~Qtger E~X§!ci~ (Con) without referring the patient 
ru1d/or the physician's responsibility to his colleague. 
We listed the kind of actions for each patient's case in the ne"t table: 
-232-
Table 51 
IUNDS OF ACTIONS 
CASE nr ADV PR DIE LAB XR REF CON Nr of cases 
i-----. -------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Nr 
% 
2 
6 
Nr 18 
% 58 
Nr 
% 
Nr 
%% 
Nr 
% 
Nr 
% 
Nr 
% 
3 
9 
2 
6 
3 
9 
3 
9 
4 
13 
2 
6 
20 
65 
30 
91 
3 
9 
7 
13 
4 
13 
30 
100 
7 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
9 
3 
9 
3 
3 
1 
3 
27 
87 
4 
13 
4 
12 
29 
88 
22 
78 
25 
78 
8 
26 
1 
3 
1 
6 
2 
5 
l 
3 
31 
31 
33 
33 
33 
32 
32 
30 
30 
8 Nr 5 19 2 8 30 
% 17 63 - 7 - 27 - ---------------------~-----------------------------------------1 
adv= advice; pr= prescription; die= diet; lab= laboratory tests; xr= x-ray; ref= 
referral to a physician; rpw= referral to a paramedical worker; con= 
consultation. 
Preferences of therapeutic actions are clearly case dependent: cases 1,4,5,6.for 
referral, cases 2,3,7,8 for prescription 
We must realize that several actions can be taken for the same case. E.g. 
advising, prescribing and dietary measures can perfectly go together, as well as 
advice together with laboratory and/or Xray information etc. 
Therefore, in all cases the number of actions amount to more than 100%. 
The figures largely indicate that the action truten is problem-oriented, 
which is supports our conception that the therapeutic action is more linked to 
the preceding process than to the outcome of it. The two most striking actions, 
prescription and referral, are, as a matter-of-course, opposing. 
Consistency of action across the physicians can be found in cages 1, 4 and 
6 (referral) and 3 and 7 (prescription). The physician's confidence in his 
competence to handle and manage the situation seems to reflect the choice of 
action. In case 4 it is obvious that the needed surgical treatment is beyond the 
possibilities and capabilities of family physician and general internist. For 
case l, the myocardial infarction case, there is some general discussion in 
medical literature about the desirability to refer these patients to a hospital 
or to treat them in their own environment at home.Still, the overall trend is to 
refer the patient to a coronary care unit. However, in case 6, hyperthyreoidism, 
it seems that the family physician's lack of knowledge and confidence determined 
his decision. 
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Cases 3 (atopic aczema) and 7 (asthmatic bronchitis) are obviously within 
the range of the (family) physician's competence. ftle have to admit that the 
consequences of misdiagnosis and/or indequate therapy are less severe than, for 
insta."lcer in cases 1 and 4. Possibly these considerations play a role in the 
physician's decision. In the other cases less consensus of the various actions 
is reached across the different physicians. However, we have to admit that not 
all physlcl.ans arrived at the same diagnosis. So disagreement of diagnosis can 
also contribute to inconsistency. 
The majority of treatment plans concerns two types of actions: prescription 
and referral. A referral (to another physician) was established in 129 {out of 
253) cases, 51%. In 10 cases the patient was referred to two specialists at the 
same tiiue. In case of atopic eczema e. g., two patients were referred to a 
del~atologist as well as an allergologist; in case of low baok pain the patient 
was referred to both a neurologist . and an orthopedic surgeon; in case of 
gallstones to an internnist and a surgeon, and in case of anaemia to a 
hematologist and a gynaecologist. We listed the destinations of referral in the 
next table. 
Table 52 
REFERRAL DESTINATIONS FOR THE ViLQIOUS PATIENT CASES 
PATIENT 
CASE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
Between: 
In the 
NUJ?.IDER OF 
REFERRALS 
28 
6 
6 
29 
24 
26 
10 
brackets 
cases of 
consultants. 
DOUBLE 
REFERRALS 
1 
2 
2 
2 
l 
2 
DEST.INATION 
Int.medicine (1), Cardiology (27) 
Orthopedic Surgery (2), Neurology (4) 
Allergolo~J (2), Dermatology (4) 
Gynaecology 
Intern.Medicine (12), Surgery (12) 
Inter. Medicine ( 25) , Gastro-enterology (1) 
Intern.Med.(7), Gastro-ent.(l) 9 Gynaecol.(2) 
the number of referrals to the particular clinical specialty. 
"double referral" the patient was sent to two different 
The differences between the destinations can partly be contributed to the 
varying diagnoses. Sometimes, however, it is a matter of opinion. In the case of 
the gallstones half of the participants considered surgical treatment the best 
solution to the case, while the other half thought of consulting the internist 
as a first choice. Sometimes one or more of the symptoms displayed by the 
patient determined the referral destination. In the case of hyperthyreoidism the 
patient complained about some gastro-intestinal troubles. One physician 
considered this as a clue to a referral to a gastro-enterologist. The patient 
with anaemia suffered from menorrhagia (severe. blood-loss during menstruation). 
Two physicians correctly referred the patient to a gynaecologist. 
Another question is \vhether the physician considers the referral a.s a 
delegation of responsibility or not. We asked the participm1t whether he would 
keep in contact with the patient (asking the patient to return to his office 
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after th.e specialist's examination) or leave it to the patient to contact hm or 
not. The next table presents the opinions of the participants per cfill:le:with 
regard to 'revisits' in case of referral. 
Table 53 
EXTENSION OF THE PHYSICIAN'S RESPONSIBILITY IN CASES OF REFERRAL. 
(asking a patient to revisit) 
PATIENT CASE REVISIT. 
number 
1 3 
2 
3 
4 1 
5 2 
6 5 
7 
8 2 
TOTALS 13 
~6 
---
11 
-
-
3 
9 
20 
-
25 
11 
NO REVISIT NR of RE FERRA!. 
number % 
l-· 
---
24 89 27 
4 100 4 
4 100 4 
28 97 29 
20 91 22 
20 80 25 
-
-
-
6 75 8 
--
106 89 119 
Physician's request for revisit after completion of the 
referral consultation is limited to approximately 10% 
of the cases. Apparently medical responsibility is not 
extended to the consultants' offices. 
In general, the participating physicians considered the referral as a delegati.on 
of their medical responsibility. Eleven percent of the physicians explicitly 
asked the patient to contact them after the specialist's consultation. The same 
was asked with prescriptions. 
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Table 54 
PHYSICI~~'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR TREATMENT EVALUATION AFTER PRESCRIPTION. 
(revisits after prescription) 
PATIENT REVISIT NO REVISIT NUMBER of 
CASE 
" 
m:unber % number % cases 
---------- ------------- ----------
--------
1 1 50 l 50 2 
2 19 95 1 5 20 
3 28 93 2 7 30 
4 l 33 2 67 3 
5 4 57 3 43 7 
6 4 100 4 
7 25 83 5 17 30 
8 19 100 19 
--------- ----------- ----------
-------
Physician's requests to revisit for evaluation of the 
treatment were noted in 88% of the pe~taining cases. This 
picture is the reverse side of the 'referral picture'. 
Apparently, responsibiiity is considered as a unique patient 
physician condition, not a general medical professional 
one. 
In this case 88% of all patients having been prescribed drugs were asked to 
revisit their physician, mainly between 3 &ld 7 days after their first visit 
(which was the condition of the simulation) 
In total 135 (53%) patients Nere explicitly asked to revisit, and 118 (47%) 
were not. Apparently,responsibility is considered as a unique patient-physician 
deal, not to be delegated beyond this relationship 7 and not to be seen a~ a 
general medical condition. 
As mentioned before, not all participants reached the same diagnosis in a 
particular patient case. It means that comparisons between the precription of 
the various physicians are hard to obtain. In a minority of cases a sufficient 
number of equal diag~oses was foa~d to allow comparisons among the 
prescriptions. We can only present an analysis of the prescription for the cases 
3, 7 and 8. For case 3 (atopic eczema & bronchospasms) we found 19 records of 
approx. the same diagnosis. The 19 physicians prescribed 9 different drugs, 
mostly in combinations(l7 times). In two records a single prescription was 
provided. The next table shows the frequency of prescriptions for the various 
medicaments by these 19 physicians. The medicaments are mentioned by their 
pharmacological group names. In 7 records more than 2 medicaments were 
prescribed. 
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Table 55 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A CASE OF ATOPY 
NAME MEDICAMENT-GROUP NUMBERS % 
---------------------------~-----------------------------~--
CORTICOTROPINES* 
SYMPATHICOMIMETICS 
ANTIHISTAMINICS 
BASIC COf\-1PONENTS FOR CREAMS 
ANTIBIOTICS : TETRACYCLINES 
ANTIPRURIT!CS 
SULFONAMIDES 
SPASMOLYTICS : XANTHINE-DERIVATIVES 
HOMOEOTHERAPY 
15 
11 
8 
7 
3 
2 
1 
1 
l 
31 
22 
16 
16 
6 
4 
2 
2 
2 
* Corticotropines were prescribed in 11 records. In 
three records they were prescribed more than once. 
For case number 7, asthmatic bronchitis, the same procedure was foll~Jed. 
21 records of approx. the same diagnosis were found. The 21 physicians 
prescribed drugs from 9 different classes~ for the larger part in combination 
(16) and 5 in single prescription. In 7 records more than 2 medicaments were 
prescribed. 
Table 56 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A CASE OF ASTHMATIC BRONCHITIS 
NAME MEDIC~illNT-GROUP NUMBER 
ANTIBIOTICS : TETRACYCLINES 9 
EXPECTORANS / MUCOLYTICUM 9 
ANTIBIOTIC : BROAD SPECTRUM PENICILLINES 8 
SPASMOLYTICS : XANTHINE-DERIVATIVES 5 
ADRENERGICA: S~4PATHICOMIMETICS 5 
EMOLLIENTIA 4 
COUGH DEPRESSING DRUGS 3 
CORTICOTROPINES 2 
.ANTIHIST.Al<IINICS 2 
% 
19 
19 
17 
11 
11 
9 
6 
4 
4 
In case 8~ iron-deficiency anaemia, a very convincing consensUs among the 
physicians was found. We found 16 records with the same diagnosis. In all these 
cases a single prescription was provided. All physicians recommended to 
administer an iron (ferro) derivative orally. 
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Surveying these three cases, we get the impression that most of the 
prescriptions are symptom-oriented. This is especially obvious in the case of 
iron-deficiency anaemia. But in the other cases, one can hardly speak of a 
cause-related therapy. Although corticotropines are outstanding suppressors of 
allergic reactions, they are only suppressing a symptom or a cluster of 
symptoms. The antibiotics prescribed in the case of asthmatic-bronchitis may be 
excellent medicaments but by their nature-(broad-spectrum)-hardly specific. 
This impression is substantiated when surveying the various prescriptions 
for a variety of diseases as mentioned in the group of participants.The personal 
appreciation and interpretation of the various diseases and their symptoms seems 
to lead to the variety of drugs. This, in its turn, is consistent with the 
philosophical backgrounds of inductivism. 
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Paragraph 6 
It is WJ.dely believed that elq)erience improves the cli:rdcal competence and 
the inference qualities of physicians. For some authors t.his belief is reason 
enough to reJect simulated exami.nination (e.g. by means o:f Patient Management 
Problems) for measuring clinical competence as the performance on the PMP's is 
negatively related to experience at the postgraduate level (28). The notion of 
e"pertise rests on the presumptiJn that diagnostic skill is an innate trait of 
experienced physicians that is generalized across clinical situations. However, 
Elstein and co-workers (1) failed to demonstrate any difference between 17 
judged by theu peers to be highly proficient diagnosticisns ("criteria! group") 
and seven others who were not so nominated ("non-criteria! group"). These 
findings do not support the widespread belief that designation of expertise by 
medical peers is well-founded and well-validated (2). It also questions the 
expertise itself. According to Brehmer (29), improvement of clinical competence 
and expertise on the basis of clinical experience is founded on an incorrect 
conception of the nature of experience. Indeed, scrutini2ing this conception 
leads to a more pessimistic view a:)out people's ability to le-arn from experience 
(see also 30). Prejudice prevents physicians to learn from the information 
experience can provide. Some of these biases are based on the personalistic and 
inductive character of the clinical judgment. 
In th1s paragraph we shall match some of the aforementioned variables to 
the experience of the participants. The experience is expressed in te1~s of 
years in medical practice, in day-to-day service in health care. In paragraph 4 
we indicated that any trend in experience-related estimation for prevalences, 
incidences and disease consultation values could not be detected. 
In this paragraph we split the group of participants into three 
compartments: the younger, expected to be the non-experienced-group of 
physicians with a practice exPerience between 0 and 5 years, a middle group with 
6 to 20 years in practice, and a group of physicians more than 20 years in 
health care service. These groups represent respectively 11, 67 and 22 percent 
of the total of 253 records. 
These figures can be more or less compared with the frequen~J 
distribution within the research sample. When experience plays a part in gaining 
insight, knowledge or competence in the medical problem-solving skill we may 
expect a more-or-less linear trend across the various variables. In the next 
tables we shall present a number of these variables matched with the three 
"e"perience groups". 
One of the assumptions made in literature (e.g. 13) is that the more senior 
the doctor, the more relevant information is asked in the least number of 
questions. As described in paragraph 2 of this chapter we defined a relevancy 
factor from the symptoms which could be allocated to a hypothesis and those 
which could not. 
The symptoms which could be attributed to_a particular hypothesis were 
called, Hypothesis Prerelated Symptoms (HPS) and the Hypothesis Related Symptoms 
(HRS). These symptoms contrast with the ones which could not be attributed to 
these (or other) hypotheses, Non-Hypothesis-Related Symptoms, (NHRS). The 
relevancy factor thus could be delineated as 
HPS + HRS 
------------------- * 1no· 
HPS + HRS + NHRS 
-239-
The more relevant to a particular hypothesis the symptoms were asked the 
higher the factor. Confirmation of the assumption means that we may expect an 
upward tendency of the relevancy factor with increasing experience. The second 
part for the suggestions predicts a downward tendency of.the n'iJ,illber of questions 
with increasing experience. 
Table 57. 
PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCE VERSUS REI,EVANCY FACTO!l 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 20 years 
> 20 years 
RELEVANCY FACTOR 
61.2 
65.5 
68.5 
The assumption that more experience leads to the 
acquisition of more relevant information can scarcely 
be sustained when matched with the Relevancy Factor. 
Table 57a 
PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCE VERSUS MEAN NUMBER OF QUESTIONS 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS NUMBER OF ST.DEV. 
QUESTIONS 
0 - 5 years 32.04 11.08 
6 - 20 years 43.49 21.31 
> 20 years 31.66 15.13 
The thought that more experienced physicians ask less 
questions ( but more relevant ones) than their younger 
colleagues cannot be confirmed by these figures. 
The first part of the hypothesis seems to be slightly corroborated. The 
second part, however, does not sustain the assumption. In fact, significant 
differences with respect to the total number of questions between the three 
groups could not be traced. 
To test the possibility that 
time-schedule, we also matched the 
solving a patient case. 
the "oldest" group took a more leisurely 
groups with the mean total time used for 
Table 58 
PHYSICIAN'S' EXPERIENCE VERSUS MEAN TOTAL TIME 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 20 years 
> 20 years 
TOTAL TIME 
(mean) 
11.81 
11.79 
12.08 
ST.DEV. 
3.75 
6.05 
4.97 
Experience does not influence the time needed to solve 
a patient's problem. 
Again we could not 
time-spending. 
find differences between the groups with regard to 
\ 
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Another question is whether more e"'"Perienced physicians are more elaborate 
in their generation of hyPotheses. In literature different opinions are found. 
Some authors believe the experts to be more specific in their work-up with 
correspondingly less hypotheses» while others assume a different attitude. Our 
results are presented in table 59. 
Table 59 
PHYSICI~~S' EXPERIENCE AND THE GENERATTION OF HYPOTHESES 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 20 years 
> 20 years 
NUMBER OF 
HYPOTHESES 
(mean values) 
3.55 
2.89 
2~79 
ST.DEV. 
1.65 
1.55 
1.12 
From the me~ number of hypotheses and the 
standard deviations we may conclude a tendency 
towards the generation of less hypotheses with 
increasing experience. 
Although differences are small,we may assume a tendency to the opinion that 
expertise parallels specificity of the work-up. We wondered whether this notion 
is reflected in the subjective estimates of prior and posterior probabilities of 
the hypotheses. We may remember from paragraph 4 of this chapter that it was 
assumed that the prior probability reflected the prevalence (or incidence) rates 
of the supposed disease, and the posterior probabilities as the adjustment of 
the prior probability considering the acquired infor-mation. This view is widely 
held in primary health care that unexperienced family physicim1s lack the 
knowledge and the insight in the frequency distribution of diseases and their 
symptoms in more or less specified populations. In tel"ES of decision making 
jargon it can be denoted as the unexperienced physician being unacquainted with 
the P[D] and the P[S:D], and their counterparts P[d] (=nonD), P[s:d] (=nonS and 
nonD). We matched the figures of prior probability and posterior probability, as 
they are presented in paragraph 4, with the groups of experience 
Table 60 
PH'lSICIM~'S EXPERIENCE MiD THEIR ESTIMATES OF PRIOR ~Jill POSTERIOR PROBABILITIES 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS 
0 - 5 years 
6- 20 years 
> 20 years 
FIRST PROBABILITY LAST PROBABILITY 
MEAN 
39 .. 26 
47.58 
36.43 
ST.DEV. 
24.01 
20.24 
20.31 
MEAN 
73.26 
73.85 
74.38 
ST.DEV. 
23.77 
25.20 
22.94 
Remarkably, the group of physicians with an 
experience in medical practice of 6 to 20 years 
estimated the prior probabilities for their first 
hypotheses higher than the other groups. On the 
diagnostic . level the posterior probability 
estimates bring the groups together. 
As we have seen in figures 3, 4, 5, the values for prior probabilities of 
the "youngest" and the "oldest" group astonishingly resemble each other, while 
-241-
"middle" 
probabilities, 
group 
only 
takes a different 
an optimist will 
position. With regard to the posterior 
observe a tendency towards increasing 
experience. 
Probability-estimates,as weighing factors for the hypotheses, sometimes 
reflect the state of (un)certainty of the physician. We matched therefore this 
variable also with the experience groups. 
Table 61 
PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCE AND THEIR FEELINGS OF UNCERTAINTY 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS FIRST CERTAINTY ESTIMATE LAST CERTAINTY ESTIMATE 
mean values st.deviat. mean values st.deviat. 
0 - 5 years 45.44 27.70 61.33 26.34 
6 - 20 years 44.1~ 29.32 69.59 21.34 
> 20 years 35.36 27.63 65.32 23.30 
Primary uncertainty is highest for the most experienced physicians, although the 
values for standard deviations make filJn conclusions hazardous. The last 
certainty estimates (on diagnostic level) are approx. on even level. 
The most striking phenomenon of this table is the rather high degree of 
primary uncertainty among the most experienced group of physicians. It may be an 
artefact of the investigation. The older physicians are, on the average, the 
less they are accustomed to being observed - especially with videocameras - in 
comparison with their younger collegues, who are acquainted with this type of 
equipment. However, a plausible explanation may also be, that more experienced 
physicians are more careful and prudent. From table 57 we know that they use 
slightly more time than their other collegues. Why this is so, has to be 
investigated as yet. 
With regard to management and treatment one might expect a more restraint 
in the "older" group towards referral of patients to hospitals and specialists. 
Their knowledge and insight on prognosis, course of illness and the various 
reactions of drugs are greater than that of their less experienced colleagues. 
We matched two features of therapeutic action, prescription and referral, with 
the three experienced groups. 
Table 62 
PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCE AND TREATMENT PLANS FOR PRESCRIPTION AND REFERRAL 
EXPERIENCE GROUPS 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 20 years 
> 20 years 
PRESCRIPTION 
48 % 
49 % 
50 % 
REFERRAL 
52 % 
51% 
50 % 
(The percentages are calculated from 
actions divided by the total number 
particular experience group) 
the number of the particular 
of solved cases within that 
Differences of conception with regard 
the experience groups are not found. 
to patient management between 
Eventually, we wanted to know the differences in strategy across the 
various experienced groups. We hypothesized that in . the more experieJQ,ce group 
pattern-recognition would play a more distinct role than in the less experienced 
group. Furthermore, we assumed a more elaborate work-up of the cases in the 
19youuger" group because of their rather recent backg-round of medical education. 
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That means a relatively larger portion of the more "specialistic" way of 
inference, in our nomenclature the inductive-algorithmic method. 
In the next table the row of percentages represent the proportions of that 
type within the "experience group". The column percentages represent the 
proportion of the types across the "experience groups". To allm\1 comparisons the 
three groups were standardized to 100. 
Table 63 
PHYSICIAN'S EXPERIENCE AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT OF THE STRATEGIES 
STRATEGY PATT.RECOGN. HES.PATTT.REC. INDUCT.HEUR. INDUCT.ALGOR. TOTAL 
-----------r-------------- ---------------~·------------- ------------- ------~ 
EXPERIENCE row % row % row % row % 
GROUPS col % col % col % col % 
---------r----------- -------------,-··-----------+-·--·-------+-·----1 
0 - 5 yrs 7.4 7.4 85.1 100 
27.5 27.0 37.7 
6 - 20 yrs 12.3 11.2 62.0 14.7 100 
45.7 40.7 27.5 73.5 
> 20 yrs 7.2 8.9 78.7 5.3 100 
26.8 32.3 34.8 26.5 
--------- -·---------- r------
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
'rhe "6 -
using the 
employing 
"youngest" 
-------------- ------------- ---~ 
20 years experience group" counts the largest number of physicians 
Pattern Recognition method, and also the largest number of doctors 
the Inductive Algorithmic strategy. The similarities between the 
and the "oldestt' group are striking. 
From these figures we must conclude, that otrr hypotheses have to be 
rejected. For the least experienced group the most employed strategy is the 
inductive-heuristic one, while the inductive-algorithmic method is largely used 
in the middle group. This group also counts, proportionally, the largest number 
of "pattern-recogni tioners". There is hardly any difference bebJeen the 'oldest' 
and the 'youngest, group as far as three of the four strategies are concerned. 
The inductive-algorithmic strategy represents an exception to the rule, which 
can largely be attributed to the number of general internists constituting this 
group. For all the experienced groups the inductive heuristic strategy is the 
most employed method. The other strategies play a minor, although marked, role. 
Informal information shows that pattern-recognition plays a much larger role in 
the daily practice of a busy family-physician. 
How busy is a physician in his curing and caring that he can allow himself 
some continuing eduction? Our last question with regard to age and experience 
was, how much time was spent in formal continuing education i.e. the time spent 
in official courses. The time is noted in days per two year. 
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Table 64 
PHYSICIANS·' EXPERIENCE AND THE CONTINUING EDUCATION 
EXPERIENCE GROUP 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 20 years 
> 20 years 
TIME SPENT IN COURSES* 
(mean values) 
6. 71 days 
11.52 days 
9.2 days 
* the figures refer to a period of two years. 
ST.DEV. 
4.5 days 
8.0 days 
20.2 days 
Apparently, the physician's need for continuing education is 
greatest when he is between six and twenty years in 
practice. Continuing education seems less attractive to 
'younger' and 'older' doctors. 
These results reflect our presumptions that the younger group experiences 
less need to continuing education than the older colleagues. However, the 
extent of the time spent in continuing education surpassed our expectations. 
Approximately one week a year the physicifu! attends official courses for 
continuing education. Whether this education increases medical competence or 
diagnostic or therapeutic consistency among physicians is to be questioned. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the observation of the lack of consistency among 
family physicians was one of the major incentives to start this investigation. 
Observing and realizing the personal character of the problem solving activities 
and their outcomes, the more curious we became about the diagnoses and their 
contents when strict uniform patient cases were offered. It was our strict 
intention not to judge the performances of the participants. We were interested 
in the process, not the product. Besides, according to which standards should we 
judge a physician knowing that practically all judgments have a personal nature? 
The patients' stories and qualities which composed the patient scenarios for the 
simulation were all derived from individuals for whom no conclusive diagnosis 
was made at that time. In actual health care we meet the same situation. 
However, another question is whether the physicians, given a uniform 
patient case, shall come to equal conclusions; and further, whether the 
composing elements of this conclusion (= diagnosis) will broadly cover a uniform 
cluster of symptoms. 
The former question was approached in the following way: 
Because of the nature of the study we cannot claim one type of diag~osis as 
correct, and at the same time proclaiming another judgment as incorrect. In this 
study we only have to observe gradations between agreement on one name of a 
disease and the lack of any common denominator. For practical reasons we chose 
four stages of gradation: 
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L) One joint name of a disease; 
2. ) Various names of diseases belonging to the same organ systen\j 
3.) (various) names of diseases belonging to an adjacent organ system; 
4.) (various) 
2 and 3 
common. 
names of diseases not belonging to the organ systems mentioned in 
and having less than 25% of the symptoms mentioned in 1.) in 
Returning to the question as mentioned within the continuing education 
item, we matched these stages with three classes of continuing eduction. The 
mean number of days spent in official courses is 9.2 days. Remember that among 
these physicians some of them did not attend any course at all. This leads to 
the following categorization: 
a.) physicians who spent less than 9.2 days per 2 years in official courses; 
b.) physicians who spent more than 9.2 days per 2 years in official courses; 
c.) physicians who did not attend continuing education.Because of preliminary 
inclusion criteria this class could only be. split off from the preceding ones 
constituting an 'extra' number of records. 
The matching led to the following results. 
Table 65 
DIAGNOSTIC GRADATION VERSUS CONTINUING EDUCATION 
DIAGNOSTIC CONTINUING EDUCATION# 
GRADATION LESS Tl~ 9.2 DAYS MORE THAN 9.2 DAYS NO COURSES 
number % number % number % 
1 60 *• 48 61 48 18 43 
2 47 38 42 33 16 38 
3 10 8 13 10 4 9.5 
4 8 6 12 9 4 9.5 
------------ -----------------
----------
TOTAL 125 100 128 100 42 100 
----------- --------------------
------------- ----------
* number of records = number of solved 'patients' 
# continuing education refers to official courses within a two-year period 
From this table follows that whatever amount of continuing education is 
attended or not, improved consensus of diagnoses does not automatically 
result. 
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Apparently, consensus of diagnostics does not improve by continuing 
education. We can think of several explanations: 
a.) courses do not focus on diagnostic procedures; 
b.) courses are more concerned with new developments in medicine; 
c.) courses have not been validated towards routine practice situations. 
We cannot specify this effect from our material. It may be recommended to 
encourage further studies in this field. 
The problem-orientation of the clinical 
preceding paragraph, may easily lead to the 
gradation will show marked differences among 
patient cases. 
Table 66 
inference, as met within the 
prediction that the diagnostic 
the outcomes of the various 
DIAGNOSTIC GRADATION AND CASE - DEPENDENCY 
PATIENT CASE 1 2 3 
lnr 
4 5 6· 7 8 
nr % nr % nr % % nr % nr % nr % nr % 
---------- ------ --- -----
DIAGNOSTIC 
GRADATION 
1 20 65 10 32 9 27 24 73 21 64 27 84 13 43 12 40 
2 9 29 14 45 18 55 1 3 9 27 - 12 40 11 37 
3 1 3 4 13 5 15 7 21 2 6- 4 13 -
4 1 3 3 10 1 3 1 3 1 3 5 16 1 3 7 23 
TOTAL 31 100 31 100 33 100 33 100 33 100 32 100 30 100 30 100 
Focussing on diagnostic gradation (types of corresponding diagnoses or 
clusters of symptoms) we can see a great variability of the results 
among the various cases. It seems that consensus of opinion about 
diagnoses and symptom-clusters is problem-oriented. 
It seems that especially for the cases 2 (ischialgia)~ 3 (atopic eczema)~ 7 
(asthmatic bronchitis) and 8 (i~on-deficiency anaemia) the medical nomenclature 
is rather confusing and/or the physician's designation of this particular case 
to a well-defined disease class is difficult. The more clear-defined disease 
entities like hyperthyreoidism score higher agreement on a common denominator 
than the aforementioned ones, although the latter ones are much more prevalent 
in the population. This finding sustains the notion of Croft that there is a 
ladr of standard medical definitions (25). 
However, another explanation may be that some problems are more difficult 
to solve than others. Assuming that experience is a trend towards increasing 
diagnostic skills, we may hypothesize that the most experienced group, more than 
20 years in practical health care, should perform on a more consistent level 
than the other groups. 
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Table 67 
PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCE VERSUS DIAGNOSTIC GRADATION 
These findings corroborate Brehmer's statement that experience does not 
improve clinical judgment (29). An alternative explanation may be the more 
variable nomenclature among more experienced physicians. However, this leads to 
the same confusion. Because of the structure of this study, we cannot give a 
definitive judgment about this matter. It \oJould be interesting to study this 
phenomenon in greater detail. 
In a similar context it is interesting to know whether the opinions about 
diseases and the nomenclature of family physicians differ from those of general 
internists. We may assume that the concepts about several c1inic'al diseases of 
general internists are much more uniform than those of family physicians as they 
are confronted with a much wider variety of diseases, illnesses and social 
troubles. 
Table 68 
DIAGNOSTIC GRADATION FOR FAMILY PHYSICIJ\...NS AND GENERAL INTERNISTS 
DIAGNOSTIC 
GRADATION 
FAMILY 
PHYSICIANS 
number % 
GENERAL 
INTERNISTS 
number % 
------------------------------------------------------
1 107 46 14 67 
2 83 36 6 29 
3 23 10 
4 19 8 1 5 
TOTAL 232 100 21 100 
Consensus of diagnostic nomenclature is greater among the 
general internists than among the family physicians. This 
can be explained by the great variety of diseases, illnesses 
and ailments the family physician is confronted with. 
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Although a conclusive judgment cannot be given, these results seem to 
confirm the statement. This phenomenon is especially important in a number of 
circumstances. E.g. when the outcomes of the health care work of family 
physicians and/of specialist/hospital based care are compared one must be aware 
of this deviation in medical definitions; in case of epidemiological studies and 
medical classifications the results obtained from primary health care and 
specialist and/or hospital care cannot automatically be matched or mixed. 
We tried to create a similar gradation system for the therapy~part of the 
medical process. But here we lack a more or less generally accepted 
nomenclature. Also, there is no general agreement about. optimal treatment; at 
most one can find recommendations and personal preferences for most of the 
diseases described in textbooks. A joint denominator on therapy cannot be 
expected to be found. To bypass this obstacle we used.a book in the possession 
of all physicians, because it ·was sent to them free of charge. It is the 
counterpart of a textbook known in the U.S.A. as "Current Medical Diagnosis and 
Treatment", a'l'ld revised, translated and published in Holland in 1983. For each 
disease a concise treatment recommendation is advised. Our gradation :for therapy 
runs as :follows: 
a.) the advice of the book is followed completely or at least for 
three-quarters; 
b.) half or more of the recommendation for the particular disease are 
followed; 
c.) less than half of th~ treatment advices are prescribed by the 
participant. 
d. ) neither a, b or c can be applied. 
We are aware of the vulnaribility of this system but at least it will give 
some indication, some awareness of the physician's behaviour. 
Within this context we give some figures matching the diagnostic gradation 
with its therapeutic counterpart. 
Table 69 
DISTRIBUTION AND CONSISTENCY FOR THE VARIABLES 
GRADATION 
DIAGNOSTIC AND THERAPEUTIC 
DIAGNOSTIC 
GRADATION 1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
----------
-------
-----------.------------ ----------
-------- ----
THERAPEUTIC REAL GRADATION EXP REAL EXP REAL EXP REAL EXP 
a 88 60 26 44 9 11 3 10 126 
b 27 48 53 36 12 9 10 8 102 
c 6 10 9 7 l 2 5 2 21 
d - 2 1 1 1 - 2 - 4 
- - -
TOTAL 121 89 23 20 253 
---------
------ -----------~------------- ------- ---------- ------
The diagnostic consensus and the therapeutic conformity seem to coincide. The 
less diagnostic consensus tthe less therapeutic conformity is to be found. The 
question of the consistency between these two variables is answered by the 
calculation of the expected values for each box of this cross-table. The 
deviations to the real figures indicate a considerable consistency between the 
variables. 
# REAL = r~al values as Nere found in the investigation. 
* EXP =values as expected from calculation (explanation in text). 
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The figures in the· boxes represent the number of records to which both a 
diagnostic gradation and a therapeutic gradation pertains.To test the 
consistency between these two variables,we calculated for each cell the 
standardized predicted values from the totals of each class of gradation in case 
the values follow the relative composition of these totals.It is calculated as 
the total of a certain diagnostic class multiplied by the total of the 
pertaining therapeutic gradation class divided by the total number of 
Jr"ecords.E.g. for the upper left hand cell (la) the calculation is 121*126 
/263,and for 2b 89*102/253. 
The most striking phenomenon in this table is, in my opinion, that the more 
uniform the diagnosis, the more consensus we can find on the part of the 
therapy. The highest gradations from both sides match for 72%, all other 
gradations are strikingly l~~er. The second stage of both gradations scores 60% 
and decreases relatively with (decreasing) . diagnostic g-.cadation. The lower 
gradation on the diagnostic side·also scores remarkably low in the therapeutic 
part. Apparently, diagnostic and therapeutic uniformity and consensus parallel 
each other. This aspect deserves great attention. As we mentioned before~ the 
action of management and treatment cannot be viewed as separate parts in the 
medical process. Both are parts of the same process, maybe the same strategy. 
This latter question cannot be answered from our material, because treatment 
recommendations were coupled by us to the diagnosis, not to a majority-diagnosis 
within the same patient case. Therefore, we can only present the results of the 
matching between the diagnostic gradations and the types of strategy. To allot! 
comparisons we standardized the four groups of diagnostic gradation. 
Table 70 
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF STRATEGY VERSUS DIAGNOSTIC GRADATION 
STRATEGY PATT.RECOGN. HES.PAT.REC. INDUCT. HEUR. IND.ALGOR. TOTAL 
R0\\1% col% ROW% col% ROW% col% ROW% col% 
------------------------------ ------------- ------------ -----------
-----
DIAGNOSTIC 
GRADA'l'ION 
1 10.7 
* 
27 8.2 22 68.0 23 13.2 38 100 
2 11.3 28 14.7 39 62.7 22 11.3 33 100 
3 13.0 32.5 4.4 12 82.6 29 - - 100 
4 5.0 12.5 10.0 27 75.0 26 10.0 29 100 
------------------ ------------- ------------
r---------- -----------t-------
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
-----------------------------
-- ---------- ,__ _____ 
* the number of records is standardized for each of the variables. 
From the relative figures of this table we observe a high score for the 
Inductive Algorithmic method in case of diagnostic gradation 1. Taking the 
sum of the diagnostic gradation l and 2 togetther again the Inducttive 
Algorithmic method scored highest, and lowest in the Inductive Heuristic. 
It seems that consensus of opinion about diagnoses among physicians 
employing the Algorithmic method is markedly greater. 
For the group of diagnostic gradation 1 the largest proportion of 
consensus is found with the inductive-algorithmic strategy. 
Because of its specification (the same disease,or one belonging to the same 
organ system) we are especially interested in the diagnostic gradation 1 and 
2.From the relative figures of this table it is seen that the Inductive 
Algorithm method scores highest for diagnostic gradation as weil as gradation l 
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and 2 together. At a long distance it is followed by the Hesitating Pattern 
Recognition method.Remarkably,the Inductive Heuristic strategy is the type with 
the lowest score for the sum of diagnostic ~cadation 1 and 2. 
We have tried to answer the consensv..s of opinion among physicians regarding 
the bigger items in medical nomenclature and classification9 the names of 
disec:. .. ses and illnesses. Our second question was directed toward the consensUB 
at a lower level of sophistication: the consensus among physicians about the 
composing elements of these diseases and diagnoses, the symptoms. 
To conclude this paragraph and this chapter we shall sketch few elements of 
this question. 
After they had made a diagnosis we asked the participating physicians to 
delineate the composing elements of the diagnosis they made a moment ago, to 
denominate the colours of the picture they have in mind. They all pictured the 
particular disease as they saw it as characteristically in terms of a number of 
symptoms. This number counted between 4 and 14 symptoms; on the average 6 
symptoms. Obviously, one can distinguish two types of consistency regarding 
these elements: the external and the internal consistency. The former one points 
to the agreement upon symptoms among physicians concerning the same disease. 
E.g. when 10 physicians are making the diagnosis myocardial infarction, about 
how many symptoms do they agree in making that particular diagnosis. The 
internal consistency refers to the matching of the - by the physician - given 
picture of the disease and the actual acquired sinnptoms during the work-up. 
First, we shall deal with the external consistency. This attribute will be 
described i~ figures, in tables and in graphics. 
Considering a particulcuA diagnosis a - large number of symptoms 
concerning this diagnosis have been named. Some of these symptoms are mentioned 
by all physicians who have diagnosed this particular disease (100% external 
consistency). Other symptoms are only mentioned by half of these physicians 
(50%) or a quarter (25%) and so on. 
When an amount of symptoms is mentioned for a particular disease any of 
these symptoms has a corresponding percentage related to the number of 
physicians who had asked this symptom.The sum of these percentages divided by 
the total number of different symptoms constitute the MEAN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
FACTOR. 
The Mean External Consistency Factor can be defined as:the average with 
which any symptom within a cluster of symptoms,corresponding to a particular 
disease,is mentioned within a group of physicians who asked these symptoms. 
In the tables the symptoms are denoted by a letter code. For the leading 
symptoms we shall present a decoding. The numbers refer to the times this 
particular symptom is mentioned within the group of physicians who diagnosed the 
same disease. The percentages in the third row express to be the external 
consistency for that particular symptom. 
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Table 71 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
DECOMPOSITION OF THE DIAGNOSES INTO THEIR SYMPTTOMS ; CONSENSUS OF OPINION ABOUT 
THESE SYMPTOMS AMONG THE PHYSICIANS 
I 
MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION 
NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS 
WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS: 20 TOTAL NUMBER OF SYMPTOMS: 94 
SYMPTOlV'.S A B C D E F G H I J I{ L M N 0 P Q 
NUMBER 20 11 11 8 7 6 3 3 2 2 
% 100 55 55 40 35 30 15 15 10 10 
MEAN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR 16.0 
Leading symptoms: 201 A: pain 
B: blood pressure 
C: perspiration l51 
10 ~ 
5 
0 
A B C D 
ISCHIALGIA 
NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS 
WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS: 17 
SYMPTOMS A B C D E F G H I 
NUMBER 17 8 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 (16X) 
% 100 47 24 18 12 12 12 12 
MEAN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR: 9.9 
15 
Leading symptoms: 16 
A: pain 14 
B: Achilles tendon reflex 12 
C: lower extremity sensory loss 10 
6 
6 
4 
2 
0 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
(llX) 
10 10 10 10 10 10 
--------
··--- ·--·-----
E F 6 H J I( LMNOPQ 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYMPTOMS: 56 
A 6 c D E F 6 H 
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III 
CHOLELITHIASIS (GALL-STONES) 
NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS 
'i'VITH '.l'H.f!: SAME DIAGNOSIS: 21 TOTAL NUMBER OF SYMPTOMS: 87 
SW4PTOMS A B C D E F G H I J K L 
NUMBER 21 13 9 8 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 (15X) 
% 100 62 43 38 24 19 19. 9 9 9 9 
---------------------------------------------.------
MEAN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR: 13.1 
Leading symptoms: 
A: pain 
B: food intolerance 
C: discoloration of stools 
ABCDEFGH IJKL 
IV 
HYPERTHYHEOIDISM 
NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS , 
WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS: 27 TOTAL NUMBER OF SYMPTOMS: 155 
. . 
__________________________________________ ..... ___________ _ 
SYMPTOMS A B C D E F G H J K L M N 0 P Q R 
NUMBER 26 16 13 12 12 ll 6 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 1 (25X) 
% 96 59 48 44 44 41 22 22 18 18 15 11 11 11 7 
MEA.lll' EJ!TERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR: 11.7 
Leading symptoms: 
A: weight loss 
B: (normal) appetite 
C: palpitations (heart) 
D: perspiration 
E: stool - frequency 
301 
25 i 
20 ~ 
! 151 
.,., j 
,\..< . 
5 
0 JIJIJitl,m,a, , 
A B C 0 E F 6 H J K L M N 0 P Q R 
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v 
EXTRA - UTERINE PREGNANCY 
NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS 
WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS: 24 TOTAL NUMBER OF SYMPTOMS: 100 
------------------------------------------~----------
SYMPTOMS A B c D E F G 
----------------------------------
NUMBER 22 15 11 8 6 5 4 
% 92 63 46 33 25 21 17 
MEAN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR: 10.0 
;eading symptoms 
A: pain 
B: menstrual cycle alteration 
C: perspiration 
H J K L M 
2 2 2 2 .1 (2lX) 
8 8 8 8 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
A 5 C D E F 6 H J K L M 
VI 
ASTHMATIC BRONCHITIS 
NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS 
WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS: 13 TOTAL i~ER OF SYMPTOMS: 73 
--------------------------------------------------------------
SYMPTOMS A B c D E F G H J K L M N 
--------------------------------------------------------
NUMBER 13 11 7 7 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 (13X) 
% 100 85 54 54 38 38 15 15 15 15 15 15 
ME.AN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR: 18. 3 
Leading symptoms: 
A: dyspnea 
B: cough 
C: rales 
D: sputum 
14 
12 
10 
B 
6 
4 
2 
0 
A B C D E F 6 H J K L M N 
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VII 
IRON - DEFICIENCY ANAEMIA 
~~ER OF PHYSICIANS 
WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS: 13 TOTAL NUMBER OF SYMPTOMS: 73 
SYMPTOMS A B C D E F G H J K L M N 0 
NUMBER 21 10 8 7 6 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 1 (19X) 
% 100 48 38 33 29 24 19 19 19 14 14 14 5 
-------------------------------------------------~ 
MEAN EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY FACTOR: ll. 75 
Leading symptoms: 
A: tiredness 
B: dizziness 
C: nervousness 20 
15 
10 
0 
A 5 C D E F 6 H J K L M N. 0 
The mean external consistency factor ranges between 9.9 and 18.3. This 
means that on the average physicians agree for approximately 10 - 15% upon a 
symptom within the symptom-cluster of a disease in case of a description of a 
"textbook picture" of this particular disease. For only one symptom per disease 
the participating physicians fully agree. (The agreement on symptoms with regard 
to the presented simulation is discussed i:n paragraph 2 of this chapter). 
This striking phenomenon can be considered as a even more serious obstacle 
to the idenfication and classification of diseases than the preceding 
inconsistency of disease nomenclature. It means that there are grave limitations 
to the construction of data-bases, unless the items are coded in basic elements 
like symptoms. However, this requires a new registration system,which has to be 
developed and applied in close co-operation with physicians who can handle and 
use it. 
The internal consistency factor compares the symptoms of the description of 
the disease by the physician with the actual acquisition of these s~ptoms in 
the problem-solving of that particular case.This factor focuses on two aspects: 
l) the minimum number of symptoms proportional to the total number of 
symptoms named in the personal description,which is required to make a 
diagnosis; 
2) the number of symptoms acquired which are irrelevant to the ultimate 
diagnosis,the redundancy. 
We shall picture these aspects separately. 
We may remember from our sketch of the 'paper patient' (chapter VII) that 
each symptom was accompanied by a rather fix~d number of aspects. In medical 
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history the number of aspects for each symptom ranged between 20 and 25, and for 
physical examination ·between 8 and 15. For each symptom a number of questions 
can be asked. For some symptoms e.g. pain, practically·a~l various aspects were 
asked by the joint participants, while for other symptoms one or two aspects 
sufficed. 
It must be seen as an artefact therefore to depict the total number of 
questions in relation to redundancy; Another question is whether the physicians 
are fully aware of the deepening of their insight into a symptom by asking the 
several aspects adherent to this symptom. The next table shows the relation 
between questions and symptoms, for a number of diseases: 
Table 72 
THE RELATION OF QUESTIONS AND SYMPTOMS VISITED MORE THAN ONCE 
DIAGNOSIS 
Myocard.infarct. 
Ischia1gia 
Cholelithiasis 
Hyperthyreoidism 
Asthm. Bronchitis 
Extra-ut.pregnancy 
Iron-def.Anaemia 
Salpingitis 
Colitis 
* per physician 
TOTAL NUMBER 
of SYMPTOMS 
mean values* 
12.2 
12.0 
13.0 
20.8 
15.4 
19.6 
21.0 
11.0 
37.5 
TOTAL NmviBER 
of QUESTIONS 
mean values# 
24.5 
26.1 
23.7 
33.2 
25.0 
34.2 
35.0 
20.5 
58.5 
NUMPER of QUESTIONS 
per SYMPTOM 
mean values 
1.8 
2.1 
1.9 
1.6 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
1.9 
1.6 
# in relation to the symptoms mentioned in the first column. 
The table indicates the interviewing of a symptom and its 
substructure. On the average a symptom is visited twice during a 
work-up. Significant differences between the cases for this 
"visiting effect" could not be found. 
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These results confirm that each symptom is 
the questioning physician. Differences between 
physicians were not found. On the average hio 
insight in the meaning of a particular symptom. 
rather low and could be improved. 
touched upon more than once by 
general internists and family 
questions a~e used to acquire 
In our opinion, this figure is 
Relating the total .number of symptoms to symptoms NOT depicted into the 
diagnostic sltetch led to the redundancy factor. As was argued before, we have to 
realize that redundancy can only be established in hindsight. It does not and it 
cannot judge the. quality of the problem solving or decision making process. It 
just pictures the groping and the searching of a physician in order to come to a 
conclusion. The next table gives the results for a number of diseases. 
'fable 73 
REDUNDANCY OF S\'MPTOMS 
DIAGNOSIS TOTAL ~ER 
of SYMPTOMS 
TOTAL NUMBER 
of QUESTIONS 
REDUNDANCY FACTOR 
mean values* mean values# % 
Myocard. Infarct. 12.2 9.4 77 
Ischialgia 12.0 10.1 84 
Cholelithiasis 13.0 10.8 83 
Hyperthyreoidism 20 .• 8 16.9 81 
Ast.l:un. Bronchi tis 15.4 12.4 80 
Extra-ut.pregnancy 19.6 16.5 84 
Iron-def.anaemia 21.0 17.8 85 
Salpingitis 11.0 8.5 77 
Colitis 37.5 34.5 92 
* per physicia11 
# in relation to the symptoms mentioned in the first column 
' . 
Symptoms 
redundant. 
of the 
redundancy 
not related to the diagnosis are assumed to 
This type of redundancy constitutes approximately 
total number of collected symptoms. This type 
can only be established in hindsight. 
be 
80% 
of 
Approx. 80% of the collected symptoms are redundant in relation to the 
ultimate diagnosis. It also means that 80% of the time spent in decision-making, 
the physician follows the wrong tracks. In the light of.this phenomenon the 
attempts of medical decision making to formalize the process and making it more 
efficient, seem very convincing. However, not only is this knowledge hindsight 
kn~Nledge, but the methods of clinical decision making lack, in our opinion, 
also several elements of reality. Nevertheless, any strategy which could 
effectuate a more efficient way towards a decision should be welcomed. 
This is especially true when we realize that the minimum number of symptoms 
regarded by the participating physicians to be necessary to make a diagnosis, is 
approx. 4.5. This means that only a restricted number of symptoms suffices to 
come to a diagnosis. This restricted number proportional to the number of 
symptoms depicted in the diagnostic sketch is the internal consistency factor. 
In our last table the results are shmvn, again, for the diseases mentioned in 
the preceding tables. · 
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Table 74 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
"HOW CONSISTENT IS THE PHYSICIAN'S PICTURE ?" 
DIAGNOSIS NUMBER of DEPICTED NUMBER of SYMPTOMS INTERNAL 
CONSISTENCY 
FACTOR SYMPTOMS COLLECTED 
mean values mean values % 
-----------------------------------------,- --'---------
Myocard. Infarct. 
Ischialgia 
Cholelithiasis 
Hyperthyreoidism 
Asthm.Bronchitis 
E~'tra-Ut. Pregn. 
Iron-def.Anaemia 
Salpingitis 
Colitis 
The picture of the 
as colours consists 
of collected equal 
Factor across these 
4.7 
3.3 
4.1 
5.7 
5.2 
4.2 
4.6 
4.0 
5.0 
2.8 
1.9 
2.7 
3.9 
3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
2.5 
3.0 
60 
58 
66 
68 
58 
74 
7o 
63 
60 
diagnosis as painted by the physicians in symptoms 
on the average of 4.5 symptoms. The average number 
symptoms is 2.9. The.mean Internal Consistency 
9 different diseases is 64 %. 
The physician's pictur~ of the diagnosis consists on the average of 4 - 5 
symptoms.In his workup he gathers 2- 3 of these syinptoms.Apparently,two-thirds 
of the (diagnostic cluster. of) symptoms is necessary to make the doctor decide 
upon a particular diagnosis.The Internal Consistency Factor delineates the 
discrepancy. · 
Presumably, this factor is empirically founded, and based on the - often 
extreme variability kno~m to the physicians to exist· in disease presentation. 
Maybe it is this variation of disease presentation together with the 
capr1c1ousness of nature which leads physicians to the use of inductive 
strategies and a personal based medical knowledge. 
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CI'APTER IX 
We return to one of our first qw:-stions: .. Do physicians kilow what they aNJ 
doing?" According to McLuhan thinking 1 s substituted by coupling tdes.s to i~, 
concepts to concepts, patterns to ~atterns. In his v~s1on, thinking ~ 
prostituted by easy message wrapped in tinsel. In this version th~ ans~rer to the 
aforementioned question must be neg~tive. For thinking is ofteo assumed to be 
logical thinking. an explicit proce&s of reasoning which c~ be traced in 
reverse order. It is this so-called scientific concept that largely 
determines the way people view at mectical problem solving p.roce~ses. It led tG 
emotional discussions and arguments between science-oriented tndividtmls and 
people considering medicine as an art It opposed the logical to the illogiatl. 
It created two worlds in the one people say "~1e do not understand you", and in 
the other, people ansll7er "we do not wm•t you to understand". 
The two worlds may be considered as east and west, and 'never the twain 
shall meet' . 
But these attitudes referring to McLuhan's opinion about coupling concepts 
to concepts, disregard objective thjnking and the possibil1ties to understand 
the actual processes. According to Braithwaite (l) "the function of a science 
( .. ) is to establtsh general laws covering the behaviour of emp1rical events, or 
objects with which the science in question is concerned". This characterization 
emphasizes its concern with empirical phenomena, together with 1ts function in 
expanding knowledge of the laws concerning these phenomena f2). This conception 
tncludes the studv and knowledge of disease processes and the methodology to 
diagnose, treat and prevent these diseases. Trying to understand the act~l 
processes as they are taking place in day-to-day medical practice was the main 
purpose of this study. 
Avoiding the two-world scenery we took a different position. We returned to 
an old, almost neglected domain of scientific inference, the inductive way of 
reasoning. Although the disadvantages and drawbacks of this method were broadly 
advocated by philosophers like Popper, (3), Braithwaite (l) and Medawar(4),its 
existence cannot be negated. It is practiced as an ordinary way of reasoning in 
daily life. People regularly infer general statements from particular elements 
or single observations. They often reduce complicated questions to 
comprehensible stzes and then jump to conclusions. They often make general 
conclusions from special memories or specific expertences and tell them as 
precious advtce to their friends and relatives. They estimate chances from 
single percepttons and when the outcome flaws they invent new and different 
arguments to support a general statement sometimes opposite the former one. 
Inductive reasoning can be observed ~very day in daily l1fe, on television, in 
newspapers, in polittcs etc. We are so accustomed to this type of reasoning that 
it passes without noticing. It can be v~ewed as an innate trait of the human 
being. 
But tvhy is inductive reasoning practiced on such a world wide scale? 
In our op1nion. because induct1ve inference (and judgment) bears the 
conviction of pred1ction and truth. To generalize the particular it is believed 
that this particular event will present itself in future for many more times and 
in approximately equal shape. We bel1eve this prediction to ~e true because we 
believe the inference and the evidence upon which the judgment rests to be 
true. 
The evidence for the 1nductive statement stems from successful past 
applications of 1nduct1on. The theory of induction holds that we experience many 
things of a similar kind. It creates a "habit of mind" which makes us believe 
that we will see more things of this kind. Then, when we have seen five white 
swans, we believe the sixth to be white too. This means that our belief in the 
inductive reasoning is strengthened when we see many similar things. But how do 
we knm1 that the things that we encounter are really similar and instances of 
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the same phenomenon? If we still continue to feel that there is some consistent 
relation between our beliefs and the factual evidence presented to us, we must 
regard this reasoning (with Hume) as a mere habit without acknowledging any 
justification of the convictions expressed by the habit. 
The 'real world of experience' becomes ~our world'; genuine statements 
become subjective state:ment~; 'facts' are only perceived by one's subjective 
interpretation. When we collect data~ we do so with an implicit or e:h."Plicit 
question in mind. Popper makes this pofnt for his pupils: "My experiment 
consists in asking you to observe, here and now. I hope you are all ·co-operating 
and observing! However~ I fear that at least some of you, instead of observing, 
will feel a strong urge to ask: "What do you want me to observe?" (5). 
In inductive reasoning not the evidence is compared tothe hypotheses, but 
hypotheses are tested by other hypotheses, weighed against each other on basis 
of subjective (probability) estimates. This ~11ay of reasoning treats the degree 
of probability of a certain statement (hypothesis, conclusion from the given 
evidence) as a measure of.the feelings of certainty or uncertainty, of beliefs 
or doubts, which may be aroused in us by certain asserti'ons or conjectures. 
Hypothesis testing in inductive reasoning is comp~ring the sequence of, 
hypotheses for its most believable, most convincing one. 
It is true that one can obtain classes of hypotheses, diagnoses, 
individuals in this way, but these classes will still be individual concepts -
concepts defined with the help of personal oriented names. Individual, because 
the validity of the inductive inference is based upon the proportion of former 
experienced inferences which led to conclusions which were true to the subject. 
He has merely drawn a portrait of his conceptually prefigured conclusion 
(Hadamard, in 6) 
A diagnosis can be regarded as a very special personal statement bearing in 
it a personal opinion and prediction. Questioning this statement is questioning 
the person. The physician has committed himself to his judgment. The reflecting 
physician is then caught in an insoluble conflict between a demand for an 
impersonality which would discredit all the commitments (to the judgment) and an 
urge to make up his mind which drives him to recommit himself (6). 
Against this background we have to face the results of this study. Not the 
conclusion (inductive strategy) but its consequences give rise to much concern. 
It questions the generality of medical science. It questions the generality of 
medical knowledge and its methods; it questions its classification and its 
concepts. It demarcates, in Popperian sense the physics from the metaphysics; 
science from art. In our. study several examples of this phenomenon have been 
given. 
Although not 'strictly valid' the investigation attained some degree of 
'reliability' or of 'probability' by its participants' judgments. In this sense 
the conclusion can only be an inductive one: a theory temporarily accepted until 
a better, more valid one comes along. It is the fate of a descriptive study: it 
observes predicted features and elements; it proves nothing.The study has 
created a theory of problem solving to which Newell et al. (7) formulated a 
number of conditions: 
1.) it should predict the performance of a problem solver handling specific tasks; 
2.) it should explain how human problem solving takes place; 
3.) it should indicate what processes are used; 
4.) it should indicate what mechanisms perfo~ these processes; 
5.) it should predict the incidental phenomena that accompany problem solving, and 
the relation of these to the problem solving task; 
6.) it should show how changes in the attendant conditions - both changes vrinside" 
the problem solver and changes in the task confronting him alter the 
problem-solving behaviour; 
7.) it should explain how specific and general problem-solving skills are learned, 
and ~Jhat it is that the problem-solver "got" when he has learned them. 
Briefly, it can be stated that validity may be assumed when the model predicts 
the operations actually employed in the task performance. 
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This investigation produced failure and success. Failure in that we could not 
trace a deductive strategy, as it was designed in our model. In the first phase' of 
classification, we selected 10 records with a rather abundant primary data 
collection, (10 questions or more ahead of the generation of the first hypothesis). 
However, they nearly all failed to fulfil the second criterion of the progression 
(;.;Own the levels. In only one record a trace of such a progression could be 
signalized. But this last record failed in the criterion of rejection: two hypotheses 
remained apart from the diagnosis. Thoroughly looking into the record and applying 
the HRS/ HPS criteria, we learned that this case fitted into the Inductive-Heuristic 
strategy. 
We seriously regret this absence of a deductive strategy. Although Harre (8) 
supposes the hypothetico-deductive method being actually an inductive mode, we think 
it possible a deductive strategy could exist. The failure to detect any deductive 
strategy in our material can be attributed to several causes. 
1.) the method of investigation was not suitable to detect the deductive 
strategy; 
2.) the number of participants or the composition (mainly family physicians, a 
small number of general internist) of the group have made the detection of a 
deductive strategy less probable; 
3.) physicians do not practice in a deductive way; 
4.) medical science is not structured in a way which permits a deductive way of 
reasoning. 
From our material and literature we shall conclude that the latter 
considerations are the more valid ones. 
The absence of a deductive strategy in our material deprives us of the special 
and necessary insight into this method on the basis of empirical evidence. 
Comparisons between the deductive and inductive inference processes could have 
provided several questions and solutions thusfar unknown or unthought of. 
We gained success sofar, that we ascertained a mode of problem solving 
consistent across physicians, problems and situations. We realize that 
generalizations from this study may be hazardous.However,the methods and the 
procedures physicians employ in solving patients' problems are so strikingly similar 
and uniform across the various physicians and problems,that as a result we cannot see 
why the 68 physicians who participated in this study would essentially differ from 
their colleagues elsewhere.As we argued before (chapter IV) a notable characteristic 
of the medical profession is that its practitioners almost perfectly recognize each 
other's troubles,behaviour,and working patterns.This study elucidated these working 
patterns as explicit methods as they are employed in day-to-day practice. 
The validity of the strategy discriminating criteria is in the predictive force 
of the model, and the experience of reality of the simulation by the participants. 
(chapter VII). 
Recapitulating we found: : 
1. a cycling process as could be pictured by (re)naming the adjacent symptoms 
towards the hypothesis to which they belonged (HRS, HPS).The coding system for 
symptoms and h}~otheses enabled us to elicit the special circular arrangement of the 
hypotheses (see chapter VII). 
This procedure follows from the basic principle of inductive inference: evidence 
(or premise) stems from hypothesis rather than from the presented facts. As argued 
before, inductive reasoning is a weighing of induced hypotheses rather than a 
processing procedure of data. 
As a consequence we found: 
2. the creation of a "hypotheses-base" which is visited and revisited during 
the course of the work-up. The subjective (probability) estimates attached to each 
hypothesis eventually lead to the weighing procedure; 
3. the 'inductive' hypothesis cannot be viewed as a member of a hierarchical 
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system but must be conceived as a pattern which has been evoked by a more or less 
stri!ring resemblance with a :memorized J;·attern. It does not follow from the evidence, 
nor does the evidence cover all attribuies of the pattern. The 'inductive' hypothesis 
cannot be generalized across physicians and patient problems beca·JSe of its personal 
ch.aracter and commi tme:nt ; 
4. As a consequence of the former item the levels of the generated hypotheses 
do not follow a particular pattern. Every sequence of hypotheses (hypothesis base) 
which follows a more or less hierarchicaJ nesting is quite accident~!; 
5. For reasons of personal commitment rejection of hypotheses plays only a 
minor role. Appro~tmately 20% of the hypotheses 1n the relevant strategies i.e. 
excluding the pattern-recognition strategies, were rejected. Rejection of hypotheses 
can be assumed to b~ quite accidental; 
6. We alsc 
organ systems. In 
environment. 
found a conspicuous variability of hypotheses across the various 
our opinion, it pictures a search behaviour io an uncertain task 
On the other hand, the fuzziness of medical symptomatology forces the 
practitioner to v1sit various organ systems, especially the ones ~djacent 
in consideration. rt raises the question whether medical science itself 
practitioners to part1cular methods and behaviour; 
scrupulous 
to the one 
forces its 
7. In a sequence of hypotheses, the diagnosis represents neither the 
definitive one nor the one with the lowest-level refinement. 
Besides, diagposes seem to be very personal statements uncomparable to each 
other, even in similar cases. 
This finding questions medical taxonomy when based on the classification of 
physician's diagnos~s and/or other reference features (e.g. reasons for encounter). 
8.) We found corroboration for the hypothesis concerning the endpoint of the 
diagnostic process. the endpoint being marked by a maximum subjective (posterior) 
probability and a m:1..m.mum of (subjectively experienced) uncertainty. Not only the 
weighing of the hypotheses plays a role. but the personal confidence of the physician 
as well. 
(We found some 1ndications that in 
estimates may contribute to precocious 
patient.) 
a minority of cases declining certainty 
action, mostly the Teferring of the 
The confidence 1n the conclus~on of the diagnostic process 1s reflected in the -
practical absence of any testing of the diagnosis. Even 1n the reviewing and 
reconsidering of the process by videotape after 3 - 4 days the confidence in one's 
own judgment was unshru<able. Nobody changed or even questioned his judgment. 
9.) The personal and subjective characteristics of the diagnosis and the 
treatment led to the confusing arrangement of the attributes. Supposing the majority 
of equal diagnose~ (= equal names of diseases) to be right Jess than 50% of the 
diagnoses were acc·urate. (lowest 27%. highest 84% of the total number of diagnoses 
mentioned per case. 
10.) As the model predicted, action and the decision to treatment automatically 
follow the conclusion of the diagnost1c process. This important decis1on was carried 
out within 
impression 
diagnostic 
a mintmum of time, between l/2 and 2 minutes later. It gives the 
that the decision about management and treatment 1s concealed in the 
reasoning process itself; it just has to be triggered to pop out. 
11.) The phys1cians' behaviour does not 
advocated in the domain of family practice. We 
family physician was mainly restricted to 
cases of referral to colleagues (consultant 
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reflect the continuing patient care as 
found that continuation of care by the 
cases which he himself attended to. In 
specialists) the responsibility of the 
care was largely t:cansmitted to the other person. It may partly reflect the personal 
commitment of the physician. Each health care attendant claims to have his own 
personal commitment a~d ethics. These moral values are not transferable, and cannot 
be questioned. TJ.~is attitude may hamper the effectivity of medical audit and other 
fonns of interphyslcian testing. 
12.) The effectivity of the physician's data collection is often questioned in 
:many li1ays. As data acquisition in the inductive strategy is conceived as a search for 
positive symptoms in order to confirm a hypothesis, the rather steep decline of the 
'ratio-effectiveness' (for description see chapter VIII) gives some support to this 
thou.ght. However. one has to make up one's mind whether to choose for efficiency or 
completeness. In our material these matters seem rather at variance. The contrast may 
picture the different task environments between the two groups: family physicians and 
general internists. A family physician has to 'see~ a large number of patients with a 
large variety of illnesses and complaints. His main task can be pictured as a pr~~ 
selection among the patients visiting him. His problem solving process, therefore, 
can ~ore or less be characterized by skimming the features and problP~ the patient 
presents to him.An internist is urged to take a thorough look at the diseased state 
of the patient. He is called to a more precise task performance for a smaller number 
of people. He strives for perfection. 
In other words, a general statement about physicians' effectivity in data 
acauisition cannot be given. It has to be specified for each group of physicians 
according to their speciality. 
The closer look at the details, like in the preceding example, creates a 
distinction between the groups, and, while progressing downwards, eventually between 
individuals. It was our purpose to create !~§! particular distance which would 
allow us to observe the general without blurring the details. To this end we 
originated three subtypes within the inductive strategy. This subdivision allowed to 
observe and study a number of specified items within a particular group or between 
the groups of participants. It might be clear that we did not reach beyond the 
dimension of a group of participants. Statements about individuals cannot be made. 
This subdivision consisted of three types: 
1) ~§!ter~-R~£QgQ!!!Q~ 
It is the strategy of "the happy thought". It is not one among a great many 
ideas to be pondered upon at leisure, but one which carries conviction from the 
start. This strategy can be viewed as the most fundamental one among the inductive 
strategies. It underlines Hume's theory of induction that we believe to experience 
many things of a similar kind. It is the belief in orderliness, the belief that 
things will happen in the same way in the future. "When we have seen five white 
swans, we believe all swans to be white". It is the "habit of mind" which mali:es us 
believe that we will see more things of this kind9 without ackowledging any justification of the convictions expressed by this habit. 
Although Pattern-Recognition as a way of observing and thinking is a major 
strategy in the zoological and human world, its functioning is hardly understood. It 
operates through recognition of superficial resemblances. It operates in flashes~ 
enabling animals to survive by fast recognition of their enemies. 
Although patients are, generally, not their physicians' enemies, the same 
strategy enables physicians to recognize and to react fast. It enables family 
physicians to perform their main task: making quick selections among a large 
population. The results of this study approximately 100% of the pattern 
recognition strategy was employed by family physicians - confirm this thesis. In 
modeling this strategy. we originally delineated the process as a quick hypothesis 
generation after the presentation of the complaint (2 items). In our material. 
howeverp we found a group of 26 family physicians cautiously asking a varying number 
of questions ahead of the first and only hypothesis. They exhibited a slightly 
different behaviour: a hesitating start and a - very - confident conclusion. We 
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named this group after the hesitating start. We do not know whether it is either a 
product of the simulation, the environment, or in general, the research, in which· 
case it has to be referred to as an artefact; or a mode of action actually to be 
found in practice. Our opinion tends to the former explanation. 
2.) !~Q~£i!Y~ ~1g2r!1~!£ m~!hQg . It consists of the induction of a sequence 
of "patterns" (hypotheses) through the application of systematic methods 
(algorithms). Systematic methods are employed in many cases and in many preblems. 
Usually they are far too laborious to be carried out in practice. It cannot be a 
coincidence that this strategy falls largely within the group of internists. · 
Regrettably, we must ascertain that 'algorithmic' or 'systematic' mainly refers 
to a personal conception of these terms. Any generalization of this 'systematic 
method' appears to be illusory. 
!~du£i!Y~ ~~~r!~i!£ m~1h2Q . 3.) 
"The 
heuristic, 
deliberate 
(6). 
difference between the two kinds of problem solving, the systematic and the 
reappears in the fact, that while a systematic operation is a wholly 
act, a heuristic process is a combination of active and passive stages" 
Heuristic can be described as a trial and error search program based on series 
of successful (past) random trials. 
The difference 
elucidated by two 
the questions. 
in behaviour between these two latter strategies can be 
features: the pace of questioning and the hypothesis-relevancy of 
As mentioned the I.-A. mode is marked by its more or less fixed runs or 
questions, only scarcely influenced by the patient's answers. Because of its rather 
traditional sequence the questions can be asked at a high pace. The purpose of this 
type of questioning is the screening of the health status of the patient regardless 
of the particular hypotheses for this case. 
In the heuristic fashion the questioning is more or less linked with the answers 
of the patient. We observed an acceleration of the questioning when answers were 
affirmative (completion of the pattern in mind), and a slackening when answers were 
repeatedly negative. In real encounters we could observe that vague questions led to 
uncertain answers, which in turn led to fuzzy questions from the part of the 
physician, and so on. A deadlock could be overcome by a prescription. 
In our material we found a difference of 1.3 questions per minute: average 
figures for family physicians were 2.9 questions/minute, for general internists 4.2 
questions/minute. 
The Non-Hypothesis-Related-symptoms (NHRS) 
the I-H strategy 26 %. 
took up 41% in the I-A strategy, in 
The prediction for both 'strategy-behaviours' has been confirmed by the figures. 
After this brief sketch of some general conclusions, we now again face the 
question of the validity and reliability of the model. We may, therefore, return to 
the Newell et al. (7) condition scheme (see page 2 of this chapter). 
We shall discuss these conditions in the order as they have been posed. 
1.) The model should predict the performance of a problem solver handling 
specific tasks. As we have argued before, it is our opinion that the detailed 
approach of the medical problem solving blurs the recognition of the general traits 
and characteristics of this process. Every culture, every nation has its particular 
characteristics recognizable and known to most of us. However, this does not mean 
that each individual as a part of this culture or nation, therefore, represents these 
characteristics. The French, the English, or the German national characteristics are 
distinguishable from each other, but it does not mean that while observing Monsieur 
Dupont, or Mr. Brown, or Herr Mueller, we are able to recognise these particular 
characteristics. In our situation, the uniqueness of the medical problem solver as a 
person prevents him from observing the elements he has in common with his colleagues. 
We focused on groups of physicians and found a general strategy (inductive 
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inference). Both groups, family physicians and general internists could be typifie4 
according to the subtypes within the inductive strategy. In the preceding section we 
gave various examples of differences in handling specific tasks regarding the 
participants. 
2.) The model should explain how human problem solving takes place. The problem 
solving process mainly takes place in an inductive ~<Jay of reasoning. It gives the. 
process that peculiar personal touch which is often referred to as "the physician's 
art"? or "the clinical view", or the "flair clinique". It is based upon (a sequence 
of) patterns as analogies of memorizations, as the expression of the physician's 
recollection of similar combinations of features or circumstances. The details of 
this type of problem solving have been sketched in previous sections and chapters. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to demonstrate a (hypothetico-) deductive way.of 
reasoning. We sincerely deplore this circumstance, because the controversy between 
the opinions thus still remains. For ~1e cannot prove whether the research method 
created the inductive method and/or prohibited a deductive method. Our material 
provides a reasonable belief, nothing more, nothing less. 
3.) The model should indicate what processes are used. A number of typical 
elements of the inductive inference has been explained. To repeat briefly: 
a.) a circular way of reasoning, as descended from the hypothesis 
related-symptoms (see chapters VI and VIII); 
b.) construction of a hypothesis-base; 
c.) hypotheses are tested against each other; 
d.) hypotheses are weighed according to subjectively estimated probabilities and 
the physician's feeling of (un)certainty; 
e.) the acquired evidence need not cover the diagnosis (viewed as a set of 
symptoms), or vice versa; 
f.) the therapeutic management plan is already implicitly incorporated in the 
diagnostic process. 
4. The model should indicate which mechanisms perfor.m these processes. 
After the problem has been stated and an internal representation has taken place 
(the physician has translated the patient's problem into his o~m words) a suitable 
method is selected and applied to proceed towards the solution of the problem. 
"A method, then, is tied closely to its associated problem formulation. The. 
method resides in the probl~n solver prior to its evocation to deal with any 
individual task. Thus the method must be fashioned without specific knowledge of the 
particular problem situations it will be called upon to handle. Consequently, 
mechanisms must exist in the problem solver for bringing the problem solving method 
into effective correspondence with each individual problem situation, so that the 
method can actually discover something about the situation and act on it" (9). 
Because of the character of this study, we can only guess for the mental 
mechanisms which may take place. 
We have already described the cycling process as based on a series of patterns 
elicited by only a small number of 'trigger-symptoms'. When these "trigger-symptoms" 
meet tentacles (daemons) from· some frames in long-term memory matching can take 
place, which causes the full frame (a complete disease description) to enter into 
short-term memory (see also Pauker et al.(lO). 
The first pattern which rises to consciousness is apparently based on only a few 
(mainly 2) symptoms (the presented complaint). However, to make up one's mind in 
order to generate an alternative pattern (and/or to overthrow the previous one) asks 
for a more substantial number of symptoms. We found a more or less fixed number of 
questions (16 plus or minus 1) in each cycle, regardless of the presented patient 
case. This finding applies for all six full cycles. Its meaning cannot be ascertained 
within the context of this study. It would be intriguing to link this finding to 
Miller's theory on Channel Capacity and "chunking" (ll), combining bits of 
information to chunks, or as a variation to this theme, symptoms (aspects) into 
patterns. 
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The quality and the difficulty of the presented problem evidently influence 
the choice for one of the three ('four) subtypes of the inductive strategy. 
Apparently, this feature does not fundamentally alter the strategy, i.e. from 
inductive to deductive. 
We predicted the 'even-numbered' patient-scenarios as the more difficult 
ones (and consequently the 'odd-numbered as the easy ones).This prediction could 
be corroborated for most of the variables as we have defined for the medical 
process.However, complete problem-dependency could not be assigned to the 
various case work-ups. Evidently,the procedure is more or less superimposed by 
personal characteristics of the physician. We could observe a personal 
commitment to the process and its outcome as can be typified by the absence of 
any reconsideration or readjustment of the work-up and its diagnosis during the 
revision of the videotape. 
The real mental mechanisms still remain obscure. The study may only be of 
help to lift a corner of the veil. 
5) It should predict the incidental phenomena that accompany problem 
solving,and the relation of these to the problem solving task. 
A number of the incidental phenomena accompanying the problem soving has 
been described as being part of inductivism. We shall repeat briefly some of 
these phenomena. 
a.) the heuristic search for hypotheses is typified by the ·high degree of 
variability of these hypotheses over the levels; 
b.) a detailed description of the diseases as diagnosed by the physicians, 
and, consequently, the possibility for a reliable and valid classification of 
diseases,is contrasted by the level variation of the diagnoses. (see table 13, 
chapter VIII); 
c.) there is a lack of agreement among the participants for the symptoms to 
base a diagnosis upon. 
Generally, only half of them agreed on one or two symptoms. The basis for a 
diagnosis, therefore, lacks consistency, as viewed from a descriptive 
standpoint; 
d.) the large variation of 
prevalences and incidences lends a 
solving; 
subjective estimates for probabilities, 
very personal character to the problem 
e) the variation among the composing elements of a disease description as 
the physicians had memorized (external consistency), places serious restrictions 
to diagnostic comparisons, medical audits, and the construction of medical data 
bases. This finding can be examplified by the variation of disease descriptions 
as can be found in most medical textbooks; 
f) when the diagnosis (the set of composing elements constructing a disease 
description as memorized by the physician) is related to the acquired 
symptoms,these symptoms cover only two-thirds of the totally memorized set of 
symptoms.In our opinion,it indicates the physician's alertness for the 
variability in patients,in the presentation of complaints,in co-operation,in 
situations,reactions and so on.Because of its implication its extent is 
difficult to ascertain. 
6) It should show how changes in the attendant conditions - both changes 
"inside" the problem solver and changes in the task confronting him - alter the 
problem solving behaviour. 
As we did not change the attendant conditions,this requirement cannot 
formally be fulfilled.We can only elucidate this condition by some casual 
observations. 
Some physicians started quite determinedly in a kind of pattern-recognition 
mode and ended up in a lengthy inductive-algorithmic type. Other physicians 
started with a hesitating pattern recognition method and ended up in an 
inductive-heuristic strategy. 
Some physicians who were unacquainted with a particular patient 
presentation reacted by restriction of the interviewing and referred the patient 
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to a colleague-consultant. (One physician referred the patient immediately after 
the presentation of the complaint without asking a single question.) Other 
physicians reacted in an opposite direction in similar cases: they went on and 
on interviewing the patient desperately grasping for a foothold. But all of 
these "inside" or "outside" changes took place at an individualistic level and 
cannot be generalized. As argued before, too detailed an observation blurs the 
vision. 
7.)It should explain how specific and general problem-solving skills are 
learned,and what it is that the problem solver "got" when he has learned them. 
Thusfar, the student was supposed to learn the (hypothetico-)deductive 
method, the 11 tmiversal method in problem-solving (12) 91 • But when neither older 
or younger physicians, especially the ones who had recently left medical school, 
nor the teachers (a number of the family physicians-participants and most 
general internists are assigned to a formal teaching status) employed this 
"universal method", one starts to question the aforementioned assertion of 
student learning. Most student-teaching starts from "the presupposition that it 
is possible to come to a faultless diagnosis (according to the medical 
classification system) with the rules of logic when all diseases (of that 
classification) are knrn~ and the physician is able to collect all information 
from the sick patient" (13). But, as Gerritsma & Small continue, when medical 
training is attuned to only one technique of problem solving, one has to realize 
that this technique will be applied in practice by only a small proportion of 
the physicians". 
Our findings question the presumption of the teaching of a (hypothetico) 
deductive mode of medical problem solving. We suggest that medical problem 
solving teaching, when taught, implicitly more than explicitly, transmits an 
inductive inference mode. The sooner this notion is acknowledged the sooner 
teaching programs can be reconstructed in an explicit way and aimed at methods 
which are really practiced in day-to-day health care service. 
Most conditions of the Newell et all (7) axioms to model validity have been 
fulfilled. Our findings largely cover the predictions which can be made from the 
model. We shall conclude the inductive model to be a reliable and valid theory 
for studying physicians' problem solving methods and behaviour. Especially 
because we can mention the general acceptance of the procedure by the 
participants, having enjoyed this particular type of investigati?n· 
On several occasions scattered through this book we mentioned a number of 
consequences resulting from inductivism. We shall now discuss in close-up and 
more coherently. The main consequences descend from the typical characteristics 
of inductivism. 
I : it is based on personal - or in the words of Polanyi - tacit knowledge; 
II: the process' steps are irreversable. 
The main consequence of the personal character is that the knowledge and 
the acts can only partly be formalized. By reflecting on the way in which we are 
performing a personal act, we may seem to establish rules for our own guidance. 
But such formalization must remain within the framework of the personal 
judgment. Any attempt to generalize this formalization is likely to go too far. 
All attempts to formalize the process of inductive inference go astray precisely 
in this respect 91 (6). In this sense, medicine resembles art. The rules of art do 
not determine its practice but they function as maximss which can serve as a 
guide only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art. 
Whether the rules are efficiently integrated can only be established by the 
outcome. Therefore, the judge's action is considered more authentic than what 
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he said what he is doing. The predominant emphasis physicians put on their 
diagnoses and treatment plans e>camplifies these thoughts. 
Skills, like connoisseurship of art, can be communicated only by example, 
not by precept. To be trained as a medical diagnostician one must go a long way 
of experience under the guidance of a master. Each new patient case, each new 
example is assumed to augment the - personal - knowledge of the student. This is 
the usual process of trial and error by which we feel our way to success and may 
continue to improve on our success without specifically knowing how we do it, 
for we never meet the causes of our success as identifiable things which can be 
described in terms of classes of which such things are members. We are faced 
with the general principle by which our beliefs are anchored in ourselves. A 
rule, a pattern, a treatment suggestion is accepted if we believe it to be 
actually useful to our purpose. The act of personal knowing can sustain these 
relations only because the physician· (or the student) believes that they are 
apposite: that he has not made them but discovered them. The discovery makes him 
believe that the element is a "real fact" existing outside himself. "Any 
presumed contact with reality inevitably claims universality" (6). 
The actual facts, on the other hand, are accredited facts as seen within 
the personal commitment situation. People are unable to observe without 
prejudice as Popper demonstrated for his pupils. 
But the subject believes the fact to be true. Bertrand Russel defines truth 
as a coincidence between one's subjective belief and the actual fact; yet it is 
impossible to say how the two could coincide. 
The basic principles of personal knowing are based upon rules of rightness, 
which account only for the successful working of the procedure, but their 
failures remain entirely unexplained. In a system of beliefs, e.g. a 
hypotheses-base, we will admit positive but no negative, evidence. These 
thoughts may explain the observations of various investigators in this field who 
describe physicians as being fervently looking for positive evidence and 
ignoring or neglecting negative evidence. 
Only if we believe that a solution exists we can passionately search for it 
and tempt ourselves to heuristic steps towards its discovery. When physicians 
stop to believe to be able to offer patients (a number of) solutions to their 
problems, they will lose ambition and, eventually, interest in their function. 
"Therefore, as the solution emerges in response to our search for something we 
believe to be there, it will always come to us with the conviction of its being 
true" (6). 
We can see how the whole process of discovery and confirmation ultimately 
relies on our own accrediting of our own vision of reality. In this sense, our 
confidence is an act of social allegiance. All these tacit commitments appear 
self-satisfying, irreversible and hence unspecifiable. These thoughts will be 
examplified by some of the findings. 
1.) ~~r~QQ§1 £omm!~~~ll~~ 
The conception as laid down in the preceding lines was that physicians 
consider their diagnoses and treatment plans as facts, as truths. They feel a 
strong commitment to their predictions and stick to them even when proven 
untenable. Questioning the diagnosis or the treatment plan means questioning the 
person, questioning his integrity. Medical law suits are often considered by the 
physician as a grave, personal attack. The emotional repercussions are sometimes 
far beyond the seriousness of the case because of personal involvement. 
A great deal of cognitive work and emotional investment required to reach a 
decision makes a person reluctant to admit to himself that his brainchild is 
defective. Commitment stabilizes a decision. One's commitment provides an anchor 
by which one's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour are marshaled or organized, 
which influences the way one evaluates and res·ponds to subsequent appeals or 
demands (14) 
A second aspect of the stability of the physician's statements arises from 
-269-
the automatic expansion of the circle in which an interpretative system 
operates. It readily supplies elaborations of the system which will cover almost 
any conceivable eventuality. Scientific theories which possess this 
self-expanding capacity are sometimes described as epicyclical (6). This 
epicyclical structure is a ready reserve of possible hypotheses available to 
e'@lain any conceivable event. Anybody who has visited a physician knows the 
doctor's unfailing source of explanations to unexplained events. 
The study enabled the participating physicians to comment, to reconsider, 
and to revise their processes. To this end every participant reviewed the 
videotape of these processes. Comments were audiotaped for elaboration 
afterwards. However, we found that none of the 68 physicians participating in 
the study, all together solving 253 cases, reconsidered or revised their 
original process although several suggestions from the part of the investigator 
have been made. Many of them lost interest in the review after one or two cases 
(out of four). 
Personal commitment is also e1etended to the hypotheses. Hypotheses may be 
regarded as the physician's children of memory. They reflect or simulate past 
personal experiences, good or bad, but always precious to the owner. Rejection 
of hypotheses not only means a changing of a decisional direction, but also 
something like throwing away your brainchild. 
On the average, less than 1 hypothesis per case has been rejected, 
representing appro~imately 20% of all hypotheses generated. 
The more the physician is involved, the higher the degree of commitment, 
the less likely hypotheses are rejected. The more a father knows his children 
the more he loves them. This is examplified by the rapidly decreasing rate of 
rejection progressing down the cycles. In the first cycle about half of the 
hypotheses is rejected, while in the third cycle the percentage decreased to 11, 
and in the fourth cycle to only 0.5. As we may remember, this finding can only 
slightly be attributed to the levels of refinement. 
Although the possibility was offered during the videoreviewing, rejection 
of hypotheses was not foremost in the physician's mind. 
Effects and consequences of commitment have more extensively been discussed 
by Janis & Mann (14). 
-270-
stands for the lack of reliability across judges of the same data and the 
same occasion. The physicians (judges) were asked to break down the picture ~f 
the diagnosis, they just arrived at, into its composing elements (symptoms~ 
signs, tests, etc.) These sets of components were compared to each other 
regarding the same diagnosis. 
We found a large variation of diagnoses (see table 66 chapter VIII, 
diagnostic gradation). Among these diagnoses only a few to~ere mentioned 
sufficient times to allow reliable comparisons. Seven of these homonymous 
diagnoses were found. In five of these seven diagnoses interjudge agreement 
could be reached for only one (!) symptom. The external consistency factor (for 
explanation see chapter VIII) ranged from 9,9 to 18.3 (maximum 100). 
can be defined as the reliability across data sources administered on the 
same occasion and interpreted by the same judge. 
The breakdown of the "diagnostic picture" was compared with the symptoms 
actually collected during the work-up of the case. The values represent the 
intrajudge agreement and are given in percentages ( compare with intra-observer 
agreement, chapter IV). 
On average, two thirds (64%) of the collected symptoms covered the set of 
composing (diagnostic) symptoms. For various cases the percentages ranged 
between 58 to 75, and remained within rather stable limits. 
This factor's relation to inductivism is in the personal character of each 
diagnostic process and in its irreversability. As the evidence does not cover 
the diagnosis, as we have already sketched as a characteristic of inductive 
inference, retracing of the process by means of its elements seems impossible. 
Either the memorized pictures of diseases vary in time, or the physician's 
verbal report on the diagnosis is "telling more than he can know". 
The lack of internal consistency is a serious drawback to comparability and 
judgment of problem solving processes. 
The personal character of the inductive inference process is also reflected 
by the subjective estimates of hypotheses-probabilities, prevalences, incidences 
and disease-consultation rates. 
The estimates for diseases in a population (prevalence, incidence and 
disease-consultation) stand out by their excessive variability. Prevalence rates 
for iron-deficiency anaemia vary from practically zero to over 1000 cases per 
10.000 inhabitants. Incidence rates for the same disease vary from 6 to 1000 
(per 10.000). Only the disease consultation rate (the number of times the 
patient visits the doctor for the same disease) shows some stability : between 
50 and 300. For myocardial infarction these figures range from 1 to 30 
(prevalence) 10 to 110 (incidence), and 10 to 500 (disease-consultation). These 
figures are across the years of experience of the participating physicians. 
(see figures 3, 4, 5, chapter VIII). 
The values for the probability estimates follow a similar 
variability-pattern across the physicians, for the prior probabilities as well 
as the posterior probabilities. (see figure 6, chapter VIII). 
These often extreme variabilities may pose serious limitations to 
projected reliable medical decision making. 
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Inductivism hampers the application of medical decision making in the 
general practice. By its character medical decision making contrasts with the 
inductivistic problem solving behaviour. Medical decision making treats the 
medical problem solving process as a scientific system. Any scientific system 
could be treated as a simple branching system (1). This branching system 
together with a system of weighings at each node and at each outcome of a branch 
is the basis-scheme of decision theory, in which processing steps are reversible 
along the branches. The system of weighing is based on the prior probability, 
generally represented by the prevalence of the disease in question, and the 
adjustments of this probability in the light of the acquired evidence towards a 
certain outcome. With the help of a value given to a predicted or expected 
state-of-health, as outcome of the disease (expected utility), to each node in 
the branching system a value (probability) can be attached. 
Within a system feedback plays a dominant role. As a matter of fact, 
negative feedback is the fundamental strategem of all control systems. However, 
negative feedback is avoided in inductive inference. As we have pictured before, 
neither are we able to construct reliable weighing systems, nor do we have the 
possibilities to retrace the process as it actually occurs in practice. The 
basic structure of decision making is a deductive one and does not coincide with 
the inductivistic processes in daily health care. 
In our opinion, in medical decision making as a discipline a choice has to 
be made: it has to build its own medical theory and structure, or it has to 
subsume to the inductivistic way of reasoning by rebuilding its system in close 
co-operation with medical practitioners. 
There are two main elements that hamper learning from experience: the 
inductivistic character of the medical process and the medical philosophy. 
Medicine has two qualities distinctive from science: it deals with irreplaceable 
individuals and it has to act even when wise (or scientific) policy would be to 
restrain. 
Nowadays physicians may not stand in the wings and wait and see what 
happens to the patient. As we have pictured in chapter IV, current medical 
science can bear no knowledge about the natural course of diseases. 
Consequently, the prediction for a disease can no longer be based on natural 
outcomes, but the outcomes are nearly always drug-induced. These outcomes are no 
longer based on pathophysiological consequences of diseases but are iatrogenic 
products. Needless to say that the latter ones bear a very personal character. 
To realize what one is doing and to determine the. effectivity and 
efficiency of one's process, the prediction to a case has to be compared with 
what actually happens. But when the prediction is based on varying a~d personal 
standards, how can anybody establish the effectivity and the quality of the 
actions taken? And even when the outcome satisfies patient and physician, this 
simple fact does not explain how one has arrived at this result. 
In medicine acting means the exclusion of non-acting. The individualistic 
character of the medical process excludes by its very existence a number of 
options. When a physician prescribes drug X it excludes the prescription of drug 
Y for the same patient, otherwise than as a combination. The prescription also 
debars the non-prescription. The advantages or disadvantages of drug X for the 
patient cannot be compared with the advantages or disadvantages for drug Y for 
the same patient at the same moment. Other patients and other moments create 
different circumstances. 
The observation of the results of the treatment poses another possibility 
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of error, an error extension of which we are unaware. 
Sometimes a physician has to act in cases of life-threathening diseases or 
cases with the risk of serious disablement. His life-saving acts, however, 
cannot be proved to be the better ones because the acting is irreversible. The 
physician acts, and has to act, on basis of reasonable belief, from the 
inductivistic character of his problem solving as well as from vocational duty. 
But, as we argued, inductive reasoning includes irreversibility of the 
process. It cannot explain the causes of failures, because the operational 
principle bears in it the conditions of the success. In this sense, the medical 
process is a one-way process. But when feedback mechanisms do not exist, how can 
a physician learn from these instances? How can he learn by trial and. error when 
he cannot detect the causes of the errors? 
To test the hypothesis that experience does not enhance medical 
capabilities, we matched a number of the variables with groups of physicians. 
These groups were differentiated by the years in practice: a group of 
physicians 0 - 5 years in practice, one group from 6 - 20 years, and a last one 
with physicians who practiced for over 20 years. These distinctions were 
empirically based. 
Matching with the relevancy factor, total time per case work-up, the number 
of hypotheses, posterior probabilities, certainty estimates, and therapeutic 
management revealed no relevant differences, thus confirming the hypothesis. 
For the number of questions and prior probability estimates the middle 
group scored slightly different than the other groups. For these items 
experience seems beneficiary, but declines for the elder group. The middle group 
employed the pattern-recognition strategies in a significantly higher 
percentage. Probably, the confidence in their judgments scores higher for this 
group. 
On the basis of available literature (e.g.21,69,100), the concepts of the 
inductive theory, and our findings, we conclude that learning from experience is 
at least questionable. 
The consequences of the employment of the inductive model in the medical 
processes are far-reaching. We come to realize that medical data bases as they 
are mainly based on subjective estimates and data like diagnoses, treatments, 
and probabilities, represent unreliable sources of general information. They 
contain information strongly colored by personal op1n1ons, interests and 
concepts. Diagnoses of one physician cannot be compared with the same diagnoses 
of another physician, and so on. 
Unless the medical nomenclature can be clearly defined, these types of 
information sources can only have a restricted value, and may not contribute to 
the improvement of the health care. 
For the same reason medical classification systems need revision. Even if 
diseases or diagnoses are inclosed on basis of the highest level of refinement 
(sharp circumscription), we cannot be sure that one and the same element is 
inclosed. The current systems reveal the ambiguity of the supposedly impersonal 
terms. Nevertheless, without the knowledge of the health or diseased state of a 
population medical science and health care policy run the risk of going astray. 
It is our opinion that data-base constructions and medical classification, 
especially in the world of general practice, must be based on the 'atomic' 
element in medicine, the symptom. It needs an innovative approach to 
traditionalistic medicine. It can help to improve clinical judgments and student 
teaching and learning. 
From the latter statement we shall cast a view to the future. 
We think that three main routes for future research lay ahead: medical 
decision making, medical classification, and medical education. These subjects 
are interdependent and closely interwoven. In the light of the results of this 
study medical decision making as a discipline has to make up it mind, which of 
the two options to choose: 
1.) proceeding along the line of the optimizing strategy according to 
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Decision Theory; or 
2.) adopting the lines of the satisficing strategy which seems much more 
attuned to the inductivistic and heuristic way of functioning of the :medical 
practitioners. 
As already mentioned, the optimizing variant of the decision-theoretical 
approach appears to contrast with the actual processes in health care. This 
means, in our opinion, that either the optimizing theo1-y has to build its own 
medical structure and system to accomodate · its theory and its various 
applications, or it has to drop its claim to be or to become the practical 
assistance to the routine health care of physicians. 
Let us make clear that we do not oppose a reconstruction of :medical 
knowledge, as mentioned on several occasions in this book. It would be the first 
reconstruction after the eminent worlrs of Thomas Sydenham four centuries ago. 
HoNever, the challenge is high, the resistaTlce to change too. In a society in 
which eternity no longer exists, and short term successes are preferred to long 
term items~ this task appears to bear little reward. 
Nevertheless, we plan to .construct a small scale medical data-base, 
predominantly based on with the words of Blois- the 'atomic pieces', or 
'bits' of medical information; on symptoms and their aspects, including signs, 
tests, etc. For each patient the 'bits' will be clustered into 'chunks' which 
will primarily be nominated after the physician's original dia~1osis. This 
nomenclature, may be changed when more and more homonymous 'chunks' can be 
developed. The contents of the 'chunks', the cluster of composing 'bits', 
primarily can change within limiting ranges, progressively restricting when the 
'chunks' get their definitive for.ms.The scatterdiagrams as presented in Chapter 
VIII e"amplify these thoughts.It is our intention to strive for a more complete 
covering of the "symptom - space" for a particular disease entity. 
In this phase the physician is able to call the 'chunks' by means of a 
(number of) 'bit(s)' in order to compare the contents of the 'chunk' with the 
symptoms collected from the patients enabling recognition of patterns. 
The feedback mechanisms of the system to the physician and the physician to 
the system should control this medical data-base system. We think it possible 
that changing societies, changing environments, changing hygiene, changing 
health states have outdated the current system of diseases and syndromes. The 
difficulties the especially family - physicians experience in classifying 
(i.e. diagnosing) the presented illness picture of the patient underlines these 
thoughts. 
We constructed a model (by lack of a suitable name, we shall call it the 
R-model containing approximately 6000 items, covering the main bulk of symptoms 
met in general health care (see chapter VII). With the help of this R-model, we 
shall try to originate and construct a medical data base which really allows and 
enables physicians to communicate in a two-way version. In our opinion, the two 
way communication is an essential condition to persuade medical practitioners to 
participate and to contribute to an alternative medical m1owledge system. 
This data base system and a - possibly - alternative medical classification 
may provide more substantial values for some kind of weighing system, presumably 
esse~tial to whatever type of decision making system. Possibly, these values can 
also be incorporated in some kind of Artificial Intelligence system. 
It will be clear to every physician that to cope with the ove~Jhelming 
amount of information in medicine and adjacent domains, and still more to come, 
some kind of assistence is needed to ascertain a reliable 9 effective and 
efficient health care. As we discussed in chapter I, these qualities are more 
and more questioned. We cannot stay aside and watch developments. We, 
physicia~s, must actively participate in these developments. 
One of these actions might be the education of our future colleagues. They 
have to learn substantial methods as they are actually performed and will be 
carried out in actual practice. 
nTraining programs aimed at the education of problem-solving techniques 
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with the principles of formal logic (deductive reasoning), Bayesian statistic$ 
and problem orientec:,i medical records incur a risk of transmitting·a wa:y'of 
thinking that hardly exists in practice and is probably quite useless"(l3). 
We are planning to develop a training program for students (and physicians) 
based on the design of this study. The R-model allows a very good storage 
capacity and retrieval rate. It can be approached in a written, verbal an4 a 
computerized way. Further advantages are: 
- it challenges student's problem-solving skills; 
- it allows the student to follow his own reasoning pathways; 
- it allows good scoring possibilities of the separate data; 
-it allows students for an extensive interaction with the 'patient'; 
all types of clinical patients can be modelled; 
ambiguities can be prevented by careful designing; 
it allows scoring possibilities for the problem selving methods and 
pathways; 
it allows revisiting special items; 
- it allows retracing of the process' steps; 
it covers the entire medical process, from presenting complaint till 
establishment of the treatment; 
in case of the verbal mode the cueing problem is avoided (cueing: 
suggesting questions, options or categories to the testee that otherwise did not 
cross his mind) ; 
- the construction of a 'paper patient' is easy, fast, and at low costs. 
Disadvantages are: 
- in case of the verbal mode the use of a competent operator is needed; 
reliable and extensive data collection from real patients, their 
relatives, and their medical caretakers is needed. 
It is our intention to set up training programs for students and physicians 
(the latter category for continuing education). Whether the R-model can serve as 
an intermediary for medical audit is still a matter of discussion. 
Our aim is to make explicit what thusfar is implicit. To show, to make 
observable the steps and the actions, the thoughts and the deliberations of 
physicians solving problems patients present to them. To assist to recognize 
what is going on for the purpose of understanding and improving the processes of 
caring and curing people. Perhaps it is this caring aspect of our profession why 
physicians have adapted and practice an inductive strategy. Because inductive 
reasoning permits people to recognize individuals. 
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With regard to the question what is to be tran$mitted in teaching two 
aspects have to be considered: 
a) the contents of the specialty; and 
b) the problem-solving methods with regard to the specialty. 
On the first aspect an overwhelming amoUnt of book$ and articles has bee~ 
written in medicine. 
The second 8Spect is usually only mentioned in passing. In my opinion, ~his 
subject has thusfar been greatly undervalued. When one is unable to trace the -
problem-solving processes how can anyone determine the efficscy, the 
effectivity, and the efficiency of this process, or value~ the outcome. To state 
it in Magerien terms: "If you do not know where to g;o, you may very well end up 
somewhere else- and not even know it." 
How physicians solve clinical problems is the main object of this research. 
The investigator studied and modeled two of the eldest and famous ways of 
pJroblei!Jlrsolving: the deductive and the inductive strategy9 with the modern 
probability reasoning viewed as an extension of the latter strategy. 
All 68 physicians who participated in this investigation used the inductive 
strategy for the -usually four - presented patient-problems. Within the 
inductive strategy three variants could be distinguished. 
The consequences of this finding are far-reaching. As the inductive 
strategy does not include a logical hierarchy of argumentationsteps, retracing 
of the process is impossible. (This aspect is also relate~ to our opinions about 
experience-knowledge end teaching)A 
As the hypothesis generation is prior to the acquisition of infot~tion, 
this latter aspect can only be viewed in the light of the former~ and thus 
limited to a small number of domains. 
As the hypothesis generation is - partly - unrelated to the total available 
amount of information, the decision making (chopsing the ultimate diagnostic 
hypothesis) will usually follow implicit~ personal trends and standards, e.g. 
satisfying minimal eicpectations (Satisficing Theory, Simon} or risk-avoiding 
prospects (Prospect Theory, Kahnemann & Tversky). It suggests a highly personal 
character of diagnostics and/or the therapeutic management, which is 
contradictory to general accessibility of medical knowledge and medical 
teaching. 
This feature of personal concepts easily links up with Polanyi's theory of 
"PeJrsonal" or 91Tacit Knowledge" as contrasted to "Objective Knowledge" (Popper) 9 
which has general accessibility and validity. During the investigation this 
as~oct came forth. The framework of the investigation (patient simulation) end 
the special definitions and coding of illness elements (symptoms, signs 9 tests) 
all~wed for comparing similar conceptions (diagnoses, treatments) ~ong the 
participants. These comparisons confirm Polanyi's theory and the concepts of 
inductive reasoning. Mutual comparibility of diagnoses seems hardly possible 
when analysing these conceptions into their basic elements (symptoms etc.). 
This aspect touches upon one of the main cornerstones of clinical ~edicine. 
When the starting positions have not been unequivocally defined treatment, 
.,;ie-Jed as the intervention in the natural course of a disease, can only lead t4:!1 
uncertain outcomes. 
The lack of · standardized :medical definitions and a tmiform, unambiguous 
taxonomy inhibits the application of a formalised, normative decision theorry for 
clinical medicine. 
Future planning aims at a reconsideration of medical terminology~ medical 
taxonomy and medical problem-solving methods by means of clustering the basic 
elements of clinical medicine. 
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!~dian men zich de vraag stelt wat men in bet onderwijs meet overdragen 9 
dan ric.ht zich d!at op twee facetten: 
a) de i:nhou.d van het vakgebied; en 
ib) de meth.oden waarmee :men voorltomende problellBen (in dst vakgebied) kan 
oplossem~. 
In de geneeskunde zijn met betrekking tot het eerste facet bibliothcl[en vol 
gescb.reven. Het tweede facet krijgt veel minder aandacht en wordt meestal 
slechts terloops aangeduid. Near :mijn :mening is dit een onde~iaardering van dit 
aspect. Indian men n1e~ in staat is de - probleem-oplosaende - processen te 
tracerenp hoe kan men dan de doeltreffendheid ( en de doelmatigheid) van het 
proces te weten komen, of de waarde die men toe moet kennen san de uitkomst 
o'la2r1Yan. Of zoals Mager het zei: 11 If you do :mot know where to go, you :msy veey 
well end u.xp some'W'here else - and not even know it". 
JB!oe a:rtsen patient-problemen oplossen is de vra.agstelling in dit onderzoek. 
De onderzoeker richt zich daarbij op de bestudering en ~odellering van twee van 
de oudst bekende wijzen van probleem-oplossen: de deductieve en de inductieve 
st:rategie, waarbij de m0derne waa.rschijnli .. ikheidsleer gezien wordt in het 
verlengde van de inductieve methode. 
Alle 68 deelnemende artsen geb:ruikten voor het oplqssen van de - in het 
algemeen vier voorgelegde patient-problemen de inductieve st:rategie, waar·in 
een d:rietal varianten voor enige variatie zorgden. 
De consequenties van deze bevinding zijn ver-reikend. Omda.t de inductieve 
strategie geen logische hierarchie van (argumentatie)-stappen kent 9 is het 
(re)trsceren van het proces niet (meer) mogelijk. Dit aspect heeft tevens 
betekenis voo:r de opvattingen over ervarings-kennis en ervarings-overdracht. 
Omdat in de inductieve st:rategie de hypothese-vo~ing voora.f gaat san de 
informatie--inwixming9 is dit laatste uitsluitend te zien in het licht ven het 
voorafgaande en is derhalve geli:miteerd tot slechts enkele aandachtsvelden. 
Omdat de hypothese-vor.ming gedeeltelijk los staat van de in totaal te 
ve:rk:rijgen informatie, za.l de bealuitvorming (het kiezen van de diagnostiache 
hypothese) in het algemeen verlopen volgens impliciete, persoonlijke normen, 
bijvoorbeeld het voldoen aan minimale verwachtingen (Satisficing Theory, Simon), 
of risico-vermijdende vooruitzichten (Prospect Theory, Kahnemann & Tve:rsky) enz. 
Dit geeft de diagnose-vorming en therapie-bepaling een eigen en persoonlij~ 
karakter waardoo:r deze aspecten niet of slecht overdraagbaa:r zijn. 
Dit karakter van persoonlijke concepten sluit aan bij de theorie van 
Polanyi, die sp:reekt van ''Personal" of "Tacit Knowledge"; di t in tegeDstelling 
tot ''Objective Knmdedlge" (Popper)~ die a.lgemeen toegamkelijk en geldig is. 
Tijclens bet onde:rzoek kwsm dit vraagstuk eve:neens aan de orde. Door de 
opzet van het onderzoe.k (simulatie van patienten) en een speciale indeHng en 
codering van ziekte-elementen (symptomen 9 verschijnselen, testen enz.) waren wij 
in staat om gelijksoortige concepties (diagnosen, the:rapieen enz.) onderling 
(tussen de artsen) te ve:rgelijken. Deze vergelijkingen bevestigen de opvattingen 
van Polanyi en die van de inductieve inferentie methoden. 
Indien men diagnosen als essentiele eenheden van de geneeskunde ontleedt in 
bun basale elementen (symptomen, verschijnselen enz.) lijkt unifo:rmiteit van 
diagnostiek~ en dus vergelijkbaarheid van diagnosen, een ve:r verwijderd 
idesal. 
Hie:rmede komen ea~ele pijlers in de geneeskunde (preventie, the:rapie enz.) 
ter discussie. Indien de uitgangssituaties niet eenduidig gedefinieerd zijn c.q. 
kunnen worden, den leveren interventies slechts onzekere uitkomsten op. 
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Het ontbreken van gestandaardiseerde medische definities en een unife~ 
tmconomie maakt tevens bet eventuele toepassen van een geformaliseerd, no1~tief 
besluitvormingsmodel (Medische Besliskunde) illusoir. 
De onderzoeker stelt voor om op basis van clu~tering van de besale 
elamenten der geneeskunde (symptomen, verschijnsele~) te komen tot eem 
herbezinning op de medische terminologie, de medische t~onomie en de mediscbe 
besluitvormingsmethoden. 
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